Early morning. A light swell easily rocks the ships of His Majesty on the ocean wave. Clear winter sky, visibility from horizon to horizon. The boredom of months of patrolling, which could not be dispelled even by the smoke noticed by the observer of the "Agex". You never know what neutral transport slowly smokes the sky for its merchant affairs?
And suddenly - in a tub of icy water, a message from Captain Bell: "I think this is a 'pocket' battleship."
This was the beginning of the first major naval battle of the Second World War, which became one of the few classic artillery battles between large warships. In it, representatives of opposite concepts clashed: the German "destroyer of trade" - the pocket battleship "Admiral Graf Spee", and the British "defender of trade" "Exeter", supported by two light cruisers. What happened?
The British commander, Commodore Henry Harwood, divided his ships into two detachments, with Exeter turning to the left and rushing at the enemy, while the light cruisers tried to put the enemy in two fires. The commander of the Spee, Hans Wilhelm Langsdorff, also showed healthy aggressiveness and went to rapprochement with the enemy.
The battle began at 06.18 - from a distance of 100 cables, the German raider was the first to open fire. At 06.20, the Exeter's heavy 203-mm cannons struck in response, a minute later it was supported by the Aquilez, and at about 06.23 the Ajhex's guns came into action.
In the first minutes of the battle, the German commander acted in an exemplary manner. He activated both main-caliber turrets and concentrated their fire on his main enemy, the British heavy cruiser. At the same time, the auxiliary 150-mm (actually 149, 1 mm, but for brevity we will write the generally accepted 150-mm) guns of the "pocket" battleship fired at British light cruisers. Since the fire control of the German six-inch guns was carried out according to the residual principle, they did not achieve any success over the entire battle, without having achieved a single hit, but the benefit from them was already that they made the British nervous - being under fire is psychologically very difficult and affects the accuracy of shooting ship.
Here I would like to note that the British see this moment of the battle differently: that at the beginning of the battle "Spee" divided the fire of its 283-mm guns and each tower fired at its target. But the Germans do not confirm anything of this kind - both towers fired at Exeter, just at first one tower fired a full three-gun salvo, and after it - the second, and only after covering the target did the battleship switch to six-gun volleys. From the outside, this could really be perceived as firing at two different targets, especially since the fire of 150-mm German guns focused on British light cruisers (most likely one of them) and the British saw from the bursts of shells that the Germans were firing at two targets, and not one.
Correct tactics brought the Germans quite predictable success. The first volleys of 283-mm guns were made with semi-armor-piercing shells, but then, artillery officer "Spee" Asher switched to fire with high-explosive 300 kg "suitcases" containing 23, 3 kg of explosives. This turned out to be absolutely the right decision, although it was criticized by the Germans after the war. Now the German shells exploded on impact on the water, fragments from close explosions causing Exeter almost more damage than direct hits. The confrontation between six 283-mm raider guns, guided by the traditionally excellent German MSA and six 203-mm English "budget" heavy cruisers, equipped with rangefinders and fire control devices according to the principle of minimum sufficiency, led to a completely predictable result.
Already the third salvo of the Germans fired a cover, while shrapnel of a 283-mm projectile riddled the side and superstructures of Exeter and its seaplane, destroying the torpedo tube's servants. This was already unpleasant in itself, but the fragments also interrupted the signaling circuits about the readiness of the guns. Now the senior artilleryman, Lieutenant Jennings, did not know if his guns were ready for a salvo, which made it much more difficult for him to fire. He could still give orders to fire a volley, but now he had no idea how many guns would participate in it, which made it very difficult to zero in.
And the Germans continued to methodically shoot Exeter: their fifth and seventh volleys gave direct hits. The first of them fired a semi-armor-piercing projectile with a deceleration - although by that time the Spee had switched to fire with high-explosive projectiles, apparently, the remnants of the semi-armor-piercing projectiles fed into the reloading compartment were being fired. Exeter survived this blow relatively well - the shell pierced the cruiser on both sides and flew away without exploding. But the second hit was fatal. A high-explosive projectile hit the cruiser's nose 203-mm turret and completely brought it out and built, igniting a charge in one of the cannons of the knocked-out turret. The cruiser immediately lost a third of its firepower, but the problem was different - the fragments fanned out over the Exeter superstructure, killing all officers except the ship's commander, but most importantly, destroying the fire control. The cables and intercoms connecting the rangefinder station with the conning tower and the wheelhouse with the central post were destroyed. From now on, Exeter could still fire, of course, but not hit. Before the failure of the OMS, the heavy cruiser made two hits on the enemy's "pocket" battleship. Exeter fired semi-armor-piercing projectiles, so the first hit that hit the unarmored superstructure only led to the formation of a small through hole - the projectile flew away without exploding. The second projectile achieved more - breaking through the top of 100 mm of the armor belt (although … among foreign sources there is no consensus about the thickness of the armor belt "Admiral Count Spee." mm bulkhead. Then it exploded, hitting the armored deck, could not pierce it, but caused a fire in the storage of a dry chemical agent for extinguishing the fire. The people who put out the fire were poisoned, but in any case, the combat capability of the German ship was not seriously affected.
Exeter achieved nothing more. No, he, of course, continued to fight, leaving the battle would not be in the tradition of the British. But how did he do it? The control of the ship had to be transferred to the stern superstructure, but there, too, all communication cables were out of order, so that the commands to the engine room had to be transferred along a chain of sailors. The two surviving 203-mm towers fired towards the enemy - exactly to the side, because without centralized fire control, it would have been possible to get into the German raider only by sheer coincidence.
In other words, the British heavy cruiser almost completely lost its combat effectiveness in less than 10 minutes of fire contact with the "pocket" battleship, while he himself was unable to inflict any serious damage to the enemy. From a hunter "Exeter" turned into a victim - the cruiser could not oppose the volleys of 283-mm guns of its "opponent".
How then did the cruiser manage to survive? There was not a single reason that prevented the Sheer from continuing to converge and finish off Exeter - and then tackle the light cruisers. The "pocket" battleship did not have any serious damage - in addition to two 203-mm hits, the British managed to "reach" it with several 152-mm shells, which did not cause any serious damage to the fascist raider. The fact is that the English light cruisers (like, by the way, Exeter) used semi-armor-piercing shells in that battle, which were too weak to penetrate the German armor, but flew away without breaking when hitting unarmored superstructures. And if Langsdorf had stuck to his original tactics …
… only, alas, he did not adhere to it.
Until now, disputes do not subside as to who won the Battle of Jutland - the British or the Germans. The thing is that the British, no doubt, suffered much heavier losses, but the battlefield remained behind them, and the badly beaten Hochseeflotte could barely take his legs. But regardless of the results of these disputes, it must be admitted that "der Tag" ("Day" - the favorite toast of the Kaiserlichmarin officers, glasses were raised on the day when the two great fleets converge in a decisive battle) inflicted an indelible mental trauma on the officers of the German fleet. They were ready to fight, they were ready to die, but they were absolutely not ready to BEAT the British. Suffice it to recall the stupor that Admiral Lutyens fell into when Hood and Prince of Wells opened fire on the Bismarck. Perhaps the stories about the emergence of the "Tsushima syndrome" among Russian officers have a foundation, but it must be admitted that the German commanders were struck by the "Jutland syndrome" in its most severe form.
Captain zur see Langsdorf did everything he could to overcome it. He bravely led his ship into battle (in fairness, we note that at the time of the decision, Langsdorf believed that he was opposed by a cruiser and two British destroyers), and he, like Heihachiro Togo, Witgeft and Beatty, ignored the conning tower, settling on the open bridge.
And so it turned out that at the beginning of the battle the British could not "get" the German raider, they could not even really scratch it. But they were able to "get" his commander - fragments of a six-inch shell hit Langsdorf in the shoulder and arm, and the energy of the explosion threw him back with such force that he lost consciousness. And when Langsdorf came to his senses, he no longer resembled the admiral of the "gray times". The officers present on the bridge later spoke out neatly (honor of the uniform!) That their commander, after being wounded (described as insignificant), made "insufficiently aggressive decisions."
What was Langsdorf supposed to do? To continue on the same course and speed, allowing his gunner, who groped for Exeter, to complete what he had begun so successfully and to destroy the largest ship of the British - for this, it would be enough to achieve only a few more hits. Here is a diagram showing the approximate location of the ships at that time of the battle.
In fact, it is impossible to draw up any precise maneuvering scheme, because the German and English descriptions of the battle differ greatly from each other and have internal contradictions. Therefore, the graphic image is rather arbitrary. But in the actions of the German commander, alas, there is no ambiguity - regardless of when exactly he did this or that action, all sources agree that he transferred the main battery fire to light cruisers and turned it aside (possibly in another sequence), thereby ending the rapprochement with British ships. Then he seemed to turn his back on the enemy, but immediately put a smoke screen (!) And again showed the British the stern, and only then did he again transfer fire to Exeter. Here the gunners of the Spee showed themselves again, hitting the British heavy cruiser three times, which caused the latter to lose the second bow turret of the main battery, and the somehow restored fire control system was destroyed, now - forever. Lieutenant Jennings, however, and then found a way out - he simply climbed onto the last surviving tower and directed fire directly from its roof. But in essence, Exeter was on the verge of death - a meter of trim on the nose, broken instruments, the speed was not more than 17 knots … The fruit was ripe, but Langsdorf did not reach out to rip it off.
At this time, "Spee" actually fled from two light cruisers of the enemy, periodically putting up smoke screens and "chasing volleys", i.e. turning in the direction where the enemy shells fell, so that the next volley of the enemy, adjusted for the previous error, would lead to a miss. Such a tactic could be justified if the British commanders of light cruisers used it, if the Spee were chasing them, but not vice versa. It is impossible to give any reasonable explanation for such "tactics". The Germans claimed that their commander, himself a former torpedo boat, feared British torpedoes. But precisely because Langsdorf once commanded destroyers, he simply had to know that this weapon was practically useless at a distance of 6-7 miles, at which he fled from the British cruisers. Yes, the Japanese with their long-lance would be dangerous, but who knew then? And it was not the Japanese who fought against Langsdorf. On the contrary, if he was really afraid of torpedoes, then he should have approached the British for some time, provoking them to a volley, and then, indeed, retreat - the chances of hitting the "pocket" battleship with a torpedo in pursuit in this case would be less than illusory.
Another option for explaining Langsdorf's actions is that he feared damage that would prevent his crossing the Atlantic, and this reason had to be approached with all seriousness - what's the point of drowning an enemy undersized cruiser, if then you have to sacrifice a much more powerful ship practically for empty space? But the fact is that Langsdorf ALREADY got involved in the battle, which the British fought in their usual aggressive manner, despite the fact that their cruisers were faster than the "pocket battleship" and the Germans could not interrupt the battle at will. Langsdorff did not win anything, dragging out the battle, he needed to end it as soon as possible, and since he could not escape, then he only had to neutralize the British ships as soon as possible. His "pocket" battleship had the necessary firepower for this.
In fact, even retreating, "Admiral Graf Spee" could well have destroyed the pursuing British. But Langsdorf constantly demanded to transfer fire from one target to another, not allowing his gunners to properly aim, or in every possible way interfered with them with his "volley hunt", throwing the "pocket" battleship from side to side. It is known that fortune protects the brave, but Langsdorf did not show courage in this battle - perhaps this is why a sad misunderstanding was added to the mistakes he made. During the battle, there was no such case when the German fire control system would have been disabled, but at the most crucial moment, when the distance between the Spee and Harwood's light cruisers was less than 6 miles and Langsdorf once again ordered the transfer of fire from the Ajax "On" Akilez ", the connection between the wheelhouse and the rangefinder was broken. As a result, the gunners fired at the Aquilez, but the rangefinders continued to tell them the distance to the Agex, so, naturally, the Spee did not hit anyone.
However, a detailed description of the battle at La Plata is beyond the scope of this article. All of the above is said to ensure that the dear reader notes fairly simple facts for himself.
When creating "pocket" battleships, it was required to find such a combination of armor and weapons that would provide the German ship in battle with a decisive advantage over any "Washington" cruiser, and the Germans succeeded quite well. Any "Washington" and light cruiser that did not shy away from the battle was "legal game" for the pocket battleship. Of course, the first task of the raider is to destroy the merchant tonnage while dodging naval battles. But, if the enemy's cruisers still manage to impose a battle on the "pocket" battleship - so much the worse for the cruisers. With the correct tactics of the Spee, Harwood's ships were doomed.
To the great happiness of the British, the captain zur see Langsdorff adhered to the correct tactics, taking full advantage of the advantages of his ship for exactly 7 minutes - from 06.18, when the Spee opened fire and before turning to the left, i.e. the beginning of the flight from the British cruisers, which occurred approximately at 06.25. During this time, he managed to disable the British heavy cruiser (destroying the SLA and the main battery turret), without receiving any significant damage. In other words, Langsdorff won, and he won with a devastating score for the British. In order to put Harwood's detachment on the brink of defeat, the "pocket" battleship took seven, maybe (taking into account possible timing errors) at most ten minutes.
However, after these 7-10 minutes, instead of finishing off Exeter and then concentrating fire on one of the light cruisers, unnerving the other with 150-mm guns, Langsdorf seemed to have forgotten that he was fighting a "pocket" battleship against three cruisers, and fought as a light cruiser should fight against three "pocket" battleships. Usually, when analyzing a particular naval battle, they talk about some mistakes of the commanders committed at one time or another, but the entire battle of Langsdorf, starting from 06.25, was one big mistake. If a decisive commander were in his place, the British would remember La Plata just as they remember Coronel, where Maximilian von Spee, after whom Langsdorf's ship was named, destroyed the squadron of British Admiral Cradock.
This did not happen, but by no means because the designers of the "Admiral Graf Spee" did something wrong. It is impossible to blame the ship's design for the indecision of its commander.
Let's remember how "pocket" battleships were created. The Treaty of Versailles limited the displacement of the six largest ships in Germany, which she was allowed to build to 10 thousand tons, but did not limit the caliber of their guns. As a result, the German Navy, like an epic hero, found itself at a fork in three roads.
On the one hand, it was proposed to build such half-armored carriers, half-monitors - four 380-mm guns, 200 mm of citadel armor and a speed of 22 knots. The fact is that the countries surrounding post-war Germany (Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Soviet Russia, etc.) possessed fleets of moderate strength, the strongest ships of which carried 280-305-mm artillery. The only exception was France, but in Germany it was believed that the French would not dare to send their dreadnoughts to the Baltic, which, after the explosion of France, there were only six left, and would be limited to a maximum of Dantons. In this case, six ships with 380-mm cannons practically guaranteed the Germans dominance in the Baltic and thereby returned it the status of a naval power.
On the other hand, Germany, at the very beginning of 1923, sketch drawings of the I / 10 project appeared. It was almost a classic "Washington" cruiser, in which, by the way, the features of the future "Admiral Hipper" were well guessed - 10,000 tons, 32 knots, 80 mm armor belts with a 30 mm deck and bevels and four twin-turrets with 210-mm guns
Nevertheless, both of these options did not satisfy the German sailors (although the future commander-in-chief of the Griegsmarine Raeder was inclined towards the 380-mm ship option). The fact is that the German Navy did not want to confine itself to coastal defense, counting on more, and therefore the seaworthy battleship monitors were unacceptable for him. As for the cruisers, they were very interesting to the sailors, but having built them, the Germans would have received six quite ordinary ships, of which the leading sea powers have much more, and which could not cause concern for England. The six "almost Washingtonians", of course, did not pose much of a threat to British shipping.
And, finally, there was a third way, proposed by Admiral Zenker, who had recently commanded the battle cruiser Von der Tann in the Battle of Jutland. He proposed to reduce the caliber of the future ship, adopting something intermediate between 150 mm and 380 mm and create something that would certainly be stronger than any heavy cruiser, but faster than the bulk of the world's battleships, which had 21-23 knots of speed. So, in 1926, the 1 / M / 26 project was born, which became the prototype of pocket battleships.
What about these ships?
In order to ensure an overwhelming superiority over the world's heavy cruisers, it was possible to go in two ways - to strongly protect the ship by providing it with moderate caliber artillery, or to rely on powerful guns with moderate protection. The first route was traditional for German design thought, but this time the emphasis was placed on very powerful 283-mm cannons, while the booking was only slightly superior to that of most armored cruisers, even, perhaps, inferior to the most protected ships of this class. Still, the armor protection used on the "pocket" battleships could not be called bad. Even on the most weakly protected head "Deutschland", as V. L. Kofman, from any angle it provided from 90 to 125 mm of total armor thickness with a combination of horizontal and vertical (mostly inclined) barriers. At the same time, the booking system was improved from ship to ship, and the most protected of them was "Admiral Graf Spee".
The heavy-duty artillery was complemented by an excellent fire control system - "pocket" battleships were provided with three command and rangefinder posts (KDP) each, one of which had a 6-meter rangefinder, and the other two - 10-meter. The KDP were protected by 50 mm armor, and observation from them could be carried out by means of periscopes. Compare this splendor with the British Kent-class cruisers, which had one 3, 66-meter rangefinder in the conning tower and two of the same, which stood openly on the wings of the bridge, as well as a 2, 44-meter rangefinder on the aft wheelhouse. The data from the rangefinders on the British ships was processed by the central post, but on the German pickpockets there were two of them - under the bow and stern cabin. Not all battleships could boast of such a perfect FCS. German ships were equipped with artillery radars, but their quality was very low and did not allow adjusting the fire, so they were used only to detect potential targets.
Contrary to popular belief, initially the 150-mm artillery of pocket battleships was not at all a "poor stepdaughter" in terms of fire control - it was assumed that the distance to its targets would be measured by one of the command and control centers, and data for firing would be generated by a backup processing center located in the stern of the ship … But in practice, the commanders preferred to use all three KDPs to support the work of the main caliber, and the stern calculation center was assigned the duty to "supervise" the anti-aircraft artillery - and it turned out that there was no one to deal with the 150-mm auxiliary caliber.
Thus, the Germans got a ship capable of quickly destroying an enemy cruiser with the help of powerful artillery and an MSA, and protected so as not to receive heavy damage during such a battle. Considering that its diesel power plant provided it with a cruising range of up to 20,000 miles, the "pocket" battleship became an almost ideal heavy artillery raider.
Of course, it also had its drawbacks. In an effort to meet the weight requirements, MAN re-lightened the diesels, as a result of which they were exposed to strong vibration and made a lot of noise. Critics of the project quite rightly pointed out that it would be better for a "pocket" battleship to take less ballast, but make the diesels heavier (whatever one may say, they are located at the very bottom of the hull) and the project would only benefit from this. However, it should be noted that the usually mentioned inability to communicate, notes and blood from the ears still refer to cases when the ship was in full swing, otherwise the noise was not so strong. The intermediate caliber - 150 mm artillery, was also a mistake, it would have been better to strengthen the anti-aircraft weapons or armor. Reservation was considered by the Germans sufficient for a mid-range battle, but the hit of the 203-mm Essex projectile, in which both the armored belt and the 40 mm bulkhead behind it, were pierced, it was not so simple. If the projectile had passed a little lower, it could have exploded right in the engine room. The "pocket" battleships had other, not so obvious drawbacks, but, in fact, which ship does not have them?
Low speed is often blamed on "pocket battleships". Indeed, their 27-28 knots gave them an advantage over battleships of the era of the First World War, but already at the time of the laying of the lead Deutschland, there were seven ships in the world that could catch up with it and destroy it without any problems. We are talking about "Hood", "Ripals", "Rinaun" and four Japanese battle cruisers of the "Congo" class. Later, as new generation battleships were built (starting with the Dunkirk), the number of such ships grew rapidly.
Can the German "pocket" battleships be considered unsuccessful ships on this basis? Yes, in no case.
First, do not forget that fast battleships have many other things to do, except chase someone across the Atlantic and Indian oceans. And here is the result - theoretically, the allies could send five high-speed battleships and battle cruisers in search of the "Admiral Count Spee" - three British ships and "Dunkirk" with "Strasbourg". But in practice, the British managed to attract only the "Rhinaun" sent to the South Atlantic to capture the raider, and the French battleships, although formally included in the "anti-raider" groups, did not take any active actions. And this was in 1939, when the allies fought only against Germany, and Italy and Japan with their powerful fleets had not yet entered the war!
Secondly, diesel pickpockets had a huge advantage over ships with a conventional power plant - they had a very high economic speed. The same "Spee" could pass more than 16,000 miles at 18 knots, no battleship or battle cruiser could boast of anything like that. In other words, yes, the same "Dunkirk", when meeting with the "Sheer", is certainly capable of catching up and destroying the latter, but arranging such a "meeting" with a fast moving "pocket" battleship would not be easy.
And thirdly, it should be understood that "pocket" battleships, not surprisingly, perfectly fit into the strategy of the Kriegsmarine and could play an important role in the Anglo-German struggle at sea.
The fact is that the German plan of military operations against Britain, around which the pre-war fascist fleet was created, provided for the following strategy: it had to include raider forces sufficient to force the British to send part of their line squadrons into the ocean, and a group of high-speed battleships capable of intercepting these squadrons and destroying them. Thus, "biting off a piece" from the British fleet was supposed to equalize with him in strength, and then - to achieve superiority at sea.
The logic seems to be absurd, but let's imagine for a second that the Bismarck raid to the Atlantic was postponed for some reason or even ended in success.
In this case, by the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942, the Germans in the fleet would have had Tirpitz, Bismarck, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau completely ready for battle. But the British of the high-speed battleships would only have King George V, Prince of Wells, and even just entered service (November 1941) and not underwent combat training Duke of York - and this despite the fact that individually, the Bismarck-class ships were stronger than the British battleships.
And the rest of the battleships? Some high-speed ships of the Queen Elizabeth type are connected by the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. To get them out of there is to bring down the entire Mediterranean strategy of Great Britain, which the British would not forgive any government. Ships of the Royal Soverin and Rodney class are slow-moving and would not be able to intercept the German line formation, moreover, even if they met, it could always evade the battle. There were only "two and a half" British high-speed battleships and battle cruisers. France has already surrendered and cannot be counted on for its linear forces, the United States suffered a crushing defeat at Pearl Harbor and cannot help England in any way.
If this happened, and every fast ship would be in the British account. Moreover, battleships must periodically be repaired - out of six high-speed ships, some of them will be almost constantly repaired. For the Germans, on the contrary, it is not difficult to bring their battleships into a combat-ready state by the predetermined date of the raid.
Let's say the Germans send their "pocket" battleships into raiding. In this case, the British would find themselves in an extremely difficult situation. Send battlecruisers out to sea in pursuit of pickpockets? And risk the fact that the four battleships of the Kriegsmarine will go to sea and will not have to fight with them in full force? This is fraught with defeat, after which the British communications will be defenseless against the raids of heavy German ships. Do nothing? Then "pocket" battleships will arrange a real massacre on communications. Cover the convoys with old battleships, the forces of which are quite enough to scare off the Sheer? And who can guarantee that the Germans will not attack such a convoy with Bismarck and Tirpitz, which will playfully deal with a single British ship? Will the high-speed battleships of the Grand Fleet have time to intercept the German formation before they tear to pieces both the convoy and the ships of its escort?
It is known that Churchill assumed and was extremely afraid of joint actions of the German battleships and attached great importance to the destruction of the Bismarck before the Tirpitz entered service.
Thus, we can state that, despite some shortcomings, the German pocket battleships were quite successful ships, capable of performing the tasks that the leadership of the Kriegsmarine set for them. But why, then, did the Germans stop building them? The answer is very simple - according to the pre-war plans of the German industry, it was necessary to create several squadrons of the most powerful battleships, which, of course, would need cruisers for protection. But the "pocket" battleship was completely unsuitable for the role of a cruiser in the squadron - just here its low speed was completely inappropriate. That is why the Germans returned to the idea of a heavy cruiser, which they had back in 1923, but this is a completely different story …
And - a small note.
Of course, in terms of the totality of their tactical and technical characteristics, "pocket" battleships cannot be classified as battleships. Where did the name "pocket battleship" come from then? The fact is that in accordance with the Washington Naval Agreement of 1922, any ship with a standard displacement of over 10,000 tons or guns larger than 203 mm was considered a battleship. It's funny, but if the Germans still preferred the 32-knot cruiser with 210-mm artillery to the pickpockets, from the point of view of international treaties it would be a battleship. Accordingly, according to the Washington agreement, Deutschland was also a battleship - well, a certain correspondent endowed with a good sense of humor, taking into account the small size of the German ship, added the epithet "pocket" to the "battleship" and this name stuck.
The Germans themselves never considered and did not call the "Deutschland" and its sisterships battleships. In the German navy, these ships were listed as "panzerschiffe", ie. "Armored ship" or "battleship", in contrast to "Gneisenau" or "Bismarck", which were called "schlachtschiffe". In the Kaiser's fleet "panzerschiffe" were called battleships, but the most modern of them were renamed "linienschiffe" - ships of the line, and dreadnoughts were called "large ships of the line" or "großlinienschiffe". Well, shortly before the war, the Kriegsmarine enlisted "pocket" battleships in the class of heavy cruisers.
