The "limited contingent of Soviet troops" introduced to Afghanistan on December 25, 1979 (the later famous Fortieth Army), was almost immediately reinforced by helicopter units and fighter-bombers of the 49th Air Army (VA) from TurkVO bases. Like the entire operation to "provide international assistance to the Afghan people," the transfer of aircraft and people took place in strict secrecy. The task - to fly to the airfields of Afghanistan and transfer all the necessary property there - was set before the pilots and technicians literally on the last day. "Outstripping the Americans" - it was this legend that was later stubbornly defended to explain the reasons for the entry of Soviet army units into the neighboring country. Shindand, a separate helicopter squadron was also placed there.
During the relocation, no technical problems arose - after a half-hour night flight, the first group of An-12, which delivered technical crews and the necessary ground handling equipment, landed in Afghanistan, followed by the Su-17. Haste and confusion made themselves felt - no one could say with certainty how the unfamiliar country, in whose hands the airfield was, would meet them, and what awaited at the “new duty station”.
The conditions of Afghanistan turned out to be far from comfortable and did not resemble the usual airfields and training grounds. As stated by the orientation of the General Staff, "by the nature of the terrain, Afghanistan is one of the most unfavorable areas for aviation operations." However, the climate was not favorable for the actions of the aviation either. In winter, thirty-degree frosts suddenly gave way to lingering rains and slush, the "Afghan" often blew out and dust storms flew in, reducing visibility to 200-300 m and making flights impossible. It was even worse in the summer, when the air temperature rose to + 52 ° C, and the skin of the aircraft under the scorching sun heated up to + 80 ° C. The constant drying heat, which did not subside at night, the monotonous diet and the lack of conditions for rest exhausted people.
There were only five airfields suitable for basing modern combat aircraft - Kabul, Bagram, Shindand, Jalalabad and Kandahar. They were located at an altitude of 1500 - 2500 m; sea level. Only the excellent quality of the runway deserved approval for them, especially the "concrete" of Jalalabad and Bagram. Everything else needed for arranging, equipping parking lots and ensuring flights - from food and bed linen to spare parts and ammunition - had to be delivered from the USSR. The road network was poorly developed, railway and water transport simply existed, and the entire load fell on the transport aviation.
In March-April 1980, military operations of the DRA army and Soviet troops began against groups that did not want to reconcile with the "socialist orientation" imposed on the country. The specifics of the local conditions immediately demanded widespread use of aviation, which could ensure the planned operations, supporting the actions of ground forces and striking hard-to-reach places. In order to increase the coordination and efficiency of actions, the air units located in the DRA were subordinated to the command of the 40th Army located in Kabul, under which the command post (CP) of the Air Force was located.
Su-17M4 at the Bagram airfield. Under the wing there are RBK-500-375 single-use cluster bombs with fragmentation equipment. On the fuselage - cassettes with heat traps
At first, the enemy was scattered, small and weakly armed groups that posed no practical danger to combat aircraft. Therefore, the tactics were quite simple - bombs and unguided aircraft missiles (NAR) were struck at the detected armed groups from low altitudes (for greater accuracy), and the main difficulty was the difficulty of orientation in the monotonous mountainous desert terrain. It happened that the pilots, upon their return, could not indicate exactly on the map where they dropped the bombs. Another problem was the very piloting in the mountains, the height of which in Afghanistan reaches 3500 m. The abundance of natural shelters - rocks, caves and vegetation - forced people to descend to 600 - 800 meters when searching for targets. In addition, the mountains made it difficult for radio communications and made it difficult to manage flights.
The exhausting climatic conditions and intense combat work led to an increase in the number of errors in piloting techniques and violations in the preparation of aircraft, and the average age of the pilots of the "first race" did not exceed 25-26 years.
The technique was not easy either. The heat and the highlands “ate up” the engine thrust, caused overheating and equipment failures (the ASP-17 sights often failed), the dust clogged the filters and spoiled the lubrication of the aircraft components. Takeoff and landing performance deteriorated, fuel consumption increased, ceiling and combat load decreased. The takeoff run of the Su-17 and at normal takeoff weight increased by one and a half times! When landing, the brakes of the wheels overheated and failed, the tires of the pneumatics "burned".
The operation of the automatic sight when bombing and launching missiles in the mountains was unreliable, so it was often necessary to use weapons in manual mode. The risk of collision with a mountain when attacking or leaving it required the performance of special maneuvers, for example, hills with approaching a target and dropping bombs from a height of 1600 - 1800 m. combined with a weak warhead made them ineffective. Therefore, in the future, the C-5 was used only against weakly protected targets in open areas. In the fight against fortifications and firing points, the heavy NAR S-24, which had increased accuracy and a more powerful warhead weighing 25.5 kg, showed themselves well. Suspended
the UPK-23-250 cannon containers turned out to be practically unacceptable for the Su-17 - there were no suitable targets for them, and two built-in 30-mm HP-30 cannons were enough. The SPPU-22 with movable guns were also not useful - the terrain was not very suitable for their use, and the complexity of the device led to the excessive time spent on maintenance. The requirement for the promptness of combat missions, supply problems and difficult local conditions quickly determined the main directions in the preparation of aircraft: speed and maximum simplification of equipment, requiring the least possible investment of time and effort.
The fighting quickly became widespread. Attempts by the government to "restore order" led only to growing resistance, and the bombing strikes by no means aroused the population's respect for the "people's power". The Kyzyl-Arvat regiment a year later replaced the Su-17 from Chirchik, and then the regiment flew to Afghanistan from Mary. Subsequently, by decision of the General Staff of the Air Force, other regiments of fighter, fighter-bomber and front-line bomber aviation were to pass through the DRA to gain combat experience, develop skills for independent action and, last but not least, identify the capabilities of personnel in a combat situation. The equipment, which in intense exploitation most fully revealed its capabilities and shortcomings, was also subjected to testing.
To conduct operations in remote areas, Su-17s from Shindand were transferred to Bagram airbases near Kabul and Kandahar in the south of the country. They tried to avoid basing in Jalalabad, since shelling from the "green zone" that came close to the airfield became common there.
The expansion of the scale of hostilities required an increase in the effectiveness of sorties and the improvement of tactics. First of all, this was due to the fact that the enemy himself had changed. Already from 1980-81. large opposition detachments began to operate, well armed and equipped at bases in Iran and Pakistan, where modern weapons, communications and transport were supplied from many countries of the Arab world and the West. Aviation posed the greatest threat to them, and soon the Mujahideen received air defense weapons, primarily large-caliber DShK machine guns and 14, 5-mm anti-aircraft mining installations (ZGU). Low-flying aircraft and helicopters were also fired from small arms - machine guns and machine guns. As a result, 85% of all damage to aviation equipment at that time accounted for bullets of caliber 5, 45 mm, 7, 62 mm and 12, 7 mm.
The increased danger in the performance of combat missions made it necessary to take measures to improve the training of pilots sent to the DRA. It was divided into three stages. The first took place at its own airfields and took 2-3 months to study the area of future combat operations, mastering tactics and piloting features. The second took 2-3 weeks of special training at TurkVO training grounds. And, finally, on the spot, the pilots were commissioned within 10 days. Later, the Afghan experience was introduced into the practice of combat training of the Air Force, and the regiments were transferred to the DRA without special training. The newly arrived pilots were introduced to the local conditions by the pilots from the changing group, who took them out in Su-17UM "twin" cars.
The widespread use of aviation required a clear organization of its interaction with its troops and an accurate determination of the location of the enemy. However, pilots of supersonic fighter-bombers, equipped with the most modern equipment, often could not independently find inconspicuous targets in monotonous mountainous terrain, among gorges and passes. For this reason, one of the first large-scale operations, carried out in the Panjshir River valley in April 1980 (known as the first Panjshir), was planned without the use of aircraft. The three Soviet and two Afghan battalions that participated in it were supported only by artillery and helicopters.
Su-22M4 of the Afghan 355th Aviation Regiment. During the war years, the DRA's markings repeatedly changed their shape, retaining the main colors: red (ideals of socialism), green (loyalty to Islam) and black (the color of the earth)
The preliminary reconnaissance of targets for future raids was supposed to increase the efficiency of aviation operations and facilitate the work of the pilots. It was initially carried out by the MiG-21R and Yak-28R, later by the Su-17M3R, equipped with KKR-1 / T and KKR-1/2 suspended reconnaissance containers with a set of aerial cameras for planned, perspective and panoramic surveys, infrared (IR) and radio-technical (RT) by means of detection. The role of reconnaissance turned out to be especially important in the preparation of major operations to destroy fortified areas and "clean up the terrain." The information received was applied to photographic plates, which indicated the placement of enemy targets and air defense systems, features of the terrain and characteristic landmarks. This facilitated the planning of strikes, and the pilots could familiarize themselves with the area in advance and decide on the implementation of the mission. Before the start of the operation, additional exploration was carried out, which made it possible to finally clarify the details.
Intense combat work forced to reduce the time of aircraft maintenance. While the pilot was having lunch, they managed to refuel this Su-17M4R, reload cameras and heat trap cassettes, and replace worn out tire pneumatics.
Night photography of gorges and passes (and the revitalization in the camps of the Mujahideen, the movement of caravans with weapons and access to positions took place mostly secretly, at night) with illuminated air bombs (SAB) and FP-100 photo cartridges turned out to be ineffective. A lot of harsh shadows that appeared in the mountains under artificial lighting made the use of UA-47 aerial cameras practically useless - the images obtained could not be deciphered. Comprehensive reconnaissance with the use of infrared equipment and the SRS-13 radio-technical system, which detected the operation of enemy radio stations, helped out. The improved infrared equipment "Zima" made it possible to detect even the traces of a passing car or an extinct fire by residual heat radiation at night. Preparing "work for the day", around Kabul, Bagram and Kandahar at night worked 4-6 reconnaissance aircraft Su-17M3R and Su-17M4R.
The appearance of scouts in the sky did not bode well for the Mujahideen. As a rule, attack aircraft flew after them, and the scouts themselves usually carried weapons that allowed them to independently carry out a "hunt" in a given area. At the same time, the aircraft of the leader, in addition to the reconnaissance container, carried a pair of heavy NAR S-24, and the slave - 4 NAR S-24 or bombs.
By 1981, military operations in Afghanistan had acquired a scale that required the use of large groups of aircraft. Due to the difficulties of basing on the territory of the DRA (mainly, the small number of airfields and problems with the supply of ammunition and fuel), the concentration of aircraft involved in the strikes was carried out at the TurkVO airfields. Su-17s made up a significant share there, comparing favorably with other aircraft with a significant combat load and greater efficiency when operating against ground targets. Su-17 regiments that passed through Afghanistan were stationed at the Chirchik, Mary, Kalai-Mur and Kokayty airfields. The "local" regiments of the 49th VA worked "beyond the river" almost constantly, and in case of delays in the planned replacement of units, they found themselves in the DRA "out of turn."
Work from the TurkVO bases required the installation of external fuel tanks (PTB) on the Su-17, which reduced the combat load. I had to revise the weapons options used in favor of the most effective ones. Su-17s began to be equipped with high-explosive and high-explosive bombs (FAB and OFAB), mainly with a caliber of 250 and 500 kg (the previously used "hundreds" were not powerful enough for strikes in the mountains). Multi-lock bomb racks MBDZ-U6-68, each of which could carry up to six bombs, were rarely used - to raise a large amount of ammunition in the heat, making them optimal for suspension on one and a half hundred kilogram MBDs, the Su-17 was simply beyond its power. Bomb bundles and single-shot RBK cluster bombs were widely used on the Su-17, which "sowed" several hectares with fragmentation or ball bombs at once. They were especially effective in conditions where every rock and crevice became a cover for the enemy. The insufficiently powerful 57-mm NAR S-5 were replaced by new 80-mm NAR S-8 in the B-8M blocks. The weight of their warhead was increased to 3.5 kg, and the launch range made it possible to hit the target without entering the anti-aircraft fire zone. Usually, the combat load of the Su-17 was determined on the basis of the reliable performance of the mission and the possibility of a safe landing in the event of a malfunction (by the landing weight of the aircraft) and did not exceed 1500 kg - three "five hundred".
A pair of Su-17M4R scouts at Bagram airfield before takeoff. The leader's plane is carrying a KKR-1 / T container. The slave's task is to conduct visual reconnaissance and perform binding to landmarks on the ground
Summer heat not only reduced the thrust of the engines and the reliability of the equipment, but also the pilots could not wait for a long time to take off in hot cockpits. Therefore, whenever possible, flights were planned for early morning or night. Some types of ammunition were also "capricious": incendiary tanks, NAR and guided missiles had temperature restrictions and could not stay on suspension under the scorching sun for a long time.
An important task was also preventive actions aimed at destroying caravans with ammunition and weapons, destroying mountain paths and passes through which the Mujahideen could get to the protected objects. The powerful FAB-500 and the FAB-250 dropped in a salvo caused landslides in the mountains, making them impassable; they were also used to destroy rock shelters, warehouses and protected firing points. Typical options for weapons when departing to "hunt" for caravans were two missile units (UB-32 or B-8M) and two cluster bombs (RBK-250 or RBK-500) or four NAR S-24, and in both versions two PTB-800.
On the side of the enemy were good knowledge of the terrain, support of the population, the ability to use natural shelters and camouflage. Opposition units moved quickly and quickly dispersed in case of danger. It was not easy to find them from the air, even on a tip, due to the lack of characteristic landmarks in the monotonous terrain. In addition, planes and helicopters increasingly came across anti-aircraft fire. On average, in 1980, an emergency landing occurred at 830 flight hours, or approximately 800-1000 sorties (and there were very few places suitable for landing a wrecked aircraft).
To increase the combat survivability, the design and systems of the Su-17 were constantly being improved. Damage analysis showed that most often the engine, its units, fuel and hydraulic systems, aircraft control fail. The complex of modifications carried out included the installation of overhead ventral armor plates that protected the gearbox, generator and fuel pump; filling fuel tanks with polyurethane foam and pressurizing them with nitrogen, which prevented ignition and explosion of fuel vapors when fragments and bullets hit them; changes in the design of the ASP-17 sight, which protected it from overheating. A defect in the design of the brake parachute was also eliminated, the fastening lock of which sometimes broke off, and the plane rolled out of the runway and was damaged. Structural strength and endurance of the Su-17 helped out. There were cases when damaged vehicles returning from a combat mission flew off the strip and buried themselves in the ground up to their "belly". They managed to be restored on the spot and put back into operation. AL-21F-3 engines reliably worked even in carrying sand and stones "Afghan", transferring both the nicks of the compressor blades, unthinkable under normal conditions, and contaminated fuel (pipelines stretched from the Soviet border for its delivery were constantly fired upon, blown up, or even just unscrewed by the local population hungry for free fuel).
To reduce losses, new recommendations were developed on tactics for the combat use of aircraft. It was recommended to approach the target from a great height and speed, with a dive at an angle of 30-45 °, which made it difficult for the enemy to aim and reduce the effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire. At speeds over 900 km / h and altitudes over 1000 m, combat damage to the Su-17 was completely ruled out. To achieve surprise, the strike was ordered to be performed immediately, combining the launch of missiles with the release of bombs in one attack. True, the accuracy of such a bombing strike (BSHU), due to its high altitude and speed, was almost halved, which had to be compensated for by an increase in the number of strike group aircraft reaching the target from different directions, if the terrain allowed.
By 1981, the saturation of combat areas with air defense systems had reached such proportions that when planning operations, one had to take into account the need to overcome them. Around the fortified areas and bases of the Mujahideen, there were up to several dozen anti-aircraft gun emplacements. Risk reduction was achieved by skillful use of the terrain, which ensured the secrecy of the approach and the suddenness of reaching the target, as well as the choice of escape routes after an attack.
As a rule, a pair of Su-17s appeared first in the intended area, the task of which was additional reconnaissance and target designation with lighting or smoke bombs, which simplified the strike group's exit to the target. They were piloted by the most experienced pilots who had combat experience and skills in detecting inconspicuous objects. The search for the enemy was carried out at an altitude of 800 - 1000 m and a speed of 850 - 900 km / h, taking about 3 - 5 minutes. Then everything was decided by the speed of the strike, which did not give the enemy the opportunity to organize a return fire.
After one or two minutes, a group of air defense suppression from 2-6 Su-17s reached the designated SAB target. From an altitude of 2000-2500 m, they detected the positions of the DShK and ZGU and, from a dive, struck NAR C-5, C-8 and RBK-250 or RBK-500 cassettes. The destruction of anti-aircraft points was carried out both by a single aircraft and by a pair - the wingman "finished off" the air defense pockets. Without letting the enemy come to his senses, after 1 - 2 minutes the main strike group appeared above the target, carrying out an attack on the move. FAB (OFAB) -250 and-500 bombs, S-8 and S-24 missiles fell on fortifications and rock structures. The reliable and easy-to-use S-24 had a long range and launch accuracy (especially from a dive) and were used very widely. To combat manpower, RBK-250 and RBK-500 cluster munitions were used. Incendiary tanks with fire mixture were sometimes used during actions in the "greenery" and in open places. The cannons gradually lost their significance - their fire at high speeds was ineffective.
For a second attack, the planes performed a maneuver with a divergence, rising to 2000 - 2500 m, and again struck from different directions. After the withdrawal of the strike group, scouts again appeared over the target, making an objective control of the results of the BSHU. The completion of the task had to be documented - otherwise, the ground troops could expect unpleasant surprises. When performing particularly powerful air raids, photo control was carried out by an An-30 specially called from the Tashkent airfield. His photographic equipment made it possible to make a multispectral survey of the area and accurately determine the degree of destruction. Reliable radio communication with the command post and coordination of actions was ensured by the An-26RT repeater aircraft in the air.
Testing of the Su-17M4 engine
Afghan Su-22M4 differed from Su-17M4 only in the composition of onboard equipment
If the strike was carried out to support ground units, increased accuracy was required, since the targets were close to their troops. To organize interaction with aviation, ground units were assigned aircraft controllers from the Air Force, who established communication with the pilots and indicated to them the position of the leading edge by launching signal flares or smoke bombs. The attacks, supported by ground forces, lasted up to 15-20 minutes. With the help of air controllers, strikes were also delivered on call to suppress newly identified firing points. To ensure the secrecy of the maneuver of troops or to cover their withdrawal, the Su-17 were also involved as directors of smoke screens. To assess the effectiveness of the attacks, the pilots, no later than 5-10 minutes after landing, when the impressions were still fresh, had to submit a written report to the regiment headquarters, which was immediately transmitted to the Air Force command post.
Another task of the Su-17 was aerial mining of dangerous areas and mountain trails. Along with the destruction of the passes by bomb strikes, their mining made it difficult for the Mujahideen to move, depriving them of the advantage in mobility and surprise of the attack. For this, containers of small-sized cargoes of the KMGU were used, each of which could carry up to 24 minutes. The Su-17 mines were spread at a speed of about 900 km / h.
During the performance of combat missions, shortcomings were also revealed that reduced the effectiveness of the BSHU and increased the risk of damage and loss. So, when mastering the Afghan theater of military operations, the pilots, having completed several successful combat missions, tended to overestimate their forces, underestimate the enemy (especially his air defense) and began to carry out attacks in a monotonous manner, without taking into account the characteristics of the terrain and the nature of the targets. The bombs were not dropped according to a single method, which led to their dispersal. Several units of the Su-17 were even returned to the bases due to the low accuracy of strikes and the danger of hitting their troops. So, in the summer of 1984, near Kandahar, the leader of the Su-17 group, who refused the assistance of an aircraft controller, mistakenly dropped bombs on his infantry battalion. Four people were killed and nine were injured.
Another drawback was the frequent lack of accurate data on the enemy's air defense (according to intelligence, in the areas where the Mujahideen were based in 1982 there were up to 30-40 anti-aircraft weapons, and in strong points - up to 10). Anti-aircraft machine guns and PGUs disguised themselves, hid in shelters and quickly moved to firing positions. The pattern of attacks and the delay in processing a target in such conditions became dangerous. In the Kandahar region in the summer of 1983, the Su-17 was shot down during the sixth (!) Approach to the target. Pilot errors and equipment failures were other causes of losses.
The increased tension of the fighting has led to greater stress on the pilots and aircraft technicians. Specialists of the Research Institute of Aerospace Medicine, who studied the "human factor", determined that excessive loads on the body during 10-11 months of intense combat missions lead to "significant functional shifts and disorders in the cardiovascular and motor systems; 45% of the pilots have fatigue and disturbances in normal mental activity. " Heat and dehydration led to significant weight loss (in some cases up to 20 kg) - people literally dried out in the sun. The doctors recommended reducing the flight load, shortening the waiting time before departure and creating favorable conditions for rest. Practically the only implemented recommendation was the observance of the maximum permissible flight load, defined in 4 - 5 sorties per day. In fact, the pilots sometimes had to perform up to 9 sorties.
Based on the accumulated experience, mixed groups were formed, consisting of fighter-bombers, attack aircraft and helicopters, complementing each other in the search and destruction of the enemy. With their use, in December 1981, a carefully prepared operation was carried out to destroy the Islamic committees of "local power" in the province of Foriab, which organized armed resistance to Kabul. In addition to the ground forces, airborne assault forces (1200 people) and 52 Air Force aircraft were involved in the operation: 24 Su-17M3, 8 Su-25, 12 MiG-21 and 8 An-12. From the army aviation, 12 Mi-24D, 40 Mi-8T and 8 Mi-6, as well as 12 Afghan Mi-8Ts participated in the operation. The entire operation was prepared in strict secrecy - there was already experience of striking empty spaces in cases when Afghan staff officers participated in the development of plans. In this case, a legend was developed for them, and only in 2 - 3 hours the Afghan military was informed of the true information.
Su-17M3R reconnaissance aircraft with a KKR-1/2 complex reconnaissance container for infrared and television shooting (after returning from Afghanistan)
"Eyes of the Army" - reconnaissance aircraft Su-17M4R with a radio and photo reconnaissance container KKR-1 / T
The scale of the operation demanded, in addition to the antiaircraft suppression group by MiG-21 aircraft, the allocation of three strike groups, numbering 8 Su-17M3s each (the first of which was also assigned 8 Su-25s, especially effective during attack), armed with FAB-250 and RBK-250 with ball bombs. This time the strike was not only aimed at weapons depots, air defense positions and strongholds of armed detachments. The headquarters of the Islamic committees, residential buildings where the mujahideen could hide, and rural schools, in which the "anti-Kabul agitation" was conducted, were subject to destruction. After the withdrawal of the strike groups, the Mi-24D "processed" the terrain; they also provided fire support during the landing of the troops from the Mi-8T and Mi-6. Despite the low cloud cover, the air operations helped to achieve success - the base in the area ceased to exist. Losses amounted to one Mi-24D and two Mi-8Ts, shot down by DShK fire.
In April 1982 g. A similar operation to destroy the base area of the Mujahideen was carried out in Rabati-Jali (Nimroz province), and on May 16, hostilities began to clear the Panjshir River valley from armed groups. They were attended by 12,000 people, 320 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 104 helicopters and 26 aircraft. The success of the second Panjshir operation was ensured by the Su-17 reconnaissance, who for 10 days conducted aerial photography of the area of the forthcoming actions, filming about 2000 square meters for the preparation of detailed photographic plates. km of terrain.
The Afghan campaign acquired the scale of a real war, in which aviation had to carry out a variety of combat missions. Su-17 fighter-bombers from Afghan airfields and bases in TurkVO destroyed enemy targets and bases, provided direct support to troops, covered reconnaissance groups and airborne assault forces, conducted reconnaissance, air mining, target designation and smoke screens. When attacking and attacking from low altitudes, the Su-25 were more often used, which had better maneuverability and protection. However, the success of the next military operation turned into an increase in the opposition and the activity of retaliatory attacks. The hopelessness of the continuation of the war became obvious, but Babrak Karmal was sharply negative about its end. Despite the efforts undertaken to clear the provinces of the armed detachments of the Mujahideen and to impose "people's power", only large cities and patrolled areas around airfields, military units and some roads were actually under control. The map, on which the pilots were indicated the recommended places for forced landing and ejection, spoke eloquently about who really was the master of the situation.
This was well seen by the Afghan pilots (the 355th Aviation Regiment stationed in Bagram flew on the "dry ones"), who were not enthusiastic about combat work. They flew into the air extremely rarely, mainly so as not to lose piloting skills. According to one Soviet adviser, the participation of the Afghan army's elite - the pilots - in combat "felt more like a circus than a job." For the sake of fairness, it must be said that among them there were also brave pilots who were not inferior in flight training to Soviet pilots. Such was the deputy commander of the Afghan Air Force, whose family was massacred by the mujahideen. He was shot down twice, he was seriously wounded, but he continued to fly the Su-17 a lot and willingly.
If the Afghan "comrades in arms" only fought badly, it would be half the trouble. High-ranking officials of the government air force gave the enemy details of the upcoming operations, and ordinary pilots, it happened, flew to neighboring Pakistan. On June 13, 1985 in Shindand, the Mujahideen, having bribed the Afghan airfield guards, blew up 13 government MiG-21s and six Su-17s in parking lots, seriously damaging another 13 aircraft.
At the beginning of the Afghan epic, armed opposition units went abroad for the winter to rest and reorganize. The tension of hostilities during this period usually eased. However, by 1983, the opposition had created many strongholds that made it possible to fight all year round. In the same year, the Mujahideen also acquired a new weapon - portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS), which changed the nature of air war. Lightweight, mobile and highly effective, they could hit aircraft at altitudes up to 1500 m. MANPADS were easily delivered to any area and were used not only to cover the bases of armed detachments, but also to organize ambushes at airfields (before attempts to attack them were limited to shelling from afar) … Ironically, the first MANPADS were Soviet-made Strela-2, which came from Egypt. In 1984, 50 missile launches were noted, six of which reached the target: three aircraft and three helicopters were shot down. Only the Il-76, shot down by an "arrow" right over Kabul in November 1984, convinced the command of the need to reckon with the increased danger. By 1985, the number of air defense weapons discovered by reconnaissance had increased 2.5 times compared to 1983, and by the end of the year had increased by another 70%. In total, in 1985, 462 anti-aircraft points were identified.
Su-17M4 carries three high-explosive "five hundred" FAB-500M62
A Su-17 reconnaissance aircraft is photographing the Zingar mountain plateau near Kabul at night with illuminated SAB. Flashes at the top - the track of the DShK anti-aircraft machine gun
To overcome the growing threat, when planning sorties, the safest routes were chosen, it was recommended to reach the target from directions not covered by air defense means, and the attack was carried out within a minimum time. The flight to the target and back should be performed along different routes at altitudes of at least 2000 m, using the terrain. In dangerous areas, the pilots were instructed to monitor possible launches of "arrows" (at this time all MANPADS were called "arrows", although there were other types - American "Red Eye" and British "Bloupipe") and avoid hits with an energetic maneuver, leaving in the direction of the sun or thick clouds. In the most dangerous areas of the flight - during takeoff and landing, when the aircraft had low speed and insufficient maneuverability, they were covered by helicopters patrolling the area around the airfield. MANPADS missiles were guided by the thermal radiation of aircraft engines, and their damage could be avoided using powerful heat sources - IR traps with a thermite mixture. Since 1985, all types of aircraft and helicopters used in Afghanistan have been equipped with them. On the Su-17, a set of modifications was carried out to install the ASO-2V beams, each of which carried 32 PPI-26 (LO-56) squibs. Initially, 4 beams were installed above the fuselage, then 8 and, finally, their number increased to 12. In the gargrot behind the cockpit, 12 more powerful LO-43 cartridges were installed. In the enemy's air defense zone and during takeoff / landing, the pilot switched on the machine for shooting traps, the high combustion temperature of which distracted the homing "arrows". To simplify the work of the pilot, the control of the ASO was soon brought to the "combat" button - when launching missiles or dropping bombs over a protected air defense target, the PPI was automatically fired. Combat flight of an aircraft not equipped with squibs was not allowed.
Another way of protecting against MANPADS was the inclusion of an "umbrella" from the SAB in the strike group of aircraft-directors, which in themselves were powerful sources of heat. Sometimes Su-17s were involved for this purpose, conducting additional reconnaissance of the target. Large heat traps could be dropped from the KMGU, after which the striking planes reached the target, "diving" under the SABs slowly descending on parachutes. The measures taken made it possible to significantly reduce losses. In 1985, an emergency landing due to combat damage occurred at 4605 flight hours. Compared to 1980, this indicator has improved 5.5 times. For the entire 1986, anti-aircraft weapons "got" only one Su-17M3, when a young pilot in a dive "dived" to 900 m and DShK bullets pierced the shell of the engine nozzle.
Analysis of losses for 1985 showed that 12.5% of the aircraft were shot down from machine guns and light machine guns, 25% - by fire from the DShK, 37.5% - by fire from the PGU and 25% - by MANPADS. It was possible to reduce losses by further increasing the flight altitude and using new types of ammunition. Powerful S-13 salvo launchers and heavy S-25 NARs were launched from a range of up to.4 km, they were stable in flight, accurate and equipped with proximity fuses, which increased their efficiency. The main defense was the departure to high altitudes (up to 3500-4000 m), which made the use of NAR ineffective, and bombs became the main type of weaponry for fighter-bombers.
In Afghanistan, for the first time in a combat situation, volume-detonating aerial bombs (ODAB) and warheads were used against missiles. The liquid substance of such an ammunition, when it hit the target, was dispersed in the air, and the resulting aerosol cloud was blown up, hitting the enemy with a hot shock wave in a large volume, and the maximum effect was achieved during an explosion in cramped conditions that retained the power of a fireball. It was such places - mountain gorges and caves - that served as shelters for armed detachments. To lay bombs in a hard-to-reach place, pitch-up bombing was used: the plane went up from the zone of reach of anti-aircraft fire, and the bomb, describing a parabola, fell to the bottom of the gorge. Special types of ammunition were also used: for example, in the summer of 1988, the Su-17 from Mary broke rock fortifications with concrete-piercing bombs. Corrected bombs and guided missiles were more often used by Su-25 attack aircraft, which were more suitable for operations on point targets.
Air raids were conducted not only by skill, but also by number. According to the armament specialists of the headquarters of the TurkVO, since 1985 more bombs have been dropped on Afghanistan every year than during the entire Great Patriotic War. The daily consumption of bombs only at the Bagram airbase was two carriages. During intensive bombing, which accompanied the conduct of major operations, ammunition was used directly "from the wheels" brought from manufacturing plants. At a particularly high expense, even old-style bombs that had survived from the thirties were brought from the TurkVO warehouses. The bomb racks of modern aircraft were not suitable for their suspension, and the gunsmiths had to sweat and manually adjust the hardened steel ears of the land mines using hacksaws and files.
One of the most intense operations with widespread use of aviation was carried out in December 1987 - January 1988 "Magistral" to unblock Khost. The battles were fought in the territories controlled by the Jadran tribe, which at no time did not recognize either the king, or the shah, or the Kabul government. The Paktia province and Khost district, bordering on Pakistan, were packed with state-of-the-art weapons and powerful fortifications. To identify them, a false airborne assault was landed in the fortified areas and powerful air strikes were launched against the firing points that had discovered themselves. During the raids, up to 60 missile launches at attacking aircraft per hour were noted. The pilots have never encountered such a density of anti-aircraft fire. 20,000 Soviet soldiers took part in the large-scale operation, the losses amounted to 24 killed and 56 wounded.
January 1989 Su-17M4R scouts until the last days ensured the withdrawal of troops from the DRA
The protracted war was fought only for its own sake, absorbing more and more forces and means. It was not put to an end by military means, and on May 15, 1988, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began. To cover it, powerful air forces were sent to the airfields of TurkVO. In addition to front-line and army aviation - Su-17, Su-25, MiG-27 and Su-24, Tu-22M3 long-range bombers were attracted for raids on Afghanistan. The task was unambiguous - to prevent the disruption of the withdrawal of troops, shelling of the departing columns and attacks on the abandoned facilities. To this end, it was required to prevent the movement of armed detachments, disrupt their access to advantageous positions, deliver preemptive strikes at their deployment sites, disorganize and demoralize the enemy.
The effectiveness of each sortie “beyond the river” was out of the question - the assigned tasks had to be performed quantitatively, by “rolling out” stocks from all district aviation ammunition depots to the Afghan mountains. The bombings were carried out from great heights, since according to intelligence data, by the fall of 1988 the opposition had 692 MANPADS, 770 ZGU, 4050 DShK. On the Su-17, which participated in the raids, the long-range navigation radio system (RSDN) was improved, which provided automated targeting and bombing. The accuracy of such a strike turned out to be low, and in the summer of 1988, during one of the raids, the field headquarters of the Afghan motorized infantry division was "covered" with bombs.
The second phase of the withdrawal began on 15 August. To avoid unnecessary casualties of the war coming to an end, they decided to increase the intensity of the bombing of the areas of the expected concentration of the Mujahideen and to accompany the exit of the columns with constant strikes, breaking the connection between the opposition units and the approach of caravans with weapons (and there were more than a hundred of them in October alone). For this, night sorties in groups of 8, 12, 16 and 24 Su-17s began to be widely used, with access to a given area using the RSDN at high altitude and conducting navigation (area) bombing. The strikes were delivered throughout the night at different intervals, exhausting the enemy and keeping him in constant tension with close explosions of powerful bombs. Two sorties per night became commonplace for pilots as well. In addition, night illumination of the area along the roads was carried out using the SAB.
By winter, it became especially important to ensure security in the section connecting Kabul with Hairaton on the Soviet-Afghan border. The Panjshir and South Salang regions were controlled by the detachments of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the “Panjshir lion,” an independent and far-sighted leader. The command of the 40th Army managed to agree with him on the unimpeded passage of Soviet columns, for which Lieutenant General B. Gromov even suggested Massoud "to provide the Panjshir armed detachments at their request with artillery and aviation support" in the fight against other groups. The ceasefire was thwarted by Afghan government units, which constantly launched provocative shelling of villages along the roads, causing return fire. It was not possible to avoid battles, and on January 23-24, 1989, continuous air raids began on South Salang and Jabal-Ussardzh. The force of the bombs was such that residents of nearby Afghan villages left their homes and moved closer to the roads along which trucks and military equipment were reaching the border.
The withdrawal of troops ended on February 15, 1989. Even earlier, the last Su-17M4Rs flew to Soviet airfields from Bagram, and ground equipment was taken to the Il-76. But the "dry" still remained in Afghanistan - the 355th Afghan Aviation Regiment continued fighting on the Su-22. The supply of the most modern military equipment and ammunition to the Najibullah government even expanded with the departure of Soviet troops. The war continued, and in 1990, by the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, 54 combat aircraft, 6 helicopters, 150 tactical missiles and many other equipment were transferred to Afghanistan. The pilots of the 355th Aviation Regiment had three more years of fighting, losses, participation in the failed mutiny in March 1990 and the bombing of Kabul when it was captured by the opposition forces in April 1992.
The technician puts another star on the plane, corresponding to ten sorties. In some regiments, stars were "awarded" for 25 sorties
Su-17M4 at the Bagram airfield. Under the wing - high-explosive bombs FAB-500M54, which by the end of the war became the main ammunition used
1. Su-17M4R with an integrated reconnaissance container KKR-1/2. 16th Reconnaissance Aviation Regiment, which arrived in Afghanistan from Ekabpils (PribVO). Bagram airbase, December 1988 The regiment's planes carried emblems in the forward fuselage: a bat on the right, an Indian on the left.
2. Su-22M4 with RBK-500-375 cluster bombs from the 355th Aviation Regiment of the Afghan Air Force, Bagram airbase, August 1988
3. Su-17MZR 139th Guards IBAP, arrived from Borzi (ZabVO) at Shindand airbase, spring 1987
4. Su-17M3 136th IBAP, which arrived from Chirchik (TurkVO) to the Kandahar airbase, summer 1986. After repairs, some of the regiment's aircraft did not have identification marks, and some had stars without edging
