“The ship is nowhere to be found,” diver Joseph Carnecke reported to the astonished commission. Moving by touch in the muddy water, he passed unhindered into the hull of the half-submerged battleship. Finding no sign of West Virginia, the diver turned back, attributing his incredible discovery to an error and loss of orientation under water.
On the surface, they did not yet know that in this place at “V. Virginia”there was absolutely no port side. Where the once most powerful American liquor of the Pacific Fleet was supposed to be, there was a gaping void: Japanese torpedoes literally "gutted" the battleship.
Nagumo's pilots reported nine torpedo hits. The Americans, having examined the ruins of “V. Virginia”, recorded seven with a cautious caveat: in view of the vastness of the destruction, it is difficult to establish the exact number of hits. Indeed, how to examine what is not there? Thousands of tons of hull structures simply disappeared, dispersed in space under the influence of torpedo explosions.
The official picture of the destruction was as follows.
Three hits fell below the armor belt. As a result, the battleship heeled and began to sink in the water. The next one or two torpedoes pierced the belt that had already gone under the water, unfolding seven armor plates. Further blows fell on the upper part of the hull. The explosion of the next (or several) torpedoes happened between the second and upper decks of a battleship lying in shallow water - a phenomenon, frankly speaking, unusual for naval battles.
One of the torpedoes went through a hole formed by previous explosions and, due to the failure of the fuse, got stuck inside the battleship's hull.
The seventh hit was in the aft part: the torpedo tore off the rudder blade, causing additional damage to the bottom of the hull.
In addition to at least seven torpedoes, “V. Virginia”took a portion of two large-caliber armor-piercing bombs (410-mm AP shells with welded stabilizers). The hit of the first special ammunition destroyed the searchlight and signal bridges of the battleship, the fragments of an unexploded bomb reached the second deck.
The second hit the roof of the third main battery turret. Like a giant scrap, a steel bar weighing 800 kg broke through the 100-mm armor plate and went inside, destroying the breech of the main battery gun. Along the way, crushing a catapult with a seaplane mounted on the tower.
The spare seaplane "Kingfish", observing these events, also immediately exploded, flooding the deck with burning gasoline and the damaged main battery turret.
But that was only the beginning. The resulting fire source turned out to be a mere trifle against the background of a real cataclysm. A field of burning fuel oil flowing from the deceased LK Arizona was approaching the site of the sinking of the West Virginia.
Over the next 30 hours of indomitable fire, everything that could burn in the parts of the battleship remaining above the water was destroyed. And what could melt was melted into shapeless ingots. The metal structures of the superstructures were distorted and deformed by the high temperature.
Once a thunderstorm and the epitome of the power of the Pacific Fleet, the USS West Virginia (BB-48) has ceased to exist as a combat unit.
Sometimes, as a reason for the resurrection, “V. Virginia”refers to the shallow depth of Pearl Bay, which made it possible to organize the recovery of the sunken ship. Who would raise “V. Virginia”from under the ocean water? However, the statement itself does not contain any messages for logical analysis. On the high seas, with the Japanese forces at their disposal (one squadron of torpedo bombers for each battleship), it would have been impossible to inflict such damage on an actively maneuvering ship with active air defense.
Yes, lifting the remains of “V. Virginia”was produced in shallow water. But how justified were further efforts to restore the ship?
Evil tongues argue that the main reason for the decision about the advisability of restoring the battleship was that the decision was made by his former commander, Walter Anderson. By that time, in the rank of admiral, he held the post of head of the Commission for the Inspection of the Ship Personnel.
The nostalgic feelings of the former commander were combined with the obvious desire of the command to underestimate the losses incurred in the defeat of Pearl Harbor. Thus, the list of irrecoverable losses among the LK was reduced to a couple of units: Arizona (detonation of ammunition with catastrophic consequences) and an overturned Oklahoma, which received nine torpedo hits along the entire height of the hull in the area of the bow superstructure. By the way, the condition of the damaged “V. Virginia "was not much better than" Oklahoma ", which had a similar pattern of damage. This is not illusory evidenced by the timing of the "repair", which corresponded to the construction of a high-speed aircraft of the new generation.
Four of the six battleships damaged during the attack on Pearl Harbor were commissioned in the first half of 1942. However, the epic with the rise and restoration of “V. Virginia”took more than two and a half years. The battleship lay at the bottom and stood in repair docks for most of the war, starting to perform combat missions only in the fall of 1944.
The story of two lives of the battleship “V. Virginia fits well with the legend of the incredible resurrection of the destroyers Cassin and Downs.
At the time of the Japanese attack, both ships were in the same dry dock together with the PA "Pennsylvania". The bomb hitting the Downs echoed with the booming echo of the detonation of the torpedo charges. The explosion of ammunition led to the ignition of the fuel and a powerful fire that engulfed the remains of the destroyer. The destroyer Kassin, which was standing nearby, was torn from the keelblocks by a shock wave - it fell on board and finally crushed the Downs with itself. Flames fused together the debris of the destroyers.
In its initial report, the Fleet Inspectorate noted the complete destruction of the Downs, with the possibility of using only a few metal structures. Cassin's condition was also viewed with skepticism.
But the Yankees weren't used to giving up. Two years later, the repaired (!) Destroyers Kassin and Downs returned to the Navy, with only names and individual hull elements remaining from their previous ships.
However, I liked the case of a diver who could not find the edges of the hole better …
Reflections
Generals tend to minimize their own losses and exaggerate the losses of the enemy. Simply put, they are not there. The prestige and public opinion are always more important than the real state of affairs. And if the losses among the personnel are obvious - no one has yet been able to resurrect the killed (the fact of death can only be classified), then in the case of military equipment the situation sometimes takes on a completely absurd character.
The degree of damage to equipment is known only to those in charge in uniform, who are not interested in divulging facts that discredit their honor and reputation of “successful” commanders. At the same time, the truth that is not fully told is an even greater lie than just silence.
But back to the smoke of naval battles.
Among the most vicious examples is the rebirth of the battleship Mikasa. The hero of Tsushima, the flagship of Admiral Togo, ingloriously died from the explosion of the stern cellar, just a week after the end of the Russo-Japanese War. Then began a multi-month operation to raise the ship, which sank in the Sasebo harbor, followed by a two-year refurbishment. The degree of damage to the battleship during detonation of the ammunition does not need explanation.
At first glance, this is a dubious face-saving operation.
But the Japanese had their own, purely pragmatic explanation of this story. The Land of the Rising Sun at that time did not yet have the ability to build its own warships. At the same time, Japan had significant experience in the field of ship repair. As of 1908, of the 12 battleships, six were British-built. The other six are captured Russian ships, recovered from a completely broken state (EBR "Eagle", which received 76 hits in the battle of Tsushima). Slightly better looking battleships, shot by siege howitzers in the harbor of Port Arthur.
Therefore, from the point of view of the Japanese, the story of the rise and restoration of “Mikasa” was not some kind of extraordinary event.
At the same time, from the point of view of world practice, bringing a heavily damaged ship into a combat-ready state while maintaining the previous functionality and purpose is a rare accident.
The remains were removed from under the water. Sometimes in parts. The removed weapons and mechanisms were used for installation on other ships and coastal facilities. Some of the "wounded" got on their own or in tow to the nearest port, where, due to the obvious nature of the damage, they turned into a non-self-propelled battery, barracks or hulk.
But no one ever had the audacity build a new hull, install some of the mechanisms from the disassembled metal predecessor and pretend that this is the same "repaired" ship. Nobody but the Americans.
The Yankees have always flatly refused to admit losses. According to American practice, the death of a ship from enemy actions is recognized only immediately at the moment of battle. If a charred ruin (or at least a part of it) has crawled to the nearest port - that's it, the conversation is only about the “damaged” unit. It doesn't matter that already on the transition to the next atoll, it can fall apart and sink due to irreversible damage to the power set.
Top-ranking beauties, the combat core of the fleet, aircraft carriers "Enterprise", "Franklin", "Saratoga", "Bunker Hill", under the influence of Japanese attacks turned into floating barracks and / or were used as targets. They were no longer good for anything else. They did not even try to restore them.
The enemy has completely "ushatched" you four shock aircraft carriers - if you please put them on the list of irrecoverable losses. Why are there only sunken destroyers on the official list of kamikaze casualties? However, all this is the case of bygone years.
And what about the Navy in the nuclear missile era?
Port! Hard A-Port! Full Astern
(“Left aboard! Full back!”) But it was already too late. The corner flight deck of the John F. Kennedy cut off the superstructure of the Belknap cruiser.
The sharp edges of the Belknap's metalwork dug into the overhanging aircraft carrier, destroying the rooms below the corner deck, from which streams of JP-5 aviation kerosene poured. Two of the three gas stations located at that location were under pressure with an estimated fuel delivery rate of 4000 liters per minute.
On "Belknap" blow blew the left half of the bridge, both masts and pipes. Fuel from the aircraft carrier spilled directly into the ruptured chimneys, which led to a massive fire in the boiler rooms. The cruiser was instantly de-energized and engulfed in fire, all automatic fire extinguishing equipment was disabled. The superstructure elements made of light aluminum alloys melted and fell into the hull. All antenna devices, communications and weapons control equipment were destroyed, the combat information center was completely burned out.
A few minutes after the collision, the aft boiler room was destroyed by an explosion. Another explosion thundered in the central part of the cruiser - the ammunition load of 76-mm universal guns detonated.
The destroyer Ricketts, who came to the rescue, crashed into the side of the damaged Belknap, causing additional damage.
The situation was complicated by the dark time of day and the inability to use helicopters due to the danger of exploding shells.
At the cost of the selfless actions of the crew and all the ships of the combat group, the fire on the Belknap was localized two and a half hours after the collision with the aircraft carrier. Individual fires were extinguished by the next morning.
This incident took place in November 1975, in the operational zone of the Sixth Fleet. Despite extremely serious damage, the cruiser was taken in tow and delivered to the United States.
From the point of view of the realities of the post-war fleet, the main share of the cost of high-ranking warships falls on weapons control. The reasons for this are the uniqueness and small-scale production, aggravated by military corruption and the inadequately high cost of skilled labor in the developed countries of the world (unlike civilian computers, radar antenna arrays are not assembled in a Malaysian factory by the hands of teenagers).
Given this circumstance, the Belknap cruiser was completely destroyed and was no longer of value to the fleet.
All that remains of the ship: a crumpled hull box, with systems and mechanisms that have turned into a shapeless charred mass.
Evil tongues claim that the only reason for the restoration of the cruiser was the desire of the admirals to hide the loss at any cost in the light of the events of that time. Literally in the year of the Belknap disaster on the roadstead of Sevastopol, a large anti-submarine ship Otvazhny perished from a fire. As you know, disasters of this kind can happen only among Soviet sailors. The Americans don't lose ships without a fight.
In addition, a few interesting facts from this story. Bureaucratic procedures and work on the restoration of the cruiser lasted for five years. The reconstruction of the Belknap took longer than its construction in the early 1960s!
By the time it re-entered service (1980), the Belknap was largely an outdated ship. The first generation missile cruiser, one of the firstborn of a new era, with many design compromises. The re-construction of the Belknap began concurrently with the ambitious program to create the Aegis Cruisers, much more powerful and sophisticated ships of the new generation. The order for the head "Ticonderoga" was issued in 1978, it was to be followed by another two dozen of the same type.
In this regard, the long and expensive epic of the restoration of Belknap lost all practical meaning. But the responsible persons, obviously, had their own ideas on this score.
