The uncrowned emperor, the de facto co-ruler of Catherine the Great - this is how Grigory Potemkin is often called in historical monographs and novels. His influence on the development of the Russian Empire in the 70s and 80s of the 18th century was enormous. The geopolitical projects of His Serene Highness have predetermined the future of Russia for centuries to come.
Large-scale statesmanship, pragmatism, diplomacy, ebullient energy earned him fame during his lifetime, not only in Russia, but also abroad. In the context of the growing influence of the Russian state on European affairs, the intensification of international relations, Grigory Potemkin was viewed as a promising candidate for a number of state thrones.
At least three times there was an opportunity to transform the status of an unofficial prince - consort of the Russian Empire into the title of monarch of one of the European principalities.
At the beginning of 1779, a group of noblemen from Courland turned to Potemkin with a request to head this small state. By that time, the Duchy of Courland was formally in vassal dependence on Poland, but in fact it was subordinate to St. Petersburg. Local elites were looking for a replacement for the extremely unpopular Duke Pierre Biron. The corresponding proposal was conveyed to Grigory Alexandrovich by the then colonel Ivan Mikhelson, who was of Baltic origin. His Serene Highness liked this idea, but Catherine II replied with a categorical refusal.
By that time, the development of Novorossiya was already in full swing, and the diversion of the attention of the state governor in this strategically important region of the empire to the affairs of the Baltic duchy was seen as undesirable. In addition, the empress did not want to bind herself with any agreements with Prussia (which also had its own interests and influence in Courland) in the context of the emerging alliance of Russia and Austria.
The question of the Courland crown for Potemkin was continued in 1780. The Prussian king Frederick II, concerned about the rapprochement between Russia and Austria, through his envoy in St. Petersburg, offered support for Grigory Alexandrovich's claims to the ducal crown or in his reconciliation with Grand Duke Pavel Petrovich. Friedrich probably thought that by doing so, the personal interests of the influential courtier could be opposed to the aspirations of the Russian state. But he was wrong.
The proposal to create for Potemkin a semi-independent principality in the Commonwealth was expressed by the Polish king Stanislav August. It sounded during the famous trip of Catherine the Great to the Crimea. On March 20, 1787, at a preliminary meeting with the Russian delegation in the town of Khvostovo, the head of Poland expressed the idea of turning the Potemkin possessions in the Smila region (Right-Bank Ukraine) into a special sovereign principality. This state formation was to be formally dependent on the Polish crown, like Courland.
The fact that this step corresponded to the aspirations of the Most Serene Prince may be evidenced by the fact that in the late 70s of the 18th century he himself was looking for an opportunity to create a separate possession on the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The so-called Russian party, which was actually supported by Potemkin's money, attempted to give him the official status of an indigenous to his vast estates in Lithuania and Belarus.
Empress Catherine II was annoyed by the act of the king. After all, it turned out that, referring to the actual co-ruler of Russia, Stanislav August acted over her head. At that time, she was extremely restrained about attempts at Russian-Polish rapprochement. Grigory Alexandrovich had no choice but to reject this initiative. A year later, His Serene Highness was already actively promoting a plan for Russia to absorb the entire Polish Ukraine, as well as Belarus and Lithuania.
The claims of Grigory Alexandrovich to the throne of the ruler of the Moldavian principality are not documented in the now known historical sources. On the contrary, the Austrian diplomat Charles-Joseph de Lin in his memoirs quoted the statement of His Serene Highness with regard to the Moldovan-Wallachian throne: “This is a trifle for me, if I wanted, I could become the king of Poland; I renounced the Duchy of Courland. I stand much higher."
However, thanks to the events of the Russian-Turkish war in 1790-1791, Grigory Potemkin nevertheless became the de facto head of the Moldavian state. His actions in the principality went far beyond the powers of the head of the occupation administration and betrayed long-term interests in Moldova.
The commander-in-chief of the Russian armies in the south rotated the members of the Divan (Moldovan government) and appointed Ivan Selunsky, the former Russian vice-consul in Iasi, as its head. At the main apartment in Moldova, he created a courtyard, which was a semblance of the imperial court in St. Petersburg. Here "Asian luxury and European sophistication were combined at the holidays that followed one another, in an unbroken chain … The best contemporary artists flocked to amuse the Most Serene Prince, who was crowded with important famous nobles of neighboring countries."
Potemkin attracted the local nobility to the court, was especially affectionate towards the Moldavian boyars. Those, in turn, almost openly called on Grigory Alexandrovich to take the fate of the principality into his own hands. In letters they thanked him for his release from the "tyranny of the Turks" and begged him not to lose sight of the interests of their country, which will always "honor him as a liberator."
Many Moldovans served at the General Staff and in the active army. Moldovan volunteers (about 10 thousand) were transferred to the position of Cossacks and subordinated directly to Potemkin. Instead of taxes collected by the Ottomans, supplies were introduced in Moldova to provide Russian troops with supplies and transport. The Russian administration demanded from the local authorities strict adherence to the distribution of duties in accordance with the income of residents. Due to the fact that a stricter tax regime was established in the regions of Moldova occupied by Austrian troops, there was an influx of population into the territory controlled by Potemkin.
In February 1790, at the behest of Grigory Alexandrovich, the first printed edition of the newspaper type in the history of Moldova was published. The newspaper was called Courier de Moldavia, was published in French, each issue was decorated with the coat of arms of the Moldavian principality - the image of a bull's head crowned with a crown.
Potemkin patronized Moldovan cultural and art workers. It was he who was able to discern the great talent of the artist in Eustathia Altini, who later became an outstanding icon painter and portrait painter. With the care of the prince, a peasant nugget from Bessarabia was sent to study at the Vienna Academy of Arts. Local art critics say that the artistic impressions of the inhabitants of the principality under the influence of the musical and theatrical undertakings of the prince turned out to be so significant that they allow us to speak of the "Potemkin era" in Moldova.
Probably the most ambitious undertaking of His Serene Highness in the Danube principality was the establishment in 1789 of the Moldavian Exarchate. Despite the fact that the Danube principalities were the canonical territory of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, the exarchate was created as part of the Russian Orthodox Church. It can be assumed that Grigory Alexandrovich would hardly have unleashed a conflict with the Patriarch of Constantinople if he had not linked his future with Moldova.
The content of diplomatic battles during the Russian-Turkish war of 1789-1791 can shed light on Potemkin's plans for the Moldavian principality.
The war plan, approved by the State Council of Russia in 1787, was based on the provisions of the Russian-Austrian treaty of 1781. The treaty provided for the severing of the Moldavian and Wallachian principalities from the Ottoman Empire, their unification into one independent state called Dacia. It was planned to make the ruler of this new state a prince professing Orthodoxy, attentive to the interests and security of Russia and Austria.
At the end of 1788 (after the capture of Ochakov), under the influence of the folding of the Triple League (England, Prussia and Holland) and its threats against Russia, Petersburg was ready to make concessions to Istanbul on the issue of the Danube principalities, provided that their autonomous status was preserved.
The active offensive actions of the allies in 1789 led to the creation of a draft peace treaty with Turkey by Russia and Austria, proposing that the Porte begin negotiations on the basis of the principle of uti possidetis (recognition of the right to own the conquered territory). Recognition of the independence of Moldova and Wallachia, according to this project, was one of the most important conditions for concluding a peace treaty. By that time, Russia actually controlled most of Moldova, Austria occupied Wallachia.
Having settled in Yassy, Grigory Potemkin insisted on the need to create a separate Moldavian principality. This is evidenced by the rescript of Catherine II to Potemkin, dated March 1790: “You know that in the event of the success of our weapons, we assumed an independent region, from Moldavia, Wallachia and Bessarabia, compiled under its ancient name Dacia … We agreed with your opinion, that Moldavia alone, by its abundance, could … make up a profitable lot … The brightest defended the same condition in absentee negotiations with the Turkish vizier, abundantly stimulating the compliance of the Ottoman officials with generous donations.
However, England and Prussia again intervened, insistently demanding the return of the Danube principalities to the Ottoman Empire. In February 1790, Emperor Joseph II died, and in July the Austrians signed an armistice with the Turks, ceding the territory of Wallachia to them and leaving Russia alone with the Ottomans and the pro-Turkish coalition in Europe. Catherine II again doubted the need to defend an independent status for Moldova. Nevertheless, in 1790, under the leadership of Potemkin, the Russian armies and the Black Sea Fleet carried out one of the most brilliant campaigns in their history, culminating in the capture of Izmail. Encouraged by Western support, the Turks dragged out the peace talks. It was not possible to end the war in 1790.
Concerned about the growing aggravation of relations with England and Prussia, the military preparations of Poland, Catherine more and more insistently advocated the signing of a peace treaty with Turkey. In February 1791, His Serene Highness went to St. Petersburg, transferring command of the armies to Prince Nikolai Repnin. In the capital, he insists on the need for a deal with Prussia (at the expense of Poland) to gain freedom of action in relation to the Turks and Poles. In the meantime, Repnin becomes the main negotiator with Turkey, having received from the empress the authority to interrupt hostilities at any time on conditions favorable to Russia.
While the continuation of the war was seen by Catherine II more and more hopeless, the anti-Russian coalition in Europe began to show deep cracks. In England, anti-war sentiment was rapidly growing (merchants, port workers and even sailors protested), on March 18, the leader of the British opposition, Charles James Fox, made a fiery speech in parliament, proving that England had nothing to defend near Ochakov, British Prime Minister William Pitt was accused of patronizing the Turks - "Asian barbarians". Anglo-Prussian relations worsened.
On July 31, 1791, taking advantage of the victory in the Battle of Machin, the day before Potemkin returned to the headquarters of the commander-in-chief, Repnin signed an armistice agreement and preliminary conditions for a peace treaty with Turkey. The document provided for the expansion of the territory of Russia at the expense of the Bugo-Dniester interfluve upon the return of Moldova and Wallachia to the Sultan on the terms of autonomy. The Most Serene Prince was outraged by the last demand. In his correspondence with Catherine, he spoke of the need to reduce the armistice. Quite rightly, he reprimanded Repnin that he was in too much of a hurry to make peace at the moment when Ivan Gudovich's troops took Anapa, and Fyodor Ushakov's fleet was crushing the Turks at Kaliakria. According to Grigory Alexandrovich, these events would have made the conditions of peace incomparably more beneficial for Russia.
Potemkin joined in the struggle to renegotiate the terms of the unprofitable agreement. He demanded that Turkey undertake not to change the rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia of its own free will, granting the right to appoint them to Boyar Divan with the approval of the Russian consul. Turkish diplomats desperately resisted, seeing in this a desire only to formally subordinate Moldova to the Ottoman Empire. New military preparations began. It is difficult to imagine how this confrontation would have ended if it had not been for the sudden death of His Serene Highness.
Grigory Alexandrovich died on October 5, 1791 on the way from Iasi to Nikolaev, ten miles from the Moldavian village of Punchesti (now the Old Redeny of the Ungheni region of Moldova). On October 11, crowds of people flocked to the mourning ceremony in Iassy, the Moldovan boyars grieved over the loss of their benefactor along with Potemkin's military comrades-in-arms.
The claims of Grigory Potemkin to the thrones of a number of monarchical state formations are closely intertwined in the history of Russian foreign policy during the era of Catherine the Great. His actions can be justified by the stylistics of international relations of the 18th century, the great vanity of the Most Serene Prince, his objective desire to protect himself in the event of the death of the Empress-co-ruler.
Nevertheless, Grigory Alexandrovich's monarchical ambitions were not opposed to the interests of the Russian state. On the contrary, the implementation of Potemkin's personal geopolitical projects characterizes him as a statesman who prioritizes the achievement of foreign policy successes of the Russian Empire.
