January 12, TASS.
TASS is an authoritative news agency, and, of course, this source is real, and the words he said are real. The question arises: how reliable are they? In its publication, TASS stressed that it was not possible to obtain official confirmation (which is not surprising).
The first public disclosure of information on Status-6 took place on November 9, 2015 at a meeting on the development of the defense industry, chaired by Russian President V. V. Putin. The "information bomb" was a random frame from the TV report of the NTV channel - an open album with a description of the "ocean multipurpose system" Status-6 "(lead developer - OJSC CDB MT" Rubin ").
Purpose:
Carriers: under construction nuclear submarines of special purpose "Belgorod" (project 09852), and "Khabarovsk" (project 09851).
The beginning was in the USSR
From the memoirs of the Deputy Head of the Anti-Submarine Weapons Directorate (UPV) of the Navy, Gusev R. A., summoned in November 1983 to the head of the UPV Butov:
- Well, read it. Have you heard anything about nuclear powered torpedoes?
- Yes, I heard. From the Americans. There is a collection of translated articles. Everything is painted, even with drawings. It doesn't look like misinformation, but also …
Gusev stopped in time. I was going to blur out about the insanity of the idea, the danger for the founders themselves, no less than for the foe. That shouldn't have been said. He already knew that weapons were not necessarily developed for war. It was also known that the Institute of Weapons of the Navy "spoiled geographical maps" for several years, and its chief, Khurdenko A. A. repeatedly reported the results of studies on "the feasibility of using a nuclear power plant in torpedoes" (ESU). But the work did not go further than the paperwork of military specialists …
Soon an appeal was drawn up to the government …
Butov S. A. organized in December 1983 the consideration of the issue with Admiral Smirnov NI.. The meeting was attended by representatives of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of the Industry, the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, but the president of the Academy of Sciences could not attend, and his visa must be required when applying to the government. With this document, Gusev went to report to Academician A. P. Aleksandrov. in a few days.
- I could not be at your meeting … But I am aware of the consideration of the issue of creating an ESU for torpedoes. It's time to work in small volumes. Moreover, protection will not be acute here.
Gusev pushed him a folder with a document, and Aleksandrov plunged into reading. Then, without saying a word, he put his signature.
Gusev will come to this office with a similar document again. Now it was proposed to significantly expand the scope of work … Not even a month had passed after the Chernobyl disaster, but the president signed the document firmly, without hesitation.
So, the only person in the country who could scientifically and without looking back at a new direction in the arms race, on the contrary, turned on the green light for it. Some time later, the chief of the General Staff, Akhromeev, also turned it on. He knew how many times we could turn America into dust, but it seemed not enough. Since “they” can and want to, let them do it. "They" are industry.
Green lights were consistently lit in the Central Committee, the military-industrial complex, in the government …
But then the work stopped.
O. D Baklanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, recalls:
They were going to create torpedoes that were supposed to go to the American shores with great speed. And to amaze them … But if they began to be implemented, it would not remain a secret for the Americans. Therefore, they were abandoned."
An echo of these works is reflected in the history of the Central Design Bureau "Chernomorsudoproekt" (Nikolaev):
“… With the coming to power of President Reagan in the United States, work began on the use of space for the purpose of nuclear missile warfare, and the Soviet Union began to look for options for countering. CDB was involved in this strategic task. The Bureau proposed a project for a ship carrying strategic torpedoes. The ship had a semi-submerged architecture and was equipped with 12 devices for firing huge atomic torpedoes, capable of crossing the World Ocean at a depth of up to a thousand meters at a speed of about 100 knots. One of the variants of the project with reinforced weapons was jokingly called KS (end of the world) by the designers.
Evaluation of the system and "super torpedoes" "Status-6" ("Poseidon")
From the above links, the following features of the "super torpedo" and the "Status-6" system ("Poseidon") are obvious:
• "dirty" super-powerful nuclear warhead providing;
• speed of about 100 knots (50 m / s);
• range - intercontinental;
• depth - about 1 km (for torpedoes it was successfully mastered not only in the USSR, but also in the USA, back in the late 60s of the last century);
• carriers - special submarines (surface carriers were also considered in the USSR).
Taking into account the fact that the information from NTV on November 9, 2015 obviously overlaps with the information from the book about the history of the Central Design Bureau “Chernomorsudoproekt”, these data are highly likely reliable. It should be emphasized that these characteristics are not only technically realistic, but can also be underestimated (in depth).
The other is unreliable, and this completely negates the entire military meaning of the "Status".
First. Allegedly "unaffectability" of the super-high-speed "Status", which runs at a kilometer depth. This is definitely not the case. In fact, "Status-6" can be successfully hit by means that existed at the end of the Cold War: nuclear depth charges and Mk50 torpedoes (which had a special powerful deep-seated ESU) when they are finalized. The USSR was aware of this factor, therefore the “road” for “Statuses-6” was to be provided with nuclear strikes on elements of the US-NATO anti-submarine warfare system - a decision from the “boil the sea” category, but it was then made in the context of an inadequate assessment by the leadership of the USSR of advertising capabilities of the US SDI.
Moreover, there are good reasons to believe that the developers of the American anti-torpedo "Tripwire" "Status-6" was directly designated as one of the typical targets. This is evidenced by such design features of Tripwire as extremely small hull diameter (and a large length-to-diameter ratio, which significantly complicates maneuvering when attacking conventional torpedoes, which caused the Tripwire problems against conventional torpedoes), and the use of a very complex, expensive, unnecessary (normal) depths, but providing a very large depth of application of ESAs of the Mk50 type.
The defeat of a high-speed small-sized target with an anti-torpedo at a lower speed is provided at the bow (oncoming) heading angles, subject to the issuance of accurate target designation to it. Yes, there will be only one attack for each anti-torpedo, but taking into account their large ammunition load on board the carriers (primarily aviation), accurate target designation from the aircraft's search and aiming system and the length of time that the base US patrol aircraft will have to destroy the target (more days!), the accumulated probability of hitting "Status-6" will be close to one.
A reserve for the US Navy also remains the return of nuclear depth charges to the ammunition load, ensuring the guaranteed destruction of any target in general, regardless of any of its parameters.
Second. The statements about the alleged "secrecy" of "Status-6" have no basis at all.
The estimated power requirement for the movement of an object with the size of "Status-6" at 100 nodes is about 30 MW. Taking into account the known specific characteristics of nuclear power plants (for example, from the work: L. Greiner "Hydrodynamics and Energy of Underwater Vehicles", 1978), the mass of the "Status" power plant turns out to be about 130 tons (despite the fact that the volume of "Status" is about 40 cubic meters). m). Suppose we made a breakthrough in the area of small reactors (this is possible and logical), but even in this case, the effective removed power is determined by the heat removal, i.e. there is "hard physics" and the corresponding restrictions. Those. objectively, there is no reason to believe that the specific indicators have improved at least twice or three times from the American data. At the same time, "Status-6" carries not only a power plant, but also a heavy warhead. Driving at a kilometer depth requires a strong heavy body, which also affects the weight of the vehicle. All this together means a huge overweight of "Status-6" (a large value of negative buoyancy).
Due to the significant overweight, "Status-6" simply cannot move slowly. It can carry its weight only due to the lifting force on the body, and, accordingly, the speed of movement. With a high probability, it has a reduced speed mode (it is needed at least to work out the ESA), but even this mode can in no way be considered "secretive".
The high speed requirement for such an underwater vehicle makes it impossible in principle to achieve stealth. A high-speed object is a priori noisy (and can be detected from a long distance). With a good probability, the noise level of "Status-6" can be estimated "not lower than the levels of the 2nd generation submarine", and, accordingly, the detection range of its underwater lighting systems will be from several hundred to several thousand kilometers (depending on environmental conditions).
Taking into account the movement of "Status-6" at great depths, there can be no question of using a cavitation cavity to reduce the resistance. The tremendous pressure of water at depth will prevent it from forming. For example, significant restrictions on the use of the high-speed torpedo (submarine missile) "Shkval" under the ice were associated precisely with its extremely shallow depth of movement (a few meters), where the cavity could physically exist.
There is an opinion (expressed in foreign media with reference to the "intelligence of the US Navy") about the speed of "Status-6" of about 55 knots. (and, accordingly, power 4-4, 5 MW). However, the volumetric energy intensity of even "such an option" of the "Status" is more than 156 hp / m3. For comparison: for a Los Angeles-type submarine (full speed 35-38 knots, low noise - 12 knots) this value is 6.5 hp / m3. Those. the energy intensity of "Status-6" is more than twenty times higher than for submarines with a low-noise motion mode! At the same time, a low-noise course for a submarine is a power-to-weight ratio of the order of 1 hp / m3.
With the power required to move at the specified speed (and enormous energy intensity), there is simply no room (and the diameter of the body) on the Status for the effective use of acoustic protection equipment.
The "argument" about the "effectiveness" of great depth for secrecy is also untenable. At depths of about a kilometer, the object experiences enormous hydrostatic pressure, which "squeezes" the body and acoustic protection, while being in ideal conditions for detection - near the axis of the deep-water (hydrostatic) underwater sound channel. The masking factor is a “layered cake” of complex hydrology (including jumps in the speed of sound) while remaining “high above” the object, at depths of up to 200-250 m, and cannot cover it at a depth from hydroacoustic stations with deep antennas.
Conclusion: stealth and "Status-6" are incompatible due to the huge overweight of the "Status" and its inability to move at low speeds (ie, stealthily).
Taking into account the fact that the means of destruction of "Status-6" have existed since the Cold War and new ones have appeared, very bad questions arise regarding those who deliberately misled the military-political leadership about the alleged "non-defeat" of "Status-6".
Today we have a catastrophic situation with naval submarine weapons of the Navy (to the point that "antiques" (minesweepers) built in 1973, which have not undergone any modernization at all, are "crawling" into combat services), and at the same time, huge budget funds for the extremely dubious "underwater wunderwaffe" … Ie. instead of a normal and worthy answer to our "probable adversaries" in terms of torpedoes, anti-torpedo protection, mine defense, and other critical problems of the country's defense, the leaders of the armed forces and the country, who have "filled up" everything in underwater weapons, are allegedly slipping achievements in the "wunderwaffe" …
Huge funds were spent on this, incl. two nuclear-powered ships of the Russian Navy have already been withdrawn. The same Belgorod, mentioned in the materials on November 15, 2015, could already be part of the Navy - with a powerful missile system (up to 100 cruise missiles), and could become the first modernized nuclear-powered ship of the 3rd generation. In fact, until now, not a single boat of the 3rd generation has undergone normal modernization in our country!
And all this without taking into account the money that has been spent on this project since Soviet times, without taking into account the supply vessels and coastal infrastructure, without taking into account the money that has not yet been spent that will be needed for testing and deployment.
In fact, it is difficult to imagine what this program will cost the country in the end and how much money it will "tear" away from solving really necessary defense tasks.
Testing "Status-6" is a separate and very inconvenient question. An example from the topic of deep-sea technical equipment of the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research: initially it was planned to use power plants of the "reactor for spacecraft" type on them, but upon careful study this option was rejected. This decision was also supported by the chief designer of this power plant, the head of NPO Krasnaya Zvezda, N. P. Gryaznov, who said at the meeting:
I would like to ask: who, where and how is going to "burn" the reactors for "Status" now?
Test only the "practical option" (according to the author, this is exactly what they want to do with us)? A good example of what the deliberately insufficient statistics and insufficient depth of testing lead to is the 53-61 torpedo, according to which it was discovered only after ten years of operation in the fleet (and then by chance) that most of the time the torpedo was in ammunition … unfit for action. Moreover, this constructive flaw did not manifest itself in any way in its practical version!
Due to the specific conditions of their location and use, torpedo weapons objectively require large test statistics! We have a strong influence on R&D of "rocket scientists" who often simply do not understand this. However, we look at the statistics of the US Navy on combat training with firing: the number of torpedo firing is about an order of magnitude greater than the number of missile firing!
Politico-military implications
At the same time, the "Status" situation is much worse than "simply deceiving the leadership" and its military inexpediency. "Status-6", in fact, is not a factor of strategic deterrence, but of destabilization.
Basic requirements for strategic deterrence instruments:
• ensuring the possibility of a retaliatory strike, guaranteed inflicting unacceptable damage to the enemy;
• accuracy and flexibility of application.
The first condition requires a strategic triad, since taking into account the shortcomings of some strategic means, they overlap with the advantages of others. It is obvious that "Status-6" is simply harmful here, tearing resources away from truly effective strategic means.
The second condition is due to the "variable height of the nuclear threshold" in different conditions of the situation and the minimization of damage to "neutral objects". And if the first factor has long been recognized and implemented by us (in our strategic triad), then there is often a deep misunderstanding of the second.
It starts with the magnitude of the "nuclear threshold". It is obvious that an adversary with an overwhelming military-economic potential will have the initiative and impose on us the model of a collision that is deliberately below the "nuclear threshold" (which we want). To counter this, powerful general-purpose forces and a stable economy (which are the foundation for strategic deterrence) are needed, and the possibility of flexible use of nuclear weapons, incl. minimizing collateral damage.
Minimization can be achieved by inflicting a "warning" strike, for example, at a point in the ocean, or at an enemy military facility located far from large cities.
At the same time, the rate of growth and progression of a military conflict waged by modern weapons requires that such a strike be delivered not only "in the right place", but also "at the right time", which will not be possible to provide an apparatus hundreds of times slower than a ballistic missile, and ten times slower than the winged one. The strike by "Status-6" may not just be "late" (if the device by some miracle is able to overcome the enemy's PLO). It can be inflicted after the enemy has requested peace or at another politically inappropriate moment. And it may be impossible to stop the fired torpedo at this moment.
At the same time, it is worth agreeing with the former US Secretary of Defense D. Mattis in his assessment of these weapons: they do not provide anything new for our deterrent potential. The devastation from the use of existing ballistic missiles on US soil will be such that 32 powerful explosions of "Statuses" in already destroyed cities will change absolutely nothing. This is the most important disadvantage of the project, reducing its value to zero even without taking into account all other factors.
A separate issue is not just civilian objects of the enemy (in the existing "Anglo-Saxon" "tradition of military operations" their destruction is possible and expedient), but objects of neutral countries.
Certainly, the use of nuclear weapons, even limited ones, will have environmental consequences for everyone. However, “collateral damage” is one thing, and it is rather limited - for example, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a “limited atomic war” in the world was actually conducted in the form of a huge number of nuclear weapons tests on the ground and in the atmosphere. An entirely different matter is the use of special "dirty bombs" that ensure long-term and strong contamination of the territory not only of the enemy, but also of neutral countries. The use of these means is contrary to the rules of war, and their deployment could have extremely grave political consequences for us. Obviously, the main goal of "Status-6" is to contain the United States, however, a number of countries (including such large ones as China and India) may have logical questions: what do they have to do with it and why they are not fighting themselves, as a result of hypothetical use "Dirty weapons" in the conflict of other countries "should" suffer heavy losses as a result of their use?
The deployment of such "barbaric" weapons systems will allow the United States to retaliate in such actions that they themselves have previously declared unacceptable. Moreover, all these retaliatory measures will be met with understanding even in countries of the world that are friendly to the Russian Federation.
As for the "alternative means" of warfare, the "inverted chessboard principle" is very good for evaluating them: if you want to do this, see what happens if the enemy does the same for you.
Thus, the military-political role of the "Status-6" ("Poseidon") project for us is not even zero, but negative.
In the face of extremely serious problems with general-purpose forces, huge funds are invested in a system that does not provide any military advantages (Poseidons are easily detected and destroyed). At the same time, funds are torn away from truly effective strategic weapons (SSBNs, Avangards, Yarsy, new long-range aviation missiles). It's a good question: if our "strategic sword" of existing means is strong (as officially stated), then why spend huge amounts of money to kill the enemy several more times after his death?
At the same time, today the Boreyev grouping in Kamchatka is in no way secured in anti-mine and anti-submarine relations, a lot of other critical problems in the fleet, army, defense industry complex …
On the political side, things are even worse.
Obviously, a tough and objective examination is needed of what has already been done on this topic, the funds spent on it (including an objective assessment of the alleged "secrecy" and "invulnerability" of "Poseidon"), as well as an assessment of the activities of persons who deliberately misled the highest military political leadership of the country.
Do not throw out the child with dirty water
Unlike Status-6, the use of nuclear power on large underwater vehicles is not only possible, but also expedient. Today in the Russian Federation there is a serious scientific and technical groundwork in small-sized nuclear reactors and deep-water technical means. The groundwork created in the USSR for them must not only be "preserved", but developed in terms of expanding the range of special tasks to be solved and the capabilities of deep-sea facilities.
For example, instead of "status topics" it would be quite expedient to build another deep-sea submarine "Losharik" (with its deep modernization and expansion of the range of special tasks to be solved).
It is extremely advisable to equip our diesel submarines in ocean-going fleets with small-sized nuclear plants.
Here it is appropriate to recall the historical experience in the creation of deep-sea technical means.
From the memoirs of D. N. Dubnitsky:
The technical design of the 1851 complex, developed in 1973, differed quite noticeably from the sketch in its technical solutions (mainly in terms of the propulsion and steering complex, special devices and the electric power system), but did not change the main tactical and technical elements. However, by the end of the technical project, the chief designer realized that the choice of the type and parameters of the main power plant, made at the stage of the preliminary design, was incorrect in principle and required a radical revision and, in fact, the implementation of the technical design again with a revision of the composition of the co-executors. Further movement along the previously chosen path obviously led to a dead end and could end with only one thing - the cessation of work on the creation of the project 1851 complex … attracting new co-executors and changing the TTE and cooperation approved by the government decree. Such a step, fraught with the risk of removal from office with irreversible consequences for the career, required a great deal of personal courage. … It is no exaggeration to say that the replacement of the power plant on the order of 1851 saved a whole line of underwater technical means.
Summarize
Creation of the system "Status-6" ("Poseidon") (in the form published in the media - a high-speed and deep-sea "super torpedo" with a super-powerful nuclear warhead, designed to "create zones of extensive radioactive contamination, unsuitable for implementation in these zones of the military,economic and other activities for a long time”) is meaningless and inexpedient from a military point of view and can have serious political consequences.
The created technical groundwork must be directed to the creation of large underwater vehicles (including with nuclear power systems, but with high stealth), equipping diesel submarines with small-sized nuclear power plants, the development of deep-sea technical means and the solution of other critical problems of the armed forces.
Afterword
This article was written more than a month ago and could not be published for reasons beyond the author's control (and obvious). During this time, a lot of news appeared on the topic, in fact, raising the question of the presence of a planned advertising campaign to promote the "status" topic. The situation is simple: “there is no money,” even the most important and necessary state programs are being objectively “cut” … Against this background, huge amounts of money are actually buried in an extremely dubious system that has a negative value for the country's defense and security.
And questions about this "Status" arise, incl. from many military and scientists.
Here it is appropriate to cite only one piece of news, not on the "Status", but directly related to it.
February 26. TASS. Deputy General Director of PJSC "Company" Sukhoi "Alexander Pekarsh:
If we talk about the Su-57 program, then … today, under the current contract with the Ministry of Defense, we have two aircraft with delivery dates for the first aircraft in 2019, and the second aircraft in 2020.
Those. we have an absolutely open and shameful fact for Russia: the fifth generation fighter, the program of which, according to the logic, should be among the highest priority, is supplied to the Ministry of Defense at a "rate" of one aircraft per year! "No money left"…
But for some reason they are on a "status" scam ", incl. and at the cost of crushing the program of rearmament of the Aerospace Forces for 5th generation aircraft and other programs that are extremely necessary for defense!
