Almost everyone knows about American supplies to the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. The "Studebakers" and the American stew, nicknamed "the second front" by the Soviet soldiers, immediately pop up in my memory. But these are, rather, artistic and emotional symbols, which are actually the tip of the iceberg. The purpose of this article, the author sets out to create a general idea of Lend-Lease and its role in the Great Victory.
In the initial period of World War II, the so-called act of neutrality was in force in the United States, according to which the only way to provide assistance to any of the belligerents was the sale of weapons and materials exclusively for cash, and transportation was also entrusted to the customer - the "pay and take" system (cash and carry). At that time, Great Britain became the main consumer of military products in the United States, but very soon it exhausted its hard currency. At the same time, President Franklin Roosevelt was well aware that in this situation, the best way out for the United States is all-round economic support for the countries fighting against Nazi Germany. Therefore, on March 11, 1941, he actually "pushed through" the "United States Protection Act", also called the Lend-Lease Act, in Congress. Now, any country whose defense was recognized as vital for the United States, weapons and strategic raw materials were provided on the following conditions:
1. Weapons and materials lost in the course of hostilities are not subject to payment.
2. The property left after the end of the war, suitable for civilian purposes, must be fully or partially paid on the basis of long-term loans provided by the United States.
3. Equipment not lost after the war must be returned to the United States.
Joseph Stalin and Harry Hopkins, 1941
After the German attack on the USSR, Roosevelt sent his closest aide Harry Hopkins to Moscow, as he wanted to find out "how long Russia will hold out." This was important, since in the United States at that time the prevailing opinion was that the resistance of the USSR would not be able to provide significant resistance to the Germans, and the supplied weapons and materials would simply fall to the enemy. On July 31, Harry Hopkins met with Vyacheslav Molotov and Joseph Stalin. Following their results, the American politician left for Washington with the firm conviction that the Germans would not have a quick victory and that the supply of weapons to Moscow could have a significant impact on the course of hostilities.
However, the USSR was included in the Lend-Lease program only in October-November 1941 (up to this point, our country paid for all American military supplies). It took Roosevelt such a long period of time to overcome the resistance of a sufficiently large number of American politicians.
The first (Moscow) protocol, signed on October 1, 1941, provided for the supply of aircraft (fighters and bombers), tanks, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, trucks, as well as aluminum, toluene, TNT, oil products, wheat and sugar. Further, the number and range of supplies were constantly expanding.
The delivery of goods took place along three main routes: Pacific, Trans-Iranian and Arctic. The fastest, but at the same time dangerous was the Arctic route to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. The ships were escorted by the British fleet, and on the approaches to Murmansk, security was reinforced by ships of the Soviet Northern Fleet. At first, the Germans practically did not pay attention to the northern convoys - their confidence in an early victory remained so great, but as the hostilities became protracted, the German command pulled more and more forces to bases in Norway. The result was not long in coming.
In July 1942, the German fleet, in close cooperation with aviation, practically defeated the PQ-17 convoy: 22 out of 35 transport ships were killed. North Africa forced the British to stop escorting northern convoys before the onset of the polar night. Beginning in 1943, the balance of power in Arctic waters gradually began to shift towards the Allies. The number of convoys increased, and their escort was accompanied by fewer losses. All in all, 4027 thousand tons of cargo along the Arctic route to the USSR. Losses did not exceed 7% of the total.
Less dangerous was the Pacific route, along which 8376 thousand tons were delivered. Transportation could only be carried out by ships flying the Soviet flag (the USSR, unlike the United States, was not at war with Japan at that time). Further, the received cargo had to be transported by rail practically through the entire territory of Russia.
The Trans-Iranian route served as a definite alternative to the northern convoys. American transport ships delivered cargo to the ports of the Persian Gulf, and then they were delivered to Russia using rail and road transport. In order to ensure full control over transport routes in August 1941, the USSR and Great Britain occupied Iran.
To increase the capacity, we carried out a large-scale modernization of the ports of the Persian Gulf and the Trans-Iranian Railway. Also, General Motors has built two factories in Iran, which assembled cars intended for delivery to the USSR. In total, during the war years, these enterprises manufactured and sent to our country 184,112 vehicles. The total cargo traffic through the ports of the Persian Gulf for the entire period of the existence of the Trans-Iranian route amounted to 4227 thousand tons.
Aircraft under the Lend-Lease program
From the beginning of 1945, after the liberation of Greece, the Black Sea route also began to function. In this way, the USSR received 459 thousand tons of cargo.
In addition to those noted above, there were two more air routes along which aircraft were ferried on their own in the USSR. The most famous was the Alsib (Alaska - Siberia) air bridge, over which 7925 aircraft were airlifted. Also, planes flew from the USA to the USSR through the South Atlantic, Africa and the Persian Gulf (993 planes).
For many years, the works of Russian historians indicated that lend-lease supplies accounted for only about 4% of the total volume of Soviet industry and agriculture. And, although there is no reason to question the reliability of this figure, nevertheless, "the devil is in the details."
It is well known that the strength of a chain as a whole is determined by the strength of the weakest link. Therefore, defining the range of American supplies, the Soviet leadership sought first of all to close the "weak points" in the army and industry. This can be seen especially clearly when analyzing the volumes of strategic raw materials supplied to the USSR. In particular, the 295.6 thousand tons of explosives received by our country accounted for 53% of all produced at domestic enterprises. Such a ratio for copper - 76%, aluminum - 106%, tin - 223%, cobalt - 138%, wool - 102%, sugar - 66%, and canned meat - 480% looks even more impressive.
General A. M. Korolev and Major General Donald Connelly shake hands in front of a train arriving as part of a Lend-Lease supply.
The analysis of supplies of automotive equipment deserves no less close attention. In total, the USSR received 447,785 vehicles under Lend-Lease.
It is significant that during the war years Soviet industry produced only 265 thousand cars. Thus, the number of machines received from the allies was more than 1.5 times higher than its own production. In addition, these were real army vehicles, adapted for operation in front-line conditions, while the domestic industry supplied the army with ordinary national economic vehicles.
The role of Lend-Lease vehicles in combat can hardly be overestimated. To a large extent, they ensured the success of the victorious operations of 1944, which went down in history as the "ten Stalinist blows."
Considerable merit of allied supplies and in the successful functioning of Soviet railway transport during the war years. The USSR received 1,900 steam locomotives and 66 diesel-electric locomotives (these figures look especially clearly against the background of its own production in 1942-1945 in 92 locomotives), as well as 11,075 cars (own production - 1,087 cars).
In parallel, the "reverse lend-lease" functioned. During the war, the Allies received from the USSR 300 thousand tons of chromium and 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, as well as timber, gold and platinum.
During discussions on the topic "Could the USSR do without Lend-Lease?" many copies have been broken. The author believes that, most likely, he could. Another thing is that now it is not possible to calculate what the price of this would be. If the volume of weapons supplied by the allies could, to one degree or another, be fully compensated by the domestic industry, then with regard to transport, as well as the production of a number of types of strategic raw materials without supplies from the allies, the situation would very quickly turn into a critical one.
The lack of rail and road transport could easily paralyze the supply of the army and deprive it of mobility, and this, in turn, would reduce the pace of operations and increase the growth of losses. A shortage of non-ferrous metals, especially aluminum, would lead to a decrease in the production of weapons, and without food supplies, it would be much more difficult to fight hunger. Surely our country could have withstood and won even in such a situation, but it is not possible to determine how much the price of victory would have increased.
The Lend-Lease program ended on the initiative of the American government on August 21, 1945, although the USSR asked to continue deliveries on credit terms (it was necessary to restore the country destroyed by the war). However, by that time F. Roosevelt was no longer among the living, and a new era of the Cold War was knocking loudly at the door.
During the war, payments for supplies under Lend-Lease were not made. In 1947, the United States estimated the USSR's debt for deliveries at $ 2.6 billion, but a year later the amount was reduced to $ 1.3 billion. It was planned that the repayment will be made within 30 years with the accrual of 2.3% per annum. I. V. Stalin rejected these accounts, saying that "the USSR paid off the debts of the Lend-Lease in full in blood." As a substantiation of its point of view, the USSR cited the precedent of writing off debts for supplies under Lend-Lease to other countries. In addition, I. V. Stalin quite reasonably did not want to give the funds of the war-ravaged country to a potential enemy in the Third World War.
An agreement on the procedure for the repayment of debts was concluded only in 1972. The USSR pledged to pay $ 722 million by 2001. But after the transfer of $ 48 million, payments were stopped again in connection with the adoption of the discriminatory Jackson-Vanik amendment by the United States.
This issue was raised again in 1990 at a meeting between the presidents of the USSR and the United States. A new amount was set - $ 674 million - and a final maturity date of 2030. After the collapse of the USSR, the obligations on this debt passed to Russia.
Summing up, we can conclude that for the United States, Lend-Lease was primarily, in the words of F. Roosevelt, "a profitable investment of capital."Moreover, it is not the profit directly from the supplies that should be assessed, but the numerous indirect benefits that the American economy received after the end of World War II. History was pleased to order that the post-war welfare of the United States to a large extent was paid for with the blood of Soviet soldiers. For the USSR, Lend-Lease became practically the only way to reduce the number of victims on the way to Victory. Here's a "marriage of convenience" …
