Fortified areas (UR) were assigned a very important role in the construction plans of the Red Army. According to the plans, they were supposed to cover the most important operational directions and areas, on the retention of which the stability of the defense depended, and serve as support lines for the action of field forces both in defense and during the transition to a decisive offensive. In the event of a breakthrough by the enemy in neighboring directions, the UR had to form a solid support for maneuvering forces and means. According to these calculations, in the engineering preparation of probable theaters of military operations, the main attention was paid to the construction of the SD.
In 1927-37. 13 fortified areas were built on the line of the old western state border and in the immediate operational depth, forming the so-called "Stalin Line".
In the pre-war years, there was a lot of propaganda noise around these fortifications. The fortifications of the old state border were called indestructible and were compared with the French "Maginot Line". I remember the stories of my father, grandfather and many other veterans, who in the first days of the war were absolutely sure that the Germans would definitely be stopped on the line of the old border. This belief in "Stalin's line" was absolute, and therefore when the war easily moved further into the depths of our territory, the people experienced a shock. For a long time, many fighters and ordinary Soviet citizens were worried about the question: "Why did the Germans overcome the invincible fortifications so easily, if the Red Army for three months barely broke through the" Mannerheim line ", which was considered weaker?"
And now, ten years after the war, the answer to this question was born from somewhere by itself: they disarmed, they say, the old border, transported everything to a new one, and blew up the defenses. And everyone sighed with relief, satisfied with this explanation, like an annoying fly driving away the question-doubt from themselves: "Why was it necessary to blow it up?"
So, the version adopted after the war and retold many times, including in the works of the so-called "historian" V. Rezun, better known under the pseudonym Viktor Suvorov, based on the memoirs of General P. G. Grigorenko (one of the builders of the "Stalin line") with colleagues, as well as in numerous publications of the open post-war press. Here are excerpts from the "book of life" by Comrade Rezun, who brought together all the stories glorifying the power and mourning the fate of the indestructible fortifications on the old border:
“Each SD is a military formation equal to the brigade in terms of the number of personnel, but equal in firepower to the corps. Each SD included a command and headquarters, from two to eight machine-gun and artillery battalions, an artillery regiment, several separate batteries of heavy caponier artillery, a tank battalion, a company or communications battalion, an engineer battalion and other units. Each SD occupied an area of 100-180 km along the front and 30-50 km in depth … Each SD could independently conduct military operations for a long time in isolation."
The basis of the UR was made up of long-term firing structures (DOS), or long-term firing points (DOT). One of the so-called "standard" pillboxes of the "Stalin's line" - pillbox # 112 of the 53rd Ur in the Mogilev-Podolsk region looked, in the opinion of all the same authors, as follows: “It was a complex underground fortification structure … It contained weapons depots, ammunition, food, medical unit, canteen,a water supply system (operating, by the way, to this day), a red corner, observation and command posts. The armament of the pillbox was a three-embrasure machine-gun point, in which three Maxims and two half-caponiers with a 76-mm cannon in each stood on stationary turrets. "…" Stalin's Line "was built not at the very borders, but in the depths of the Soviet territory."
"In the fall of 1939 … all construction work on the" Stalin Line "was stopped … The garrisons of fortified areas on the" Stalin Line "were first reduced, and then completely disbanded … And on the eve of the war itself - in the spring of 1941 - powerful explosions thundered throughout the 1200-kilometer lines of fortifications. Mighty reinforced concrete caponiers … - tens of thousands of long-term defensive structures were lifted into the air on the personal order of Stalin "(I repeat - all these theses are taken from V. Rezun's" Icebreaker "book of life).
Like this! For a long time they built a powerful line of defense, and then they liquidated it with their own hands. Therefore, they say, the Germans, like a knife through butter, went all the way to Moscow. This explanation suited everyone and, first of all, our "outstanding" military leaders and "talented" military engineers and builders. And today new "researchers" also cling to it, trying to offer their own interpretations of this fact.
Like Comrade Rezun, I asked myself the question "why was it necessary to blow up the fortifications?" I just tried to find the answer to this question in the archives, access to which, according to other "truth seekers", is tightly closed. Nevertheless, for some reason they let me into the archives and gave me all the documents of the period 1936-41 that were available on this issue. And here I was surprised to discover that the inaccessibility of the "Stalin's Line" in the post-war period was, to put it mildly, exaggerated, and no one has ever destroyed any fortifications on the old state border!
Some facts from the life of "Stalin's Line"
It has already been said that in 1927-37. 13 fortified areas were built on the line of the old Western state border and in the immediate operational depth from it. However, their characteristics were much weaker than the builders of the memoir (General Grigorenko associates) knew. The length of each SD along the front averaged 80-90 km, although there were individual giants occupying up to 200 km along the front, but none of them extended 50 km in depth, but only 1-3, up to five km. Most of the permanent structures in the UR were built in 1931-37. were erected from off-grade concrete, often even without steel reinforcement (and at the time of Slalin they stole and attributed). Due to the traditional long-term construction in our country (and especially in those years), some long-term structures by the time of completion of construction automatically passed into the category of "requiring major repairs and reconstruction." It is also interesting that the development and design of the Fortifications was carried out by the Main Military Engineering Directorate on the maps of 1909-1913. and therefore, in the process of construction, excesses have repeatedly arisen, when the interests of the military come into close contact with the interests of the national economy, etc. For example, according to the construction plans, one of the pillboxes of the Tiraspol UR was supposed to be built right in the middle of an irrigation canal dug in 1931 and not included in the plans and maps of the GVIU.
Armament 90% of the built bunker and DOS were supposed to be one, less often - two "Maxim" machine guns. Only up to 10% of firing points (more precisely - 9, 3%) had gun semi-caponiers designed by General Durlyakhov mod. 1904 for 76 mm guns mod. 1900 and 1902, but by January 1, 1939, only a third of the required number of guns was installed, and those were withdrawn from long-term storage warehouses and were mostly incomplete.
In 1938-39. The services of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs carried out a wide inspection of the fortifications of the old state border, which showed their practical non-combat capability. Here are excerpts from some of the reports of the said inspection:
« NCO comrade Voroshilov
January 5, 1939
… According to the Special Department of the BVO, the construction of the Slutsk UR is very unsatisfactory … Of the 91 objects planned for construction according to the plan of 1938, only 13 were built … several months…
L. Beria"
« NPO tov, Voroshilov
January 17, 1939
According to the NKVD of Ukraine, the construction of the UR KOVO is in a clearly unsatisfactory state. The construction plan approved by the NGO for 1938 was not fulfilled, as well as the plans of previous years … Of the 284 structures planned for December 2, 86 … 60 structures were concreted, including 30 bunkers and 30 command and observation posts due to the lack of drawings, not represented by the department of engineering troops KOVO, were completely removed from construction … The drawings of the internal equipment of structures sent by the Engineering Department have a number of serious shortcomings, as a result of which not only normal operation in them is disrupted, but also their use …
In the Shepetovsky UR under construction, nodes 7, 8 and 9 have completely dropped out of the construction plan, as a result of which there are more than 60 km of open gates between Shepetovsky and Starokonstantinovsky UR …
In the Novograd-Volynsk UR, in the construction plan, there was no 19th structure approved by the General Staff of the Red Army … There are no drawings of the internal equipment of many objects … The planned materials do not meet the needs of construction …
The practice of concreting structures at a number of facilities is carried out contrary to the existing instructions of the NGO …
In Kamenets-Podolsk UR, during the concreting of structures (in particular No. 53), the concrete near the embrasures was not punched out, as a result of which the post of concreting had to additionally fill in the formed empty spaces, which significantly reduced the strength of the structures …
In the Ostropolskiy UR, the concrete walls turned out to be 15 cm thinner than the established value … Especially many defects were noted in the construction of the Ostropolsk and Kamenets-Podolsk UR …
L. Beria"
« Non-profit organization of the USSR comrade Voroshilov
13 February 1939
Despite the long construction and additional equipment of the Pskov and Ostrovsky UR, they cannot be considered combat-ready at the present time. Due to improperly designed and built internal equipment of most bunkers, they cannot be occupied by troops … up to half of the structures are 20-40 cm filled with water, which appeared due to an incorrect assessment of the depth of groundwater. At the same time, the water supply system does not work … There is no electrical equipment for the fortified areas … In the living quarters of the UR there is high humidity and stale air …
SD supply centers have not been built … There are no food warehouses …
Due to illiterate planning of the UR, their firing structures cannot fire at a distance of more than 50-100 m, since the area has hillocks, ravines and uncut forests. DOS No. 3 is installed on the slope of a ravine and cannot be camouflaged due to constant landslides, and the half-caponier available in it is useless, since it is located below the level of the surrounding terrain … To expand the shelling sectors, it is necessary to remove about 120,000 cubic meters of land, up to 300 hectares of forest and shrubbery …
The embrasures of the bunker are designed for the use of Maxim machine guns, but they are equipped with machines of unknown design, … most likely intended for the Hotchkiss machine gun, which has long been removed from service. The semi-caponiers of the gun are not equipped with armored dampers and serve as a source of penetration of melt water and precipitation into the bunker …
The artillery armament of the UR consists of 6 obsolete field guns of 1877, for which there are no shells …
The territory of the UR is not protected. In the course of its work, the commission repeatedly met local residents passing in the immediate vicinity of the firing structures to shorten the path between the villages …
L. Beria"
«In the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Ukraine
About the state of C&R
January 11, 1939
… The Kiev fortified area today represents only the skeleton of the local position, consisting mainly of machine-gun structures … and is completely not provided with the required equipment.
Of the 257 structures available in the area, only 5 are ready for combat … The left and right flanks are not protected and have free passage for the enemy (left - 4 km, right - 7 km).
In the center of the SD zone … a bag is formed (a gap of 7 km), through which a free passage is open for the enemy directly to Kiev.
The front edge of the long-term strip is only 15 km away from the center of Kiev, which makes it possible for the enemy to shell Kiev without invading the fortified area …
Of the 257 structures, 175 lack the required shelling horizon due to the terrain (hillocks, mountains, large forest and bushes).
Planning work on SD, despite the instructions of the government, is delayed by the implementation of the wartime, while this work must be carried out immediately. Only in the 3rd section it is necessary to remove more than 15,000 cubic meters of land for planning work, and this is at least 4 months of work … In total … in the fortified area it is necessary to remove at least 300,000 cubic meters of land and cut down up to 500 hectares of forest and thickets.
… 140 firing structures are equipped with machine-gun flaps mod. 1930, which, when firing, close automatically and contribute to the defeat of soldiers from their own machine guns with ricocheted bullets.
The special department of KOVO has repeatedly informed the command of KOVO about the non-combat capability of the KIUR and the failure to take measures by the commandant of the KIUR, but, despite this, until now nothing has been done …
Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
B. Kobulov"
In the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Ukraine
On the state of the Mogilev-Yampolsky Fortified Region
… On the territory of the Mogilev-Yampolsky fortified region there are 297 firing structures, of which 279 bunkers and 18 artillery half-caponiers …
The material part of the firing structures is in an unsatisfactory state.
There are 9 artillery half-caponiers on the territory of the 2nd defense sector. Of these, 3 structures - "Skala", "Partizan" and "Mud" do not have filtering and ventilation equipment …
In connection with the ongoing re-equipment of firing structures, artillery half-caponiers on the territory of the UR, chaos and disorder reign in the casemates …
The electrical wiring in many military industrial complexes is mixed up and does not provide them with electric lighting at all …
Semi-caponier artillery in firing installations is in an unsatisfactory condition.
All cannons are assembled from incomplete parts of different cannons. Cannon forms are not available.
The cannons located in the buildings of 1932 were disassembled and cleaned only in 1937, as a result of which all the materiel of the guns inside has traces of rust.
The springs of the cannon knobs were mostly assembled incorrectly (instead of the left one, the head spring was installed), which, when firing, led to self-unscrewing of the compressor cylinder head and the gun barrel could come off the installation after several shots.
In two guns, instead of spindle oil, drying oil was poured, clogging the hole in the oil line, which could lead to a rupture of the compressor cylinder …
The UR has not yet been staffed with … middle command personnel.
Command personnel assigned from remote places and cities (Saratov, Moscow, Leningrad) will be able to arrive in the UR only 5-6 days after the announcement of mobilization …
With the existing enlisted personnel, the pulbats will not be able to fulfill the tasks assigned to them, since there are 21 machine gunners in the company, and the company must serve 50 structures …
The pulbats are completely unsupported with artillery personnel … In the presence of artillery, the pulbats in the states have absolutely no artillery masters who could conduct technical supervision of the caponier artillery …
DeputyPeople's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
Kobulov"
Such reports and minutes were drawn up in late 1938 - early 1939. a great many. Not only the NKVD, but also representatives of the infantry and artillery units of the Red Army, which were supposed to form the basis of the garrisons of the UR, considered these structures unsuitable for conducting any kind of battles (and especially offensive ones). Therefore, soon the General Staff of the Red Army and the Military Engineering Directorate developed a set of measures to eliminate the noted shortcomings and re-equip fortifications on the old state border.
First, to eliminate gaps in the defense structure, it was decided to build an additional 8 fortified areas, the structure of which was better adapted to the terrain than the previous ones. The proportion of artillery caponiers in them was already 22-30%, and it was planned to install more modern guns in them - L-17. But no guns were found to equip the caponiers, since the Kirovsky plant disrupted the program for the production of L-17 guns. Secondly, it was ordered to urgently form new headquarters of the UR and additional machine-gun and artillery units, which were to form the backbone of their garrisons.
The re-inspection of the UR of the old border was carried out in April-May 1941 by representatives of the General Staff, the People's Commissariat of Defense and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). In particular, she revealed the following:
1. The planned measures for the completion and modernization of the fortifications of the old state border have not been carried out at present due to the need to complete construction work on the fortifications of the new state border by July 1, 1941, but they will be continued after the specified period …
2. The garrisons of the UR are currently not provided with personnel. The average number of the garrison is currently no more than 30% of the standard (actually - 13-20%) and cannot be increased due to the lack of housing and logistical support … 60% of fire structures.
3. Despite the fact that to strengthen the weapons of the UR in 1938-40. a large number of artillery means were transferred at their disposal, most of them are obsolete light field guns mod. 1877-1895 without special machines and ammunition. Of the relatively modern artillery means, only 26 76-mm guns mod. 1902 and 8 76-mm field guns mod. 1902/30 Of the 200 ordered caponier cannons L-17 were not received at all …
The installed caponier guns are incompletely equipped … The state of the mechanisms is such that … it is impossible to fire from them, and often it is dangerous for the calculation. These tools do not have forms … The spare parts kits have been lost … There is no proper maintenance of the tools …
4. The small arms of the bunker are half of machine guns of outdated design and foreign brands, for which ammunition is often lacking.
5. Tank battalions and tank support companies of the UR exist only in reports, as they have outdated materiel produced in 1929-33. with a fully depleted resource, do not have machine-gun armament and can only be limitedly used as fixed firing points. There is no fuel for tank support companies anywhere.
6. Despite repeated instructions about the need to build hidden gun and machine-gun turret installations … for which more than 300 T-18 and T-26 tanks were transferred to the engineering department, not a single installation is currently available, and tank towers are installed on tank corps buried in the ground, sometimes additionally casually concreted. Life support systems in such armored turret installations are absent …"
The new list of imperfections was almost identical to that made at the beginning of 1939, and again, once again, the People's Commissariat of Defense made the right conclusions. On May 25, 1941, another jubilee decree of the government (since 1932, the tenth in a row!) Was issued on measures to strengthen the fortifications on the old and new state borders. On the old border, the deadline for the execution of the measures was set on October 1, 1941, but nothing was done before the start of the war - all forces were sent to complete the construction of new SDs on the "Molotov line".
The last of the documents found on strengthening the armament of the fortifications of the old state border dates back to June 11, 1941. According to the document, the following were shipped from the warehouses of the NZ Art Department from the warehouses of the NZ Art Department. machine guns "Vickers" on a tripod - 2 pcs; heavy machine guns Colt - 6 pcs; 37-mm Rosenberg battalion guns on an iron gun carriage - 4 pcs, 45-mm tank guns mod. 1932 without towers - 13 units; shrapnel artillery rounds of 45 mm caliber - 320; shrapnel artillery rounds of caliber 76, 2-mm - 800; 7, 62-mm rifle cartridges - 27,000. As you can see, the practice of using the UR by the Red Army as warehouses for obsolete junk was no different from the practice of similar use of fortresses by the Russian army at the beginning of the century and the bloe of modern UR at the end. And no government decrees could change this situation.
So the strengthening of the old state border until the very beginning of the war was waiting in the wings to undergo modernization once again. By the way, G. K. Zhukov testifies to this in his "Memoirs and Reflections":
“URs on the old state border were not eliminated and disarmed, as it is said in some memoirs and historical developments. They were retained in all the most important sectors and directions, and it was intended to further strengthen them. But the course of hostilities at the beginning of the war did not allow to fully implement the planned measures and properly use the old fortified areas …"
Zhukov is careful in his words - Urs were saved and were not used only as a result of an unforeseen "course of hostilities."
There is another interesting piece of evidence made this time by one of the enemies. On July 17, 1941, at the headquarters of the 20th Army, Lieutenant Bem, a German sapper who had been taken prisoner during the battles near Orsha, was interrogated. The interrogation of the prisoner lasted more than an hour and there is no need to cite his transcript in full. But in the course of other useful (and not so) information, he told something about the fortifications of our old state border.
“… Our company had the task of blocking concrete fortifications on the line of the old border of Soviet Russia and undermining them … We had very good training and were preparing to act as part of mobile groups with tank troops … But we could not fulfill our task, because instead of powerful fortification lines, which we expected to meet … we found only scattered abandoned concrete structures, unfinished in some places … Those firing points that met us with machine-gun fire, we easily bypassed, using the uneven terrain … borders …"
However, even in the presence of great deficiencies in the UR firing structures, their planning and equipment, being occupied by the field troops, they sometimes offered some resistance to the German troops. So it was the Karelian UR (one of the representatives of the earliest construction), occupied by the troops of the 23rd Army, that held back the offensive of the Finnish troops and blocked their way to Leningrad. It was the Karelian UR that was the core of the defense of Leningrad from the north until 1944.
Kingisepsky UR, occupied by units of the 41st and 191st rifle divisions, held out for two weeks, but the fortifications could not withstand the bombing and turned out to be useless against tanks.
For a little more than 10 days, the Ostropolsky and Letichevsky UR fought, although in this case, in addition to the infantry filling of the 8th and 13th battalions, as well as the 173rd rifle division, they were reinforced by an artillery brigade and some units of the 24th mechanized corps. These areas could hold out longer, but were surrounded and abandoned.
The Mogilev-Yampolsky UR, the construction of which was occupied by the 130th Rifle Division, also resisted the Romanians. However, since no stocks of ammunition and food were initially provided for in the location of the UR, and also due to the threat of bypassing it from the flanks, the fortified area was abandoned by the troops, and by the time of abandonment a number of fortifications had already been brought to silence.
Thus, the story about the allegedly built in 1928-1939. in the USSR, the indestructible "Stalin's Line", which was then blown up by the stupid (or, on the contrary, super-smart) order of the "leader of all peoples" before the war itself, which, they say, served as one of the reasons for the rapid retreat of the Red Army, was contrived from beginning to end. And the authors of this tale (which appeared, by the way, after 1955 with the highest blessing of N. Khrushchev), are many of those who built this line. And those who showed their "strategic art" in the summer of 1941 willingly supported the authors.
