After the resignation of Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and the approval of Sergei Shoigu in this post, we again began to remember that the country is undergoing military reform. No - it cannot be said that everyone completely forgot about carrying out this, but recently an ordinary ordinary Russian (and not only from among the military) began to follow the progress of military reform with less enthusiasm, and at the same time more and more often switched to emerging corruption scandals in the main defense department. In this regard, we can say that if the reform went according to plan, then it simply could not have any rational public response, since the attention of the Russian public was by no means always focused on the percentage of implementation of reform plans.
But the reform is not endless - sooner or later it must be completed, and the funds allocated for its implementation (about 20 trillion rubles) must be properly spent. Moreover, Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev set a clear deadline for the end of the military reform - 2020. In other words, on January 1, 2021, Russia must receive a completely new army that will be able to solve any tasks that correspond to its competence. But what kind of beast is this - a new army? Usually, when it comes to reform, there is a kind of revolutionary leap that will radically change the situation with the country's defense capability for the better. However, all the same, in this case, it makes sense to talk about systematic evolutionary changes, since unexpected jumps more often completely destroyed the troops than made them more combat-ready.
It's autumn 2012. It seems that there are still eight long years ahead, and there is more than enough time to complete the army reform. However, let us not forget that the reform was not started this morning, and not even last night, but it began in 2008 - at the very time when Russia, with the help of quite great efforts, forced its presumptuous southern neighbor to peace. It was the year 2008 that showed that it is pointless to continue to observe the decline in the effectiveness of the Russian army, which means that it is necessary to stop engaging in endless talk about the need to change something in the most serious way, and start making real efforts for positive changes.
Efforts really began to be made. An unprecedented level of financing for the reform was announced for the new Russia: 20 trillion rubles over 12 years. For comparison, according to the so-called French White Paper (the doctrine of the development of the French army) of 2008, about 15 trillion rubles will be allocated from the state budget over 12 years (until 2020) (in terms of euros, of course). In other words, Russian funding for the army can be called truly colossal, because over the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the army continued to receive, excuse me, leftovers from the master's table.
So, financially, the situation has changed, which means that it was possible to start talking about the implementation of long-planned plans. One of these plans was the currently fashionable personnel optimization. About 200 thousand servicemen were dismissed from military service, and the composition of the army became fixed - 1 million "bayonets" (according to the plan). Optimization, no matter how criticized it, made it possible to free up a sufficient amount of funds, which, among other things, went to increase the pay of servicemen. Yes - the servicemen lost certain benefits, but the state announced the compensatory nature of the new payments. And in those military units where everything is in order with financial transparency, the servicemen have experienced an increase in the level of monetary allowances. This was the first sign of a new reform, which, as usual, caused a heated discussion among the servicemen themselves. For obvious reasons, those who were dismissed sharply criticized the optimization of the personnel of the Armed Forces, aviation and navy. You can understand these people. But at the same time, without solving personnel problems, the implementation of the reform itself would be in question. After all, the fighting efficiency of a modern army, as shown by global practice, is not always in direct proportion to the number of soldiers, officers and generals. In other words, bigger is not better. It was under this slogan that personnel restructuring in the Russian army continued to be implemented.
It was reported that by the end of the reform, about 48-49% of Russian servicemen should represent those who signed a contract by status. In other words, the emphasis was and continues to be made on the contractual-conscription nature of the army's recruitment.
But here another difficulty arose, which could not be solved "head-on". Today there are about 187 thousand contract servicemen in the Russian army. In order for the standards outlined in the reform plans to be fulfilled, it is necessary to conclude a contract with at least 300 thousand servicemen. Considering that there are eight years left until the end of the reform, the figure does not look super high. However, the pace of "recruiting" new contractors is still insufficient to implement the reform plans. In this case, it can be stated that an increase in the level of wages is far from the only thing that can attract young people to undergo military service under a contract. Additional incentives are required, requiring new and new costs. And the very concept of a contract in our country is often subject to legal interpretations, according to which any serviceman, if desired, can quite easily escape from fulfilling contractual obligations or even break the contract altogether. The numerous legal centers operating today for the so-called legal assistance to military personnel allow us to find legislative gaps for solving such problems.
The classic term “staff turnover” is still evident today, raising to the surface the problems of both the prestige of service and the legislative consolidation of servicemen's labor standards. After all, it turns out that, on the one hand, contract soldiers are positioned as subjects of labor law, capable of disposing of their own labor potential, and on the other hand, they want many times more from them than from conscripts. This is a typical version of the transitional system, which, I would like to believe, by the end of the reform will develop into a clearer basis for the relationship between the rights and duties of a serviceman who has the status of a contract soldier.
The reform (at least on paper) made it possible for conscripts to use the time of their service (12 months) exclusively for training within the framework of their VUS, to comprehend the basics of military service. The soldiers were freed from cleaning, kitchen work and even repairing military equipment. In this regard, they were replaced by outsourcing employees: cleaners, car mechanics, dishwashers and other personnel. This stage has come under great criticism, since the indicated approach makes a dependent person out of the Russian soldier. A soldier who is waiting for a civilian specialist to repair an armored personnel carrier will be absolutely helpless during a combat operation in the event of a breakdown of his equipment. Moreover, it was this part of the reform that made it possible to talk about the first corruption scandals of a new type. Often, dishonest commanders of military units continued to use the labor of soldiers both during cleaning and during maintenance of park equipment, and through a shell outsourcing company, funds were withdrawn to their own bank accounts. Strengthening control allowed to reduce the level of financial crime, but this problem has not yet been fully resolved.
The next stage of the reform was the revision of the constituent units of the Russian army. Instead of the usual formula "military district - army - division - regiment", the triad "military district - operational command - brigade" appeared. This approach to the hierarchy allows, according to the authors of the reform, to make command and control more efficient by reducing the number of representatives of the high command and reducing the time for transferring commands up the hierarchical ladder. For a modern army, gaining time is one of the top priorities. True, in some cases it was decided to leave the previous version of the hierarchy. This uneven approach is explained by the different, shall we say, landscape conditions in the military districts and the prevailing situation. They switched to brigades where the use of small mobile units is required, and where fighting with divisions is simply pointless. At the same time, where a small group of servicemen cannot fulfill a combat mission, it was decided to leave divisions consisting of separate regiments.
On the one hand, this may seem confusing, but in fact, this is actually an individual approach to the formation of military units in separate military districts, branches and branches of the armed forces.
One of the most discussed points of the ongoing military reform is the rearmament of the army. And here the new leadership of the Ministry of Defense, perhaps, will have to face difficulties to a greater extent. The fact is that the previous minister was never able to establish a clear system for the implementation of the State Defense Order. The conclusion of agreements was postponed indefinitely, the money lay in the accounts, the production was idle without work … Everything led to a banal dead end. In recent months, the situation seems to have begun to get off the ground, but there is still too much to be done to re-equip the army by 2020 with the planned 70% new types of weapons and military equipment.
Obviously, a lot has already been done in terms of reform, but today is the turning point when more needs to be done. If the new minister, together with his entourage, make every effort to turn the Russian army into a real fist, capable of delivering a crushing blow at the right time, while creating a positive image of the Russian serviceman and increasing the prestige of the service itself, then the reform can be considered not in vain. If, however, they begin to play back and revise in all segments of the reform, then this can hardly be called a positive. In general, there is a lot of time, but, paradoxically, there is little time … So, it is not in vain that Deputy Vladimir Komoedov from the Duma Defense Committee advises the new minister to get down to work, rolling up his sleeves.
