A quarter of a century without the Warsaw Pact has not added security to Europe
In 1990, the Warsaw Pact (ATS) ceased to exist, five years before its half-century anniversary. How possible at the present stage is an objective analysis of the activities of this once most powerful military-political organization and, more broadly, of the geopolitical project?
On the one hand, the OVD cannot be called a tradition of deep antiquity. Suffice it to say that NATO military structures deployed in Eastern European countries are using their Soviet legacy, which to this day forms the basis of the weapons of our former allies. On the other hand, other political leaders who stood at the origins of the Internal Affairs Directorate and led it during the Cold War have already gone into the world. And the first question: did the Warsaw Pact ensure stability in Europe or, on the contrary, played a destructive role?
For obvious reasons, public opinion in the West sees the OVD only in a negative light. In Russia, the situation is different. For liberal circles, the history of the Department of Internal Affairs is associated exclusively with the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia and is perceived as the desire of the totalitarian regime to retain control over the socialist camp and, at the same time, raise fear in the "free world". Most of the society positively assesses the role of the Warsaw Pact, explaining the presence of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe by reasons of state security.
Soviet Europe
For what purpose did the Soviet leadership create the most powerful military grouping in Eastern Europe? The view of Western experts is well known: the Kremlin was striving to spread its military and political influence throughout the world. A year after the creation of the Internal Affairs Department, Khrushchev issued the famous phrase to the Western ambassadors: "We will bury you" (however, it was taken out of context). In the same 1956, Soviet troops suppressed the Hungarian uprising, the USSR provided military support to Egypt in the struggle for the Suez Canal. And the West saw in Khrushchev's ultimatum a threat to use nuclear weapons against the European powers and Israel.
But it must be borne in mind that Hungary's withdrawal from the Internal Affairs Directorate could become a precedent behind which the danger of destruction of the entire military-political structure created by the USSR in the region was hidden. And then NATO's expansion to the East would have begun not at the end of the century, but half a century earlier, and there is no reason to expect that this would strengthen stability in Europe and in the world.
In addition, the OVD was created six years later by NATO precisely as a retaliatory step. The statements of the North Atlantic Alliance to guarantee the freedom and security of all its members in Europe and North America in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter were purely declarative. The aggression against Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya, the attempt to overthrow the legitimate regime in Syria, the desire to include the countries of the former USSR in the orbit of influence testify to the aggressive nature of NATO. The true goals of the bloc in 1949 did not coincide with the peace-loving statements of its founders.
In creating the OVD, Moscow was guided solely by considerations of its own security. It was the desire to prevent NATO from approaching the western borders of the USSR that led to the Kremlin's tough reaction to any attempts by the Warsaw Pact states to withdraw from the organization. This should explain the entry of troops into Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
Recall that several years before the suppression of the Prague Spring, the United States was ready to invade Cuba to prevent the nuclear threat posed by Soviet missiles deployed there. The Kremlin was guided by similar considerations in 1968 when it dismissed Dubcek.
It is enough to look at the map to be convinced: Czechoslovakia, even more than Hungary, was the cornerstone of the entire military system of the Internal Affairs Directorate. By sending troops into a neighboring country, the Soviet leadership did not seek to acquire foreign territories, but maintained a balance of power in Europe.
The judgments of those who believe that Prague, which had left the Department of Internal Affairs, would not have turned out to be a US sphere of influence in the near future, are extremely naive. Yes, the statements of American diplomats at that time testified to the unwillingness of Washington, which had not yet recovered from the Vietnamese adventure, to aggravate relations with Moscow over Czechoslovakia. However, military experts in the West and in the Soviet Union understood that Czechoslovakia is not Vietnam, so the Kremlin could not rule out that Prague would allow the deployment of NATO bases on its territory, in the immediate vicinity of our borders.
Let us note the very geographical position of the Eastern European countries largely predetermines the nature of their foreign policy doctrines. This is an orientation either towards the USSR (Russia) or towards the West. As you know, the ex-OVD countries chose the second option, turning from allies of a powerful eastern neighbor, who saw them as brothers in arms, into NATO satellites, into cannon fodder for the implementation of the geopolitical efforts of the United States. Why so, the explanation is simple: the Slavs, like the Hungarians and the Romanians, do not belong to the Romano-Germanic world. Therefore, the alliance does not guarantee security to our former partners in the event of a large-scale military conflict - it will rather leave them to their own devices. It is impossible to imagine how the Americans or the British are shedding their blood for freedom, for example, of Poland.
In general, Western analysts view the activities of the Department of Internal Affairs in the light of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine, the key provisions of which were formulated overseas, and not in the USSR, although the Soviet leadership did not dispute its main theses. The essence of the doctrine: the USSR reserves the right of military intervention in the life of any country - a member of the Warsaw Pact in case the latter wishes to leave the organization. Note that, in fact, a similar provision is contained in the NATO Charter. This document states that if destabilization in one of the countries poses a threat to others, the alliance has the right to military intervention.
General Margelov against black colonels
The conclusion about the Kremlin's desire to maintain a military balance in Europe can be confirmed by the opinion of A. A. Gromyko, who headed the Foreign Ministry for 28 years. This most experienced diplomat was opposed to any changes in the country's foreign policy, consistently advocating the preservation of the status quo on the world stage. This position is quite logical, because, according to the minister's son Anatoly Gromyko, an objective analysis of the foreign policy activities of the Brezhnev cabinet is possible only if we take into account the so-called syndrome of June 22: almost all Soviet leaders went through the Great Patriotic War and therefore did their best to prevent the escalation of military tension in Europe.
A year before the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia, the countries participating in the Internal Affairs Directorate held the Rhodope exercises, caused by the coming to power in Greece of the "black colonels" - then there was a real danger of the junta invading southern regions of Bulgaria. The commander of the Airborne Forces, General of the Army V. F. Margelov, supervised the maneuvers. The paratroopers were airlifted to the Rhodope Mountains, along with the available heavy equipment and anti-tank weapons, since the Soviet General Staff allowed the possibility of a tank attack by the Greek troops. Units of the Marine Corps, also with heavy weapons, landed on the coast and made a 300-kilometer march to the place of the exercises, in which Romanian and Bulgarian units also took part. Without unnecessary pathos, let us say that the elite Soviet units led by the legendary general demonstrated, firstly, the USSR's readiness to protect the allies, which is unlikely - we repeat - NATO old-timers will go with respect to their newly made members, and secondly, they showed high skill and mobility of troops. Moreover, the actions of Soviet units cannot be called window dressing, because almost a decade later, the same 106th Airborne Division demonstrated excellent combat readiness in the mountains of Afghanistan.
In the same year, the USSR held exercises under the code name "Dnepr", covering the territory of the Belarusian, Kiev and Carpathian military districts. Here Moscow used exclusively Soviet troops, but the defense ministers of the countries participating in the Internal Affairs Directorate were invited. Thus, the exercises can be called an integral part of the activities of the Warsaw Pact. Their scale is evidenced by the fact that the leadership was carried out by the Minister of Defense A. A. Grechko.
We believe that the Rhodope maneuvers and the Dnepr exercises became a serious deterrent for those American generals who in 1968 were ready to insist on providing Czechoslovakia with more active support.
Our response to Reagan
In the 70s, the situation in Europe remained stable: neither NATO nor the Internal Affairs Directorate took hostile actions towards each other, fully understanding their futility from a military point of view. However, the situation changed in 1981 when Reagan became the president of the United States, publicly calling the Soviet Union an evil empire. In 1983, the Americans deployed Pershing-2 and Tomahawk ballistic missiles in Western Europe. Both types of offensive weapons were equipped with thermonuclear ammunition. The flight time of the Pershing to the Urals was about 14 minutes.
Of course, the actions of the White House were declared as a defensive measure against the "aggressive designs" of the Kremlin. Were such fears of Washington justified? In 1981, the countries participating in the Internal Affairs Directorate conducted the Zapad-81 exercises, which were of an operational-strategic nature and became the largest in the history of the Soviet Armed Forces, in terms of the scale and number of troops involved, comparable to the offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. For the first time, automated control systems and some types of high-precision weapons were tested, and a massive landing in the enemy's rear was worked out. The exercises were offensive, but their strategic goal was precisely defensive - to show the West the power of the Internal Affairs Directorate, the ability to prevent any aggression from NATO, as well as interference in the internal affairs of the countries of the socialist camp. Note that the exercises were conducted during an unstable situation in Poland.
The following year, we conducted the Shield-82 exercise, called a seven-hour nuclear war in Brussels. The actions of the ATS troops were practiced in a thermonuclear conflict. Against the backdrop of Reagan's aggressive statements and the prospects for the deployment of American missiles in Europe, Moscow took adequate steps to demonstrate the power of the Soviet Armed Forces. Cruise missiles were launched from the Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers, an interceptor satellite was launched into orbit, etc.
Demonstration of military power by the USSR and its allies probably caused the opposite effect - Reagan saw in Moscow's actions a desire to deliver a nuclear strike first. In 1983, NATO conducted an exercise codenamed Able Archer 83 ("Experienced Shooter"). The latter, in turn, alarmed the Soviet leaders. In retaliation, the Kremlin brought the Strategic Missile Forces on alert No. 1, and increased army groupings in the GDR and Poland. For the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the world is on the brink of a nuclear war. However, the balance that had been established between NATO and the ATS made the armed conflict in Europe meaningless, which in many respects helped to preserve the peace. More precisely, a nuclear conflict was becoming meaningless, while a meeting on the battlefield of the land armies of two military-political blocs could end on the shores of the English Channel. This conclusion can be drawn based on the results of the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia. Even with the overwhelming superiority, the alliance did not dare to undertake a ground operation.
I felt sorry for Alaska
A natural question arises: Would Reagan have refused to deploy nuclear missiles in Western Europe, if earlier we had not conducted large-scale exercises? Based on the doctrinal guidelines of the White House, the aggressive rhetoric of the president, which followed a decade of NATO expansion to the East, and a direct invasion of Iraq, it seems that the United States would have deployed its missiles anyway.
One can object: why, focusing on the USSR's desire to maintain stability in Europe through the creation of the Internal Affairs Directorate, in fact they deny this desire to the Western countries - NATO members. Yes, probably, creating the North Atlantic Alliance, the leading European countries were guided primarily by defensive tasks, especially since the power of the Soviet Armed Forces, even without taking into account the allies in the socialist camp, in aggregate, significantly exceeded the military potential of England, and even more so France. Concerned about the preservation of the crumbling empire and exhausted by the Second World War, Great Britain, of course, could not nurture aggressive plans against the USSR - the "Unthinkable" plan should hardly be considered seriously, since London did not have the funds or resources for its implementation. The same can be said about France, which did not find the strength and desire to defend its own independence in 1940, and pro-Soviet sentiments in the Fourth Republic of the post-war period were very strong. However, the United States played a key role in NATO's activities. In Washington, in the middle of the 20th century, they did not hide their aggressive intentions towards the USSR.
Suffice it to say that in 1948 the Pentagon developed a plan for the war against the USSR, which had the code name "Troyan". American strategists expected to strike with 133 nuclear bombs on 70 Soviet cities. At the same time, the US military leaders set the task of destroying the civilian population, the main economic centers and military facilities of the Soviet Union as their main goal.
The named plan was not the only one. Already in the next year, 1949, the Pentagon developed "Dropshot" ("Short Strike"), according to which it was supposed to drop at the first stage 300 atomic bombs on 100 Soviet cities, of which 25 - on Moscow, 22 - on Leningrad, 10 - on Sverdlovsk, 8 - to Kiev, 5 - to Dnepropetrovsk, 2 - to Lvov, etc. As a result, the irrecoverable losses of the USSR would have amounted to about 60 million people, and taking into account further hostilities - over 100 million.
This plan partially lost its relevance only in 1956, when Soviet long-range aviation aircraft were able to reach US territory with refueling in the air and deliver a nuclear strike. However, the scale of possible losses still turned out to be incommensurable. Nuclear parity between the USSR and the United States was achieved only in the 70s.
In this situation, the creation by the Kremlin of a powerful military-political bloc in Eastern Europe became at least a relative guarantee that the Americans would not dare to use atomic weapons against us, since otherwise their NATO allies would have been under the blows of Soviet troops. Yes, and Washington did not want to lose Alaska, and in the event of a full-scale conflict with the Soviet Union, it would hardly have been able to keep it.
The fact that the United States not only nurtured aggressive plans towards the USSR as a hostile system, but also strove for the maximum military-economic weakening of Russia as a civilization alien to them, of a different cultural and historical type, in the language of Nikolai Danilevsky, is evidenced by themselves overseas politicians. After the end of the Cold War, Zbigniew Brzezinski emphasized: "Don't be mistaken: the fight against the USSR was in fact a fight against Russia, no matter how it was called."
