Already the first experience of using aviation in Afghanistan has shown its insufficient effectiveness. In addition to the pilots' unpreparedness for conducting counter-guerrilla warfare and shortcomings in tactics, the planes themselves did little to match the nature of combat operations. Supersonic fighter-bombers created for the European theater of operations. it was impossible to turn around in the mountain gorges, and their sophisticated aiming and navigation equipment turned out to be practically useless when searching for an inconspicuous enemy. The capabilities of the aircraft remained unclaimed, and the effectiveness of strikes was low. The Su-25 attack aircraft turned out to be a suitable vehicle - maneuverable, obedient in control, well-armed and well-protected. As a result of testing in Afghanistan (Operation Rhombus-1) [7], he was highly appreciated by the military. As soon as the test program was completed, in February 1981, the formation of the first combat unit on the Su-25 - the 80th Separate Assault Aviation Regiment (OSHAP) began in Sital-Chai on the Caspian coast, 65 km from Baku. The proximity of the manufacturer simplified the development of the machine and the solution of problems associated with the start of operation, and the nearby ZakVO training ground was supposed to help the pilots master piloting in mountainous terrain - it was no secret to anyone that the unit was being prepared to be sent to the DRA. The regiment received the first 12 serial Su-25s in April. At first, the "hunchbacked horse" [8] on plump wheels did not arouse enthusiasm among the pilots, and not at all from distrust of the new technology: switching to an attack aircraft, they were deprived of "supersonic" rations and an increase in their salary.
The need for the Su-25 was very high, and the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force A. N. Efimov, who arrived in Sital-Chai on April 28, 1981, set the task: to urgently prepare a squadron of the available machines and pilots who had mastered them for work in the DRA. A. M. Afanasyev, deputy regiment commander for flight training, was appointed commander of the 200th separate assault air squadron (OSHAE). To speed up the retraining, test pilots and instructors from the Lipetsk Air Force Combat Training Center, the "high school" of military pilots, were attracted, and part of the acceptance tests and tuning of the onboard equipment of the still "half-baked" machines were carried out at the Air Force Research Institute.
On July 19, 1981, the 200th Squadron, whose work was coded as Operation Exam, arrived in the DRA. Shindand was chosen as the base - a large airbase, already run in by the Su-25 during tests in 1980. Shindand was located in a relatively calm area compared to the central and eastern provinces, and among other Afghan airfields it was considered low-lying - its almost three-kilometer concrete was located at an altitude of 1150 m and was more than sufficient for the Su-25.
The attack aircraft of the Shindand air base were to support the Soviet 5th motorized rifle division stationed in these places, which was then commanded by Colonel B. V. Gromov, paratroopers of the 103rd division and the 21st infantry brigade of government forces. The Su-25 began combat work within a few days after arrival. At that time, there were battles for the Lurkokh mountain range not far from Shindand - an impenetrable pile of rocks rising among the plain, occupying several tens of square kilometers. The fortress, created by the very nature, was a base camp, from where spooks raided nearby roads and attacked military posts. The approaches to Lurkokh were protected by minefields, rocky and concrete fortifications, literally every break in the gorges and the path was covered by firing points. Taking advantage of invulnerability, the enemy began to use Lurkokh as a command post, where the leaders of the surrounding gangs gathered. Repeated attempts to capture the mountain range were unsuccessful. The command decided to abandon head-on attacks, switching to daily powerful bombing and artillery shelling, which would have forced the enemy to leave the inhabited camp. Outside, Lurkokh was surrounded by dense minefields, passages and paths inside the massif were periodically also bombarded with mines from the air.
To assess the effectiveness of the actions of attack aircraft, a military pilot, Major General V. Khakhalov, arrived in the DRA, who had an order from the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force to personally assess the results of the Su-25 strikes. After another raid, a pair of Khakhalov's helicopters went into the depths of Lurkokh. The general never returned. The helicopter with him was shot down and fell near the base of the spooks. The death of Khakhalov forced to change the course of the operation - paratroopers were thrown into the assault on Lurkokh, who made their way to the center of the fortified area to pick up the bodies of the general and the pilots who died with him. After a week of fighting, which cost the lives of eight more people, the troops occupied the base, blew up its fortifications, and once again mined the entire area, left it.
Work for the Su-25 regiment for a day - FAB-500M54 bombs at the Bagram bomb depot
The attack aircraft of the 200th OSHAE also participated in the struggle for Herat, which was located 120 km north of Shindand and became the center of opposition in the west of the country. The local gangs operated right in the city, dividing it into spheres of influence and fighting not only with government troops, but also among themselves. There were also strongholds, stocks of weapons and ammunition. The Su-25 had to strike directly in the city on the quarters controlled by the dushmans and the houses indicated by the intelligence. There was also enough work in the vicinity of Herat - the endless green zone and the adjacent Gerirud valley. The detachments operating in the provinces of Herat and Farah were supported by numerous villages, which supplied the Mujahideen with food and replenishment. They immediately found rest and lodging, receiving weapons from nearby bases in Iran. The most prominent of the field commanders here was Turan Ismail, a former army captain who passed over to the mujahideen after the April revolution. Military experience, literacy and exactingness quickly allowed him to become a local emir, who ruled over seven provinces and an army of five thousand fighters. Under the cover of "greenery" - vast thickets of bushes, orchards and vineyards - the Mujahideen approached the location of military units, robbed and burned convoys, and after attacks instantly dissolved in the surrounding villages, and it was not easier to find them in these places, especially from the air, than in the mountains.
In the air above the valleys, a dusty veil constantly hung up to 1500 m, impairing visibility and already hiding landmarks for several kilometers. In the season of dust storms and a hot "Afghan" flying from the desert, there was no escape from it, and from under the hatches and hoods of the returning stormtroopers handfuls of sand were dug out. It was especially difficult for the engines - sand, like emery, gnawed the blades of the compressors, and the heat reaching + 52 ° made it difficult to start. To help the choking starter, savvy aviators used a kind of evaporative cooling, splashing a couple of cups of water into each air intake. There have been cases when the APA plug was firmly burnt to the onboard electrical connector. In a hurry, the cable was chopped off with an ax lying at the ready, and the plane flew away with scraps of wires hanging. The search for the enemy took time, and to increase the duration of the flight, most of the tasks had to be performed with a pair of PTB-800 suspended tanks (the Su-25 was conceived to work in the front line, and with a supply of fuel in the internal tanks, its range did not exceed 250-300 km).
Since September 1981planned hostilities began in the south of the country in Kandahar, also included in the area of responsibility of the 200th OSHAE. The second largest city in Afghanistan, the ancient center of trade and crafts, occupied an important strategic position, which made it possible to control the entire southern direction. The main roads and caravan routes passed through Kandahar, including the only highway in the country that connected all major cities and surrounded the country with a horseshoe. The proximity of Kandahar to the Pakistani border was also attractive for the Mujahideen. The 70th motorized rifle brigade of the Soviet contingent, sent to Kandahar, was immediately drawn into endless hostilities, on which the situation on the roads and the situation in the city depended. Numerous detachments, settled in the "greenery" around the city, sometimes for weeks blocked the garrison, not allowing a single vehicle to enter Kandahar. From the north, Kandahar was approached by the Maiwanda mountains, where fortresses that had survived since the wars with the British served as strongholds for the Mujahideen.
In mountain gorges, the high maneuverability of the Su-25 was especially useful. Crossfire from heights turned the intermountains into a trap for soldiers who entered them; it was not always possible to bring up artillery and tanks there, and attack aircraft came to the rescue. The Su-25 dived into narrow stone bags, where other planes did not dare to descend, entering the target along the gorge or, if the width allowed, rolling down one slope and literally crawling out of the attack in another. In the Black Mountains northwest of Kandahar, one of the 200th OSHAE pilots in October 1981 succeeded in suppressing a firing point hidden in the rocks at the end of a long winding gorge. Attempts to bomb it from above did not bring success, and the Su-25 had to enter a dark hole, maneuver, sweep over it and, delivering an accurate blow, get out with a sharp combat turn.
The small turning radius of the Su-25 (450-500 m) helped the pilots when building an attack: after detecting a target, they could immediately turn on it, and on repeated visits, turn without losing sight of the enemy, and finish off, sparingly spending ammunition. Pilots of high-speed Su-17 and MiG-21, turning around for the next strike, often could not find the target again, "devoid of clear unmasking signs."
Due to its large wing area and powerful mechanization, the Su-25 favorably distinguished itself from other aircraft in its good takeoff and landing qualities. Attack aircraft with a maximum combat load of up to 4000 kg (8 FAB-500) were enough for a take-off run of 1200-1300 m, while the Su-17 based in Shindand, with a ton of bombs, took off from the ground only at the very end of the strip. The structure of the suspended weapons "twenty-fifths" included NAR, RBK, high-explosive and fragmentation bombs. In the valleys, 100- and 250-kg bombs were often used, sufficient to destroy adobe structures; in the mountains, which abounded in natural shelters, the high-explosive power of "five hundred" became necessary (they were more often used in "winter" versions of equipment, when, with a cold snap, the engines could develop full thrust). In green areas and villages, where there was something to burn, incendiary tanks and bombs were used. A mixture of gasoline and kerosene thickened for stickiness of a half-ton tank ZB-500GD covered an area of 1300 sq. M.
High-explosive fragmentation NAR C-5M and C-5MO from 32-charge blocks UB-32-57 were widely used. In one salvo, they covered up to 200-400 square meters, depriving the enemy of one of the most important advantages - the ability to hide and quickly disperse on the ground. Usually 2-3 approaches were made to the target, launching 8-12 missiles from a dive in a salvo. In flight with blocks, a significant increase in resistance had to be taken into account: already with the suspension of four UB-32-57s, the attack aircraft obeyed the rudders worse, sagged at the exit from the dive, losing altitude and speed - a feature that was not present when using bombs, becausetheir release immediately freed the plane for maneuver.
Small-caliber NARs were gradually replaced by more powerful 80-mm S-8, used in different versions: S-8M with enhanced fragmentation effect, S-8BM with a strong heavy warhead that crumbled rock firing points and walls, and S-8DM, which contained liquid explosive, from which the enemy was not saved by any shelters - after a missile strike, a fog of explosives covered the target, climbing into the nooks of villages and mountain crevices, hitting the most secluded places with a continuous cloud of explosion. The same effect was possessed by "crows" - volumetric detonating bombs ODAB-500P, which were three times more powerful than mines of the same caliber. The deaf clap of the explosion of such an ammunition swept away buildings within a radius of 20-25 m, muffling and blowing away all life for hundreds of meters around with a hot shock wave. The targets for ODAB had to be selected only in the valleys - in the thin air of the highlands, the explosion lost its strength. In the heat or strong wind, when the explosive cloud quickly lost the concentration required for the explosion, they used a "cocktail" - a combination of ODAB and smoke bombs, the dense smoke of which did not allow the aerosol to dissolve. The most effective ratio turned out to be: a pair of DAB-500 for six ODAB-500P. Space-detonating ammunition was widely used, preparing sites for helicopter assault forces - suitable landing sites could be mined, and attack aircraft thus cleared them, causing mines to detonate over a large area.
The pilots' favorite weapons were heavy NAR S-24 with high accuracy characteristics (from 2000 m missiles fit into a circle with a diameter of 7-8 m) and powerful high-explosive fragmentation action, which were well suited to combat a variety of targets. Attack aircraft fired at the machine-gun nests and vehicles of the Dushman caravans from the GSh-2-30 side cannon, which had a high rate of fire and a powerful projectile. The instruction recommended firing short one-second bursts of 50 armor-piercing explosive and high-explosive fragmentation shells (the mass of such a volley was 19.5 kg), but the pilots tried to shoot the target "with a guarantee", slashing at it with a long burst, and often after 2-3 pressing the combat button were left without ammunition.
On flat terrain, the ASP-17BTs-8 automatic sight proved itself well, with the help of which cannon firing, missile launch and bombing were carried out. The pilot only needed to keep the target of the attack in the mark of the sight, the automation of which, using a laser rangefinder, took into account the distance to the target, and also made corrections for altitude, speed, air temperature and ammunition ballistics, at the right time giving the command to drop bombs. The use of the ASP gave very high-quality results, and the pilots even argued among themselves for the right to fly an attack aircraft with a well-adjusted and well-adjusted sight. In the mountains, its reliability decreased - with sharp changes in altitude and difficult terrain, the computer of the sight could not cope, "losing its head" and giving too many misses. In these three cases, it was necessary to fire using the ASP as a conventional collimator sight, and to drop the bombs "at the behest of the heart."
The respect of the pilots was deserved by the well-thought-out protection of the systems, main units and the cockpit of the Su-25. Its titanium armored box and frontal armored glass could not penetrate the bullets of small arms and DShK, and on the sides of the Su-25 there were traces of smeared bullets. The attack aircraft held the blow well - A. Lavrenko's plane, having received an anti-aircraft projectile over the Panjshir in the tail section, flew in with almost completely interrupted control thrust, from which less than 1.5 mm of metal remained. Managed to reach the airfield and Major G. Garus, in whose car the DShK bullets pierced the engine through and completely disabled the hydraulic system.
Together with the 200th OSHAE, a brigade of factory specialists and OKB workers was constantly in Shindand, who accompanied the operation (in fact, military tests of the Su-25) and carried out the necessary changes and improvements on the spot, primarily to expand flight restrictions. For 15 months of operation, the attack aircraft of the 200th OSHAE, having made more than 2,000 sorties, had no combat losses, but in December 1981, due to an excess of the permissible dive speed, Captain A. Dyakov crashed (the situation was aggravated by the bomb release from only one extreme pylon, after then the plane pulled into a roll, the pilot did not manage to level the car, and she, slipping onto the wing, crashed into the mountainside). Under the same circumstances, G. Garus almost died, but this time the pilot had enough height for the withdrawal. Another Su-25 was lost due to the fact that they forgot to charge the accumulator on the ground, and the landing gear could not retract during takeoff, the temperature behind the turbine rose, threatening a fire, the heavily laden aircraft began to “crumble” down, and the pilot had to eject. The pilots also noted the insufficient efficiency of the air brakes, the area of which was not enough during a dive - the Su-25 continued to accelerate, losing stability and trying to roll over onto its back. These shortcomings were eliminated in the subsequent series of the aircraft: they introduced boosters into the control of the ailerons, duplicated mechanical rotation of the front wheel of the landing gear for the possibility of "foot" control when taxiing, modified the fuel system and increased the resource of the engines. Due to the strong recoil of the gun when firing, it was necessary to strengthen the attachment points of the gun and the "cracking" structural elements. They also made many small operational improvements that simplified and accelerated the preparation of the aircraft, and bright stencils were applied on the sides, reminding of its order.
Starting Su-25 engines from the airfield launch unit (APA)
Powerful and reliable S-24 missiles were included in most of the attack aircraft equipment
The disadvantages of the aircraft were the low reliability of the radio electronics and, first of all, the ARK-15 automatic radio compass and the RSBN-6S navigation radio system. When performing assignments, it was necessary to choose an aircraft with more or less well-functioning equipment in the squadron, which served as the leader for the entire group. The real enemy of on-board electronics was the cannon - powerful shocks during firing now and then led to the failure of the electronic equipment.
As a result of the "Exam" operation, they also noted the high labor costs for equipping the Su-25 weapons. Reloading 250 rounds to the gun took 40 minutes for two gunsmiths and was very inconvenient: they had to kneel while working, tucking a massive tape into the compartment above their heads. The provision of ground facilities has always been considered a secondary issue (although this is difficult to attribute to the shortcomings of the aircraft itself), carts and weapon lifts worked extremely poorly, were unreliable, and the technicians preparing the attack aircraft had to manually drag bombs and missiles, using the soldier's ingenuity, contriving to hang even half-ton bombs, since the pylons were not very high (Even when designing the Su-25, the designers took into account this "unsolvable problem" and determined the position of the pylons, taking into account that a person can lift a large load only to chest level). The worn-out wheels, literally burning at mountain airfields, were changed in about the same way. This procedure was often carried out without jacks and unnecessary difficulties: several people climbed onto one wing of the attack aircraft, the other was lifted, it was propped up with some kind of board, the wheel hung in the air and it was easily changed.
Inspecting the work of the 200th OSHAE, Air Marshal P. S. Kutakhov flew to Shindand several times, personally supervising the Su-25. By October 1982, Operation Exam was completed. By this time, hostilities were already being waged throughout Afghanistan. Unfortunately, it was not possible to carry out the instructions of the Minister of Defense Sokolov - "to finally destroy the counter-revolution by November 7". Moreover, in the memo of the headquarters of the TurkVO it was noted: “… the military-political situation has worsened almost everywhere … and became extremely acute even in a number of those areas where there were no large bandit formations earlier and, due to geographical features, there are no favorable conditions for their activities (north, plains and areas bordering the USSR)”. Several dozen combat aircraft transferred to the DRA were clearly in short supply. The aviation group needed to be strengthened, and the Su-25, tailored to the standards of the Afghan war, was to become a mass machine.
The 200th OSHAE from Sital-Chai was replaced by the squadron of Major V. Khanarin, a year later it was replaced by the next one. So the forces of one squadron in shifts of the 80th OSHAP continued to work in the DRA until September 1984, when the 378th OSHAP of Lieutenant Colonel A. Bakushev was formed, the first of the assault regiments in full force to leave for the DRA. Two of his squadrons were stationed at Bagram and one at Kandahar. Assault squadrons of other regiments were also sent to Afghanistan. They led a "nomadic" lifestyle, working "at different airfields as" fire brigades ", never staying anywhere longer than a few months. If necessary, the Su-25 relocated closer to the places of operations, operating from
Kabul airport and Mazar-i-Sharif and Kunduz field airfields in the north of the country. There was no longer enough parking space, and they were urgently supplemented with prefabricated corrugated flooring, hundreds of tons of which were delivered to the airbases. During major operations that required the concentration of aviation forces, it became crowded on them, and the planes were rolled onto the ground along the taxiways, leaving only the front wheel on the concrete so that the air intakes would not suck in sand and gravel. Su-25s were replaced by helicopters with the support of troops in areas exceeding 2500-3000 m. For greater efficiency, attack aircraft began to be used from the "air watch" position, and, meeting resistance, the infantry could immediately aim aircraft at firing points. The holding area for the Su-25, according to safety conditions from air defense fire and "supervision" of the terrain, was assigned at an altitude of 3000-3500 m, and the flight into it was carried out according to the schedule or on command from the command post, which kept in touch with the ground units. During attacks by mixed air groups, the Su-25 was assigned the role of the main striking force. Taking advantage of good protection, they worked at a target from heights of about 600-1000 m, while the more vulnerable Su-17 and fighters - about 2000-2500 m. ". According to them, each Su-25 achieved greater success than the flight, or even the eight of the Su-17s, and A. V. Bakushev, who became the head of the combat training of the FA, noted: “Everything that came with a column of ammunition was sent primarily for the Su -25. They spent them more efficiently and for their intended purpose. " The nickname "Rook", which originally served as their radio call sign in Operation Rhombus, was fully justified by the Su-25 by its ability to find and "peck" prey, resembling this hardworking bird.
Particularly effective was the joint work of attack aircraft and helicopter pilots, who managed to study the terrain from low altitudes and were better oriented in the strike area. A pair of Mi-8s, circling over the target, conducted reconnaissance and indicated the Su-25's location with signal flares and tracer machine-gun bursts. The first to reach the target were 2-4 aircraft, suppressing anti-aircraft points. After them, the Mi-24 para-link cleared the area from the surviving air defense pockets, opening the way for a strike group of one or two Su-25 units and combat helicopters. If circumstances required it, "for greater persuasiveness" the blow was delivered by full squadrons (12 Su-25 and Mi-24 each). Attack aircraft carried out several approaches from an altitude of 900-1000 m, after which they were immediately replaced by helicopters, finishing off targets and leaving the enemy no chance to survive (as often happened during raids of high-speed fighter-bombers, instantly sweeping over the target). The task of the helicopters was also to cover the planes leaving the attack, after which they, in turn, again fell on the revived firing points.
The forces of such a group conducted an operation on February 2, 1983 in the province of Mazar-i-Sharif, where Soviet specialists who worked at a local nitrogen fertilizer plant were captured and killed. Kishlak Vakhshak, in which the gang was in charge, was attacked by four Su-25s; it was supported by a Mi-24 link and six Mi-8s, blocking the village and preventing the enemy from escaping the blow. The village was hit by two ODAB-500P, ten tons of conventional high-explosive bombs and forty S-8 missiles, after which it practically ceased to exist.
Similar operations were carried out after the capture of prisoners by the dushmans. It was only possible to repulse them by force, and a demonstration BSHU was carried out at the nearest village. The invitation to dialogue looked convincing enough, and if the prisoners were still alive, after the first strikes, the local elders went to negotiations, agreeing to return them, if only the planes were recalled. “Diplomacy of stormtroopers”, exchange for captured Mujahideen, or even ransom during the war years, managed to return 97 people from captivity.
The large combat load and the ability to penetrate into hard-to-reach places made the Su-25 the main vehicle for air mining, widely used to lock the enemy in bases and operational blockade. Typically, the Su-25 carried 2-4 KMGU containers, each of which contained 24 anti-personnel fragmentation mines - "frogs" POM or high-explosive PFM in the container blocks of the BK. They also used tiny "anti-finger" mines the size of a palm, almost invisible underfoot. Their charge was only enough to inflict small wounds and immobilize the attacker, and the loss of blood and the almost complete absence of doctors made his situation hopeless. Mining of the Su-25 was carried out at a speed of 700-750 km / h from an altitude of 900-1000 m, and for a more dense "sowing" on trails and roads, they were reduced to 300-500 m.
In 1984, the Su-25 accounted for 80% of all mine-laying sorties, 14% were made by helicopter pilots and another 6% by IBA pilots.
Hindering the movement of armed detachments, the Su-25 demolished stone cornices and paths, bombed gorges, making them impassable. The Su-25's ability to work accurately was used in November 1986 near Asadabad, where suspension bridges thrown over the gorge were discovered, leading to warehouses hidden in the mountains. It was not possible to bomb them from above - the thin threads of the bridges were hidden in the depths of the gorge - and the four Su-25 of Major K. Chuvilsky, having descended between the overhanging stone walls, hit the bridges with bombs point-blank.
Su-25s also went hunting. Its areas were indicated to the pilots according to the intelligence directorate of the headquarters of the 40th Army, where information from units, sentry posts, special forces brigades flowed every day, received aerial photography and even space reconnaissance data. With the appearance of radio stations among the Mujahideen, radio-technical reconnaissance means were deployed at the airfields - radio intercept and direction finding complexes "Taran", the equipment of which was located on the basis of five MT-LBu tractors. This equipment made it possible to pinpoint the location of dushman radios, and experienced "listeners" and translators literally received first-hand information about the enemy's intentions. Attack aircraft flying out to "hunt", in addition to the obligatory PTB, usually took a universal version - a pair of NAR UB-32-57 (or B-8M) blocks and two 250-500-kg bombs. The best conditions for "hunting" were on the plain, which allowed attacking from any direction immediately after the target was detected. For surprise, they practiced strikes from extremely low altitudes (50-150 m), using special assault bombs with brake parachutes, which made it possible for the aircraft to escape from their fragments. Such an attack took the enemy by surprise and did not give him time to open return fire, but it was also difficult for the pilot himself, who quickly got tired of flying over the approaching terrain, every minute waiting for a target to appear. The most experienced pilots, who knew how to independently navigate in an unfamiliar area, find and identify the object of attack, went on the "hunt".
Attack aircraft suffered losses not only from enemy fire (Su-25 Major A. Rybakov, Kabul, May 28, 1987) …
… but also during rough landings caused by high speed and difficulty of the landing maneuver (Bagram, November 4, 1988)
During emergency landings, a strong box of the Su-25 armored cabin saved the pilot
Attack aircraft taxiing for takeoff along the "walkways" - a flooring of metal strips
Since the fall of 1985, the "hunt" was carried out at night, although the Su-25 did not have special sighting equipment. All improvements were reduced to installing an anti-glare shield near the landing lights so that they would not blind the pilot. On moonlit nights in winter, they did without the help of the SAB - on the snow-covered passes and fields, any movement and even trampled tracks were perfectly visible, leading to shelters and overnight places. Caravans creeping in the dark (camels and horses were replaced by jeeps, mostly Japanese Nissan and Toyota) pretended to be headlights, which they hit. Finding a target in a mountain gully, where it was not easy to accurately lay bombs during the day, the "hunters" practiced hitting with powerful mines higher up the slope, which caused a landslide, burying the enemy under tons of stones. The darkness of the night reliably hid the attack aircraft from anti-aircraft fire, but required increased attention so as not to crash into the mountains (so in the winter of 1985 A. Baranov died on the Su-25 st.lt).
Providing the wiring of the transport convoys, the Su-25 knocked out dushman ambushes from the commanding heights, preventing them from moving into positions and firing at vehicles. From the report of the attack aircraft A. Pochkin: "Acting in a pair along the road north of the city of Gardez, I found a rocket launcher with a crew on the top of the mountain, which was firing at a column of tankers, and destroyed it with one bomb attack." In August 1985, during an operation to supply the provincial center of Chagcharan, 250 Soviet and several hundred Afghan trucks, accompanied by four motorized rifle battalions, tanks and an artillery battery, covered 32 aircraft and helicopters. Clearing the way for the convoy, in six days they destroyed 21 firing points and more than 130 rebels.
Of particular importance in organizing the raids were clear leadership and combat control, which required reliable radio communications. Without it, the pilots could not coordinate with their neighbors and aircraft controllers. Having descended, the planes disappeared over the mountains, disappearing from all-round view screens and from the air, forcing the flight leaders to swear: "The Red Army is strong, but communications will destroy it." To ensure continuous radio communication, An-26RT repeater aircraft, which for hours hung in the sky over the strike area, began to be lifted into the air. In the course of major operations, when special coordination and preparedness of the actions of large aviation groups in a vast area was required (as was the case in the summer of 1986 during the defeat of the arsenal base near Herat), Il-22 flying command posts, equipped with a powerful on-board control complex, appeared over Afghanistan. and communications capable of supporting the work of an entire air army. The Su-25 themselves were equipped with a special VHF radio station R-828 "Eucalyptus" for communication with ground forces within the line of sight.
In connection with the increased frequency of shelling and sabotage since the spring of 1985, the Su-25 began to be involved in patrolling over the Kabul airport and the headquarters of the 40th Army, located in the former palace of Amin. At night, helicopters were on duty, and when guard posts reported suspicious activity in the nearby mountains, Su-25s rose from Bagram. A couple of attack aircraft were constantly on duty in Bagram, whose task was to immediately strike the area where Ahmad Shah Massoud appeared - enemy number one in these places and the undivided master of Charikar and Panjshir. A skilful and energetic adversary, appointed by the top of the opposition as the "commander-in-chief of the fronts of the central provinces," Masoud aroused particular dislike in Kabul with his daring operations near the capital itself and, especially, with his indisputable authority among the population. The pilot who destroyed Ahmad Shah was promised in advance the title of Hero of the Soviet Union; Turan Ismail, a commander of a lower rank, was accordingly evaluated with the Order of the Red Banner. Attack aircraft and special forces hunted for Masud, ambushed him, conducted military operations, at least 10 times it was reported about his death (B. V. Gromov himself believed that “since the 85th year Ahmad Shah is no longer alive - this is only a banner from the opposition "), but the elusive" amirsaib "again and again escaped persecution, through his people in Kabul learned in advance about the impending strikes - among the informants of Massoud were high-ranking officers of the Afghan army who sold secrets and the chief of intelligence of the General Staff himself, Major General Khalil (Betrayal of Khalil and the officers of his entourage was discovered in the spring of 1985).
Conducting reconnaissance occupied a relatively modest place among the tasks of attack aircraft (insufficient flight range and the lack of special equipment interfered with) and was limited to visual reconnaissance in the interests of its own unit. Preparing for a raid, the squadron commander or navigator flew around the area of the future strike, getting acquainted with the terrain and landmarks, and immediately before the attack, the squadron pilots carried out additional reconnaissance. At the suggestion of A. V. Rutsky, who adopted the 378th OSHAP in the fall of 1985, one Su-25 was equipped with a photocontainer to record the results of strikes.
The versatility and, in many cases, the indispensability of the Su-25 made their use extremely intense. In 1985, attack pilots scored twice as many sorties as their counterparts on the Su-17, and had an average flight time of 270-300 hours (the "Union" standard was 100 hours), and many left these indicators far behind. Rutskoi made 453 sorties (of which 169 - at night), senior lieutenant V. F. Goncharenko from the 378th regiment had 415, and Colonel G. P. Khaustov (on all types of aircraft) - more than 700 for two years of work in the DRA (Marshal of Aviation A. N. Efimov - the famous attack pilot twice Hero of the Soviet Union during the entire Patriotic War performed 222 sorties). fly on missions up to 950. The load on attack aircraft and their wear and tear exceeded all norms, which is why the practice of “shift shifts” did not become widespread - the transfer of machines to replacing regiments and squadrons.
Among the Su-25 pilots, occupational diseases included persistent stomach pains, aching joints and nosebleeds caused by flying at altitude in a leaky cockpit. These problems were aggravated by a meager and monotonous diet, which added to the promised "hardships and hardships". Normal "food ration" turned out to be an insoluble problem for the suppliers, and the aviators were expected day after day by hateful cereals, canned food and concentrates, which remained the basis of the diet amid the abundance of greens and fruits that surrounded them. They did not even try to establish supply at the expense of local resources, for fear of poisoning, and the rear services sold to Afghanistan stocks that had been lying in warehouses, with which canned bread, stewed meat and rusks made in 1943 fell into the flight canteens (they say they beat any nail),
Brake flaps, not removed after landing, became a real disaster for other aircraft - the spreading "sandals" of the Su-25 now and then turned down the LDPE of neighboring cars
With the strengthening of the air defense of the Mujahideen, the Su-25 increasingly began to bring serious damage from the battle. Although reliable protection in many cases rescued the pilot, anti-aircraft fire damaged engines, tanks, controls, and disabled aircraft equipment. Su-25, piloted by V. V. Bondarenko, returned to the airfield, dragging a plume of kerosene from its tattered wings and stopped on the runway without a single drop of fuel. The attack aircraft of Major A. Porublev received a DShK bullet in the lock of the wing holder, from which the outboard tank fell, immediately strung by the dive plane onto the pylon. The aircraft with a vertically protruding tank was difficult to control, but no matter how hard the pilot tried, he could not shake off the tank, and with this unusual suspension the Su-25 came to base. Another time on the plane st. Lieutenant Kovalenko was simultaneously beaten by 30 anti-aircraft guns, according to eyewitnesses, "reminiscent of a fireworks display on Red Square." During the first year of operation of the 378th OSHAP, pilots had to return to the airfield 12 times with one "knocked out" engine. And yet the attack aircraft suffered losses: there was a case when the Su-25 crashed due to the hit of just one bullet, which interrupted the oxygen hose; the pilot lost consciousness, and the uncontrolled car fell to the ground. December 10, 1984over Panjshir was shot down Su-25 st.l-ta V. I. Zazdravnova, attacking the target with cannon fire: at the exit from the dive, the response burst damaged the controls, and the plane crashed into the rocks.
The good maintainability and interchangeability of units, prudently incorporated into the design of the Su-25, helped to return the damaged aircraft to service. On the spot, perforated tanks, flaps, rudders, broken landing gear struts were replaced, attack aircraft with completely new engine nacelles, nose and tail parts of the fuselage were encountered. The need to “mend” numerous bullet and shrapnel holes made us recall locksmithing and riveting, which had been forgotten in the combat units, and the industry arranged the supply of sets of the most damaged panels and hoods. Due to the abundance of holes (a kind of record was 165 holes on one Su-25), many of them were patched clumsily, “on the knee”. Sometimes there was not even enough duralumin for repair, and in one of the regiments attack aircraft carried patches from flattened sleeves! Another problem was the lack of spare parts, and from time to time one of the most damaged aircraft turned into their source and went "to feed" its fellows who continued to work.
During the 4th Panjshir operation, launched in May 1985 (its goal was "the complete and final defeat of bandit formations in the central provinces"), the valley was also covered by 200 DShK and ZGU, in addition to which Ahmad Shah's detachments received another three dozen 20 mm antiaircraft gun "Oerlikon-Berle" of Swiss production with a height reach of up to 2000 m. They were easily disassembled for transportation and made it possible to equip positions in the most unexpected places. Foreign instructors helped to master the weapons well, the Mujahideen themselves learned to build an air defense system around the camps, using the terrain features to shelter firing points. The saturation of the combat areas with anti-aircraft weapons began to pose a serious threat, and neglect of it could not go unpunished: on July 22, 1985, the Su-25 S. V. Shumikhina was above the target for almost half an hour and was shot down on the 11th combat approach, coming under fire disguised anti-aircraft guns.
Working as a pair, the attack aircraft began to distribute duties as follows: the leader attacked the target, and the wingman followed the terrain, striking the detected flashes of "welding" on the move. To protect against fire from above, under which planes fell in gorges and on bends, pilots began to receive titanium armored helmets, but heavy "bowlers" did not take root among pilots who preferred a good view and freedom of action.
New types of ammunition came to the aid of the attack aircraft, combining high lethality with a long sighting range, which made it possible to work on a target without entering the air defense zone. The Su-25 began to use large-caliber 122-mm rocket blocks B-13L with a launch range of up to 4000 m. They were equipped with high-explosive fragmentation NAR S-13-OF, in terms of power and destructive power by an order of magnitude superior to the C-8, and C-13 with a penetrating warhead, breaking through a three-meter layer of earth and stones above the shelters. Heavy NAR S-25-OF and OFM with a two-hundred-kilogram warhead "tough" were also strong, well-defended structures - fortresses, firing points in the rocks and fortifications. Reliable and unpretentious S-25 when equipping the aircraft were no more complicated than conventional bombs. Piles of launch tubes with missiles lay on the airfields, and for their preparation it was enough to rip off the wrapping paper and screw in the fuse. Suspended installations SPPU-22-01 with movable guns GSH-23 were also used. During the landing at the Javar base in April 1986, the four Su-25s cleared the way for the approaching helicopters with SPPU irrigation fire on the slopes of the gorge. Not a single Mi-8 with a landing party was lost.
In April of the same year, the Su-25 Rutskoy and the squadron commander Vysotsky, attacking the warehouses hewn in the rocks near Khost, first used guided missiles that could be launched from safe distances and heights. When using the X-23 radio command, it was difficult for the pilot to find the target himself and control the missile, monitoring its flight. Therefore, the most practical were the Kh-25 and Kh-29L with laser homing, target illumination for which another attack aircraft could be guided with the help of the Klen-PS onboard target designator rangefinder, but the best results were obtained with the help of a ground gunner who knew the area well. At first, ground-based laser designators were improvised on armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, then they were replaced by standard aircraft guidance combat vehicles (BOMAN) based on the BTR-80, on which the system was covered under armor and moved out during operation.
The enemy quickly appreciated the significance of the unusual-looking vehicles and tried to shoot them first. After several particularly successful launches, when missiles hit the headquarters and Islamic committees, the hunt for BOMAN began on the roads and parking lots, forcing them to hide the cars behind barbed wire and minefields of well-guarded airfields.
Rockets have become a reliable weapon of destruction of cave shelters, practically invulnerable to other ammunition. The Mujahideen used them for warehouses and hiding places, equipped workshops for the repair of weapons (in the cave city on the basis of Javar there was a whole cartridge factory). The mountains dug by holes turned into natural fortresses - having dragged up recoilless guns, DShK and mortars, the spooks set up firing positions, closed from shelling from below, and artillery and tanks could not knock them out of there. The fire from the towering cliffs was destructively accurate, and steep slopes and rubble did not allow getting close to them. When using aircraft, the enemy hid in the depths under thick arches, and bombs and NAR were wastedly crumbling stones around. After waiting for the raid, the arrows got out and continued to fire.
The accuracy of hitting the "lasers" was amazing - the missiles could be placed exactly in the entrances of caves and embrasures, and their solid warhead was more than enough to destroy the target. Particularly effective was the heavy Kh-29L with a warhead weighing 317 kg, enclosed in a sturdy hull. Punching a stone, she went deep and broke into the most inaccessible objects from the inside. If an ammunition depot was hidden in the cave, the success was truly deafening. Simpler guided missiles S-25L were also used - a variant of conventional NAR, on which a head unit with a control system and a laser seeker of the same type as on the Kh-25 and Kh-29L was installed.
The Su-25 missile attack was vividly described by the commander of a landing company, pinned to the ground by fire from a bunker hanging over the Baghlansky gorge: pillbox in gravel ". More often, rather expensive missiles were used against "piece" targets, using intelligence data, carefully preparing each strike. The launches were carried out from a range of 4-5 km with a gentle dive at an angle of 25-30 °, the deviation of the missiles from the aiming point did not exceed 1.5-2 m. According to the Sukhoi Design Bureau, a total of 139 guided missile launches were made in the DRA.
Bristling with pendants infantry attack aircraft called "comb"
The "security zone" around the airfields was patrolled by combat helicopters
With the advent of MANPADS among the Mujahideen, the statistics of the losses of attack aircraft began to change for the worse. Their first victim was, apparently, the squadron commander Lieutenant Colonel P. V. Ruban, shot down on January 16, 1984 over the town of Urgun. On his Su-25, the engines and controls were damaged by shrapnel, the attack aircraft began to fall, and when the pilot tried to leave the car, the height was no longer enough. Once the Su-25 even brought back from a flight an unexploded rocket that hit the engine and was sticking out. Until the end of the year, five more attack aircraft were shot down with the help of MANPADS. At this time, the Strela-2M missile systems from the Arab countries and the American-made Red Eyes, which were going through Pakistan, were used. There also appeared the English "Bloupipe" with radio command guidance and higher altitude (up to 3000 m), which, however, did not find wide application due to the complexity of control and heavy weight (21 kg in the equipped state versus 15 kg for the "Strela" and 13 kg for "Red Eye"). Most likely, one of the "Bloupipes" in April 1986 near Khost was shot down by A. V. Rutsky: the plane had already been flashed with a burst of PGU, when the missile hit the air intake of the left engine and "turned off" it, caused surging of the adjacent engine and damaged the control system with shrapnel … The attack aircraft, which was barely in the air, was finished off by the next anti-aircraft gun, and the pilot managed to leave the car that was falling on its side already above the ground.
To protect against thermal seeker, the Su-25 was equipped with four ASO-2V cassettes with PPI-26 (LO-56) infrared squibs, but the pilots rarely used them. The ASO control panel was on the side of the pilot, and to work with it, one had to distract himself at the hottest moment of the attack. In addition, the stock of traps was barely enough for one minute of ASO operation, and the attack aircraft took care of them as a last resort, but when they noticed the launch, it was too late to pour in the squibs - the seeker captured the target, and the rocket went to the plane. In view of the urgency, the problem was solved simply - they installed additional ASO-2V beams on the engine nacelles, doubling the number of traps. Now shooting started automatically with pressing the combat button at the beginning of the attack and continued for 30 seconds until the end of the combat approach. The Su-25 began to carry 256 squibs, each of which cost about 7 rubles, and the pilot who arranged a good "fireworks" thus released 5-6 of his salaries into the air. The expense was worth it - the pilots were convinced of the effectiveness of the traps by hearing deceived missiles bursting behind them.
The situation was changed by the appearance at the end of 1986 of "Stingers" with a highly sensitive selective seeker, which distinguished an engine with a characteristic temperature range from a burning trap. The Stinger had a great height reach, could be used on a collision course, and its warhead was three times more powerful than the Red Eye. In combination with a proximity fuse, which worked even when flying close to the aircraft, this made it possible to cause severe damage without a direct hit. The reliability of protection with the help of LH declined, and reports began to note "a trend towards a serious increase in losses from MANPADS." During the first week of the Stingers' use in November 1986, they shot down four Su-25s, killing two pilots. By September 1987, the losses amounted to an entire squadron.
Basically "Stingers" hit the tail section and engines of attack aircraft. Often the Su-25 returned to the airfield with incredible damage.
Su-25 struck by the Stinger landed in Kabul on July 28, 1987
The intention to install on the Su-25 an active jamming station "Sukhogruz", which jammed missile seeker and showed itself well on helicopters, was not realized due to its too high power consumption, and the survivability of the attack aircraft began to increase in more traditional ways - additional protection of the most vulnerable units and systems … The angles of the approach of missiles and the dispersal of fragments, the most suffering nodes, the nature of the destruction and their "fatality" were determined by studying the statistics of damage, which was not lacking - "Rooks" often returned home "on parole." Major A. Rybakov (the day before he had already received an anti-aircraft projectile in the flap) reached the airfield on an airplane with one choking engine, filled with kerosene from punctured tanks, a flashlight excised by shrapnel, a completely failed hydraulic system and a non-releasing landing gear. Not a single device worked in the cockpit, and the pilot with his face covered in blood was flying the plane blindly, at the command of his partner. Sitting on his belly, the pilot rushed to the side of the plane, and only after making sure that the explosion did not threaten the car, he returned to turn off the engine that was raising clouds of dust.
Jul 28, 1987an attack aircraft came to the base with a hole in the side, whose right engine was blown apart by a rocket, the fire whipping from the engine compartment burned through the firewall, the electrical fittings and power units completely burned out, the elevator control rods burned out by 95%. The fire continued until the landing, and yet - every cloud of it - the landing gear went out of the short circuit, and the plane was able to land.
The tail of the Su-25 by P. Golubtsov was blown off by a rocket, but the engines continued to work. The brakes failed, and after landing, the plane rolled out of the strip into a minefield, where the pilot had to wait for the sappers to get out. In another plane, an explosion tore out almost a quarter of its wing. On the plane of Lieutenant Burakov, the rocket blew almost the entire keel to the root, and the pilot managed to land with great difficulty, controlling the course with the help of the ailerons. The pilots also talked about strong explosions in the fuselage a few minutes after extinguishing the fire in the motorcycle compartments. It was not the tanks that exploded - the sponge filling them extinguished the shock wave and stopped the flame, but kerosene continued to gush from the broken pipelines, pouring over the hot engine.
The chief designer of the aircraft, V. P. Babak, flew to the DRA several times himself, and one of the mutilated Su-25 with a ruined engine and traces of fire was taken to the Design Bureau. In most cases, the rockets exploded from the bottom-side of the engines, the destroyed turbine and compressor were racing, and the blades flying in all directions chopped everything in their path worse than fragments. To isolate the damaged engine, protect the fuselage compartments and fuel fittings from fire, from the aircraft ser. No. 09077 on the sides of the motorcycle compartments between frames 18-21 and 21-25 steel 5-mm shielding plates and protective mats made of fiberglass were installed. Titanium engine control rods were replaced with heat-resistant steel ones, the gaskets of the fuel pipelines were changed, covering them behind screens, and to prevent explosions in leaks, an automatic fuel cut-off was introduced when the fire system was turned on, protecting it and the tail section of the fuselage with electrical equipment and control wiring. To blow off the engine compartment and cool the nozzles, air intakes were installed on the engine nacelles. In the complex of improvements, they mounted the armored curtain of the lantern and an additional armor plate that covered the ASO - there were cases when the machine guns were knocked out by shrapnel, and the plane turned out to be defenseless. The total mass of the Su-25's protection reached 1100 kg, making up 11.5% of the structure's mass. Attack aircraft with increased combat survivability ("Su-25 with PBZh") began to arrive in Afghanistan in August 1987.
To reduce the risk of injury from the end of 1986, the pilots were forbidden to descend below 4500 m, but this order contradicted the very "style of work" of the attack aircraft and was often violated by them. AV Rutskoy, according to the description - "a strong pilot and strong-willed commander", had two penalties for violating the restriction, and his Su-25 suffered 39 holes. For less vulnerability during takeoff and landing, attack aircraft began to use steep trajectories, using air brakes for a sharp descent and almost parachuting into the runway. Going around was already considered a serious fault - enemy shooters could wait in the surrounding greenery. On January 21, 1987, K. Pavlyukov's Su-25 artillery piece that took off from Bagram was shot down by the Stinger from an ambush. The pilot ejected, but at dusk, the search helicopters could not find him. The wounded pilot took the fight on the ground and, having used up all the cartridges, blew himself up with a grenade.
A significant part of the damage to combat vehicles fell on rough landings due to the complexity of the maneuver and the high speed of approach, which required increased attention from the pilots returning from the battle exhausted by several sorties. Rarely did a month go without accidents: attack aircraft landed with a minimum of fuel, without flaps and air brakes, touched each other, not having time to turn off the runway in time, lost wheels and demolished the landing gear. There are also many known cases of folding the front landing gear when touching the runway too hard. The brakes burnt out at the landing and the scattered pneumatics were an everyday thing and on another day they happened several times. On October 4, 1988, in Bagram, a Su-25 that landed on the runway blew all three landing gears on its concrete threshold, flew across its belly in a cloud of sparks, and stopped, cutting the fuselage down to the armored cabin. The pilot, who did not even receive bruises, got out of the remains of the attack aircraft and went to "surrender" to the headquarters.
The number of Su-25 lost in Afghanistan is usually estimated at 23 aircraft (out of a total of 118 aircraft). However, this number needs to be clarified. It was not always possible to establish the real reasons for the death of a particular aircraft: in most cases the wreckage of the cars remained lying far in the mountains, and often it was necessary to rely only on the emotional reports of the pilot and his colleagues.
Lieutenant P. Golubtsov after landing on a damaged aircraft
The landing of a group of attack aircraft took place with a minimum interval between vehicles. One of the Su-25s "takes off his shoes" on the run and rolls out of the runway
"Rook" takes off with S-24 missiles
If the accident occurred through the fault of the pilot, it threatened him, at least, with dismissal from flight work, and there was no need to scatter personnel in a combat situation, and they tried to carry out the damage according to the column "combat". The same applied to accidents that occurred due to design and production deficiencies. It was not easy to prove the guilt of the industry - it was necessary to draw up an act of investigation of the incident, and it was often impossible to inspect the crashed car and really study the failed units.
When the futility of the protracted war became obvious, the new commander of the 40th Army B. V. Gromov, in anticipation of the imminent withdrawal of troops, set the task: to reduce losses to minimize the combat activity of ground forces, refraining from offensive operations as much as possible and guarding key areas, roads and airfields. For aviation, this meant more work: without its help, many garrisons, surrounded on all sides by the enemy, could no longer hold out. For example, in Baghlan province, a constantly attacked Soviet airborne battalion held an area of only three square kilometers at the intersection of roads, while it was believed that the province was "partially controlled by the opposition."
To reduce casualties, the Rooks became more widely used for night strikes. At the same time, the impact of air defense was almost completely excluded and there was a real opportunity to destroy, on a tip, large groups of the enemy, who were stationed for the night in fortresses and villages. (Needless to say, what fate awaited the village itself - Rutskoi assessed the situation as follows: "And the devil will take them apart, his own village or someone else's, from above they are all the same"). Su-17 helped to orient the attack aircraft, illuminating the terrain with SABs. In one of the night raids, the commander of the assault squadron noticed lights below and immediately covered them with bombs. When he returned, he reported on the "dushman bonfires" and led the entire squadron to the indicated area, inflicting two BSHUs with "five hundred" and RBK. The paratroopers, sent in the morning to assess the results of the night attack, saw only the slopes dug by bombs and the smoldering bush set on fire by the SABs. Another time, a Su-25 pilot, unable to find a target in the dark, dropped bombs at random, not risking landing with a dangerous load. Soon congratulations to the fellow pilot who successfully covered a whole gang of several dozen people who spent the night in this place came to the unit.
With the beginning of the withdrawal of troops and the departure of the garrison from Kandahar, the attack aircraft were redeployed to Shindand and Bagram. Another squadron was based at the Kabul airport. The tasks of the Su-25 were supplemented by the outgoing convoys and the regular delivery of warning strikes along the roads: according to reconnaissance data,along the highway from Kabul to the Soviet border, up to 12 thousand militants were concentrated and more than 5 thousand were drawn up to the Shindand-Kushka road (an average of 20 people for each kilometer of the way). Since September 1988, attack aircraft from Shindand have worked almost every day in the Kandahar region, where the Soviet battalion continued to defend the airfield under continuous shelling. A respite for the paratroopers came only with the appearance of the Su-25 in the sky. Under their cover, transport planes from the "mainland" were supplied with ammunition, food, and the dead and wounded were taken away. The shelling, which became commonplace (only 635 missiles fell on Kabul in 1988), did not bypass the attack aircraft. On a June night in Kandahar, a missile hit a Su-25 just received from the factory, with eight C-24s hanging under its wing. It turned out to be impossible to extinguish it - an ammunition load exploded in the fire, a chair worked and flew away, traps flew away, the missiles went hissing into the darkness, stripping the metal flooring of the parking lot with stabilizers. During the next artillery attack on the Kabul airport in September 1988, 10 Su-25s burned down in the parking lots and two more cars were seriously damaged. In total, over the last year of the war, attack aircraft have lost 16 aircraft from air defense of the mujahideen, shelling of airfields and in flight accidents. The last two Su-25s were destroyed in January 1989. One of them, on the way to Shindand, had an engine failure, the pilot ejected and was rescued, another Su-25 was shot down by a missile over the village of Pagman near Kabul, his pilot was killed. In total, 8 attack pilots did not return from battle during the Afghan war.
Closing the Afghan epic, the Su-25 took part in Operation Typhoon, which began on January 23, 1989, a series of massive strikes aimed at "inflicting the greatest possible damage on opposition forces in the central and northern regions of the country." The day before, it was possible to stop the senseless fighting by concluding a truce with local elders and Ahmad Shah. Masud promised that he would not touch a single leaving Soviet soldier, and his people even helped pull the cars skidding in the snow (they also reported cases of "drinking together with the Akhmadshahs" kishmishovka "). And yet, in the end, the "Shuravi" decided to show their strength - they fired the most powerful shelling of roadside areas, fired 92 tactical missiles "Luna-M" across the squares, and on January 24-25, the aviation carried out more than 600 sorties and inflicted 46 BSHUs that ground down the surrounding mountains and valleys … Massoud did not respond to the fire, and in the last days of January the attack aircraft left the Afghan airfields.
