“Doubts arise all the time. Contrary to all doubts, only those who are able to act in any conditions will achieve success. Descendants would rather forgive erroneous actions than complete inaction."
(G. Guderian. "Tanks, forward!" Translation from German. M., Military Publishing, 1957)
It turns out that on the eve of the outbreak of World War II, the Germans had a complete qualitative superiority in the armament of their tanks over the tanks of potential enemies, and above all the USSR, if you do not take into account the T-34 and KV tanks, which, however, have not yet been "brought to mind" and had many different disadvantages. Another important circumstance was the 30 mm armor, which was absent in the overwhelming majority of Soviet vehicles, and the relatively low quality of shells and guns of the serial T-26 and BT was already noted. True, the command of the Red Army in 1938 tried to improve them and issued an order for a new 45-mm tank gun with improved ballistic characteristics for the new turrets of the T-26 and BT-7 tanks. The armor-piercing projectile of the new gun weighing 1, 42 kg was supposed to have a speed of 860 m / s and, at a distance of 1000 m, pierce 40 mm armor at an angle of meeting 30 degrees. However, work on it was never crowned with success.
"Matilda". The tank proved itself well near Moscow, but … it had poor maneuverability on Russian ice! (Museum in Latrun)
In England, the development of an effective tank gun began in 1935, and in 1938 the two-pound rapid-fire OQF Mk 9 40-mm '(or rather 42-mm) cannon was put into service. Its armor-piercing projectile weighing 0.921 kg had an initial speed of 848 m / s and, at a distance of 450 m, pierced an armor plate 57 mm thick when it was tilted at 30 degrees, which was an excellent indicator at that time. But … in 1936, only 42 tanks were produced in England, in 1937 - 32, and in 1938 - 419, most of them with machine-gun armament. In the USA, a 37-mm tank gun, capable of penetrating 48 mm thick armor at a distance of 457 m, was created in 1938. In terms of armor penetration, it surpassed the corresponding Czech and German guns, but was inferior to the British 40-mm tank gun. However, the first tanks on which it could be installed appeared overseas only in 1939!
The first Soviet tank with 60 mm thick anti-cannon armor was the T-46-5.
Fortunately, monsters with 152, 107 and 45-mm cannons, as well as a flamethrower, existed here only in the form of wooden dummies. Tank T-39 and its variants.
All this, however, was a weak consolation for Heinz Guderian, who was aware of the economic power of Germany's opponents and knew that even if at the moment the USA and England did not have enough tanks, this did not mean that they would always be lacking., and that perhaps there will be many of them later. At the same time, knowing well the economic capabilities of Germany itself, he realized that he would never have many tanks at his disposal, and tried as best as possible to train the crews of those vehicles that were in his possession. He personally developed the charter of the armored forces, according to which tankers had to flawlessly control the tank, both day and night, shoot accurately, be able to take care of their car and maintain its mechanisms in working order on their own. First of all, tank drivers were selected and trained. If after the very first practical lessons the instructors did not notice any particular progress in the cadets, then they were immediately transferred to the radio operators or loaders. The drivers were trained to move in convoys, for which many kilometers were arranged for 2-3 days along special routes.
Everything is like in war. Work on the T-34 model was carried out in a cold shed!
The accuracy of the course they followed was monitored by specially seconded navigators from the Kriegsmarine, and instructors from the Luftwaffe, sparing no ammunition, taught the gunners the art of accurate shooting. The loaders were required to be able to meet the strict standard for loading a tank gun, providing a high rate of fire from the tank, and the gunners had to also quickly and accurately open fire at the target, which the commander indicated to them. The cadets devoted their free time to caring for the tank, and also intensively engaged in physical training, which was considered very important for them, since, by the nature of their service, tankers had to deal with lifting weights all the time. The best cadets were encouraged, the worst were regularly screened out.
"Sea trials"
Soviet tankmen later recalled: "If a German tank misses you with the first shot, then it never missed the second." Two factors: excellent optics and good training gave German tankers a real advantage in firing.
Bundesarchiv: photo of the wrecked T-34. Summer 1942. The shortage of rubber has led to the appearance of these wheels. The roar from such tanks could be heard for several kilometers!
Another photo from the Bundesarchive. Destroyed T-34 on the street of Stalingrad. The places where the shells hit are clearly visible. And there are several hits. Why is this? Wasn't it possible to stop the tank with one hit? Obviously, if there are five of them!
But what was the situation in the Red Army at that time, we look at the order of the NKO No. 0349 of December 10, 1940, which, in order to save the material part of heavy and medium tanks (T-35, KV, T-28, T-34) and " maintaining them in constant combat readiness with the maximum amount of motor resources "for training personnel in driving and shooting, putting together tank units and formations, allowed to spend 30 hours a year on each vehicle of the combat training park, and 15 hours for combat *. All tactical exercises were ordered to be carried out on T-27 tanks (double tankettes!); T-27s were excluded from the staff of rifle military units and formations and were transferred to the manning of tank divisions at the rate of 10 tanks for each battalion. In fact, this is the same as learning to drive a bus or a heavy-duty transporter behind the wheel of a small car like the modern "Oka" or "Matis".
T-34-76 manufactured by STZ. The remnants of a train destroyed by German aircraft near Voronezh. 1942 year. (Bundesarchiv)
To this should be added the numerous technical problems of Soviet armored vehicles. So, the T-34-76 tanks, produced in 1940-1942, for all their merits, had a huge number of various defects, which could be dealt with only by 1943-1944. The reliability of the "heart of the tank" - its engine was very low. The service life of 100 engine hours for diesel-2 at the stand was achieved only in 1943, while German-made Maybach gasoline engines easily worked out 300-400 engine hours in a tank.
BA-6 V. Verevochkina even shoots!
The officers of the NIBTP (Scientific Research Armored Range), who tested the T-34 in the fall of 1940, revealed many design flaws in it. In its report, the NIBTP commission directly stated: “The T-34 tank does not meet modern requirements for this class of tanks for the following reasons: the firepower of the tank could not be fully utilized due to the unsuitability of observation devices, defects in the installation of weapons and optics, the tightness of the fighting compartment and inconvenience of use ammunition rack; with a sufficient power reserve of the diesel engine, the maximum speeds, the dynamic characteristics of the tank were chosen unsuccessfully,which reduces the speed and maneuverability of the tank; tactical use of the tank in isolation from the repair bases is impossible due to the unreliability of the main components - the main clutch and chassis. The plant was asked to expand the dimensions of the turret and the fighting compartment, which would make it possible to eliminate defects in the installation of weapons and optics; to develop anew the packing of ammunition; replace existing observation devices with new, more modern ones; rework the units of the main clutch, fan, gearbox and chassis. To increase the warranty period of the V-2 diesel engine up to at least 250 hours. But by the beginning of the war, all these shortcomings were preserved almost in full.
The BT-7 looks just like the real one. Is that the tracks of the tracks are not at all the same and the engagement of the tracks is different.
In addition, it should be noted that the T-34 four-speed gearbox was unsuccessful in design and easily broke down when shifting errors by an inexperienced driver. To avoid breakdowns, skills were required, worked out to automatism, which was unattainable with the volume of hours that were allocated for driving by order of the NCO. The design of the clutches was also unsuccessful, which for this reason often failed. The fuel pumps were also unreliable. In general, the T-34 tank was very difficult to control, requiring high training and physical endurance from the driver. During a long march, the driver lost 2-3 kg in weight - it was so hard work. Frequently, a radio operator helped the driver to change gears. German tanks did not have such difficulties with control, and if the driver failed, almost any of the crew members could easily replace him.
Some of the 1930s cars looked fantastic. For example, this Czechoslovak BA PA-III (1929)
R. Gorokhovsny's armored motorcycle project.
"Hovercraft Tank". Another pearl of R. Gorokhovsky.
The observation devices of the T-34 consisted of mirrored periscopes at the driver and in the turret of the tank. Such a periscope was a primitive box with mirrors mounted at an angle above and below, but these mirrors were not made of glass, but … of polished steel. Not surprisingly, their image quality was disgusting, especially when compared to German optics from Karl Zeiss Jena. The same primitive mirrors were in the periscopes and on the sides of the turret, which were one of the main means of observing the tank commander. It turned out that it was extremely difficult for him to monitor the battlefield and carry out target designation.
It is very difficult to breathe in the fighting compartment after a shot because of the smoke; the crew literally burned out when firing, since the fan in the tank was very weak. The hatches in battle, according to the regulations, were required to be closed. Many tankers did not close them, otherwise it was impossible to keep track of the dramatically changing situation. For the same purpose, it was necessary from time to time to stick your head out of the hatch. The driver also often left the hatch open in the palm of his hand.
Heinrich Himmler examines the T-34 SS division "Das Reich" near Kharkov (April 1943). (Bundesarchiv)
Roughly the same, that is, not in the best way, was the case with the KV tanks, which were also equipped with low-quality clutches and gearboxes. From a shell hit, the KV often jammed the turret, and the T-34s were often hit through the driver's hatch, for some unknown reason placed in the frontal sheet of the armored hull. It is also unclear why on the KV tanks the designers put a broken, and not straight, as on the T-34, front armor plate. He demanded more metal, and did not add security to the car at all.
Not only was the training of Soviet tankers at the lowest level, but also there was a sorely lack of command and technical personnel. Data on some formations for June 1941: in the 35th TD of the 9th mechanized corps KOVO, instead of 8 tank battalion commanders, there were 3 (manning 37%), company commanders - 13 instead of 24 (54, 2%), platoon commanders - 6 instead of 74 (8%). In the 215th MD, the 22nd MK KOVO lacked 5 battalion commanders, 13 company commanders, staffing with junior command personnel - 31%, technical - 27%.
Soviet T-34s in service in the German Wehrmacht. The tanks show the commander's cupola from German tanks. It seems to be a good idea, but … the tower, as before, remained double. The tank commander, who is also the gunner, was very overloaded with the maintenance of the gun. And why does he also need a tower? Similar towers were installed on Soviet T-34 model 1943 with a nut turret. This tower was more spacious, but all the same - the tank commander could not use it. Didn't the Germans really understand that it was wasted work to put such turrets on the narrow tower of the thirty-four? After all, there was no way to "stick" the third tanker into the 1941 model tower!
Tankmen of the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" at their Pz. III tank near Kursk. A lot of hatches are good. It is convenient to leave the burning tank! (Bundesarchiv)
Interesting are the personal impressions of tanker Rem Ulanov, with whom I personally had the opportunity to meet and communicate when I was the editor of the magazine “Tankomaster”: “During my service in the army, I had the opportunity to deal with many tanks and self-propelled guns. I was a driver-mechanic, a vehicle commander, a deputy technical engineer of a battery, a company, a battalion, a tester in Kubinka and at a training ground in Bobochino (Leningrad Oblast). Each tank has its own "disposition" for control, overcoming obstacles, the specifics of making turns. For ease of control, I would put the German T-III and T-IV tanks first … I note that driving the Pz. IV was not fatiguing due to the ease of working with the levers; The seat with a backrest also turned out to be convenient - in our tanks the seats of the driver-mechanics did not have backrests. The only irritation was the howling of the gears of the transmission and the heat emanating from it, which seared the right side. The 300-horsepower Maybach engine started up easily and worked flawlessly. The Pz. IV was shaky, its suspension was stiffer than the Pz. III, but softer than the T-34. The German tank was much more spacious than our thirty-four. The convenient location of hatches, including in the sides of the turret, allowed the crew, if necessary, to quickly leave the tank …"
* Today, those who are trained to drive a car in category "B", according to the program approved by the Ministry, must skate on a training car with an instructor for 56 hours on a car with a manual transmission or 54 hours with an automatic transmission. For those studying to be a truck driver (category "C"), the program provides 72 hours for manual and 70 for automatic transmission. And this is for modern people living in the world of technology. For recruits of that time, and even planted in a tank, even 100 hours would be clearly not enough!
