On June 17, 1982, the world's first single-seat coaxial combat helicopter, the future "Black Shark", took off for the first time
Russian helicopters, although they appeared a little later than their counterparts in the class abroad, from the very first years won a worthy place in the history of world aviation. The records and achievements of the representatives of the two main domestic helicopter companies - Mi and Ka - can be described for a long time. But in this row there is one helicopter that has managed to overtake not only its time, but also change the very idea of what a combat rotorcraft can be. We are talking about the world's first combat single-seat helicopter, which not only took to the air, but also entered service. True, this did not happen at all quickly: for the first time the Ka-50 "Black Shark" took off from the ground on June 17, 1982, and it was accepted into service only on August 28, 1995.
The Ka-50 owes its birth, as has happened more than once in the history of world weapons, to its main rival, the American AN-64A Apache helicopter, which became the first combat anti-tank helicopter in the world. The Apache made its maiden flight in September 1975, and a little over a year later, on December 16, 1976, the Soviet government in its resolution set the task of developing a promising attack helicopter designed primarily to combat enemy tanks on the battlefield.
However, there was one more reason for the appearance of this document, which played a special role in the history of the Russian helicopter industry. By that time, the first domestic combat helicopter, the Mi-24, had been in use in the Soviet army for five years already. But for him, weighed down by the troop compartment, traditional for the Mil design bureau, it was difficult for him to act effectively on the battlefield. In addition, the classic longitudinal scheme with the main propeller above the fuselage and the helmsman on the tail boom did not allow the machine to be sufficiently nimble and high-speed, especially in situations where it was required to quickly switch from hover mode to flight mode. And most importantly, the Mi-24 was distinguished by its significant dimensions, which, with the increase in the effectiveness of the air defense systems of the battlefield, became an increasingly important factor.
With all this in mind, that December decree of 1976 was issued, and for the same reasons, it was decided to develop a new car on a competitive basis. Two long-standing rivals joined the competition for the right to create a new, more effective attack helicopter for the Soviet army: the design bureaus Kamov and Mil. At the same time, the advantage of the long-time partner of the army was with the company "Mi": their helicopters were in service with the ground forces and the Air Force since the early 1950s, when the first Mi-4s began to enter service. The Ka-25 firm declared itself as a manufacturer of helicopters for the military much later, but louder: the Ka-25 helicopter, created by it in the early 1960s, became the first Soviet combat helicopter - specifically a combat helicopter, not a military transport helicopter with combat capabilities. However, all serial military vehicles of the Kamov company were supplied only to the navy, and therefore the work on the land helicopter was, in general, quite new for the Kamovites.
But, perhaps, it was this novelty that allowed them to look at the problem with a completely unbiased view, outside the usual schemes and ways of solving problems. This is, on the one hand. On the other hand, the Kamovites took advantage of their usual coaxial helicopter layout, which until now was considered common for naval, but not for land vehicles. But not because they did not want to look for other options. Among the draft proposals, there were also traditional, longitudinal helicopter schemes, but in the end the advantage remained with the proprietary Kamov coaxial scheme. After all, it was she who gave the helicopter the advantages that turned out to be decisive for the machine, whose main task is to survive on the battlefield, fighting against a well-armored and armed enemy. The new helicopter - the world's first land-based combat helicopter with a coaxial scheme - was distinguished by a much higher thrust-to-weight ratio, which means a higher rate of climb and a large static ceiling, a higher speed of movement, the ability to move sideways and even backward at high speed, to perform many aerobatics inaccessible to "longitudinal" … And most importantly, it became more compact and tenacious, because it did not have a tail boom with transmission mechanisms, the loss of which is always catastrophic for machines of a longitudinal scheme.
But the developers of the Ka-50 did not stop at this one innovation. In search of additional competitive advantages over the developers of the Mi company, they decided to take another unprecedented step - and reduced the helicopter crew to one person! In fact, the Kamovites have developed a complete analogue of a fighter-bomber, only in a helicopter version. Even the hull contours of the new car were more of an aircraft, predatory-swift, rather than the traditional, heavy-handed helicopter. And so that the only crew member of the new machine could cope with all the responsibilities that the pilot and the weapons operator traditionally shared among themselves on other helicopters, the Ka-50, which at that time still had a working index of B-80, it was decided to equip - and also for the first time in the history of a Russian helicopter industry - a highly automated sighting and navigation system.
Ka-50 cockpit, 1982. Photo: topwar.ru
By that time, the domestic industry could well create such systems, although they, as a rule, differed in somewhat larger dimensions and weight than their foreign counterparts. But precisely due to the fact that one person had to pilot the B-80, the space and weight saved on refusing to accommodate the second crew member could be given to electronics - and still win! Finally, another advantage that the single-seat helicopter option offered was the reduction in the cost of training and maintenance of flight personnel and the reduction of losses in a combat situation. After all, the training of one pilot, even a "multi-station operator", ultimately costs the state less money and efforts than two narrow specialists - a pilot and an operator; making up for the loss of one person is easier than two or three.
Of course, the idea of a single-seat helicopter caused significant resistance from many military personnel - it was too innovative and too different from the whole world experience in the field of combat helicopter construction and application. But it was not by chance that the chief designer of the B-80, Sergei Mikheev, responded to all these objections with the following words: “There is no need to prove that one pilot works better than two, there is no need to prove the unprovable. But if the pilot in our helicopter can cope with what the two have to do in the competing helicopter, it will be a victory. And such a victory was won by the designer Mikheev and his team in October 1983, when at a meeting convened by the decision of Air Force Commander-in-Chief Aviation Chief Marshal Pavel Kutakhov and Aviation Industry Minister Ivan Silaev summed up the first results of the tests of the B-80 and Mi-28 prototypes. Most representatives of the aviation industry and military aviation spoke in favor of the Kamov aircraft, assessing its main advantages: simpler piloting technique, large static ceiling and vertical rate of climb, as well as a better ratio of efficiency and cost. The advantages of the B-80 were also confirmed by the state comparative tests of new helicopters, which began in 1984 and lasted more than two years. Everything turned out to be proven: the efficiency of the coaxial scheme, and the ability of one pilot to adequately cope with the duties of a pilot and weapons operator, and the maneuverability of the machine, and the advantages of a high-tech sighting and navigation system. As a result, four institutes of the Ministry of Defense, evaluating the test results, in October 1986 issued a unanimous final conclusion: to consider it expedient to choose the B-80 as a promising combat helicopter of the Soviet Army.
Alas, the further history of the helicopter, which received the Ka-50 index, traditional for Kamov machines, turned out to be much less rosy. The process of preparing the documentation and creating the first serial copies suitable for conducting state tests dragged on - and inevitably ended up in the tragic events of the early 1990s. Despite this, in January 1992, state tests began, and in November 1993, military ones, which took place at the Center for Combat Use of Army Aviation in Torzhok. At the same time, the helicopter entered the international arena, and then - for the first time in domestic practice! - even before the official adoption into service, he became the hero of the motion picture, which gave him his own name. The film "Black Shark", in which the main role was played by the Ka-50, was released in 1993, and the order for the picture, according to its director Vitaly Lukin, was made by the Kamov Design Bureau itself - apparently, in order to ensure the promotion of its car not only in Russia, but also abroad. This, alas, was common sense: the development of events suggested that Ka might not be able to get a serious order for new cars in its own country …
In the end, unfortunately, this is what happened. Although in 1995 the Ka-50 was adopted by the Russian army by presidential decree, there was only enough money for a dozen production vehicles. And soon quite difficult to explain events began: even after effective combat practice in Chechnya, when the Ka-50s fully proved their effectiveness and combat suitability, it was decided to make its long-time rival, the Mi-28 Night Hunter, the main attack helicopter of the army. And today it is he who is still preferred, although the appearance of a two-seat modification of the Ka-50 - the Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopter - still allowed the Russian army not to lose a unique machine. However, such oddities in the history of this or that unique type of weapon are not uncommon, and history has proven more than once that a truly worthwhile weapon will still be in the hands of those who deserve it. Even if it will take more than three decades.
