At the cost of relatively low casualties, the kamikaze pilots were able to defeat half of the US Navy!
Relatively low losses? Everything is learned by comparison: during the war years, 60,750 Japanese pilots did not return from the mission. Of these, only 3912 were "official" kamikaze. Cases of self-sacrifice in a desperate situation on their own initiative should be considered separately.
This article evaluates the effectiveness of "special attacks" as the main tactics of Japanese aviation at the final stage of the war.
So, what did the 3912 suicide pilots trade their lives for?
For six months of hostilities - 16 heavy aircraft carriers in the trash. It was like the weekly Midway marathon. Only in all episodes of that marathon was the American fleet “raked”. Essex, Saratoga, Franklin, Intrepid … more than once!
The number of blown up and burned up cruisers and destroyers went to dozens; transports and landing ships - hundreds of units!
What the hell was that?
A high-speed maneuvering air assault vehicle equipped with the best, fail-safe and unrivaled guidance system. Through the eyes of a living person.
The Japanese have calculated everything.
With "civilized" methods of combat, the pilot dropped bombs from a certain distance from the target (high or low altitudes), leaving himself the opportunity to exit the attack. To the detriment of the accuracy of the strike.
Kamikaze destroyed the prevailing stereotypes. Like the seeker of a modern missile, the suicide bomber would “lock” his plane to the chosen target and go into immortality.
The anti-aircraft gunners could shoot until they were blue in the face, but if the suicide bomber went to the sighting range of automatic cannons (Bofors ≈ 7 km, in a real stop even less - the near defense zone), then the situation acquired an inevitability factor. It was not enough to shoot down the plane. Deadly point-blank shots were often useless. The riddled "zero" with the killed pilot continued on its way in the direction of the target.
Realizing the scale of the catastrophe, the Americans began work on rearmament with 76-mm anti-aircraft guns - the proven 40-mm Bofors simply did not have enough power to scatter an air target into small debris.
The only reliable way was to intercept on distant approaches by fighter aircraft, thanks to the capabilities of the most powerful aircraft of the US Navy. Fortunately, the Japanese, in addition to combat aircraft, used everything that could fly, up to clumsy seaplanes.
The method had many advantages and only one drawback - due to the unpredictability of the situation and the difficulty in recognizing air targets, it was impossible to intercept each kamikaze.
14% of the kamikaze managed to break through the echeloned defense of the formations, damaging 368 ships and sinking another 34. 4,900 sailors became victims of these attacks, and about 5 thousand were injured. (According to the Department of Historical Research, US Department of Defense.)
In terms of the combination of damaging factors, the piston aircraft was superior to the cruise missiles of our time. First of all, its mechanical strength. Instead of plastic fairings and antennas at the head of the "Harpoons" and "Calibers", the Japanese "zero" inflicted a deafening blow with a 600-kg steel "pig" (14-cylinder engine "Nakajima Sakae"). Hence the increased penetration of this devilish weapon.
Like a red-hot knife, the kamikaze pierced the sides and bulkheads (in some cases even armored flight decks and the horizontal protection of battleships), pouring a shower of flaming fuel and their "combat equipment" into the compartments of piles of red-hot debris and their "combat equipment", which was not inferior in power to the combat units of modern anti-ship missiles. For example, the A6M5 version of the "zero" suicide bomber was equipped with a 500-kg aerial bomb on a ventral mount (which was comparable to the "Caliber" warhead, Tomahawk-TASM, or the newest LRASM).
The record holder for the number of explosives was the rocket "Oka", which carried on its wings the death of 1, 2 tons of ammonal. However, the use of MXY7 aircraft projectiles turned out to be ineffective due to the high vulnerability of their carriers - the G4M twin-engine bombers.
In matters of damage, the mass of the aircraft itself did not matter. Wings, tin sheathing and other "soft" elements were instantly torn off when they met an obstacle. Only the warhead and massive engine parts went forward.
As for the speed, the overwhelming majority of cruise missiles (~ 0.8M) did not go far from the Japanese kamikaze on piston planes (their speed at the moment of meeting with the target could exceed 500 km / h).
With regard to range, suicide records remain unattainable for modern anti-ship weapons. During Operation Tan No. 2, live bombs were launched into an attack from a distance of 4,000 km against an American squadron anchored off Ulithi Atoll. The US ships were covered by the night haze, in which the Japanese "ninja" sneaked up to the target. Nevertheless, the attack aircraft carrier Randolph was incapacitated (the flight deck was punctured, 27 dead, 100+ wounded, aircraft losses).
Considering the power of the charge (800 kg), which were equipped with twin-engine bombers "Yokosuka P1Y", who participated in the attack on Ulichi, and other examples of encounters with kamikaze, the crew of the "Randolph" was just fabulously lucky.
Comparison of Japanese pilots with anti-ship missiles is an attempt to explain, using popular examples, that the kamikaze were not fragile, funny “cornmen” operated by beardless youths. Who were thrown into a senseless attack by a criminal decision of the command.
These were the most dangerous combat vehicles, which, taking into account the capabilities of the naval air defense of that period, had a high chance of breaking through to the targets. And then came the apocalypse for the enemy.
The most perfect weapon
I confess that I myself had doubts about the effectiveness of suicide attacks for a while. In the top lines of the list of official losses of the US Navy, there are only 14 sunken destroyers and three escort aircraft carriers. With a hint that they could not sink anything larger than the kamikaze.
Interest in the topic of combat damage to ships made us look at the situation in a new way: the real damage from the actions of the kamikaze was enormous. In this sense, the statements of Japanese propaganda about “dozens of destroyed aircraft carriers” are closer to the truth than the deliberately restrained statements of the Americans about “sunk destroyers”.
To begin with, hits above the waterline are rarely capable of disrupting the buoyancy of a large ship. On the decks, an uncontrolled fire could blaze for hours, all devices and mechanisms went out of order, the ammunition could detonate. But the ship (or rather, what was left of it) was still afloat. An epic example from naval history is the agony of the heavy cruiser Mikuma, destroyed by the explosion of 20 of its own torpedoes.
It is from this position that one must proceed when assessing the effectiveness of kamikaze attacks.
What mattered more on the scale of the fleet: the sinking of the destroyer or “just damage” to the aircraft carrier Bunker Hill with a total displacement of 36,000 tons? On which, as a result of a double suicide attack, 400 people and the entire air wing were burned down. Bunker Hill was never rebuilt.
And here is the legendary Enterprise. The literature colorfully describes his exploits in all the most important battles of the Pacific theater of operations. But you rarely hear about how his fate ended.
… Lieutenant Tomiyasu entered his "zero" in the last dive. "If you want to hear my voice, press the shell to your ear, I will sing quietly."
The explosion tore out the nose lift - that was the end of the story of the Enterprise. Prior to this, the ship had already twice become a victim of kamikaze attacks (including the case of a fire caused by anti-aircraft fire when repelling a suicide attack), but each time it was recognized as maintainable and returned to service.
The third meeting with the kamikaze put an end to the aircraft carrier's combat career.
The 80 mm armored flight deck became a salvation for the nearby British aircraft carriers (Victories, Formidable, Illastries, Indomitable and Indifatigable). According to the recollections of the British, after each ramming, the sailors threw the wreckage of the kamikaze overboard, scrubbed the deck, rubbed the scratches, and the aircraft carrier resumed its combat missions. The beauty! Nothing like the hell that happened on the Essex and Yorktowns.
“The explosion knocked out a piece of the armor deck measuring 0.6x0.6 meters. Its debris ripped open the gas ducts passing in this place. On them, red-hot pieces of metal penetrated into the engine room and, breaking through the highways, got stuck in the bottom of the aircraft carrier. The Formidable was enveloped in clouds of smoke and superheated steam, and her speed dropped to 14 knots. Burning planes flew overboard from the flight deck”.
All that remained was to gently rub the “scratch” with a sandpaper …
This is not about the fact that constructive defense has not fulfilled its purpose. There is no doubt that the stability of the British aircraft carriers was higher than that of the American Essex and Yorktowns, which suffered significantly more losses. The above case only indicates that the destructive power of the kamikaze allowed them to fight even with protected targets.
And again the lines of the military chronicle:
“The victims of the first kamikaze were 11 fighters standing on the deck. During the second attack, "Formidebl" received new damage and lost another 7 cars. At that time, 15 combat-ready aircraft remained in the air wing …"
The combat capability of the Formidable itself at that moment looked obvious: an aircraft carrier with an air wing knocked out.
The damage could not remain without consequences. The accumulated damage led to a decrease in combat stability. At the end of the cruise, a fire broke out on the Formidebla hangar deck while performing maintenance on the aircraft. The fire quickly spread and engulfed the entire hangar due to the failure of the firewall drives, damaged by kamikaze attacks. The fire killed all aircraft in the hangar.
Aircraft carriers were target number 1 for the kamikaze. One of the most important tools of naval warfare, which attracted suicide bombers with its size and vulnerable construction. An abundance of explosive and highly flammable materials placed without any protection on the upper (flight) deck, which guaranteed a spectacular result.
Most of the suicide bombers were not lucky enough to fulfill their dream: they had to attack ships of other classes. Many, not daring to "tempt fate", chose destroyers that had weaker anti-aircraft fire than large ships of the 1st rank as their target. Especially hit the destroyers of the radar patrol, the sacrificial "lambs" of the fleet, patrolling away from the main forces, in the most dangerous directions.
In this sense, the tactics of the US Navy actually did not differ from the Japanese kamikaze: destroyers and their crews were deliberately sent to the slaughter, following the brutal logic of war.
Larger and more protected kamikaze ships were starved out. And in terms of the scale of the destruction, the consequences of a series of such attacks were not inferior to the Enterprise aircraft lift that flew into the sky.
Let's turn to the combat chronicle:
“The blow of the second kamikaze fell on the deck of“Australia”between installations of medium caliber on the starboard side (14 killed, 26 wounded). On the cruiser, the lack of prepared calculations for anti-aircraft guns began to be acutely felt (taking into account the first attack, which killed 50 of the sailors on the upper deck). Only two universal units remained operational - one per board."
In the evening of the same day, “Australia” was attacked by the third kamikaze, but his plane was shot down by anti-aircraft fire of the American cruiser “Columbia” - which also became a victim of suicide bombers.
On the American cruiser, a nuisance happened: a kamikaze rammed the stern section and exploded on the lower decks (13 dead, 44 wounded), setting off a powerful fire dangerously close to the cellars of the aft towers of the main battery. Their subsequent flooding, coupled with damage in this part of the hull, deprived the Columbia of half of its main caliber artillery. To the crew's credit, the cruiser continued to provide fire support to the landing in Lingaen Bay, while simultaneously fighting off anti-aircraft fire, covering herself and other ships from air attacks. Until the next suicide bomber crashed onto its deck, knocking out six fire control directors and 120 crew members. Only after that “Columbia” received permission to leave the war zone and went to the United States for six-month repairs.
As for the aforementioned “Australia”, it was subjected to a total of five attacks. At the end of the infernal performance, the mutilated cruiser with a 5 ° roll (the result of a kamikaze fall in the waterline area and a 2x4 meter hole formed in this place) left the base area and never again took part in the war.
Collisions of 180-meter hulks with a displacement of 14 thousand tons with aircraft had obvious results. To force the cruiser to stop participating in the operation, it was required repeated hitting kamikaze.
It is clear that in order to fight even larger and more protected units, the "kamikaze" tactics began to fail. The design of the "ships of the line" was designed to withstand blows from which weaker ships immediately fell apart, showering the ocean floor with debris.
Kamikaze managed to ram battleships (LC) 15 times, but none of the attacked ships interrupted their participation in the operation.
The technical level did not allow for remote control of guns and devices, forcing dozens of combat posts on the deck of the aircraft. The explosions severely beat the gun servants and everyone who was nearby. As a result of a direct ramming into the superstructure, the commander and 28 officers, including high-ranking members of the British delegation, were killed on the New Mexico aircraft.
Moment 0:40 on the video: the hit of the kamikaze in the LC "Tennessee". In the confusion of battle and clouds of smoke rising from the burning destroyer Zellars (struck by another kamikaze with a 500-kg bomb), another suicide bomber was seen from a distance of only about 2 km. Despite heavy barrage fire that tore off the landing gear of the Aichi D3A dive bomber (according to eyewitnesses) and hit its engine, the plane crashed into the superstructure, killing 22 and wounding 107 sailors. The damage to the ship itself turned out to be small: the battleship remained in the combat zone for the next 4 months, until the very end of the war.
Despite all efforts, the bomb-laden aircraft clearly lacked the power to fight the LK. Which is not surprising: over the years of the war, everyone who tried to solve such a problem became convinced of its exceptional complexity. Especially on the move, on the high seas.
Weapon of last chance
The alignment of the situation with the kamikaze is obvious: 34 sunk and 368 damaged ships.
As for personnel losses, the Allies suffered at least twice as large losses, including injured crew members.
The impregnable walls of Japan are the sheathing sheets of its planes. The actions of the "Special Attack Corps" could stop any fleet. The Kriegsmarine surface forces, the Italian Reggia Marina or the Soviet Navy would cease to exist the next day. The only thing that Takijiro Onishi and his winged samurai did not know about: the industrial capabilities of the United States made it possible to compensate any losses … Instead of hundreds of crippled, completely incapacitated units, silhouettes of new ships appeared on the horizon.
And if we take into account the naval forces of the British Empire, then the available number of suicide bombers (even taking into account their amazing efficiency) was clearly not enough to change the balance in the theater of operations.
There are always many great goals, but life is one
Militarily, there is no doubt about the effectiveness of the kamikaze. War is the same business. If the business is organized correctly, then the enemy has big losses.
As for the moral and ethical aspects related to the training of kamikaze pilots, I think the following. If Japanese society recognized and admitted the existence of such units, then this is a personal matter for the Japanese. As in Tvardovsky's poem: “The enemy was brave. / The greater is our glory."
