November 6 marks the 77th anniversary of Operation Verp, fatal for the Black Sea Fleet - the raid of the leader Kharkov and two destroyers, Merciless and Capable, on the communications of German-Romanian troops in the sea south of the Kerch Peninsula. The operation resulted in the death of all ships participating in it.
The operation was planned due to the previously unsuccessful work of the Black Sea Fleet on enemy communications, along which he evacuated troops from the Caucasus. Previously, the Black Sea Fleet ships repeatedly tried to find and destroy enemy convoys, but the results were near-zero, not a single convoy was even found. Raids carried out for artillery strikes along the coast at night were also unsuccessful. Both the headquarters and the commander-in-chief Kuznetsov demanded results, and the fleet tried to give them, but instead of the results, it turned out to be a disaster.
To this day, this failure is controversial. It is used as an illustration of the inability of the fleet to fight, as the inability of admirals to establish interaction with fighter aviation, with the front headquarters, on the other hand, it is also used as an example of the inability of army commanders to use the fleet correctly, moreover, it is also used as an example of the fact that ships are not can operate in areas where the enemy has powerful aircraft.
In fact, the main value of studying Operation Verp today is to gain an understanding of what happened and, relying on it, to answer those questions that still remain important for the development of the fleet in our country.
Is there a need for a surface fleet in such a war, which was going on in the Black Sea in 1943, that is, in the absence of significant enemy surface and submarine forces? Can ships be used where enemy aircraft operate? Did the Black Sea Fleet command really neglect the air cover of the ships? Could our planes protect the ships? Was this raid necessary at all? Was it the stupidity of the admirals or the stupidity of the generals, or was it not stupidity at all? Were there any chances of success? Unfortunately, even the best researchers do not provide detailed answers to these questions. But the answer to the fundamental question directly depends on them: did the Headquarters correctly ban the use of surface ships in the Black Sea after this operation?
This is not an idle question. Unlike the long-obsolete technology and tactics of World War II, it is still relevant today, as it refers to the correct or incorrect use of sea power in principle. We will hardly ever carry out raiding operations with artillery shelling of barges and scows in ports, now is simply not the time. But is it necessary to remove large surface ships from the theater of operations in the event of a threat from the air, but in the presence of many tasks for them? The question may well be relevant now. And the previous experience is quite useful in order to orient yourself correctly at the right time in today's environment.
Let us recall the course of events. The idea of Operation Verp was that two destroyers, Project 7 Merciless and Capable of Project 7-U, as well as the leader of the destroyers (hereinafter - the leader) of Project 1 Kharkov, together with the Black Sea Fleet Air Force aircraft, were to to carry out a raid operation against German communications south of the Kerch Peninsula and in ports.
It was supposed to combine artillery and bomb strikes on the port of Feodosia and destroy enemy ships and transports at sea. Separately, "Kharkov" was given the task of shelling Yalta. To ensure the effectiveness of the search for surface targets and artillery fire, the operation was carried out during daylight hours. The detachment of warships was commanded by Captain 2nd Rank G. P. Negoda, the commander of the destroyer battalion, which included the ships. At night, when the ships were moving to the coast, the ships were discovered and several times attacked by enemy aircraft and boats. Nevertheless, they continued to move towards the goal. "Kharkov", having separated from the detachment, fired at Yalta, without achieving any results.
By that time, it became clear that, due to the loss of surprise, it would not be possible to carry out the operation according to the original plan, and Negoda ordered to withdraw. Gathering together, the ships began to retreat. During daylight hours, in the course of several powerful air strikes, the entire detachment of warships was destroyed. This was the largest single loss of the fleet in the entire war. After that, the Supreme Command Headquarters banned the exit of large ships to the sea, and they did not participate in the war anymore. The details of this tragedy are currently available on many Internet resources and in the literature, there is no point in repeating it, but it is worth giving an assessment of what happened.
And before assessing the tragedy that broke out in the Black Sea 77 years ago, it is necessary to debunk a number of myths that surround this operation in the mass consciousness. They have nothing to do with reality, which is easily verified, but for some reason they are popular among people who have not gone into the essence of the issue very deeply.
Myths "Verpa"
The most important myth regarding Operation Verp is that the aviation was inactive and did not provide cover for the ships during the raid and withdrawal.
Fortunately for those who are really interested in the issue, the outstanding Russian military historian Miroslav Morozov carried out work to study a number of key points of the operation, the main of which can be considered the use of aviation in it. As usual, M. Morozov uses as sources of information documents drawn up in the course of hostilities at the headquarters of formations, reports, dispatches, logs of combat actions, etc. operations of the Black Sea Fleet "Verp" 6.10.1943 ". 1st MTAD - 1st mine-torpedo aviation division of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force. Let's start with this. At first link to the article by M. Morozov "Operation Verp".
And immediately the defeat of the first myth: aviation completely covered the ships, they had fighter cover most of the time. M. Morozov, starting from the "Report on Combat Actions", gives the following composition of the forces of the 1st MTAD on the day of the operation.
On 6.10.43, the air division had the following combat strength at the Gelendzhik-2 airfield *:
5 GAP ** - 18 IL-4, of which 8 are in service
11 GIAP - 15 Airacobra, - // - - 8
36 MTAP - 8 B-3 - // - - 5
36 MTAP - 4 A-20-Zh, of which 4 are in service
40 AP *** - 24 PE-2 - // - - 14
In addition, the operation involved fighters P-40 "Kittyhawk" from the 7 IAP 4 IAD, which appear in the decision for the operation in the amount of 8 units (with 16 available).
Also, a number of sorties were made by aircraft of the 11th ShAD, among which were Yak-1 fighters, but there is no data on its combat work yet.
The article by M. Morozov describes in detail both the decision, and the sequence and duration of aircraft sorties, we will not repeat ourselves.
Thus, there was a fighter cover. Another thing is that it was not enough. M. Morozov concludes that it was necessary to attract more aviation. In theory, yes, in practice … More on that below.
To illustrate the work of fighters, we present data on the losses of German aircraft in raids on ships (from an article by M. Morozov):
Flying boat BV-138 "Blom und Foss" - 1
ME-109 - 2
S-87 - 6
S-88 - 1
That is, there were fighters, they shot down the enemy (in the text of the article, the work of the fighters is well described), they inflicted losses. On the possibility of the Black Sea Fleet fighter aviation, in principle, to solve the problem of protecting ships with the existing plan of operation - below.
The second myth about the "Verpa", somewhat less popular, but sometimes encountered: the operation itself did not make sense, the idea of the raid was stupid.
In fact, the thesis is controversial. The purpose of the raid was to disrupt the enemy's communications, destroy his floating craft and transport ships in ports and at sea. Can this task be considered absolutely useless? No, since the main task of the enemy's sea transport was the evacuation of troops from the Caucasus to the Crimea. That is, it was precisely about the destruction of enemy troops (if it was possible to "catch" the convoy), military property and weapons. In addition, some of the transported goods were used by the enemy for the needs of the troops. Also, the destruction of watercraft and transport ships in itself also had value.
Could aviation accomplish this task without involving surface ships at all? In theory, yes, and it did it systematically: Black Sea Fleet aircraft regularly flew to attack ports and transports at sea, albeit with low efficiency.
Arguments against the raid, of course, can also be found, but, apparently, it is worth mentioning one fundamental point.
The main aerial bomb during the Second World War was the FAB-100, which had 70 kg of explosives. In second place in terms of prevalence was the FAB-250, which had 97-100 kg of explosives. Usually, for a combat radius of a couple of hundred kilometers, such bombs were taken 6-10, often 8.
An example from an article by M. Morozov:
9 PE-2 leading - captain Yegorov, navigator - captain Mozzhukhin, under the cover of 6 "Airacobra" (leading - Guards Major Karasev) had the task of destroying floating craft in the port and on the roadstead of Feodosia. Takeoff 6.15, landing - 7.55.
At 7.15, they struck from a dive on the floating craft in the outer roadstead of the port of Feodosia. H = input - 4000 m. H = sbr. = 3000 m. H = altitude - 2000 m. BK = 180, 16 FAB-250, 20 FAB-100 were dropped. The result was photographed.
The specified list of bombs means dropping about 3 tons of explosives on the enemy, which required 9 Pe-2 bombers, 333 kg of explosives per plane. At the same time, the flight time of the bombers was about 30 minutes, the same amount was required for the return flight, plus the group's draft, refueling, and inter-flight service. This particular flight required 1 hour 40 minutes in the air and at least several hours to prepare for a second flight.
Now, against this background, let us estimate the firing performance of a detachment of warships.
The main caliber of all the ships participating in the operation was 130-mm guns, capable of firing, among other things, high-explosive fragmentation projectiles with an amount of explosives in each of 3, 58 kg or 3, 65 kg. Let's take for simplicity as 3, 6.
Thus, in order to bombard the enemy with the same amount of explosives as nine Pe-2s in one sortie (which took several hours), the ships would need to fire 822 shells. Two destroyers each had four 130-mm guns, and the leader "Kharkov" had five guns, which gives a total of 13 barrels. 822 rounds equals approximately 63 rounds per barrel.
With a gun rate of fire of 7 rounds per minute, the ships would have fired such a number of shells in a little over 9 minutes
In this case, the survivability of the barrel liner can be approximately estimated at 130 shots. That is, having fired 64 rounds per barrel, the ships would have used up only half of the resource of the barrels if the liners were new (and before such operations they would have to be changed to new ones).
Thus, the total "shot" that the ships could afford was equivalent to a strike by at least 18 Pe-2 bombers. At the same time, artillery fire can be transferred after hitting a target, achieving shelling of a larger number of targets - these are FAB-100 and its 70 kg of explosives are indivisible, and the equivalent 19 shells can be fired at several targets.
And this ability, on the one hand, to quickly concentrate fire, keep the target under fire, and, if necessary, carry fire, is the quality of artillery that is not compensated by aerial bombs. But the ship must be brought to the target at a short distance, which means that it must be protected from enemy aircraft covering the target. The second advantage of the ships, in principle (apart from the connection with the "Verp") was the presence of torpedoes, which could attack targets at sea.
In fact, the order for the operation indicated that during the shelling of Feodosia, two destroyers had to use up 250 shells, which was equivalent to 1.8 tons of explosives, or, "in terms of Pe-2" - a strike of 5-6 bombers. The consumption of the "Kharkov" shells is not taken into account here, and all other ammunition could have been used by the ships on the discovered floating craft at sea.
The question arises in the accuracy of shooting, however, from the report of the 1st MTAD, it clearly follows the allocation of aircraft for adjusting the artillery fire.
Moreover, some targets that day were much more suitable for ships than for aircraft. Again, a quote from an article by M. Morozov:
Intelligence: …
7.16 W = 45.00. D = 35.45, a caravan of up to 20 units under the cover of 2 ME-110 was heading for Feodosia.
Counteraction: heavy fire 3A and machine guns.
This is a pure target for ships. The ships had torpedo tubes and artillery sufficient to destroy such a convoy.
Thus, we have to admit that the idea of sending not only aircraft, but also ships to attack, was, in principle, correct. Or at the very least, it cannot be considered completely wrong. This means that the insinuations about the meaninglessness of the operation, which sometimes arise, should be discarded.
In general, it should be noted that the operation was of the air-sea nature, very close interaction with aviation was envisaged, fighter cover was also envisaged, and it managed to inflict some losses on enemy aviation.
The ideas that the ships did not have any air cover and were not needed in that place and at that time are nothing more than myths, unfortunately, very tenacious.
Thus, we draw the first conclusion: the reason for the disaster that happened on October 6, 1943 was not the very idea of the raid in principle and not the absence of aviation at all.
The reasons were different.
Before we analyze them, it is worth answering a fundamental question.
Could fighters protect ships?
M. Morozov in his article indicates the following:
Now we will try to answer two main questions that appear in one form or another in all publications related to the October 6 disaster:
1. Did the Black Sea Fleet Air Force have the ability to reliably protect ships from air strikes with proper planning of the operation?
2. Was it possible to urgently organize a cover for the destroyers from 8.40, when after the damage to the leader "Kharkov" it became clear that the detachment was under threat of destruction by enemy aircraft?
The first question is relatively easy to answer. For reliable air defense of ships, assuming that the change of fighters would have to be done every hour for 6-6.5 hours (according to the planned table from 6.00 to 12.30), and the required composition of one shift was a fighter squadron, it would take 40-50 serviceable fighters. This is exactly how many of them there were in the 11 GIAP, 9, 25 IAP and the Kittyhawk squadron of the 7 IAP, based at the Gelendzhik airfield. At the same time, two-thirds of the fighters were part of the 9th and 25th IAP, not subordinate in any respect to the commander of the 1st MTAD. Thus, it was necessary either to strengthen the division, or to leave the leadership of the aviation involved in the operation in the hands of the naval air force headquarters, which was already tracking the course of events, taking belated steps to save the ships. With the cash composition of the forces, 1 MTAD could indeed deploy no more than 3-4 fighters in one shift, and this number was enough only for a more or less successful fight against air reconnaissance aircraft.
Having dealt with the first question, we actually half answered the second. 1 MTAD could not reliably cover the ships on its own, therefore everything depended on the efficiency of the naval air force headquarters. It would have been possible to cover the ships if the decision to organize maximum fighter cover had been made no later than 10:00, i.e. within an hour from the moment of damage to the "Kharkov". This was not done, although the signal from the "Kharkov" "I endure a distress" was recorded in the combat log of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force headquarters at 9.10. At 9.45 am, 3 Aerocobras and 4 LaGG-3s were raised on alarm, but only at 11.10 am the order was given to constantly cover the ships with at least 8 aircraft. Before the order was executed, a second raid took place, which incapacitated the Merciless. Nevertheless, there was still an opportunity to save the ships. From 13.40, 11 ShAD aircraft appeared over the ships, but instead of a full-blooded squadron of "yaks" on the battlefield there were only 4 Yak-1 and 4 Il-2. Together with three Airacobras and two Bostons, three Yaks took part in repelling the third raid at 14.40. Following the results of the first two strikes, the Germans took into account that the ships were covered by fighters and therefore increased the composition of the attacking group to 18 bombers and 12 fighters. With such a balance of forces, it is not surprising that our fighters were unable to break through to enemy bombers and prevent a catastrophe. Half an hour after the Germans left, the number of "yaks" increased to eight. By this time, two ships had already sunk. From 16:00, the crews of 11 ShAD for some unknown reason no longer made sorties, as a result of which the number of loitering aircraft decreased again. By the time of the last raid, there were two P-39s and two PE-2s over the ships. Naturally, they did not become a hindrance for the 25 Junkers who flew in to deal with the only destroyer!
Alas, but pointing out that, on the one hand …
For reliable air defense of ships, assuming that the change of fighters would have to be done every hour for 6-6.5 hours (according to the planned table from 6.00 to 12.30), and the required composition of one shift was a fighter squadron, it would take 40-50 serviceable fighters. This is exactly how many of them there were in the 11 GIAP, 9, 25 IAP and the Kittyhawk squadron of the 7 IAP, based at the Gelendzhik airfield.
… and on the other …
Following the results of the first two strikes, the Germans took into account that the ships were covered by fighters and therefore increased the composition of the attacking group to 18 bombers and 12 fighters. With such a balance of forces, it is not surprising that our fighters were unable to break through to enemy bombers and prevent a catastrophe.
… Miroslav Eduardovich contradicts himself.
Faced with increased fighter cover in the first half of the day, the Germans would simply orchestrate one or two more strikes, in which they would send even more aircraft. And they had planes. The Germans were consistently building up a detachment of forces in order to finish off the ships. Nothing would have prevented them from starting this build-up one flight earlier. The enemy had an initiative, he himself decided how many planes to raise to strike, when and with what cover. At the same time, the ships were in the zone of action of the German aviation all daylight hours.
Of course, we can safely say that if the command of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force had used more aviation forces, perhaps some of the ships would have survived. But perhaps not. This in itself did not guarantee anything, and the Germans would have had the opportunity to break through to the ships through the aviation forces that the Black Sea Fleet could have there in any case, and not in one attempt. They had enough strength and time.
Now let's figure out how the operation was planned and carried out, regardless of the capabilities of the fighter aircraft.
Raid plan and execution
There was nothing special about the raid itself, except for two nuances. Large air forces were involved in the operation, which was usually not the case. On the other hand, and this is a characteristic feature of the "Verpa", the ships' strikes and their withdrawal were to be carried out during daylight hours.
This was an atypical decision: mainly due to fears of enemy aircraft, the ships carried out raiding operations at night. Such operations did little, but mostly they did without losses.
The fact that the reason for the tragic ending of "Verpa" was precisely the timing of the operation is an obvious fact.
The time of sunrise on October 6 over Kerch is 6.39, an hour and a half before that it is already light. Sunset - 18.05, and then for about 40 minutes more targets are more or less distinguishable on the water.
Then darkness comes. At night, the aviation of those years could attack ships in two ways: with bombs, having previously detected the target visually on the "lunar track" and illuminating it with SABs - light aerial bombs, and then, while the target is observed in the light circle from the SABs, cover it with ordinary dive bombs.
The second method is a torpedo attack on the "lunar track". So at one time the cruiser "Molotov" was damaged.
But the ships could successfully evade SABs by maneuvering, leaving the illuminated area. They did this even at night during Operation Verp, it was a mastered and simple maneuver.
It was also, in principle, possible to evade the attack of the torpedo bombers.
The weather in those days was clear, visibility was good, but the ships had equipment for setting up smoke screens. That is, at night the enemy's chances of getting the ship were minimal.
It would be logical that a retreat, when the enemy is alarmed and looking for an opportunity to get ships, should be carried out under cover of darkness.
In the case of Operation Verp, the attacks were to be carried out at the very beginning of the day, at dawn, and the entire daylight hours, and this is more than 13 hours, taking into account twilight, three ships were to be within the reach of German strike aircraft.
The intelligence of the Black Sea Fleet at the time of the operation estimated the enemy's forces as 100 aircraft, of which 20 were dive bombers. This turned out to be an underestimated, incorrect estimate, but even such forces were extremely dangerous.
The question arises: how did it become possible to use ships in such a dangerous zone during the day? There are a lot of interesting documents on this score.
From the protocol of the interrogation of a member of the Black Sea Fleet Military Council Rear Admiral Nikolai Mikhailovich Kulakov on January 1, 1944:
“Question: What was your leadership in developing the plan and preparing the operation?
Answer: Together with the fleet commander, I heard a detailed report from the deputy chief of the operational department of the fleet, Captain 2nd Rank Yeroshenko, with the participation of Captain 1st Rank Romanov, appointed to lead the operation. During the hearing, a number of amendments and changes were made to the scheme of the planned operation, and then a secondary report was heard and the plan was approved by the Military Council.
Question: Who owns the idea of the operation?
Answer: I can't remember exactly, but the idea of this operation, in my opinion, was proposed by the head of the Black Sea Fleet's operations department, Captain 1st Rank Melnikov. A few days before that, a similar operation was carried out, but the actions of the ships and the withdrawal from the enemy shores were carried out at night. When reporting on the results of the previous operation, People's Commissar Kuznetsov criticized it and pointed out the need for such operations at dawn. This instruction of the People's Commissar was supported especially by the Chief of the Main Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral Stepanov, who was also present at the same time. As a result of the report, it was concluded that night operations have no effect, and therefore the tasks of finding and destroying enemy watercraft must be postponed to daylight hours. On the basis of this conclusion, an operation was developed for the 1st destroyer battalion on October 5–6, 1943”.
Except for minor details, these statements were consistent with what the other officers had said. That is, the "Verp" was conceived for daytime because at night the effectiveness of the ships was low. It turns out that the Soviet commanders were not afraid of aviation?
From the protocol of the interrogation of the commander on December 21, 1943, the commander of the destroyer "Merciless", Captain 2nd Rank V. A. Parkhomenko:
“Commanding a destroyer, I repeatedly took part in the operations of surface ships of the Black Sea Fleet, and these operations were carried out, as a rule, at night, and did not give any significant success. I was a supporter of the raiding operation during the day. As a supporter of daytime operations, I understood that the most serious enemy of surface ships was aviation, and therefore opposition from our aviation could always guarantee the success of the operation. Before the start of the operation on October 6, we received intelligence data that there was little enemy aircraft in the Crimea. This intelligence reassured me a little, but I understood that it was impossible to underestimate the enemy's aviation”.
In fact, there were no objections among the Soviet commanders about the day's raid, moreover, many people supported this idea. In the actions of the commander of the destroyer division, Captain 2nd Rank G. P. Negoda, there is also a lack of fear of enemy aircraft.
Moreover, when, even in the dark in the early hours of October 6, the ships were discovered by the enemy and even attacked with the help of SABs and conventional bombs (unsuccessfully), Negoda continued the operation, leading the ships to the target according to the plan.
According to his powers, he did not have the right to interrupt the operation on his own, but he did not even immediately begin to report the loss of surprise, moreover, judging by the interrogation protocols of his subordinates, he was not particularly afraid of Indignation. Yes, he himself admits it.
Here's what he wrote in the report:
This kind of detection of ships by enemy reconnaissance was systematic in past operations, therefore, he believed, would not be reflected in the performance of the operation.
From the transcript of interrogation of the commander of the BCH-1 destroyer "Merciless" N. Ya. Glazunov:
“Question: Did the meeting with Kharkiv take place at the appointed place and at the appointed time?
Answer: Yes.
Question: What was the speed of the ships while retreating from the coast?
Answer: After connecting at the withdrawal, the ships had a speed of 24 knots.
Question: Could it be more?
Answer: We could have retreated at least 30 knots.
Question: Why didn't they increase the speed?
Answer: I can only assume the presence of complacency, which was reinforced by the fact that the previous operations took place without any manifestation of any activity by the enemy.
There are, however, other indications that the course was 30-knot, but this was not the maximum speed for these ships. Having met in 8 miles from Alushta, the destroyers and the leader "Kharkov" departed at not the highest speed they were capable of, and even picked up the shot down Germans from a flying boat out of the water.
All this suggests that the sailors were not particularly afraid of aviation. Rather, they feared, but were sure that there would be no fatal consequences from the use of German aviation.
Moreover, and this is important, there was a consensus from the People's Commissar Kuznetsov and further to the commander of the Black Sea Fleet Vladimirsky, and up to the commanders of the ships that the operation in daylight could well be successful. Note that this is 1943.
It was this mistake that actually caused the death of all ships during the operation. It is she who is considered the main mistake in planning the operation by many researchers, and spiteful critics hint at the inferiority of the Soviet and Russian people as military sailors.
Let us ask ourselves, however, the question: could it be that everyone who was involved in the operation to one degree or another went mad at the same time and forgot about the threat from the air? And they forgot, having combat experience: at that time, it was already the third year of the war.
And if not? What could have forced the Soviet commanders to treat the threat from the air in this way, and all at once, including those who had to risk their lives not for the first time?
Enumeration of options will give us an unexpected, but for some paradoxical, but in fact the only reasonable answer, which cannot be reduced to something like "the Russians are not good at naval warfare."
And the answer is this: previous combat experience did not give commanders of all levels a reason to fear German aviation as much as they began to fear it after the "Verp".
It's hard to accept, but we have an afterthought and they didn't. They operated on the real achievements of German aviation.
Air threat in the Black Sea before Operation Verp
In a narrowly theoretical vein, the question was raised earlier in the article “Surface ships against aircraft. World War II … But it's worth briefly highlighting it again.
How dangerous was German aviation for surface ships on the Black Sea before that ill-fated day? The losses of the Black Sea Fleet from air strikes were considerable, but if we take large ships, then before Operation Verp we will see the following picture:
- EM "Frunze" (type "Novik"). Sunk at sea on September 21, 1941 by 9 bombers. Lay in a drift, rescuing the crew of the sunk gunboat "Red Armenia";
- KRL "Chervona Ukraine" (type "Svetlana"). Sunk on November 21, 1941 in the port of Sevastopol. While at the base, he fought off multiple attacks of large air forces, received extensive damage, lost speed and buoyancy. The crew waged a long battle for survivability, and was later removed from the ship;
- minelay "Ostrovsky" (former merchant ship). Sunk on 23 March 1942 in Tuapse, stood at the pier;
- EM Svobodny (pr. 7th). June 10, 1942, sunk in the parking lot in Sevastopol;
- EM "Perfect" (pr. 7). June 26, 1942 attacked at sea on the move by 20 bombers, received several direct hits from bombs, sank;
- the leader of "Tashkent". Sunk 28 June 1942 He was damaged during the transition under massive air strikes (about 90 German aircraft dropped about 300 bombs on him, the strikes continued all daylight hours), with the help of other ships in tow he came to Novorossiysk, died during a massive (64 bombers on the entire naval base) strike by the German aviation at the Naval Base Novorossiysk, at the time of the sinking was at anchor in the base;
- EM "Vigilant" (pr. 7). 2 July 1942 sunk by an air strike while anchored in Novorossiysk Bay;
- minelay "Comintern" (before re-equipment - cruiser "Kagul" type "Bogatyr"). On July 16, 1942, during a German air raid, he received serious damage in the parking lot in Poti, later disbanded and flooded. It was in need of repair, but due to the loss of bases on the Black Sea, repairs were impossible. Prior to that, it was repeatedly attacked from the air at sea on the move, fought off up to 10 raids per day, and retained its combat effectiveness in the event of damage caused by aerial bombs.
Then there was Operation Verp. So let's take another look at the list. What conclusions can be drawn from it?
And the conclusions are simple: for the entire war from June 22, 1941 to the unfortunate day of October 6, 1943, the Germans, attacking a ship sailing in the open sea at full speed, were able to destroy only one destroyer - "Perfect". And that's all
The leader "Tashkent" was pulled out in tow, the cruiser "Molotov" too. Prior to that, in the course of various operations of the Black Sea Fleet, starting with the landing near Grigorievka, the Germans managed to seriously damage the ships, which then returned to service and fought on.
They managed to destroy ships in bases or at the stop ("Frunze"), and they did it very well, but the sailors know: the base for a ship is the most dangerous place, and the open sea is much less dangerous.
And in the sea - nothing. The same "Cahul-Comintern" in its last campaign turned out to be too tough for the German aviation, while it was at sea. We got it in the database. In the teeth, without discounts, they turned out to be only "Impeccable", on which 20 planes were thrown on one. But, as already mentioned above, the intelligence of the Black Sea Fleet estimated all the forces of the enemy's bomber aviation at 20 aircraft, and they would have to deal, as the command believed, with three ships and their own fighters. If we take the destruction of the Impeccable as a standard, it turns out that from the point of view of combat experience, the destroyer division, covered by fighters, should have been too tough for them.
All of the above is the only rational explanation of why all, really all officers who participated in the operation in one form or another, reacted to the German threat from the air as they did. And it is confirmed by what was shown later by the participants in the operation, including G. P. Negoda.
And this is the real reason for the death of the ships during Operation Verp. It consists in the fact that the command of the Black Sea Fleet and the officers of the destroyer division, yes, judging by the report of the 1st MTAD, and the command of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force, treated the enemy as he deserved according to the results of the previous two years of the war.
And the enemy performed much better than ever before or ever since.
That's what it was. And this also caused a shock at Headquarters. They are accustomed to a very definite level of losses of the fleet from the actions of the German aviation. And he turned out to be prohibitively taller.
One cannot but say that in the fatal attack for ours - the one in which "Kharkov" got three hits in the engine room, the Germans were in many ways lucky. Eight bombers against three ships with anti-aircraft guns with a pair of fighters in cover do not look like a fatal force, but they turned out to be it. Had the Germans missed once, and the ships would have left, even despite daylight.
Alas, the captain of the 2nd rank Negoda could not abandon the Kharkiv and retreat on two destroyers. Firstly, he would not have wanted to, simply because there and then the situation did not look hopeless at all - the successful towing of the half-bombed Tashkent in the past again indicated that everything is possible.
In addition, in the conditions of the political system of the USSR in the 40s, it was problematic to simply take and leave the ship, which generally had a small speed. It was, let's say, fraught, although Commander-in-Chief N. G. Kuznetsov later wrote that "Kharkov" had to be abandoned and two other ships and people were rescued, but upon his return, the fate of Negoda might well have been determined by a completely different person than the Commander-in-Chief. This factor could not be ignored in those years.
Accordingly, those actions at the retreat, which we today consider fatal mistakes (and they were), could not be perceived as such there and then - there was simply no reason for this. Nothing particularly new for the Black Sea Fleet sailors in the morning of October 6, 1943, they more than once came out of such situations with honor, and then there were their fighters overhead …
When the prospects became clear, it was already too late to do something.
Ironically, our sailors were let down by their extensive combat experience, the conclusions from which suddenly turned out to be inconsistent with the changed reality
Some remarks
Analyzing this raid, it is worth separating the questions "why it ended with such losses" and "why it ended unsuccessfully from the point of view of the combat mission." These are two different questions.
First, the Germans were waiting for a raid. The departure of ships from Tuapse by German intelligence was discovered in advance. One can safely blame the Black Sea Fleet command for insufficient measures to ensure surprise and misinformation of the enemy.
The second incomprehensible moment is the shelling of Yalta. This action of "Kharkov" did not lead to any results at all, it simply could not be carried out. And it was possible to guess about such a "result" in advance.
It is also unclear why an aviation force was not allocated for the "Kharkov", which could correct the artillery shelling: previous experience said that such "blind" shelling was ineffective, and this time it turned out to be the same.
Independent actions of "Kharkov" would be much more useful if he was sent to search for enemy convoys and transports.
Thus, there were still flaws in the initial decision for the operation, but they have no direct connection with losses, they simply characterize the level of command, the very formulation of tasks.
Another issue is the use of smoke by ships. It is not possible to find documents that would say something about the installation of smoke screens by the ships.
Actually, the fact that during the planning of the operation there were a lot of mistakes is obvious. It was poorly planned. But her poor planning was more about how the fleet was going to achieve the objectives of the operation, rather than how it ended with losses.
Perhaps, the Scoundrel should have tried to separate the ships: if the destroyers and the Leader had withdrawn separately, then, most likely, the leader would have made it. True, without an afterthought, it is difficult to justify the separation in this way.
From the actions of G. P. Indignation, one can single out only one real and unforgivable mistake, which he HAS BEEN OBLIGED TO NOT MAKE. When "Kharkov" lost its speed, and Negoda could not abandon him, it was necessary to take the leader to the tug "Merciless", on which the commander of the detachment was, and "Able" to give the order to take off on its own at full speed and not wait for anyone.
Such a decision directly stems from the very essence of naval warfare, it should have been made by any competent commander. Ships in one detachment should be able to move at the same speed, to keep the destroyer, which is a priori weak as an air defense means to protect the crippled "Kharkov" and its towing vehicle in the presence of fighter cover, it was fundamentally wrong.
From the standpoint of afterthought
Let's think: how could the operation be performed? The main contradiction, an attempt to resolve which turned out to be so expensive, was that the ships could operate relatively safely at night, but were ineffective, and during the day, with the presence of aviation adjustments, they could inflict damage on the enemy by shooting aimed, but were vulnerable to aviation.
How could this problem be solved? The answer is this: it was necessary to carry out the withdrawal of the destroyers to the area of combat use in such a way that they would complete their combat missions at the very end of daylight hours, and the exit from the airstrike was already in the dark.
This also did not give 100% guarantees, but the chances of returning without losses increased significantly.
In addition, the need for an artillery strike on the port raises doubts in conditions when the 1st MTAD had bombers, including heavy ones.
It would be much more useful if the ships were aimed at convoys, and, possibly, at the destruction of anti-aircraft batteries located near the coast, while aircraft in ports would be attacked by aircraft.
However, an artillery strike on the port could also have been inflicted, but taking into account the time factor, that is, before evening twilight.
How long did it take for the Germans to hit the ships? During the actual operation "Verp", the first attack took place at nine o'clock in the morning, which suggests that the Germans began to take off about an hour after dawn. At the same time, in reality, they could take off at least an hour before him, visibility already made it possible to attack ships at sea, and they were discovered by the enemy even at night.
Thus, we can safely estimate the reaction time of German aviation to the appearance of ships in 1-2 hours.
That is, if the ships were discovered at about 17.00, then by the time the German Ju-88s, carrying out additional reconnaissance of targets, left the area where the destroyers were located, it would be already dark.
At the same time, the ships would have about an hour and a half to conduct shelling with the help of a spotter plane, that is, many times more than is needed to shoot a given number of shells.
The solution of the contradiction between day and night operations, thus, was reduced to the sudden withdrawal of ships for the enemy into the area of combat use during daylight hours.
How could this be achieved? By assigning them a corridor, from which they would not have to leave when moving to the designated area, and destroying all enemy forces and assets by aviation - the same 1st MTAD.
Such a procedure would make it possible, by the time the ships approach the shore, to assess whether they need fire on the ships in the port or not, and to redirect them directly to the convoys, if necessary, so that by nightfall they would have already completed or almost completed their combat mission.
Naturally, it was impossible to understand all this before everything happened. Therefore, it is impossible to make a claim to those who planned the "Verp" that they did not choose for themselves some similar course of action.
But on the other hand, such a claim can be addressed to the Headquarters.
Reaction Bet and its consequences
And now we come to the most important moment - to that lesson from the operation, which is still relevant, even in our nuclear missile era.
After Operation Verp, the Stavka banned the use of large surface ships and they did not participate in the war anymore.
The question arises: why, in fact? Due to the loss of two destroyers and a leader? But we have just sorted out the reasons, moreover, we figured out how it was approximately possible to use ships in such a situation so as not to lose several units at once.
Let's remember the British: the battle at Kuantan, where they lost a battleship and battle cruiser, did not lead to the fact that they put their ships on hold. The loss of the aircraft carrier "Glories" did not lead to the same, nor did the loss of destroyers in the Mediterranean Sea.
The rate not only had to, it was also able to undertake an analysis of what happened and develop rules for conducting air-sea operations that would exclude such things in the future or simply reduce the risks.
Ship cannons would be needed near Eltigen. Destroyers and cruisers would not have interfered with communications at night, along which the Germans evacuated their 17th Army from the Crimea.
The fleet was still needed after the "Verp". but instead he was in fact put on a joke.
Let us ask ourselves a question: and if the fleet would later lose, for example, the "Red Crimea", forcing the enemy to lose five or six thousand soldiers who went to the bottom on different scows, would this loss be justified?
The answer is yes, it would, simply because the Red Army would then spend its pace, ammunition, equipment, and, most importantly, people on the destruction of these five or six thousand soldiers. And at least not less than could have died on an old cruiser or destroyer.
And from the point of view of banal justice: why is it normal to put an infantry regiment on the offensive, but the old ship and the people as in a reinforced battalion are not?
But the Headquarters decided otherwise. No conclusions were made, no recommendations were made, the fleet was put on hold, and he did not say his word, which he could have said at the end of the war on the Black Sea. In order to understand how disastrous the decision of the Headquarters turned out to be, here are a few quotes from a German work. "Evacuation from Crimea in 1944":
During May 10, Soviet troops continued their attacks on the Chersonesus position. They managed to be recaptured. The fire of the Soviet artillery and air raids intensified. Most of the loading sites were located in the Kazachya and Kamyshovaya bays. Since these points were in the center of the position, they were very well suited to the main loading points. As planned by the naval commandant of the Crimea, Rear Admiral Schultz, large transports, which themselves could not approach the piers, had to stop at the entrance to the bays, and loading on them was to be carried out from the ferries of the 770th engineer-landing regiment. Light and heavy anti-aircraft batteries of the 9th anti-aircraft artillery division were stationed on all capes. The greatest danger during loading would be the Soviet surface forces, but the large ships of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, as before, did not interfere with the evacuation.
At the same time, an important point: the Germans could not count on aviation.
On May 1, at 00:33, a radio message from the 10th guard division provided information to the naval commandant about the location of the convoys. After that, at 03:00, one could count on the approach of the convoy "Ovidiu", which included the auxiliary vessel "Romania" (3150 brt). The arrival of the convoys "Ryer" and "Propet" could be expected only at about 10:00, "Astra" - at noon, "Pionir" and seven KFK - in the afternoon, "Flige", "Crowter" and "Volga" - in the evening. The convoys "Bukhe", "Aikhe" and "Rose" were to arrive on the night of May 11-12. Covering these convoys was carried out from the territory of Romania by long-range fighters, which made 80 sorties for this purpose. At the same time, it was possible to ensure the constant presence of only 4 Bf-110 aircraft over Chersonesos, but this was better than nothing.
And then the weather worsened altogether, and theoretically the fleet could even use a battleship.
The naval commandant had high hopes for this night, since the thickening darkness did not allow the enemy to conduct targeted artillery fire and limited the capabilities of Soviet aviation. However, the fog descending from the land greatly impeded orientation. The berths were barely distinguishable, and the artificial lighting was out of order. Therefore, it was all the more necessary to bring the convoy as close to the shore as possible. Soon "Dacia" was found, met by the BDB and Siebel ferries, after which it was brought closer to the shore with great difficulty. Then the connection between the naval commandant and the Dacia was lost again. He could not establish contact with the other convoys. Therefore, many ships, especially small ones, with poor navigation equipment, after a long voyage from Constanta, could not report their exact location, got lost in the fog near the coast and did not come to the places of loading. In total, on the last night, Chersonesos had 60 ships, of which only a few were able to load. Loading was carried out under the direction of officers of the 1st Airborne Flotilla without interference wherever ships were suitable for loading.
Perhaps more ships would have been found in the fog if the naval commandant had sent the other torpedo boats at his disposal to find them and bring them to Chersonesos. But he could not make such a decision, since the torpedo boat flotilla was the only combat unit that he had at his disposal in case the Soviet surface forces were repelled. An attack by Soviet destroyers on a convoy under loading or during its return that night or in the morning would mean another catastrophe.
But no catastrophe happened for the Germans; by the decision of the Headquarters, the ships continued to stand in the bases. And this despite the fact that "Verp", in fact, was JUST A FAILURE, nothing more.
By the decision of the Headquarters, the fleet did not help in the destruction of the German forces evacuated from the Crimea.
Although I could and should have.
The result was the evacuation of a huge number of troops from the Crimea: according to German data, for the entire period of evacuation since April 1944 - 130,000 people. But even if the numbers are overestimated, then in any case we are talking about tens of thousands of soldiers. And this was largely due to the decision of the Headquarters.
What is the reason for this strange decision? After all, because of the pogrom of Soviet aviation in 1941, it was not forbidden to fly, and because of the destruction of more than 20,000 Soviet tanks in the first five months of the war, the Headquarters did not ban their use.
The reason is as simple as day: misunderstanding of the importance of the fleet as a tool of war.
According to both the classical theories of naval power and the developments of Soviet military theorists of the 20s and early 30s, domination at sea is domination in communications, firstly, and secondly, achieving this is the main task of the surface forces of the fleet.
In post-war manuals on naval operations, we can also find similar provisions.
But from 1933 to 1939, for a naval officer, uttering the words "dominance at sea" aloud could mean execution. For many, it meant. The problem was raised very briefly in the article “We are building a fleet. Theory and purpose " … The issue was considered in detail and professionally in the essay "The Fates of Doctrines and Theories" by Captain 1st Rank M. Monakov and a number of other authors in the "Marine Collection" in the early 90s. On the one hand, this would never have made it possible to prepare for war - and the fleet was not prepared for it.
On the other hand, the lack of understanding of the significance of naval power and its nature among the highest military-political leadership of the USSR led to a misunderstanding of the importance of the fleet at the right time in the right place.
The latter, in turn, made it difficult to assess the risks and benefits of continuing the war at sea. The ship is expensive and big, it is a symbol, it is a pity to lose it, but how many lives "on the ground" are saved by the work of such a ship on communications, a person with "overland thinking" is simply not able to understand.
And if I did, I would also understand that it is better to risk the ship than to miss at least a division. As a result, they did not risk it and let the army go.
For the destruction of the Germans evacuated from the Crimea, the Red Army had to pay a considerable price.
But this was not the price of victory - it was the price of the reluctance of the top military leadership to understand the purpose of the navy and its significance
If not for this, then the Headquarters would have given "Verp" the correct assessment: just a poorly planned and at the same time unsuccessful operation with large losses, nothing more. Better reason to plan your surgery.
Conclusions for our time
Today, 77 years later, we can state that the lesson has not gone into the future. Neither the General Staff nor the people have the slightest desire to understand all these nuances.
Moreover, there are some very frightening analogies with the past.
In the thirties, the fleet, for political reasons, could not prepare for war properly: the basis of the correct theory of its application was declared a bourgeois relic, and its carriers were subjected to physical destruction. For those who do not quite understand, let’s give an analogy: it’s as if in modern Russia, for calls to learn to shoot from tank guns, not only from the spot, but also on the move, would be sent to life. Could the army prepare for war in such circumstances? No.
Today the navy cannot prepare for war. He is periodically "thrown" with new ships, but it is often impossible to start practicing preparation for combat missions. There is no opportunity to learn how to search for and destroy modern mines, because there is not a single modern anti-mine complex, there is no way to work out the interaction of at least existing ships and naval aviation, because for this you first have to admit that this interaction is absent now - and we cannot admit that something is missing, there is no way to work out an anti-submarine, because there is nothing, there is no way to work out torpedo firing in conditions close to real ones, because the existing torpedoes simply will not work in such conditions.
And you can't say about all this: you can only talk about how good everything is with us, great and wonderful, and in general, if tomorrow is a war, if tomorrow is on a campaign, if the enemy's power comes like one person, the entire Russian people for a free The homeland will rise. As in 1941, one to one.
Yes, today people do not shoot for proposals not to clean their guns with bricks and learn how to fight as Lenin bequeathed, "in a real way", but simply fired. But the result is the same, at least in the navy - for sure.
In parallel, as in the 30s, when instead of the fleet we had the Red Army Navy, today we de facto not have a fleet, but naval units of the ground forces subordinate to generals from the ground forces. There is no sane theory of the military use of the Navy in the country, the political leadership does not understand the capabilities of the fleet as a type of the Armed Forces, and the army generals responsible for the country's defense (including from the sea, oddly enough) have a fundamental reluctance to delve into all these things, strange way combined with the desire to control these things. And this, too, makes the current situation related with the years preceding the Great Patriotic War, and with it itself.
And from this, in the end, a simple conclusion follows. Since we have everything "as then", then we will fight "as then." But our enemy will be completely different.
In such conditions, new tragedies, such as Operation Verp, are simply inevitable. But this is not important, but the fact that their consequences are inevitable, which will then have to be solved with the hands and lives of 19-year-old conscripts. Like the release of the Germans from the Crimea. Moreover, in a "continental power" it will again be impossible to draw any conclusions from this. We will run in this blood-soaked vicious circle forever.
The main lesson of Operation Verp today, oddly enough, is that we are doomed to repeat it and, most importantly, its consequences. And it is good if once, and if this once in our nuclear age is not the last.
