DF-41. Separating the wheat from the chaff

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DF-41. Separating the wheat from the chaff
DF-41. Separating the wheat from the chaff

Video: DF-41. Separating the wheat from the chaff

Video: DF-41. Separating the wheat from the chaff
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Anonim

At the military parade held on October 1 in honor of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the PRC, a lot of different new products were shown. Among them is the long-awaited premiere of the DF-41 ICBM, about which for decades Chinese fans and various "insiders" have been spinning tales no worse than the heroes of the famous old cartoon "Who Will Tell a Fiction?" And they continue to do so. The voices of quite a few experts, who remain in their right mind and sober memory, are not heard behind all this chatter. Let's try to approach this system critically.

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It's time for amazing stories

Wherever you browse the Internet these days, there are amazing stories about a super-heavy Chinese moving masterpiece. These stories are missing only Internet memes about cats under a lit lamp. It turns out to be a monster that has surpassed our "Yars" of the mobile version (the mine and mobile versions always differ even within the framework of one combat missile system), and even the mine "Sarmat". And carrying in someone's fantasies for 10, 12, or even 14 thousand kilometers (as far as dreamers and "fishermen" from China have enough conscience and the size of their hands to show the "caught" fish) 10, 12, or even 14 combat blocks. Some even said about maneuvering BB - it is quite obvious that he never saw either a maneuvering BB, or a controlled BB, or a gliding winged BB as the culmination of the development of these weapon systems and does not represent its size. One of the Chinese commentators-analysts agreed to a "record" range for the world's ICBMs for this missile. But even if China itself is considered the world, then here it is also wrong.

Let's start with the range. To begin with, it is worth reminding once again that the statements of the Chinese about the range of their systems can be taken on faith in the main (with almost one exception) only up to the turn of 3, 5-4 thousand km. All other information is estimates or claims. Our Chinese friends and strategic partners (now we can speak of them as allies) have a "strange" habit of not launching their products with the declared (unfortunately, only declared and not confirmed) range at the actual maximum range and even at the intercontinental range. level. Launches usually take place within the national territory of the PRC or close to that, and this has been happening for a very long time, since the 1980s, when the Chinese were still carrying out launches into the Pacific Ocean. In general, everything is very difficult with the DF-41 and it is not worth believing the statements about "the longest-range and most powerful ICBM" at all. For the Chinese, this missile is a step forward, and not a small one, but the problems of Chinese rocketry have not gone away. Including those due to which launches are carried out at such an insufficient range: most likely, we are talking about problems with warheads, and they are trying to hide this shortcoming both from the enemy and from their leadership, probably also.

About the number of BB and the same physics

As for the statements about 10-14 BB on a mobile missile, declared as an ICBM, this is even more ridiculous. Let's start with the fact that the Chinese do not and cannot have a technological level in rocketry, not only what has been achieved in Russia now, in particular, in the field of solid fuels, and in the field of creating compact warheads, but even in a number of decisions about the level reached on "Topol", there are doubts. The level of Chinese solid fuels, at best, is approximately close to our level of the 1980s and is probably inferior to the American level of that time (we got the Americans out of solid fuels only later). According to some information, their fuel comes from the 1980s and these recipes were obtained from Ukraine - the same "OPAL" is, of course, known there.

The level of miniaturization of charges they have is such that they could not provide the creation of a MIRV in the late 80s, which had recently been promised to Deng Xiaoping in the late 80s, even on a very massive ICBM (but an honest ICBM - it confirmed the range by launching into the ocean) DF-5. And more recently they provided - as many as 3 warheads per MIRV. As for the DF-41, the American technical means recorded launches with a maximum of two simulators of the BB (perhaps in one launch there were three - the information differs in the sources), and not in all of the 7 launches that took place since 2012. But the rocket is declared as being put into service after 25 years of development and testing - and they were obliged to test a standard set of warheads with any complex of means of overcoming in full force. This means that it can hardly carry more than 2-3 blocks and the KSP missile defense system! At least those that are now. The most adequate researchers, including those from the United States, assess this missile precisely as a carrier of about three BB. It is strange that some even eminent "military Sinologists" in the West and in our country repeat this nonsense about a dozen BB!

Yes, and she is unable to carry away so much, miracles do not happen, physics is the same on the entire planet Earth. And she teaches that a solid-propellant ICBM capable of carrying at least 10-11 thousand km of 10 small or medium-power APs cannot weigh less than 90-105 tons. This is if the KSP ABM is not there. You can take data on the Soviet ICBM complex "Molodets-UTTH" or the American MX "Piskiper", it will be just a similar technical level, and everything will be visible. But the DF-41 cannot weigh that much, because then this launcher will weigh about 200 tons.

But their chassis is not bad

The Chinese use this system on the HTF5980A chassis, the fruit of the development of previous designs based on technologies that the cunning Chinese acquired from the guys from Belarus, with the MZKT, in the well-known history with the joint venture with them. This chassis, of course, bears traces of the typically Chinese approach to automotive design familiar to many car enthusiasts. But at the same time, it is more advanced in a number of aspects than the Minsk designs and their Chinese clones. The chassis is probably faster than the MZKT (but not the KAMAZ "Platform-O", which is usually scolded on the Internet without knowing much about it). There seems to be a controlled semi-active suspension, possibly variable ground clearance. It is very necessary on this system, because the non-removable leveling supports will turn an attempt to move on rough terrain into hell. However, perhaps the Chinese are going to ride them only on good roads near the Russian border under the umbrella of our air defense (because that's where they were going to place the DF-41). But this severely limits the survival of the system. And bridges in most cases will have to be avoided.

And nevertheless, the maximum weight of this chassis together with the load is no more than 135-140 tons with the actual load mass of about 85-90 tons. Moreover, the load includes a thick-walled TPK with a PAD, a weighty launch pad and its drives, and of course the rocket itself. How much of this is the rocket? Well, if we take the Topol-M PGRK, then its total mass is about 120 tons, of which 80 tons are for the load, the weight of the ICBM itself is about 47 tons. Considering the large mass of the TPK, the launcher looks like the DF-41 hardly harder and, as it were, not easier yet. And due to the presence of a table, it is most likely also shorter than our ICBM, although it is larger in diameter.

Archaic in a new beautiful package

External similarity, say, DF-31AG or the same DF-41, with our PGRK does not mean the similarity of the internal. We did not see the missiles inside the TPK on the DF-41 self-propelled launcher (SPU), and this is the SPU, and not the usual APU (autonomous launcher, that is, capable of launching without the rest of the machines of the complex), but we can draw conclusions from the outer details. And all of them are not in favor of the Chinese designers.

The first thing that caught my eye: the TPK with the missile is much larger in diameter than the "poplar" and "Yars" ones, probably by about a meter or less. But this does not mean that the rocket itself inside is also wider by a meter. Why? But because on the TPK we see welded "ears" for reloading it with a crane. You will not find this at our complexes at all - neither on the very old Temp-2S or Pioneer, nor on the Yars, loading the launcher with a container with a rocket there goes quite differently. Overloading by a crane requires a more rigid TPK (it can simply bend under its weight and the mass of the product, which will lead to sad consequences), that is, more durable and thick-walled. That can "gobble up" a part of the increase in the diameter of the TPK and the mass of the payload of the SPU, of course. The depressions in the TPK hood area also show that the structure is thicker than expected.

The TPK itself has a soft supporting membrane at the bottom end, that is, it abuts when firing into the ground. A number of details on the TPK in its lower part (or, if you prefer, the rear, when the TPK lies horizontally on the launcher) shows that, in addition to the rocket and the PAD (powder pressure accumulator), there is also the launch pad inside. Not the same, of course, as on the Korean experienced ICBMs, which is installed in advance, and the vehicle with the missile is only a transport and installation unit that puts the missile in and leaves.

DF-41. Separating the wheat from the chaff
DF-41. Separating the wheat from the chaff

We look at TPK again, and carefully. Do you see at least some boxes on it in the upper (front) part? At least on the left, at least on the right, at least on both sides? Look at the photos of the Temp-2S, Pioneer, Pioneer-UTTH, Topol-T, Topol, Topol-M or Yars systems and you will understand which boxes are meant. Such a "box" is called an "upper device" and it belongs to the SPR system (aiming system) of our PGRK, and it is responsible for bringing the rocket gyro platform into the firing plane in the prelaunch mode. And under it or next to it there should be a device called AGK - an automatic gyrocompass, which in the combat position is fixed relative to the Earth and is the guardian of the base direction after gyrocompassing in staging mode.

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AGK in our museums and in most of the photos at Topoli or Pioneers, you will not see, but his photo is still there. For a long time, they tried not to allow photographing the "upper device" (it was forbidden to photograph the starboard side of the vehicles even after the photos of the appearance of the launchers were transferred to the Americans under the SALT Treaties). Now the upper device can be photographed, and the AGK is usually covered with shields, but it is located directly under it. Both AGK and this device have a rather characteristic appearance, and the Chinese could do without them only in one case (the list of technical solutions is actually quite short, and they have all been known for a long time). They have a rotary launch pad (like a pianist's chair) and they aim it by turning it together with the rocket to align the product planes with the firing plane. This method is very old, very inconvenient and outdated, and takes a long time to prepare for launch. Yes, and the connection between the complex and the rocket also goes through the methods of the Qin Shi Huan-di times - through the end of the TPK from the bottom, and not by the side connector board, because there are no signs of taps from this board on the TPK.

All this leads to the conclusion that the DF-41 is incapable, just as the DF-31 (31A) was not capable, and the DF-31AG was just as incapable (differing for the better from the ancestors only by the rejection of the archaic scheme with a semi-trailer and the transition to an SPU) do the following. It cannot shoot from anywhere, except for pre-mapped launch points, that is, from any point on the route, no way, and no GLONASS from Beidou are assistants here, no one relies on them in such equipment for such tasks. It cannot be on duty at positions with a lowered TPK, it must be raised - otherwise it climbs (which on the same DF-31A was made not in seconds, like ours, but for a very long time), entering data on the target (choosing a target from in advance "hardwired"), aiming and preparing to fire would take too long. By the way, the cover (cap) of the TPK will also need to be removed before verticalization, because in the vertical position it is not necessary to remove it with fire bolts, as is done on our complexes before verticalization, but with mini-rocket engines, probably. It was also not possible to find signs of the presence of such fire bolts on the TPK of the Chinese "superweapon". At the previous complex, the Chinese removed the cover manually, but maybe that has changed.

There are no signs of the presence of antennas on the presented SPUs (or their installation locations, if they are secret themselves - antennas and we cannot see them in parades) of a communication system with the regiment command post or upper command post (or equipment similar to our equipment for receiving signals from the system " Perimeter-RC "or similar). It seems that the regiment's command post should be somewhere close to the combat launching position of the installations and be connected to them by a cable line - copper or fiber-optic. All this, of course, is also archaic and transforms the complex from mobile to dispersed ones.

Replicating other people's fables is beneficial to many

Why do many sources and even analysts and commentators on the Internet and the media repeat all these fables about the DF-41? Someone for lack of knowledge or inability to think critically. Someone follows others, and without trying to think: after all, you need to publish the news faster, and not think about it. As for the experts, the Americans, not everyone, but industrialists, generals, senators and the analysts fed by them, for example, find it profitable to scare themselves with Chinese products - they can ask for more to "close the gap even from the Chinese." And learn more between the right people and corporations.

The only strange thing is that in our friendly country, Chinese stories are often repeated without any understanding. Moreover, they are often spread by the same characters who like to speculate about "pictures and cartoons" in relation to "weapons of March 1" (as those six systems presented in the well-known message by our president are now called) or about "non-existent", say, "Poseidons", "Vanguards", etc. They are trying to find a speck in their own eye, even if it is not there, and a neighbor does not notice a crowbar sticking out of the eye socket.

In general, a miracle did not happen, the complex, of course, is a very decent step forward for the Chinese defense industry, but it was not even close to achieving the competencies of the superpowers and especially the USSR / RF in the field of creating mobile complexes. Yes, and the most important characteristics need to be confirmed, otherwise the system will be a dangerous self-deception for the Chinese leadership. Although it may not be, and all the dust in the eyes is intended for the United States to think that China is stronger in this matter than it really is.