December 24, 2019 took place an expanded meeting of the collegium of the Ministry of Defense with the participation of the President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin.
On this occasion, "Russia 24" made a short report, during which it "spotted" a project that was previously not worth talking about out loud. But now they are talking.
We are talking about a multipurpose corvette based on the project 22800 "Karakurt" - in fact, an enlarged "Karakurt" with enhanced air defense and the ability to fight against submarines. About how this ship should have been from the very beginning.
A little background.
RTOs, submarines and common sense
Since 2006, when V. V. Putin, led to the appearance in the fleet of cruise missiles "Caliber", the Navy acquired their carriers in the most irrational way of all possible - by building specialized "missile gunboats" of the "Buyan-M" type, with non-localized imported diesel engines, the absence of a target designation system and "no" seaworthiness. These ships could somehow perform a very narrow range of tasks, but only one task is good - a cruise missile strike against stationary (mainly ground) targets. In a war against an enemy with a combat-ready fleet, their survival was and remains a huge question - neither an attack by a submarine, even the most antediluvian, nor an air strike, at least from a helicopter, these ships will not be able to survive.
Their first combat use was, in a sense, a surprise, but specialists have always been clear about the inferiority of such ships - cruise missiles could well stand on some kind of multipurpose ships capable of performing a wide range of tasks, moreover, Russia had such ships then and still has them. just not enough. Example - corvettes of project 20385 (2 units), frigates of project 11356 (3 units), submarines of project 6363 "Varshavyanka" (7 units, 5 under construction) and frigates of project 22350 (2 units, 4 under construction).
Alas, but Gentshab's requirement to have "specialized missile ships" of the Navy and industry continued to be fulfilled due to the massive construction of frankly poor MRK, the only advantage of which was very good habitability - if a war had happened, their crews would go to the bottom, having huge and comfortable "through the bulkhead" cabins and cockpits.
Simultaneously with this "holiday of life", a serious "hole" was brewing in the country's defense capability, associated with the old age failure of the small anti-submarine ships of Project 1124 and 1124M Albatross. These ships were and still remain necessary to cover the deployment of our submarines and prevent them from being shot by the enemy at the stage of leaving the bases.
I must say that this threat is quite real. Only very recently, the US Navy began to reduce its presence in Avacha Bay, having ceased to ensure the continuous presence of a hunter submarine there at any time. True, since April 2018, the Japanese have taken up the watch and now they are on duty there.
In the north, for many years, the exit of our "strategists" from the bases was controlled by the Norwegian diesel-electric submarines of the "Ula" type. They were discovered extremely rarely and by accident, then they were always lost, it was not possible to establish any kind of long-term tracking or find the places where they charged the batteries from the Navy.
Today they are not on duty there, but the upcoming renewal of the Norwegian submarine starting in 2020 will make such operations very easy, and given the wild anti-Russian hysteria in the West, also desirable for the political forces and groups ruling in NATO countries.
In such conditions, anti-submarine defense becomes critical for ensuring the security of Russia, especially in the near sea zone in general, and near submarine bases, which are still the basis of the strike power of the Navy, in particular. In modern conditions, such defense in BMZ is provided by surface ships, non-nuclear submarines, anti-submarine aircraft and means of lighting the underwater situation.
In Russia, no anti-submarine aircraft or anti-submarine helicopters are mass-produced. FOSS has failed, and Russia does not have a working system today. Non-nuclear, or rather diesel-electric "Varshavyanka" are produced, and this is the only thing that we are good at - but the fact is that they are outdated and in general, the displacement of enemy submarines from the protected area by diesel-electric submarines is technically impossible during a threatened period. Diesel-electric submarines is a means of shooting "from an ambush", and no more.
In the face of such a failure on all fronts, there was only one option - to cover the near sea zone from enemy submarines with the help of surface ships. Together with the remaining scraps of anti-submarine aircraft, and the existing diesel-electric submarines, a large number of modern surface ships with good anti-submarine capabilities could partially compensate for the weakness of the rest of the submarine. With this approach, coverage would be critical - since we have no other means, and the submarine has an advantage in the detection range of the surface ship, there should really be a lot of such surface ships.
Like a distributed network of cooperating sensors, such ships, equipped with towed sonar stations, combined into ship search and strike groups (KPUG) could very harshly limit the ability for foreign submarines to act against ours, and sometimes force them to reveal themselves and "substitute" under strikes by PLO aircraft, no matter how primitive we have. And certainly the permeability of the areas of operation of the KPUG from such ships for enemy submarines would be near-zero. And the chances of destroying an enemy submarine from such ships in any case would be non-zero. If only because, in the correct version, a multipurpose ship should carry PLUR, and a large number of towed GAS in the ship's group would allow detecting underwater targets at a considerable distance.
Thus, the defense of BMZ, in our current conditions, required a large number of multipurpose ships with advanced capabilities in the part of ASW.
Alas, instead of them Russia was “crazy” building RTOs. At the same time, firstly, the multipurpose ship could easily replace the MRK - for the launch of anti-submarine missiles (PLUR), the same 3C-14 launcher of the UKSK complex is needed as for the "Caliber", and secondly, a massive roll in the MRK occurred literally "for the last money" - they were quickly built and handed over in conditions when the construction of project 20380 corvettes, capable of fighting submarines, was chronically underfunded, and a series of 20385 corvettes, capable of also using cruise missiles, was nailed down to please the super-expensive project 20386, the lead ship has a very good chance of never being built. Yes, and on the laid keels, the priorities of the Navy were more than clear - if the corvettes 20380 and 20385 were laid down 12 units, then the number of built, under construction and contracted MRK today is thirty. Read about how much these ships are in demand today in the articles "Does the Navy need small rocket ships?", "The United States is removing a whole class of Russian warships from the game".
The sanctions for the Crimea forced instead of "Buyan-M" with German diesels to come up with a completely localized "Karakurt". But the problem of PLO every year became more and more acute - the state of the combatant IPC is getting worse and worse, and too few corvettes were built, and new ones are not being laid, yes, to be honest, they turned out to be expensive. With our budget, it may be very difficult to close all BMZs like this, or it will have to be done to the detriment of all other needs of the Navy.
We need more budgetary solutions - massive, simple and cheap, such that the gaping failure in our anti-submarine defense could be closed in a matter of years. At the same time, the United States withdrew from the treaty on the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles, which finally put the construction of missile gunboats beyond common sense.
The understanding that the Navy is not doing what is really needed for the country's defense was and still exists among naval sailors and in industry. There are also projects of ships capable of replacing MRKs with themselves and conducting effective anti-submarine defense at the same time. So, the Zelenodolsk Design Bureau has a very interesting project based on the hull from the Project 11661 ship. True, it is not particularly interesting for the Zelenodolsk plant, but not because it is bad, but because the plant mows money on primitive RTOs and even more primitive and useless "patrol ships" of Project 22160.
Earlier there were very interesting projects of trimaran corvettes, with a completely "corvette" displacement carrying weapons at the level of the frigate.
But the "chase for missile cells" led to the fact that both time and money were spent on RTOs and "patrolmen". And even on a giant overgrown corvette 20386. The "hole" in the PLO, meanwhile, did not think to "dry up".
Somewhere "high", apparently, the awareness of the problem began and in 2019 rumors began to seep out of the abyss of naval ideas and concepts that the MPK 1124 Albatross would be repaired and modernized. This, of course, should have been done many years ago. But this is not enough.
We need a project that will make it possible to perform a miracle and “close” the PLO issue “here and now”, immediately, without wasting time.
And he appeared. It is his model that flickers in the report on the president's participation in the expanded collegium of the Ministry of Defense.
Let's take a closer look at this ship.
Multipurpose "Super Karakurt"
The author is in a certain difficulty, since it is simply impossible to write about many things related to the project, and it was not worth highlighting it until last Tuesday. Therefore, even about those things that are obvious and known, it will be written in a "conjectural" key. Much will simply have to be silent.
And nevertheless, the project is quite worthy to be presented to the public and launched into series, and the fleet needs such ships yesterday and in considerable quantities, so we will take the risk. We look at the model.
The ship's hull is developed on the basis of the Karakurt MRK hull, with an elongated central part. The same 76-mm gun mount AK-176MA is installed on the nose, followed by the "Karakurt" superstructure. Behind it, like that of the MRK, a vertical missile launch unit 3S-14 is installed, which is used to launch anti-ship missiles, long-range cruise missiles and PLUR. Theoretically, such a ship could even be used by the Zircon when receiving external target designation. Further differences begin. On the model, when viewed in dynamics, one more vertical launch setting can be traced. Taking into account the clearly visible radar "Positive-M", this can only be the "Redut" air defense system, the same one that is installed on corvettes 20380, 20385 and 20386, as well as on frigates of Project 22350. True, it is controlled by "Positive". It remains to be regretted that some of the same simplified radar did not find a place on the corvette 20385, this would radically reduce the cost of the ship.
With such a radar, the Redut air defense missile system, inside the zone in which the Pozitiv-M can detect air targets, will work better than on the 20380 corvette.
It is also seen that, unlike the Karakurt, the power plant exhaust for this ship is brought upwards. This is necessary for an anti-submarine ship, since the output of the exhaust into the water seriously interferes with the operation of the keel GAS.
At the stern, one can clearly see the round top of the AK-630 anti-aircraft artillery complex, apparently even the AK-630M, which is responsible for air defense from the aft corners.
The ship is clearly equipped with a squeaky GAS - it is clearly visible on the model. This means that it is possible to search for submarines on the move without a towed GAS released. The latter is on all existing Russian-made multipurpose ships, which means it is here as well. The lowered GAS for work "on foot", which is a very effective search method, on small anti-submarine ships is a long-standing Russian tradition, which means that it will be here as well.
Thus, in terms of its anti-submarine capabilities, this ship even surpasses the corvettes of projects 20380, 20385 and 20386, which has not yet been born. The disadvantage is the lack of a helicopter, but more on that later.
At close magnification and giving additional sharpness to the pictures, symmetrically mounted launchers of the "Packet-NK" complex are visible at the stern. Thus, the ship can protect itself from torpedoes of enemy submarines and itself hit the submarine with a 324 mm torpedo.
The most important thing that makes this ship attractive for mass construction is the Main Power Plant.
It was created on the basis of the GEMI MRK "Karakurt", with additional measures to reduce noise. This power plant is based on diesel engines manufactured by PJSC "Zvezda".
When the construction of the Karakurt began, it turned out that the supplier of diesel engines for the series of this ships, the St. Petersburg PJSC Zvezda, was simply unable to produce engines. The degradation of the enterprise has gone very far.
By now, measures to improve the situation at the plant have made themselves felt, and albeit not without difficulties, but Zvezda gives two "Karakurt" sets of power plants during the year. Since the ship does not have systems with a long production cycle, this means that such ships can be built two units per year.
And this is a very real figure - a Pella-type contractor would have mastered such a pace with such ships.
Moreover, there is a possibility that when these ships are launched into series, it will be possible to reach three sets, which will allow building and even delivering three such corvettes every year. As a result, taking into account the already built and under construction 20380 and 20385, the BMZ PLO can be closed in about five years - faster than one 20380 is being built.
The design of the ship is such that it can be built almost everywhere - at Pella, at the ASZ, and in Zelenodolsk (no matter how offensive it may be to the engineers and designers at the ZPKB), in the future even at the Zaliv - and in general, anywhere. Availability of available power plants and simplicity of design, the use of only serial ship systems with a short production cycle guarantees fast construction times - a few years per ship. It is entirely possible that such an OVR corvette will be comparable in terms of construction with the Varshavyanka submarine, of which 28 units have been built over the past 23 years.
There are no obstacles for this today.
Project evaluation
This is not to say that this project was perfect - so, for example, the lack of a bomb is a serious disadvantage. RBU is the only way to "get" a submarine lying on the ground, there are no others. A blow to a "contact" that suddenly appeared at a short distance is also faster to execute with a bomb.
For some reason, they stopped installing it on modern Russian ships. Super Karakurt is no exception.
Another disadvantage is completely zero compatibility with the helicopter. There is not even a landing site. At the same time, during operations to cover the deployment of submarines, the range of the Ka-27 and 27M helicopters allows them to be used from the shore. In addition, the KPUG may have a ship with a runway and a hangar. Nevertheless, note the minus.
The third minus obviously follows from the size of the ship - it is longer than the "Karakurt" but a little more in its displacement, that is, it is very light. This implies restrictions on the use of weapons on a strong roll, and nothing can be done about it. But, again, if you focus on real weather, then for a significant part of the year the sea waves will not impose restrictions on the ship, while the rest of the time it will probably be limited to target detection, and will transmit contact with aviation for destruction.
The fourth minus is narrow specialization. A ship can fight submarines and use rocket weapons, but, for example, firing on the shore can already be bad. The 76-mm cannon is very good as an anti-aircraft gun, it surpasses the 100-mm gun in this quality, but in other cases it is inferior and strongly - the mass of a 100-mm projectile is almost three times higher, the ammunition consumption for hitting any typical ground target in a 100-mm cannon lower by one and a half times.
But for us, the main problem is precisely the ASW, the rest is now in a somewhat less acute form, and the narrow specialization of the ship in this case can be neglected.
In general, it is not bad - the high speed and the presence of the BUGAS allows it to be installed in the PLO not only of naval bases and adjacent water areas, but also of convoys and amphibious detachments, and taking into account the presence of the Redut air defense system, it will be able to provide their air defense as well.
Like MRK "Karakurt", it can strike at surface targets and use long-range Kalibr cruise missiles.
As part of the anti-submarine KPUG, it will, minus the bomb launcher, seriously surpass the IPC pr.1124, and minus the helicopter - the corvette 20380, thanks to the presence of the PLUR.
The estimated price of such a ship is about 10 billion rubles, which is 2, 2 times less than the corvette 20385, and somewhere in 1, 9-2 times less than the corvette 20380.
But the most important thing is that, having laid down six or nine such ships in 2020, it will be possible to equip them with engines by 2023-2024, and the first three will receive engines by mid-2022 at the most. Moreover, taking into account the colossal problems taking place at the "Zvezda". This is unprecedentedly fast for modern Russia. And this makes the project simply uncontested in terms of the rapid restoration of the number of anti-submarine ships. You can make the ship better. You can even make it better for the same money.
But it cannot be done either faster or in the same time. This means that other options simply do not exist.
The project has some support within the Navy, albeit not at the very top. And this means that he has a chance.
This means that our submarines also have a chance to deploy safely from enemy submarines. We wish the fleet not to miss it.
