On December 5, 2012, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Government Dmitry Rogozin is holding a meeting of the Military-Industrial Commission, at which it is planned to discuss acute issues on the formation of the State Defense Order. This is, perhaps, the first serious discussion of the state defense order at such a high level with the involvement of a large number of experts after Sergei Shoigu took the post of Minister of Defense of Russia. The results of the meeting of the military-industrial complex, headed by Rogozin, largely depends on what laws the defense order in our country will be formed in the near future. Obviously, the old schemes have discredited themselves completely, and in order not to be unfounded, we can give telling figures:
in 2009, the state defense order was fulfilled about half of the planned volume, in 2010 the fulfillment corresponded to about 70% of the agreed norm, 2011 in this case can be called more or less positive, because the fulfillment of the state defense order was brought to almost 96.3% (according to reports of the Ministry of Defense, of course).
Growth, of course, is evident, but if we take into account the ambitions that the state has in terms of modernizing the army, re-equipping it and changing the very principle of equipment in order to increase efficiency, then even a 3-4%, let's say, shortage according to the State Defense Order per year can significantly slow down the modernization program itself. In principle, it is possible to move the dates for the completion of modernization from 2020 to a later period, but this can hardly be expected. Why? Because any delay in renewing the army as the basis of the country's defense capability will cause negative emotions and questions of the following nature, “what prevented us from being able to modernize in 10-12 years with the allocation of such significant funds?”
It is precisely about what prevents from properly assimilating the financial resources allocated from the state budget, and why the country's military department cannot really agree with the manufacturers, and discussions are being held within the framework of the meeting of the military-industrial complex. It should be noted that the meeting was preceded by a discussion of the problem of importing weapons for the Russian army during a meeting of the Public Council at the military-industrial complex. This meeting was held on Monday and it discussed issues related to the analysis of the feasibility and effectiveness of both those purchases that have already been carried out from foreign manufacturers, and plans for new deals on military equipment with foreign partners.
The assembled military experts and specialists in the design of military equipment criticized the plans of the Ministry of Defense to purchase certain military-technical samples of foreign production. In particular, the Italian armored vehicles "Iveco" ("Lynx"), 1700 units of which are planned to be purchased by the Russian military department, were once again criticized. This time, the criticism boiled down to the fact that the Lynx did not pass the full course of tests in Russian conditions and, accordingly, military experts simply did not have the opportunity to study in detail the advantages of these machines over domestic Tigers, if this advantage exists at all. And the price of Italian armored military vehicles is not much higher than the price of Russian "Tigers": "Tiger" costs about 5 million rubles, but Italians sell their products for 18-20 million …
With a new portion of criticism, the audience spoke about the Mistral helicopter carriers, about the purchase of which Russia from France was broken and without many copies. It turned out that the Ministry of Defense does not yet have a clear plan for the use of these, to put it mildly, expensive ships. And if it is planned to supply Mistrals to the Pacific Fleet, what tasks will the helicopter carriers perform in this region? - the people gathered at the meeting of the Public Council at the military-industrial complex sowed rhetorical questions.
The Israeli drones also got it, which are also planned to be purchased for the needs of the Russian army in considerable quantities.
As a result, everyone agreed that import is not even bad at all, but it would be better to use foreign knowledge, technology, experience instead of bulk purchases of technical units. It is one thing when it comes to the purchase of individual units of military equipment in order to carry out a thorough analysis of it and use the knowledge gained to create their counterparts that can surpass the purchased prototype in terms of efficiency of use, and it is quite another thing to get hooked on a complete dependence on a foreign manufacturer. After all, if you conduct large-scale purchases of military equipment from foreign manufacturers, then such a dependence will form by itself: maintenance, repair, delivery of spare parts, etc.
However, such results of the meeting of the Public Council at the military-industrial complex run counter to the opinion recently expressed by Sergei Shoigu. Having received information that Russian manufacturers of military equipment often cannot explain why prices for their products sometimes soar several times in just a couple of years, the Minister of Defense, having received information that Russian manufacturers of military equipment often soar several times, stated in a rather harsh form that this could not continue. According to Shoigu, if the pricing for the production of units of military equipment continues to be opaque, the Ministry of Defense will continue to actively buy equipment from foreign manufacturers. To some extent, this can be called Shoigu's ultimatum, which is now being discussed by manufacturers of equipment. Like, this is Shoigu serious, or the minister is bluffing - takes "weak".
And after all, be that as it may, manufacturers will still have to reveal their cards, because otherwise many of the "unopened" risk losing state financial support. The reason is that not every manufacturer prefers to provide comprehensive reports on financial costs in the production of a particular military product. After all, complete transparency in this matter can deprive interested parties of additional income. That is why it turns out so often that they signed a contract last year, for example, for a billion rubles, and this year they demand to write a line about unforeseen expenses for a couple of billion more. So much for a 200% growth with a declared inflation of 7% in 2012 … And when asked where this imbalance came from, they can safely answer: this is a military secret, and therefore it is better not to ask.
As a result, two practically irreconcilable parties (buyers from the Ministry of Defense and sellers from the defense industry) have to sit down at the same table again and begin intimate conversations about the formation of the State Defense Order for next year. For obvious reasons, many people are keenly interested in such conversations: from an ordinary Russian citizen, concerned about the fate of improving the efficiency of the Russian army, to the president. The whole intrigue is how much each side is ready to make concessions, how much room is allocated for maneuver. If common sense prevails, then it will be possible to talk about a new era in the formation of the state defense order, but if we are again presented with information that the agreements were not reached in full and we need to wait a little longer, then there is a risk of a feeling of déjà vu.
