The armed forces of Poland received enormous attention from Washington and the leading American arms corporations in just a few years after the beginning of the aggravation of the military-political situation in the small, but very complex and unpredictable European theater of operations. The proximity to the key positions of the anti-aircraft missile brigades and regiments of the Air Defense Forces of Belarus and the Russian Aerospace Forces determines the constant "pumping" of the Polish Army and Air Force with the most modern modifications of Western strike missile weapons. For example, by the end of this year, the Polish Air Force will receive a direct supply from Lockheed Martin of 40 long-range tactical air-launched cruise missiles, which are intended to be mounted on the suspension points of F-16C / D multirole fighters.
In previous reviews concerning the level of threat to the Russian and Belarusian air defense systems from this contract, we determined that with a massive missile strike by all 40 JASSMs simultaneously, the anti-missile defense in the areas of one or a pair of deployed S-300PS battalions can be broken through, and some of the unfinished cruise the missiles will follow to the coordinates of the specified targets (the most dubious direction in this regard is the Belarusian air force); a much more stable situation with the air defense of the Kaliningrad and Leningrad regions, where the Aerospace Forces are switching to the more advanced 10-channel S-400 Triumph much faster than the RB. But even here, the dangers are not excluded, because the Americans have "trump" drones - false targets ADM-160C MALD-J, which will create the radar and computing facilities of the "Triumph", as well as the calculation of a complex puzzle in the form of a "dense cloud" of dozens of target simulators and real targets flying in a chaotic mixed order at an altitude of 20 - 50 m. Selecting real targets may take precious minutes, during which no, no, but several missiles can break through. But JASSM are not the only modern threat with which our advanced anti-aircraft missile systems have to compete, because it is much easier to notify the approach of these missiles due to the airborne pylons of F-16C carriers, the combat work of the latter from a distance of several hundred kilometers will be recorded by AWACS aircraft operators. -50U. No less a threat to air defense systems are land-based tactical long-range cruise missiles.
From our side, it is the 9K720 Iskander-M operational-tactical missile system with R-500 long-range low-signature cruise missiles capable of penetrating dense enemy missile defense at a distance of more than 500 km from the front line. The most expedient deployment of Iskander-M near the borders of Eastern European NATO member states, as well as in the South and North Caucasus and the Baltic states, where the proximity of strategic military facilities in Turkey, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland allows less than an hour completely suppress most of the command and staff facilities, destroy the main nodes of electronic intelligence and air defense in order to disorganize the forward lines of the NATO Joint Forces even in the initial phase of a possible escalation of the conflict, as they say - the American concept of limiting and denying access and A2 / AD maneuver in action.
The importance of ground-based tactical missile systems has acquired in our time such proportions that programs for their development are already underway not only in global and regional superpowers, but also in states such as Poland, especially since the latter has enlisted the serious support of American aerospace giants such like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon. Apparently, the result of this support was the promising small-sized land-based cruise missile Pirania, designed by the Warsaw Institute of Technology of the Air Force (ITWL). An image of this rocket was published on September 30, 2016, on the janes.com website news, along with the preliminary performance characteristics of the designed product.
Before us is a small-sized long-range subsonic tactical cruise missile with a compact turbojet engine, the nacelle of which is located inside the tail compartment, which significantly reduces the radar signature of the CR in the frontal plane (a similar scheme was used in the R-500 cruise missile of the Iskander-M complex, as well as the SKR family "Caliber"), but unlike the "Calibers" on the "Piranha" is installed significantly extended from the body of the oval air intake made of composite materials, which repeats the design of the SKR family BGM-109A-F "Tomahawk". This indicates that the Raytheon Corporation took an active part in the Polish Pirania program.
The Piranha cruise missile is a fairly small air attack weapon: its hull diameter is 200 mm, the wingspan of retractable wings is 800 mm, and its length is 2200 mm. The mass of the rocket is within 100 kg (the Pirania rocket is 12 times lighter than the BGM-109G and exactly 2, 5 times smaller in size, which indicates the creation of an exact reduced copy of the Tomahawk). Low weight and dimensions make it easy to launch it even from small, but prepared car platforms, placed on a standard off-road chassis. This gives incredible advantages both in the promptness of the transfer of the complex to one or another part of the theater of operations, and in its excellent camouflage among ordinary civil and military vehicles. For example, it will be much easier for operators of the MRK-411 radio complex installed on ORTR Tu-214R aircraft to classify a large MLRS M142 HIMARS launcher or OTRK M270 ATACMS launcher at a distance of up to one and a half hundred kilometers, rather than stand out from other BM vehicles with a launcher installation of KR "Piranha".
Now we come to the most interesting parameter of the Pirania rocket - its effective scattering surface. It is absolutely clear that it is not possible to accurately determine this indicator without having data on the radio-absorbing materials of the body, as well as on the prevailing radio-contrast metal materials in the nose of the rocket. But guided by the well-known information regarding the RCS of a similar size (body diameter 20 cm) of aircraft, we can say that at best it will amount to 0, 015-0, 02 m2 (taking into account radio-absorbing coatings), and therefore even the most advanced onboard radars of the Irbis type -E "(Su-35S) or radar" Shmel-M "(AWACS A-50U aircraft) will be able to detect it from a distance of no more than 95-115 km. The Piranha is a much more difficult target than the Tomahawk and even the HARM anti-radar missile.
If, when launching an AGM-158A JASSM from a tactical fighter, it will be easier to determine the fact of the start of an attack, both due to the early detection of the attacking fighter itself, and the JASSM itself with a larger EPR than the Piranha, then calculate a ground launch from a small minibus or SUV of such A stealth drone, like the Piranha, would be very problematic with radar. The only way to detect its launch is to use highly sensitive airborne optoelectronic survey complexes with cooled high-resolution infrared matrices, since it is reported that Pirania will be equipped with a solid-propellant accelerator. The effectiveness of such a detection method may depend on factors such as the terrain from which the rocket is launched, as well as on the meteorological situation between the launching Piranha and the airborne heat direction finder.
It is known from official sources that the S-300PT / PS anti-aircraft missile systems can operate on elements of high-precision weapons with an effective scattering surface of at least 0.05 m2, which may lead to the opinion that it is impossible to intercept Piranha cruise missiles using these modifications " Three hundred ". The element base of these versions of the air defense missile system is really becoming outdated: the analogue electronic equipment of the combat control point (PBU) 5N63S and the multifunctional radar (MRLS) 30N6, in addition to the lower energy capabilities of the 30N6, really make such a picture plausible. In such circumstances, it remains to be hoped that the Belarusian S-300PS, similar to the Russian ones, will receive an upgrade package to the S-300PM1 level. These complexes are capable of operating on targets with an RCS of 0.02 m2, which is where the promising Polish Piranha missile launcher fits.
A very serious drawback of the Pirania cruise missile can be considered its low flight speed, which is about 500-550 km / h, but this is compensated by a minimum flight altitude of 20 m, a small radar and infrared signature, as well as a range of 300 km, which is just over 2 meters is an excellent indicator, almost reaching the American AGM-158A missile (350 km). The minimum flight altitude of 20 m creates serious difficulties for intercepting all modifications of the Osa-AKM military air defense missile system, including even the most modern Belarusian Osa-1T and T38 Stilett, since the target detection station (SOC) and the station are identical in terms of performance characteristics. target tracking (STS) have a lower limit for locating and firing targets at 25 meters, and for confident destruction it should be no more than 15-20 meters. So the air defense systems of the Tor-M1 line with a 10-meter lower threshold for intercepting targets have a great advantage over the Wasps in the fight against targets such as the Piranha.
The low altitude and high accuracy of the Piranha's exit to the battlefield is achieved by advanced avionics, which include: a radio altimeter, an inertial navigation system based on modern on-board computers, synchronized with a digital GPS module, as well as a tactical information exchange device with the command post for various radio communication channels, including satellite. In addition, flying at speeds of about 0, 4-0, 45M "Piranha" is capable of performing a fairly high-quality local reconnaissance over the theater of operations on its own trajectory, turning into a "stealth" UAV. Responsible for this is an integrated compact airborne radar with a synthetic aperture mode (in the western slang SAR), which maps in detail the relief of the earth's surface lying directly under the flight path of the Piranha. The lower border is for overcoming missile defense, the upper one is for reconnaissance. Together with the terrain, this radar weighing only 5 kg will be able to provide NATO headquarters with photographically accurate radar images of our ground military facilities in the Eastern European theater of operations, if the latter are not covered by proper military air defense. Information on this radar, just like on other important network-centric Piranha nodes, is not disclosed, but it is known that to achieve a smaller circular probable deviation (CEP), it can be equipped with a combined dual-band infrared-ultraviolet homing head, an analogue of which, called POST-RMP, installed on SAM FIM-92C complex "Stinger-RMP".
Equipping this homing head provides for the possibility of using the Piranha cruise missile against mobile ground targets (armored combat vehicles, mobile elements of air defense missile systems and MBT) using infrared traps. The introduction of an ultraviolet channel allows selection of real heat-contrast targets (from the infrared radiation of the engine) from IR traps. Also, a dual-range IR-UV homing head is capable of very effectively capture combat vehicles using optical-electronic countermeasures and coatings that reduce the infrared signature.
If we evaluate the Pirania cruise missile as a promising means of breaking through air defense missile defense as a whole, then a picture emerges where calculations of a large number of modifications of modern military anti-aircraft missile and anti-aircraft missile-artillery systems will face problems of its timely detection and destruction due to very low radar and infrared visibility. So, for example, modifications of the Osa air defense missile system, including the Osa-AKM version, will be able to fight this insidious stealth missile solely thanks to the optoelectronic complex coupled with the tracking radar, at night, when only an ineffective for detection in the front hemisphere of the IR channel, "Piranha" cannot be effectively detected by SOC and SOC of older versions of "Wasp". The same situation, apparently, will be observed with the old modifications of the Tungusska-M anti-aircraft missile and cannon systems (up to the Tungusska-M1 version), where at the hardware level the possibilities of obtaining target designation from the higher unified battery command units have not yet been implemented. points of the "Rank" type, as well as attached radar facilities. More modern military complexes such as "Tor-M1V / 2" "Tungusska-M1", "Pantsir-S1", as well as long-range air defense systems of the type S-300PM1 / 2 and S-400, using more high-potential radars for illumination and guidance 30N6E, the capabilities to combat this missile will be a couple of orders of magnitude higher.
Nevertheless, about a dozen years after the adoption of the Polish Armed Forces, the Piranhas will be a serious help in the formation of a NATO strike echelon near the western air borders of the CSTO, where we still have “gaps” and areas that cannot be seen by the radar field.
