Actually, the visit of British Prime Minister David Cameron to Afghanistan on December 6 would not have attracted much attention. It seems that such "unannounced" visits by top officials of states whose military contingents are located in this country are becoming the norm, which is not surprising. Everyone is interested in what has actually been achieved in the nine years that have elapsed since the introduction of troops and what should be expected in the near future. By 2014, almost all the member states of the Alliance intend to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, which has been repeatedly confirmed at all levels. This is on the one hand. On the other hand, everything indicates that the failure of NATO's strategy is already becoming obvious to everyone. None of the tasks declared in 2001, declared the reason for the invasion, has been solved: the Taliban are weakened, but not suppressed. The volume of drug trafficking from Afghanistan is growing. The central government is practically incompetent. The destruction of al-Qaeda and the capture of Osama bin Laden are not remembered in decent society now. In a word, according to the apt definition of "TEHRAN TIMES" - NATO is bogged down in the "Afghan swamp".
But you cannot simply leave Afghanistan. The British also understood this in the 19th and 20th centuries, the USSR and the Russian Federation understood this from their own bitter experience, and the United States also understood this. Afghanistan has been and remains the key to the Middle East and post-Soviet Central Asia. Losing such prizes in the Great Game is not in the US rules. Naturally, options for a new strategy for the United States and Great Britain are now feverishly being worked out both before 2014 and after 2014. And about one of the options being developed, David Cameron accidentally let slip: “We do not set ourselves the task of creating a perfect democracy of the Swiss type in the Hindu Kush. We strive to ensure that Afghanistan reaches a basic level of stability and security, as well as economic growth, so that the people participate in [the country's] prosperity. As you can see, some evidence of positive change is already beginning to emerge.” Key words here, as you already understood - "democracy of the Swiss type." Why Swiss, what a strange analogy? Of course, it happens that politicians make a reservation. It happens even more often that they say not at all what they think. Moreover, they do not always think what they are saying. But why Switzerland? This is how one of the legal portals defines the state structure of Switzerland: “… it is a federal state. It consists of 23 cantons, 3 of which are divided into half-cantons … each canton independently determines the issues of their organization. Most cantons are administratively divided into districts and communes. Small cantons and semi-cantons have only communities. Each canton has its own constitution, parliament and government work. The boundaries of their sovereignty are defined in the federal Constitution: "The cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the federal constitution. They exercise all rights that have not been transferred to federal power" (Article 3). How is this type of device projected onto the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan? But to answer this question, one should take a slightly deeper look at what Afghanistan has been like since the founding in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani. By and large, Afghanistan was a federation of Pashtun tribes. The dominance of the Pashtuns in all elements of government was absolute, the tribal council (Loya Jirga) acted as the supreme legislative body, the “Pashtun Walai” regulated the life of the kingdom, the provinces were feudal allotments given “for feeding” to the representatives of clans and tribes. I'll make a reservation right away that I'm exaggerating the situation somewhat, without going into detail and analysis of the features, trying to stay in the format of an article. The situation changed radically during the reign of Abdur-Rahman (who ruled from 1880 to 1901), when, following the results of the “Great Game”, Afghanistan finally established itself within the borders known to us. During the "Great Game" and the redrawing of the geographical map, territories inhabited by Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras and other nationalities were included in Afghanistan. Pashtuns on the territory of the new kingdom are already about 50%, while maintaining their dominant political influence. Moreover, it was political, since the affiliated ones quickly crushed agriculture and trade under themselves. Practically from this moment on, the main line of political development in Afghanistan is the struggle for power between the Pashtuns on the one hand and other nationalities on the other. And if the Pashtuns tried to maintain their dominant position, then the rest of the nationalities demanded representation in power according to their influence in the economy and the number in the population of the country.
Afghanistan under Abdur Rahman
The accumulated contradictions spilled over into the uprising of Bachai Sakao (a Tajik from a poor family who proclaimed himself padishah Khabibulla) in 1929 and the overthrow of Amanullah Khan, in whose support Soviet troops also came out. However, Soviet aid to Amanullah Khan did not help, Nadir Khan came to power, on whom the British were betting, who managed to put Soviet Russia in conditions that excluded an increase in the military contingent. A new round of anti-Pashtun protests began soon after the overthrow of Zahir Shah and the proclamation of the republic by Mohammed Daoud. However, the description of all the vicissitudes of this struggle is not included in the purpose of this article. Let's jump straight to 2001. What do we see? The peak of the confrontation between the Taliban (the backbone of which were Pashtuns) and the Northern Alliance led by Ahmad Shah Massoud, Ismail Khan, Rabbani (Tajiks), Rashid Dostum (Uzbek). Moreover, speaking of the Northern Alliance, we must remember that we are talking about the armed forces of the state of Northern Afghanistan proclaimed on October 9, 1996 (which retained the former name of the country, the Islamic State of Afghanistan), controlled by the Supreme Council. And it is in this confrontation that NATO is intervening. The main goal of the intervention is to overthrow the Taliban, who, according to the official version, support bin Laden. But in Afghanistan, the invasion is seen as helping support against Pashtun hegemony. But then the following happens: December 5, 2001 in Bonn under the auspices of the UN (read the United States) opens a conference on the post-war structure of the country. On the same day, the Loya Jirga National Assembly of Afghan Tribal Elders is convened, at which representatives of the Northern Alliance, under US pressure, sign an agreement on the formation of a transitional government of Afghanistan. As its head, a Pashtun from the Durrani tribe of the Popolzai clan and a distant (in the European sense, but by no means in Afghan) relative of the ousted Zahir Shah, are approved. Two years later, the Loya Jirga approves the country's new Constitution, introducing a presidential form of government, and in 2004 Karzai becomes president of Afghanistan. Here it is necessary to clarify one important point. Within the Pashtuns, Karzai is not fully trusted due to his pronounced pro-American orientation and Western mentality. Among other nationalities, he cannot enjoy support because he is a Pashtun. Actually, Karzai rests only on American support, and this is not forgiven in Afghanistan by definition. By placing Karzai as president and not creating a counterbalance to him in the form of a strong figure from the Northern Alliance as prime minister, the Americans have driven themselves into a strategic impasse. Afghanistan is well aware that Karzai can speak a thousand times about democracy and equal opportunities for all nationalities. But in practice, he will defend the interests of the Pashtuns. Trying to find a way out of their own created impasse and answering the bewildered questions of the Northern Alliance representatives - “what were they fighting for?”, The Americans organized elections to the National Assembly of Afghanistan in 2005. This is how the ethnic composition of this body looks like: Ethnic group Number of seats in parliament% Pashtuns 118 47, 4 Tajiks 53 21, 3 Hazaras 30 12, 0 Uzbeks 20 8, 0 Non-Khazaras-Shiites 11 4, 4 Turkmen 5 2, 0 Arabs 5 2, 0 Ismailis 3 1, 2 Pashai 2 0, 8 Baluchis 1 0, 4 Nuristanis 1 0, 4 Total 249 100 And the population of Afghanistan is distributed along ethnic lines as follows Pashtuns 38% Tajiks 25% Hazaras 19% Uzbeks 9% Turkmen 3% Ethnic Afghanistan map today looks like this:
The logic of the Americans in the creation of the National Assembly was quite understandable: to ensure proportional representation of national groups in the highest, in the American opinion, body of Afghanistan. But there was a trap here, too. The idea that there is “power” and “representation in power” in Afghanistan is completely different from that in NATO countries. Therefore, representation in the National Assembly does not mean anything for national groups, and is not perceived by them as participation in power. For them, the presence of their representatives in this Assembly is an empty phrase, and only the power of the president, prime minister, minister, governor of the province seems to them real. All this leads us to a very definite conclusion. With the departure of the NATO contingent, and not even the departure - weakening, a new round of national confrontation will begin. No matter how pessimistic it may seem, in the near future, the coexistence of Pashtuns and other ethnic groups within the borders of modern Afghanistan is impossible. There can be only one way out - either a confederation or a division of Afghanistan along the South-North line. And the confederation option is more preferable for the West, because it will allow the usual principle of “divide and rule” to be implemented with all external respect, without the next introduction of a contingent and armed confrontation. Probably, David Cameron's reservation was a reflection of the controversy about such a variant of the post-NATO structure of Afghanistan.
