Over the past years, the controversy over the American missile defense system has not abated. The complex currently under construction, consisting of various technical means, both receives positive reviews and is criticized. Meanwhile, the ABM Agency continues to implement its projects, trying to ensure the country's security, and pays little attention to criticism. The development of new systems and the production of existing ones continues.
However, some of the successes that have been achieved are unlikely to justify all the costs, which is the reason for the regular critical articles in the press. Not so long ago, on April 5, the Los Angeles Times published an article The Pentagon's $ 10-billion bet gone bad. The author of the publication, David Willman, analyzed the successes and failures of the United States in the field of missile defense and came to sad conclusions, the main thesis of which was made in the title. The journalist found that the activities of the ABM Agency lead to unnecessary spending of the military budget. First of all, the SBX floating radar was criticized.
Problems of the SBX complex
At the beginning of his article, D. Willman recalls how promising the new project was. The heads of the ABM Agency argued that the promising radar station would be the most powerful in the world. It was said that she would be able to spot a baseball over San Francisco while on the other side of the country. It was assumed that the radar Sea Based X-band Radar or SBX ("Radar sea based X-band") will monitor potentially dangerous regions. It could spot North Korean missile launches, calculate their trajectories, separate missiles from decoys, and issue target designations to other missile defense elements.
In 2007, speaking to a Senate subcommittee, the head of the ABM Agency argued that the SBX station was unmatched. Nevertheless, the staff of the Los Angeles Times managed to establish that the SBX project was not a revolution in its field, but a real failure. A failure at a cost of $ 2.2 billion.
D. Willman notes that the SBX system is truly capable of performing its assigned tasks. However, its real capabilities are limited by the fact that its field of view is not sufficient to deal with the most realistic attack. Experts believe that in the event of a conflict with the use of nuclear arsenals, missile defense systems will have to deal with a large number of missiles, warheads and decoys. The SBX radar does not fully meet the requirements of such a war scenario.
Floating radar SBX was planned to be put into operation in the middle of the last decade. The station was actually built, but it is still not in full operation. Most of the time, the radar station is idle at the base in Pearl Harbor. From this D. Willman draws a simple but sad conclusion. The SBX project, having "eaten" a lot of money, "gnawed" a solid hole in the defense of the United States. The money spent on SBX could be used to create other projects. In particular, the missile defense system could be replenished with ground-based missile attack warning radars with higher performance than the SBX.
Other expenses
The author of the publication recalls that unnecessary spending and useless projects have already become a real hallmark of the ABM Agency, which is responsible for the creation of defense systems against missile attacks. Over the past ten years, this organization, according to the estimates of journalists, has spent about $ 10 billion on four projects of promising systems, including SBX, which did not produce the expected results.
These dubious programs were designed to solve one of the most serious problems arising in the creation of missile defense. In addition to warheads, modern ballistic missiles carry a set of missile defense penetration means in the form of a large number of decoys. It is assumed that decoys will be able to "deceive" radar stations, forcing them to issue incorrect target designation. As a result, the interceptor missiles will try to destroy decoys while the real warheads continue to fly. In recent years, the ABM Agency has been actively involved in the creation of systems that will avoid such a situation during a possible nuclear missile strike.
In addition to the already mentioned sea-based radar D. Willman mentions other projects of promising anti-missile systems designed to find or destroy enemy ballistic missiles. All four complexes, described in the article The Pentagon’s $ 10-billion bet gone bad, cannot yet perform their assigned tasks, which accordingly affects the combat effectiveness of the entire missile defense system.
The ABL (Airborne Laser) or Boeing YAL-1 system was considered a promising and promising means of destroying enemy ballistic missiles in the early stages of flight. Boeing, Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin have installed a number of new equipment on the specially converted Boeing 747 aircraft, including three lasers. With the help of the main laser installation, it was supposed to destroy the missiles, literally burning them in flight. At one time, the ABL project was presented as a real revolution in the field of weapons and military equipment.
Later tests showed that the Boeing YAL-1 aircraft, in its current or modified form, will not be able to perform all the tasks assigned to it. So, for the timely destruction of missiles, the aircraft would have to fly near the borders of a potential enemy, being an easy target for enemy air defense. In addition, for reliable destruction of targets, a laser with a power of 20-30 times more was required. Finally, the reagents used by the laser turned out to be too expensive and unsafe for the personnel.
By the end of the last decade, the Pentagon leadership began to doubt the need to continue the ABL project, not to mention the advisability of deploying such a system within the ABM system. In 2012, amid further cuts in the military budget, the project was closed. It cost the military department $ 5.3 billion.
Another promising development is the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) rocket, designed for kinetic interception of targets. Initially, it was assumed that such missiles, developed by Northrrop Grumman and Raytheon, would be launched from land-based or shipborne launchers. After that, the KEI missiles should be guided at the indicated targets and destroy them with a direct collision. When hitting an enemy missile in the active phase of the flight, such an interceptor could guaranteed to destroy all warheads.
As the project was developed, specialists identified an increasing number of tasks that would have to be solved to ensure the required characteristics. So, the rocket turned out to be too large, because of which it could not be launched from existing ships. The necessary modernization of the fleet could cost several billion dollars. In addition, the KEI products had a relatively short flight range, which did not allow them to hit the missiles of potential enemies in the active phase when launched from a ground launcher.
As a result, the specialists came to the conclusion that there were no prospects and that it was inexpedient to continue the work. In 2009, the KEI project was closed. The development of the kinetic interceptor took about 1.7 billion.
In the middle of the last decade, Raytheon and Lockheed Martin received an order to develop the Multiple Kill Vehicle project. They were required to create a platform carrying a large number of small-sized interceptor missiles. It was expected that it would be possible to fit up to 20 interceptors into the required dimensions. The platform was supposed to deliver interceptors to the target area, after which the destruction of the enemy missile was carried out. The launch of a large number of miniature interceptor missiles made it possible to attack the missile warheads along with decoys.
The Multiple Kill Vehicle project faced great difficulties already at the stage of preliminary research and development of the appearance. The creation of small-sized interceptor missiles capable of targeting and destroying it turned out to be an extremely difficult task. In addition, there were serious problems with the delivery of such interceptors to the target area.
Numerous technical difficulties led to the fact that a promising, as it seemed, project was never developed. The original proposal turned out to be so difficult to implement that it was abandoned in 2009. During the preliminary work on the project, $ 700 million was spent.
Search for the culprit
D. Willman believes that such unnecessary spending, as well as the increased interest in missile defense in general, is due to the alarming sentiments that spread in Washington after September 11, 2001. Then the American "hawks" warned the country's leadership of a possible threat from Iran and North Korea, which, in their opinion, would soon have missiles capable of reaching the United States.
The response to these warnings was a 2002 order issued by George W. Bush. The US President ordered to speed up work and over the next two years to build a missile defense system of the country. The ABM Agency specialists, being limited in time, began to take into consideration all more or less promising proposals, not paying due attention to checking their viability and economic feasibility. In addition, the congressmen played a role in this story. Some officials actively defended even those projects that have already shown their uselessness.
Former Lockheed missile chief L. David Montague describes the situation as follows. The leaders in charge of creating new anti-missile systems did not fully understand a number of critical issues. The result was programs that "defy the laws of physics and economic logic." In addition, Montague believes that the SBX floating radar should never have been built.
The author of Pentagon 10 Billion Headquarters Lost also quotes the former head of US Strategic Command, General Eugene E. Habiger. The retired general believes that the missile defense agency's failures demonstrate the organization's inability to analyze alternatives and its unwillingness to turn to specialists for an independent assessment of the cost of new projects.
The officials responsible for creating useless projects have some arguments in their defense. They argue that their main task was to create a new architecture for the missile defense system. The reason for building the SBX radar station is that it would be much more expensive and time-consuming to deploy a ground-based radar network.
Of great interest are the words of Henry A. Obering, who previously served as head of the ABM Agency. He believes that all missile defense failures are a direct consequence of the decisions of President Barack Obama's administration and Congress. The country's leadership refused to increase funding for promising projects, which is why they could not be completed. At the same time, the former director of the ABM Agency notes that the successful interception of just one missile aimed at any US city will fully and repeatedly recoup all costs by preventing colossal damage.
The current director of the ABM Agency, James D. Cyring, in turn, declined to answer questions from the Los Angeles Times. At the same time, the organization, in its response to the request, defended controversial projects. It is argued that the built missile defense system can fulfill the responsibilities assigned to it. As for the SBX radar, it was called a good investment.
D. Willman also managed to get a comment from Boeing, which was actively involved in the creation of the floating radar. Boeing officials claim that the new station has all the capabilities to perform the assigned tasks with the required speed and accuracy. Raytheon, also involved in the SBX project, declined to comment.
About the structure of the US missile defense
Further, the author of the publication recalled the role and features of the ABM Agency's work. This organization was founded under Ronald Reagan. It currently employs 8,800 people and has an annual budget of about $ 8 billion. The Agency is in charge of several systems already on duty. These are ship-based missile defense systems based on the Aegis system, ground-based THAAD systems, as well as GMD (Ground-Based Midcourse Defense) complexes with the GBI anti-missile system. It should be noted that the four programs mentioned above were designed to complement the GMD system.
The state of the anti-missile systems is such that the defense of the United States against a possible nuclear missile strike is primarily based on deterrence. The implication is that Russia and China will not attack the United States because of the danger of a retaliatory strike with corresponding disastrous consequences. GBI interceptor missiles, in turn, are designed to protect against other threats - from North Korean and Iranian missiles, which is due to the limited strike potential of these states.
GMD complexes are deployed at Vandenberg airbases (California) and Fort Greeley (Alaska). GBI missiles are designed to destroy enemy missiles on the cruise phase of the flight. There are now 4 missiles in California, 26 in Alaska. Destruction of the target is carried out due to the kinetic energy in a direct hit of the striking element.
The development of the GMD project began back in the nineties. The work intensified after the orders of George W. Bush issued in 2002. The deployment of the first complexes was required to be completed in two years. In order to complete all work on time, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld authorized the ABM Agency to circumvent standard procurement rules and technology audits. This approach really made it possible to shorten the project implementation time, but negatively affected the quality of work and the final product.
Despite the presence of a large number of various problems, the GMD complex was officially adopted as early as 2004. Since then, there have been nine GBI test launches. Only four launches ended with a successful interception of the training target. For this reason, D. Willman notes, the capabilities of the complex to intercept missiles in a complex jamming environment are still cause for concern.
For the effective use of interceptor missiles, a modern radar station is needed that can detect and track targets, as well as distinguish real missiles or warheads from decoys. Without such means of observation, missile defense missiles will not be able to distinguish a real threat from a false one, with the corresponding consequences. In addition, the radar is tasked with monitoring the results of the use of interceptor missiles. Experts believe that without detection of target destruction, GMD complexes can quickly use all available anti-missile missiles, the number of which still leaves much to be desired.
Currently, the United States missile defense system has a network of missile warning radars. There are similar facilities in California, Alaska, Great Britain and Greenland. Ground-based radars are complemented by ship-based stations. The existing network of stations is capable of efficiently performing its functions, however, to improve its performance, it is necessary to take some measures. In particular, the detection range of objects is limited by the curvature of the Earth, which is why ground or sea radars, as well as spacecraft, cannot always correctly determine the type of detected object and the associated risks.
SBX project
Back in the nineties, the ABM Agency intended to build nine new ground-based X-band radars (frequency 8-12 GHz, wavelength 2, 5-3, 75 cm). The main advantage of using this frequency range is that the resolution is sufficiently high, which, as expected, will increase the likelihood of correct target identification. By building nine new stations, it was planned to completely cover the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans with the sectors of the survey. In 2002, due to the shortening of the deployment time for new systems, it was decided to abandon the construction of ground stations. Instead, they decided to build one sea-based radar.
The base for a promising floating radar station was supposed to be a special port on one of the Aleutian Islands. From there, the station could monitor the activities of the DPRK and other countries in the region. If necessary, it could be transferred to other regions of the world's oceans. It was from these ideas that the SBX project eventually emerged, which is now the subject of criticism.
At the suggestion of Boeing, they decided to build a new type of radar based on the units of an offshore drilling platform. In 2003, such a platform was purchased in Norway and sent to one of the American shipyards. There, the platform was equipped with a power plant, living and working rooms, a set of special equipment and a characteristic spherical antenna casing. The result was a structure about 400 feet long (122 m) and weighing about 50 thousand tons. Previous ABM Agency executives have stated that SBX service will begin before the end of 2005.
When developing the floating station SBX, one important point was not taken into account. It was planned to operate it near the Aleutian Islands, in an area with frequent strong winds and strong waves. Because of this, the platform had to be finalized. The redesign and installation of some new facilities at the future base cost tens of millions of dollars and lasted until the fall of 2007.
The ABM Agency praised the new complex in every possible way and spoke of its highest characteristics. In particular, it was mentioned that SBX, being in the Chesapeake Bay, can detect a baseball over San Francisco. However, experts note that due to the curvature of the planet's surface, this ball should be at an altitude of about 870 miles. This is about 200 miles above the maximum flight altitude of ICBMs. D. Willman quotes the words of S. W. Mead, who argued that in the real world with ICBMs, the baseball analogy doesn't make sense.
The author of the article The Pentagon's $ 10-billion bet gone bad also mentions a characteristic drawback of the SBX radar in the form of a relatively narrow field of view. This station can track a sector only 25 ° wide. Because of this, sufficiently powerful equipment, in theory capable of performing the assigned tasks, in fact, will not be able to detect targets in time. It was assumed that the missile attack warning system would work as follows. Ground-based radars detect a suspicious object and transmit information about it to the SBX. This station, in turn, aims at the target and makes identification. Further, target data is transmitted to missile systems. In a combat situation, when a large number of marks appear on the screens, such a multi-level system may not have time to process all possible threats.
Thus, the SBX station, located off the Aleutian Islands, cannot cover the entire Pacific Ocean and track missile launches in its area of responsibility. All this does not allow us to consider this radar as a full-fledged element of the anti-missile defense system.
Nevertheless, Ronald T. Kadish, who headed the ABM Agency at the beginning of the 2000s, claims that the main advantages of the SBX complex are its cheapness in comparison with ground stations, as well as the ability to move to the desired area. In addition, he claims that the SBX has sufficient characteristics to carry out its assigned tasks.
Apparently, the Pentagon leadership understood the seriousness of the problems associated with the new project. In addition, there was an understanding of the need to use an "intermediate" radar between the early detection stations and the elements of the GMD complex. To supplement and replace the SBX in 2006 and 2014, two X-band stations were commissioned in Japan and South Korea.
Also in the Los Angeles Times, the issue of persistent problems with various equipment of the SBX complex is raised. This system was used in tests of the GMD anti-missile system. During the 2007 tests, some radar systems behaved in a wrong way, which is why the specialists had to start developing updated software. Problems were also recorded during tests in 2010, when the SBX was used as the only means of target detection. Due to some malfunctions, the station was unable to aim the GBI anti-missile at the target, and it was not hit. In June 2014, SBX found a target and aimed a missile at it, but was unable to record its destruction.
Expensive and useless
The command of the US armed forces a few years ago became disillusioned with the SBX project. Over the years of testing, the platform with the radar burned tons of fuel for engines and power systems, and various factors influenced the state of the structure and instruments. Back in 2009, it was decided not to send the SBX platform to the shores of the Korean Peninsula to track North Korean missile tests. The Pentagon officials considered such a mission too expensive and unnecessary.
In 2011, the SBX radar was transferred to the navy. Naval specialists argued that in order to work effectively as part of the fleet, it is necessary to modify the complex so that it meets the existing requirements for marine technology. Nevertheless, carrying out such work will lead to additional expenses of tens of millions of dollars.
At the end of his article, D. Willman talks about the current state of the SBX project. The platform with the SBX radar station was built in the middle of the last decade, but still has not reached the intended base in the Aleutian Islands. In 2012, the status of the complex was changed to limited test support. In 2013, the platform was transferred to Pearl Harbor, where it remains to this day. The SBX program cost taxpayers $ 2.2 billion. To fulfill the tasks previously assigned to the SBX, it is planned to build a new ground-based radar station in Alaska. The construction completion date is 2020. The estimated cost is about 1 billion.
***
As you can see, the United States continues to reap the rewards of haste in building a missile defense system. The acceleration of work at the beginning of the last decade made it possible to quickly put several new complexes on duty. Nevertheless, the adoption into service was only formal, since the specialists had to continue testing and fine-tuning all the new systems. Due to their complexity, all new complexes still do not fully meet the requirements. As a result, the Pentagon is forced to spend money on projects with dubious prospects.
An American journalist from the Los Angeles Times estimated that only four failed projects, already closed or suspended, resulted in a waste of $ 10 billion. In the future, the United States will have to develop the remaining systems and build new ones, which will result in additional costs. It can be assumed that, due to all these problems, over the next few years, the United States will have a relatively weak anti-missile defense that will be able to repel only a few attacks from countries with developing missile technology. Such a system will not withstand a full-scale nuclear missile strike by Russia and China, because of which a large number of warheads will be able to reach their targets. Thus, one can agree with David Hillman: $ 10 billion was really wasted.
