Any war is a clash not only of troops, but also of the industrial and economic systems of the belligerent parties. This question must be remembered when trying to assess the merits of certain types of military equipment, as well as the successes of the troops achieved with this equipment. When assessing the success or failure of a combat vehicle, one must clearly remember not only its technical characteristics, but also the costs that were invested in its production, the number of units produced, and so on. Simply put, an integrated approach is important.
That is why the assessment of a single tank or aircraft and loud statements about the "best" model of war must be critically assessed each time. It is possible to create an invincible tank, but quality issues almost always conflict with issues of simplicity of manufacture and the mass scale of such equipment. There is no point in creating an invincible tank if the industry cannot organize its mass production, and the cost of the tank will be the same as that of an aircraft carrier. The balance between the fighting qualities of equipment and the ability to quickly establish large-scale production is important.
In this regard, it is of interest how this balance was observed by the belligerent powers at different levels of the state's military-industrial system. How much and what kind of military equipment was produced, and how it influenced the results of the war. This article is an attempt to bring together statistical data on the production of armored vehicles by Germany and the USSR during the Second World War and the next pre-war period.
Statistics
The data obtained are summarized in a table, which requires some explanation.
1. Approximate figures are highlighted in red. Basically, they relate to two types - captured French equipment, as well as the number of self-propelled guns produced on the chassis of German armored personnel carriers. The first is connected with the impossibility of establishing exactly how many trophies were actually used by the Germans in the troops. The second is due to the fact that the release of an ACS on an armored personnel carrier chassis was often carried out by retrofitting already released armored personnel carriers without heavy weapons, by installing a cannon with a machine tool on an armored personnel carrier chassis.
2. The table contains information about all guns, tanks and armored vehicles. For example, the line "assault guns" includes German self-propelled guns sd.kfz.250 / 8 and sd.kfz.251 / 9, which are an armored personnel carrier chassis with a short-barreled 75 cm gun installed. The corresponding number of linear armored personnel carriers is excluded from the line "armored personnel carriers" etc.
3. Soviet self-propelled guns did not have a narrow specialization, and could fight both tanks and support the infantry. However, they are categorized into different categories. For example, the Soviet breakthrough self-propelled guns SU / ISU-122/152, as well as the self-propelled guns of su-76 infantry support, were the closest to the German assault guns as conceived by the designers. And such self-propelled guns, such as the Su-85 and Su-100, had a pronounced anti-tank character and were classified as "tank destroyers".
4. The category of "self-propelled artillery" includes guns intended primarily for firing from closed positions out of line of sight of targets, including rocket-propelled mortars on armored chassis. From the Soviet side, only the BM-8-24 MLRS on the T-60 and T-40 chassis fell into this category.
5. Statistics include all production from 1932 to May 9, 1945. It was this technique, one way or another, that constituted the potential of the belligerents and was used in the war. The technique of earlier production by the beginning of the Second World War was outdated and does not represent any serious significance.
the USSR
The data obtained fit well into the well-known historical situation. The production of armored vehicles in the USSR was deployed on an incredible, massive scale, which fully corresponded to the aspirations of the Soviet side - preparation for a war of survival in vast areas from the Arctic to the Caucasus. To a certain extent, for the sake of mass scale, the quality and debugging of military equipment was sacrificed. It is known that the equipment of Soviet tanks with high-quality communications equipment, optics and interior decoration was significantly worse than that of the Germans.
The obvious imbalance of the weapon system is striking. For the sake of the production of tanks, there are no whole classes of armored vehicles - armored personnel carriers, SPAAGs, control vehicles, etc. Last but not least, this situation is determined by the desire of the USSR to overcome a serious lag in the main types of weapons, inherited after the collapse of the Republic of Ingushetia and the civil war. Attention was focused on saturating the troops with the main striking force - tanks, while the support vehicles were ignored. This is logical - it is foolish to invest effort in the design of bridgelayers and ARVs in conditions when the production of the main weapon - tanks - is not debugged.
At the same time, in the USSR, they realized the flawedness of such a weapon system, and already on the eve of the Second World War, they were actively designing a wide variety of support equipment. These are armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled artillery, repair and recovery vehicles, bridgelayers, etc. Most of this technology did not have time to be introduced into production before the beginning of the Second World War, and already during the war, its development had to be stopped. All this could not but affect the level of losses in the course of hostilities. So, for example, the absence of an armored personnel carrier negatively affected the losses of the infantry and their mobility. Making many kilometers of foot marches, the infantrymen lost strength and part of their combat capability even before contact with the enemy.
The gaps in the weapons system were partially filled with supplies from the allies. It is no coincidence that armored personnel carriers, self-propelled guns and SPAAGs on the chassis of American armored personnel carriers were supplied to the USSR. The total number of such vehicles was about 8,500, which is not much less than the number of tanks received - 12,300.
Germany
The German side followed a completely different path. Having suffered defeat in WWI, Germany did not lose its design school and did not lose its technological superiority. Recall that in the USSR there was nothing to lose, tanks were not produced in the Russian Empire. Therefore, the Germans did not need to overcome the path from an agrarian state to an industrial one in a wild haste.
Having started preparations for war, the Germans were well aware that they could defeat numerous and economically strong opponents in the person of Great Britain and France, and then the USSR, only by ensuring a quality superiority, which, already, traditionally, the Germans are excellent at. But the question of mass character for Germany was not so acute - relying on the blitzkrieg strategy and the quality of weapons gave a chance to achieve victory with small forces. The first attempts have confirmed the success of the chosen course. Although not without problems, the Germans managed to defeat Poland, then France, and so on. The spatial scale of hostilities in the center of compact Europe was quite consistent with the number of tank forces at the disposal of the Germans. Obviously, these victories convinced the German command even more of the correctness of the chosen strategy.
Actually, that is why the Germans initially paid close attention to the balance of their weapons system. Here we see a variety of types of armored vehicles - ZSU, ammunition transporters, forward observer vehicles, ARVs. All this made it possible to build a well-functioning mechanism for waging war, which went like a steam roller throughout Europe. Such a keen attitude towards support technology, which also contributes to the achievement of victory, can only be admirable.
Actually, the first seeds of future defeat were laid in this weapon system. Germans - they are Germans in everything. Quality and reliability! But as mentioned above, quality and mass character almost always come into conflict. And once the Germans started a war, where everything was different - they attacked the USSR.
Already in the first year of the war, the blitzkrieg mechanism malfunctioned. The Russian open spaces were absolutely indifferent to the perfectly oiled, but small number of German equipment. A different scope was required here. And although the Red Army suffered defeat after defeat, it became difficult for the Germans to maneuver with the modest forces that they had. Losses in the protracted conflict grew, and already in 1942 it became obvious that it was impossible to produce high-quality German equipment in the quantities necessary to make up for losses. Rather, it is impossible in the same mode of operation of the economy. I had to start mobilizing the economy. However, these actions were very late - it was necessary to prepare for the situation before the attack.
Technique
When assessing the potential of the parties, it is necessary to clearly separate the equipment by purpose. The decisive influence on the outcome of the battle is exerted primarily by the machines of the "battlefield" - equipment engaged in the destruction of the enemy by direct fire in the forward echelons of troops. These are tanks and self-propelled guns. It should be admitted that in this category the USSR had an absolute superiority, having produced 2, 6 times more military equipment.
Light tanks with machine-gun armament, as well as tankettes, are allocated to a separate category. Formally being tanks, they represented a very low combat value for 1941. Nor the German Pz. I, nor the Soviet T-37 and T-38, the language does not turn to be included in a row with the formidable T-34 and even light BT or T-26. Passion for this technique in the USSR should be considered not a very successful experiment.
Self-propelled artillery is indicated separately. The difference between this category of armored vehicles from assault guns, tank destroyers and other self-propelled guns lies in the ability to fire from closed positions. For them, the destruction of troops by direct fire is rather an exception to the rule than a typical task. In fact, these are ordinary field howitzers or MLRS mounted on the chassis of armored vehicles. At present, this practice has become the norm, as a rule, any artillery gun is towed (for example, the 152-mm howitzer MSTA-B) and self-propelled (MSTA-S). At the time, this was a novelty, and the Germans were among the first to implement the idea of self-propelled artillery, covered with armor. The USSR limited itself only to experiments in this area, and the built self-propelled guns using howitzers were used not as classical artillery, but as a breakthrough weapon. At the same time, 64 BM-8-24 jet systems were produced on the T-40 and T-60 chassis. There is information that the troops were satisfied with them, and why their mass production was not organized is not clear.
The next category is combined arms armored vehicles, the task of which is to support the equipment of the first line, but not designed to destroy targets on the battlefield. This category includes armored personnel carriers and SPAAGs on armored chassis, armored vehicles. It is important to understand that such vehicles, by their design, are not intended to conduct combat in the same formation with tanks and infantry, although they should be located behind them in close proximity. It is mistakenly believed that the armored personnel carrier is a battlefield vehicle. In fact, the armored personnel carriers were originally intended to transport infantry in the frontal zone and protect it from artillery shell fragments at the initial lines of the attack. On the battlefield, armored personnel carriers, armed with a machine gun and protected by thin armor, could not help either the infantry or the tanks. Their large silhouette makes them a beautiful and easy target. If in reality they entered the battle, it was forced. Vehicles of this category affect the outcome of the battle indirectly - saving the lives and strength of the infantry. Their value in battle is significantly lower than that of tanks, although they are also necessary. In this category, the USSR practically did not produce its own equipment, and only by the middle of the war acquired a small number of vehicles supplied under Lend-Lease.
The temptation to classify the armored personnel carrier as a battlefield technique is fueled by the presence of very weak tanks in the ranks of the Red Army, for example, the T-60. Thin armor, primitive equipment, weak cannon - why is the German armored personnel carrier worse? Why is a tank with such weak performance characteristics a battlefield vehicle, but not an armored personnel carrier? First of all, a tank is a specialized vehicle, the main task of which is precisely the destruction of targets on the battlefield, which cannot be said about an armored personnel carrier. Although their armor is similar, the low, squat silhouette of the tank, its mobility, the ability to fire from a cannon clearly speaks of its purpose. An armored personnel carrier is precisely a transporter, not a means of destroying the enemy. Nevertheless, those German armored personnel carriers that received specialized weapons, for example, 75-cm or 3, 7-cm anti-tank guns are taken into account in the table in the corresponding lines - anti-tank self-propelled guns. This is true, since this armored personnel carrier was eventually made into a vehicle designed to destroy the enemy on the battlefield, albeit with weak armor and a high, clearly visible silhouette of the transporter.
As for armored vehicles, they were mainly intended for reconnaissance and security. The USSR produced a huge number of vehicles of this class, and the combat capabilities of a number of models came close to the capabilities of light tanks. However, this applies primarily to pre-war technology. It seems that the effort and money spent on their manufacture could have been spent with better benefit. For example, if some of them were intended for the transport of infantry, like conventional armored personnel carriers.
The next category is special vehicles without weapons. Their task is to provide troops, and booking is needed primarily to protect against accidental shrapnel and bullets. Their presence in battle formations should be short-term; they do not have to constantly accompany the advancing troops. Their task is on time and in the right place, advancing from the rear, to solve specific tasks, avoiding contact with the enemy whenever possible.
Repair and recovery vehicles, the Germans produced about 700 units, plus about 200 converted from previously released equipment. In the USSR, such machines were created only on the basis of the T-26 and produced in the amount of 183 units. It is difficult to fully assess the potential of the repair forces of the parties, since the matter was not limited to ARVs alone. Sensing the need for this type of technology, both Germany and the USSR were engaged in handicraft conversion of obsolete and partially faulty tanks into tow trucks and tractors. In the Red Army there were quite a few such vehicles with dismantled turrets based on the T-34, KV and IS tanks. It is not possible to establish their exact number, since all of them are made in combat units of the army, and not at factories. In the German army, despite the presence of specialized ARVs, similar homemade products were also made, and their number is also unknown.
The ammunition transporters were intended by the Germans primarily to supply the advanced artillery units. In the Red Army, the same task was solved by ordinary trucks, the security of which, of course, was lower.
The vehicles of the forward observers were also mainly needed by the artillerymen. In the modern army, their counterparts are the vehicles of senior battery officers and mobile reconnaissance posts of the PRP. However, in those years, the USSR did not produce such machines.
As for the bridgelayers, their presence in the Red Army may be surprising. Nevertheless, it was the USSR that produced 65 of these vehicles on the basis of the T-26 tank under the designation ST-26 before the war. The Germans, on the other hand, manufactured several of these vehicles based on the Pz IV, Pz II and Pz I. However, neither the Soviet ST-26s, nor the German bridgelayers had any effect on the course of the war.
Finally, the Germans produced quite massively such specific machines as blasting charges stackers. The most widespread of these machines, the Goliath, was a remotely controlled single-use tankette. This type of machine can hardly be attributed to any category, so their tasks are unique. The USSR did not produce such machines.
conclusions
Analyzing the impact of weapons production on the consequences of war, two factors must be taken into account - the balance of the weapons system and the balance of equipment in terms of the quality / quantity ratio.
The balance of the armament system of the German army is highly appreciated. In the pre-war period, the USSR was unable to create anything of the kind, although the leadership was aware of the need for this. The lack of auxiliary equipment negatively affected the combat capabilities of the Red Army, primarily in the mobility of support units and infantry. Of all the wide range of auxiliary equipment, it is worth regretting the absence in the Red Army, first of all, of armored personnel carriers and self-propelled anti-aircraft installations. The absence of such exotic vehicles as remote blasting charges and artillery observer vehicles could be overcome without tears. As for the ARVs, their role was quite successfully solved by tractors based on tanks with removed weapons, and there are still no armored ammunition carriers in the army, and the troops in general cope with this task with the help of ordinary trucks.
The production of armored personnel carriers in Germany should be considered justified. Knowing the cost of military equipment, it is not difficult to calculate that the production of the entire fleet of armored personnel carriers cost the Germans about 450 million marks. For this money, the Germans could build about 4000 Pz. IV or 3000 Pz. V. Obviously, such a number of tanks would not greatly affect the outcome of the war.
As for the USSR, its leadership, overcoming the technological lag behind the Western countries, correctly assessed the importance of tanks as the main striking force of troops. The emphasis on improving and developing tanks ultimately gave the USSR an advantage over the German army directly on the battlefield. With the high benefits of support technology, it was the machines of the battlefield, which in the Soviet army had the highest priority of development, played a decisive role in the outcome of battles. The large number of support vehicles in the end did not help Germany in any way to win the war, although it certainly saved a considerable number of German soldiers' lives.
But the balance between quality and quantity ended up not in favor of Germany. The traditional inclination of the Germans to strive in everything to achieve the ideal, even where it is worth neglecting, played a cruel joke. Preparing for war with the USSR, it was necessary to pay close attention to the mass production of equipment. Even the most advanced combat vehicles, in small numbers, are not able to turn the tide of events. The gap between the combat capabilities of Soviet and German technology was not so great that German quality superiority could play a decisive role. But the quantitative superiority of the USSR turned out to be able not only to make up for the losses of the first period of the war, but also to influence the course of the war as a whole. The ubiquitous T-34s, supplemented by small Su-76s and T-60s, were everywhere, while the Germans from the very beginning of the Second World War did not have enough equipment to saturate the huge front.
Speaking about the quantitative superiority of the USSR, it is impossible to ignore the discussion of the traditional template “filled up with corpses”. Having discovered such a striking superiority of the Red Army in technology, it is difficult to resist the temptation to put forward the thesis that we fought in numbers, not skill. Such statements should be stopped immediately. Not a single, even the most talented commander, will give up quantitative superiority over the enemy, even if he can fight in times fewer troops. Quantitative superiority gives the commander the broadest possibilities for planning a battle and does not at all mean an inability to fight a small number. If you have a lot of troops, this does not mean that you immediately enthusiastically throw them into a frontal attack, in the hope that they will crush the enemy with their mass. Whatever the quantitative superiority, it is not infinite. Providing your troops with the opportunity to operate in greater numbers is the most important task of industry and the state. And the Germans understood this perfectly, having squeezed out of their economy in 43-45 everything that could be achieved in an attempt to achieve at least not superiority, but parity with the USSR. They did not do it in the best way, but the Soviet side did it excellently. Which became one of the many building blocks in the foundation of the victory.
P. S.
The author does not consider this work to be exhaustive and final. Perhaps there are specialists who can significantly supplement the information presented. Any reader can get acquainted with the collected statistics in detail by downloading the full version of the statistical table presented in this article from the link below.
References:
A. G. Solyankin, M. V. Pavlov, I. V. Pavlov, I. G. Zheltov “Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. (in 4 volumes)
W. Oswald. "Complete catalog of military vehicles and tanks of Germany 1900 - 1982."
P. Chamberlain, H. Doyle, "Encyclopedia of German tanks of the Second World War."
