The statements on “Armata”, made against the background of the sequestration of other defense projects, have not yet found public understanding. In search of an answer to the question of why new tanks were not needed, observers and journalists set about comparing the combat qualities and assessing the possibilities of their mass production.
Arguing in a rational manner, some experts supported the opinion that the T-14 as presented is not ready for mass production. First, a "pilot batch" of a dozen samples is required - for a comprehensive assessment of combat and operational qualities. Therefore, the production of "Armat" in volumes sufficient to equip a noticeable number of combat units should be expected in the middle of the next decade.
Of course, there is no need for a complete renovation of the tank fleet. Rearmament is a long evolutionary process, in which a significant part of the fleet is still made up of old-style equipment.
Another, categorical opinion is associated with the general unjustification of the cost of purchasing new equipment. According to Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, the characteristics of the available weapons fully meet the challenges of modern conflicts. In the case of "Armata", the increase in certain characteristics does not justify the cost of purchasing and operating a new tank model.
What does this mean for the entire Armata program?
The decision to create a new generation MBT turned out to be untimely. The means and technologies available today do not allow creating a fundamentally new design that would have radical differences in combat capabilities. In the presented form, the "Armata" is the same classic tracked MBT, armed with a weapon of the caliber traditional for all domestic and foreign tanks. No 140-mm cannons, liquid propellants and other futurism.
Responsible persons from the Ministry of Defense made a mistake in assessing the potential of the existing equipment of the old model and could not formulate the objective requirements for new generation tanks. As a result, a tank was created by the efforts of the military-industrial complex, which ultimately could not interest the military.
See how logical everything is?
No, it’s not logical
Disputes about the combat capabilities of technology of different generations, as well as attempts to blame the unsightly situation on the technical problems of the "Armata" itself, are a lie for complacency and removal of responsibility.
Even without the 140 … 152-mm artillery systems of increased power, the "Armata" has an undeniable advantage in firepower and protection over all types of MBT in service with the Russian Army.
Based on realities, the comparison is not made with the advanced versions of the T-90 presented at the exhibitions, but with the massive modifications of the T-72 tank, which form the basis of the domestic armored forces.
Anyone who is interested in military equipment is aware of the degree of novelty of "Armata". For the first time in world practice - an uninhabited tower and an isolated crew compartment capsule, which increases the crew's chances of survival.
Seven road wheels mean more combat weight. Consequently, a radical increase in security and the emergence of reserves for the installation of additional equipment. The most advanced solutions in the field of armored vehicles (active suspension, KAZ) were introduced in the design of the T-14. The unified tracked platform itself became the basis for creating a whole family of combat vehicles, incl. heavy tracked infantry fighting vehicles, the need for which has been demonstrated by all modern conflicts.
Experts in the field of armored vehicles can confirm the above, adding other noteworthy details to the description of "Armata". The domestic military-industrial complex has accumulated sufficient experience to create a breakthrough machine.
Why was it all unnecessary?
Here I am not going to quote the admonition that has become well known on how to behave in the absence of funds. The loud birth and strange fate of “Armata” have nothing to do with funding. According to the author, no one was going to release this tank initially.
Just as they were not going to release "Boomerang" and "Kurganets-25". Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the decision to simultaneously create several unified platforms at once, when there were not enough funds even for the production of one. And this was clear long before the statement of Deputy Prime Minister Yury Borisov.
Not a single shot, and already so many shell-shocked
The media are not the only ones to blame for this situation. Representatives of the Ministry of Defense also looked favorably on the incipient euphoria over the creation of a super tank, in every possible way stirring up the excitement and expectations of the public by demonstrating armored vehicles at significant exhibitions and parades.
What do we have in fact? Selecting the most correct definitions, "Armata" is a routine development project "Object 148", which in a strange way acquired the status of a ready-made replacement for the existing equipment, which will pour from the assembly line into the troops tomorrow.
Over the past half century, dozens of similar "objects" have been created (like the Object 640 with the name "Black Eagle" or the futuristic heavy tank "Object 279" from the Soviet past), but no one has ever stated the intention of their immediate mass production. All these single and small-scale samples from the point of view of the military-industrial complex are just sketches, sketches. To reach the final and prepare for serial production, an agreed decision of the military and industry was required, which was preceded by a huge complex of scientific, technical and organizational work.
What do we have in the case of “Armata”?
It was always and immediately talked about as a forthcoming replacement of armored forces, with plans for its production in the coming years in the amount of thousands of units.
As a result, the intrigue with the tank stretched out for a decade. The first public demonstration with confirmation of serious intentions is the May 2015 Victory Parade. Now, more than three years later, it's time to draw the line.
The next statement about the need for "trial operation to identify shortcomings" could be received ambiguously by the public. What have you been doing for 3, 5 years since the publication of loud statements and demonstration of finished samples?
Saying a firm "no" and closing the question by putting "Armata" on the dusty shelf of the design bureau is an impossible option. Such a sharp change in course would undermine the already shaken confidence in the defense industry, including on the international arms market. Such a fiasco will not go unnoticed for our "friends" from the near abroad, who will enthusiastically receive the news of the project's closure. "Armata" has died out! At the same time, foreign critics themselves cannot make even a sketch of such a machine …
Reputation is more important than any cost.
A "Solomon's decision" was made to start small-scale production of "Armata" with the aim of … speaking objectively, at least with the aim of preserving the best practices and technologies until better times. When the modernized armored vehicles of the Soviet era "will no longer meet the challenges of modern conflicts."
Do not think that the author is calling for the outbreak of a war, in which there will be a need for a large number of tanks of a new type. Waiting for the moment when the available equipment is completely outdated is a crime and a betrayal of the armed forces.
What else is there to add?
Production of 2300 "Armata" until 2020 against 132 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles until 2022, of which as many as 9 pieces. will be delivered to the troops this year.
Too sensitive difference between expectation and reality (the contract concluded on the military-technical uniform "Army-2018").
The announced rates and volumes of production are indicative of "hand-built", which raises related questions about the cost of such machines. And also expresses doubts about the justification of the appearance in the composition of the armored forces of a whole unique family of armored vehicles in microscopic quantities. Even by the standards of "toy" European armies operating 3-4 hundred modern MBTs, the production volumes of "Armat" look awkward.
A batch of one hundred units until 2022 - this is how the “five-year plan in four years” looks like in modern conditions.
Many of those present will express the opinion that 132 tanks (brigade kit) are still better than nothing. And by being in the right place at the right time, they can play a crucial role. However, excessive optimism was expressed about the brigade kit. The specified number of armored vehicles, in addition to MBT (T-14), includes BMP (T-15) and, according to other statements, BREM (T-16) based on the unified Armata platform. Their ratio within the framework of the contract remains unknown.
When, instead of mass rearmament, a small series of BTTs is offered to the enemies of the Russian land for fear and envy, intended, due to its small number, to solve what problems are unknown. All this testifies to a “soft withdrawal” from a sensitive topic, in which the interests of national defense are devoted to the sake of the personal interests of those in charge.
All of the above is true of any well-known project of recent times. When the show begins at the last moment with complaints about lack of funds, accusations of developers and looking for other reasons to renege on their promises.
