The active use of low-flying, stealthy air attack weapons in modern conflicts maintains a steady interest in the optimal means of dealing with them - short-range anti-aircraft missile systems. (Complexes and systems of medium and long range are not optimal in terms of the cost of a shot, melee air defense systems and MANPADS, not to mention the ZAK - in terms of available capabilities.)
The experience of combat use in Syria confirms the high effectiveness of Russian short-range air defense systems of the "Tor" family in the fight against modern air defense systems. Nevertheless, from time to time (and not only on the Internet, but also "from the high tribunes") the question of equipping them with anti-aircraft guided missiles with homing heads is raised as an alternative to the radio command guidance method used in these complexes.
It should be noted right away that in the short-range zone, the capabilities of both methods make it possible to more or less successfully solve the tasks facing the MD air defense system and their simultaneous use is not necessary (as, for example, in the SD air defense system and the air defense system this strong scattering of the guidance radar beams cannot be done without RC guidance, nor without a homing missile or guidance "through a rocket"), and, therefore, is unnecessary, since it is economically unjustified (the homing system increases the cost of missiles several times, the guidance radar also costs a lot - even the richest countries do not immediately allow themselves to spend funds on both). The question, therefore, includes the wording "either - or" and should be considered in light of the advantages and disadvantages of each of the guidance methods, which are easily noticeable even from a superficial comparison of the Tor-M2 air defense system and modern western short-range air defense systems VL MICA, SPYDER-SR, IRIS-T SLS (the Kampluftvern MD SAM system, which is still being developed with the IRIS-T SAM, can also be put in the same row).
These complexes are "classmates", according to passport data, their performance characteristics are largely close to each other. The speed of missiles and targets, the affected area are very similar. Of the tabular characteristics, only the deployment time indicators differ sharply: for Western complexes - 10-15 minutes, the Tor-M2 air defense system changes from the traveling position to the combat position in 3 minutes, moreover, it can conduct combat work on the move, which is inaccessible to analogues. At the same time, all western MD complexes are equipped with airborne missiles with GOS modified for ground launch: Piton-5 (SAM SPYDER-SR) and IRIS-T (SAM IRIS-T SLS and Kampluftvern) - thermal imaging (infrared), MICA-IR - thermal imaging and MICA-EM - active radar (SAM VL MICA). What does it give and what does it deprive?
The most important indicator of the effectiveness of an air defense system is guidance accuracy. At the launch site of the "Torovskaya" SAM 9M338 (0-1 km) and at the launch and march sites of the western SAM (before the target is captured by the seeker), an inertial guidance system is used, the data into which is entered immediately before the start. Then the "precision aiming systems" are connected.
On SAM MICA, IRIS-T, Piton-5 infrared seeker is used. Manufacturers do not indicate the values of the IR signature of targets in open sources, limiting themselves to statements such as:
"A fighter with an afterburner mode of operation of the power plant can be detected at a distance of 18 to 22 km."
What specific fighter? What is its IR signature, albeit in afterburner mode? This is incomprehensible. But another thing is clear: if the "afterburner fighter" is visible from 20 km, then a target with a low IR signature (even an attack UAV) can be captured by the seeker at a distance of no more than 2-3 km. The detection range of a warm-contrast target against the background of the earth is about 2.5 times less than against the background of free space (Piton-5, for example, cannot intercept targets flying below 20 meters at all). This means that in order to intercept an inconspicuous low-flying target, the inertial system must bring the missile defense system a kilometer from the target. At the same time, as the IR signature decreases, the speed of the target and the distance to it increase, the price of the slightest error in calculus when calculating the trajectory of the missile defense system and the target increases sharply, and the maneuver of the latter can generally prevent its capture by the seeker. This is especially true for intercepting targets on the far border of the affected area. Aware of this drawback, the developers have introduced a radio correction system on all the indicated western complexes, which allows to "correct" the flight path of the missile defense system. Acceptable accuracy of work on inconspicuous and especially maneuvering targets can be achieved only with its use.
The most important thing is that SAMs with IKGSN, in principle, are not all-weather: thick fog and dense clouds detain infrared waves. This is not critical if air defense systems with missiles equipped with IKGSN are used in the combat formations of the attacking side, which, of course, chooses the time of the attack itself and can adjust it depending on weather conditions. But such air defense systems can leave the defending side defenseless. Therefore, the Israelis, who periodically have to act in the role of the defending side, assign their SPYDER-SR a secondary role, and place their main stake on the much more expensive Kippat barzel SD air defense system (with an active GOS). Therefore, the French offer customers a variant of the VL MICA SAM with ARGSN. The reason for using "thermal imagers" is purely economic in nature. Yes, IKGSN significantly increases the cost of missiles. But still not as much as ARGSN: if the cost of MICA-IR (in 2009 prices) is $ 145 thousand, then MICA-EM is already $ 473 thousand.
However, it is unlikely and insanely expensive MICA-EM has tactical advantages over missiles with RK-guided missiles. Due to the weight and size limitations, the airborne radars and computers of the air defense missile systems are many times inferior in their capabilities to the radar and the air defense center and do not allow for target acquisition at a great distance. Already at a distance of tens of kilometers, the effective scattering surface of the target for guaranteed capture of its low-power ARGSN SAM SAM MD should be at least 3-5 square meters. m. Moreover, this result can be achieved only due to the extreme narrowing of the onboard radar beam. The narrow homing sector limits the possibility of using it against maneuvering targets. As a result, the same story is repeated as with IKGOS, except that the clouds do not represent an obstacle.
SAM 9M338, guided by the SN SAM "Tor-M2", is guaranteed to intercept a target with an EPR characteristic of a fighter (1 sq. M) at a distance of at least 15 km (at a transonic target speed and with a hit probability close to 100%). At a distance of 7-8 km, targets flying at a speed of Mach 2 are hit, and the minimum target size in the radio range (RCS) is 0.1 sq. m. The complex knocks down low-flying targets at 10 (according to unofficial data - 5) meters above the ground. RC guidance allows you to build various flight paths of the missile defense system, for example, hitting a low-flying target from a dive (missiles with a seeker always fly along the shortest route to the target). With the simultaneous guidance of several missiles, each of them gets its own target (several missiles with a seeker can simultaneously aim at one target - the most noticeable or close). Guidance accuracy does not depend on weather conditions. Maneuvering the target does not interfere with keeping it “in sight”.
The guidance method has a certain effect on the fire performance of the air defense system. Among the advantages of a missile defense system with a seeker, the possibility of using it according to the “fire and forget” principle is often indicated (the missile does not require continuous tracking from the guidance station). In theory, this should significantly increase the "rate of fire". Indeed, Western air defense systems can release their entire ammunition system with an interval of 2-3 seconds, while the Tor-M2 air defense system after launching (with the same interval) 4 air defense systems must take a break until they find their targets (at maximum range - about 20 seconds). However, modern Western air defense systems do not always have the opportunity to use the principle of “fire and forget”. As mentioned above, ensuring acceptable accuracy of use against modern SVN requires the use of radio correction and the fire performance is reduced to the number of radio channels. VL MICA, for example, judging by its appearance (there are two side antenna posts) and the published schemes for the use of MICA missiles from fighters (the simultaneous use of 2 missiles is drawn), has only 2 channels. Thus, the fire performance of VL MICA, not in theory, but in practice, may turn out to be two times lower than that of the "Thor".
A separate issue is noise immunity. SAM with IKGSN in this context is even indecent to mention: as already mentioned, they are not even free from natural interference. As for artificial radio interference, it is easier to drown out a weak ARGSN transmitter with an active noise signal than a guidance radar, and it is easier to deceive an onboard computer of a missile defense system with passive distracting interference than an air defense system's computing system. In any case, the work of the Tor-M2 air defense missile system is not suppressed by NATO's electronic warfare systems (which was confirmed by the tests carried out in Greece), as well as by the Russian ones.
Another "problem" with which they associate the "need" for equipping the 9M338 missiles with a homing head is the presence of a "dead funnel" from which an SVN can unexpectedly arrive. Indeed, the radar guidance system of the "Tor" family of air defense systems has a viewing sector in elevation angle of -5 - + 85 ° and, accordingly, there is an impervious zone in the sector +85 - + 95 °. And, yes, a missile defense system with a seeker does not have such a "dead zone" (there are others). However, there is no fundamental connection between it and the guidance method. If desired, it could be installed on a radar complex with a field of view extended to 90 ° in elevation. And since the military did not demand this, and the developer did not offer it, it means that none of the specialists competent in this matter sees the need for that. Why? Obviously for a variety of reasons. Firstly, a battery is a standard combat unit during the combat operation of the Tor-M2 air defense system (the minimum is a "link"), and when working together, combat vehicles mutually cover each other's non-projectile zones not only in elevation, but also in range (0- 1 km). Secondly, the Tors batteries operate in a layered defense system, where SAMs and SAMs of higher echelons cover them from high-altitude air defense systems (just like the Torahs cover the SD and BD air defense systems from air defense systems that broke through the first lines defense). Finally, thirdly, it is very problematic to find an air defense system with a confirmed possibility of diving from a height of over 12 km at an angle of over 85 ° (except for ballistic missiles, for which the MD air defense systems are not intended, but not because of the flight trajectory of a ballistic missile, but because of their high speed - hypersonic). Therefore, there is no need to change the effective guidance system because of the dubious "threat".
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the seeker does not have any advantages over the RK guidance method. The choice of Western developers is not due to tactical, but completely different considerations. Among them, we can mention the complexity and cost of the development of specialized air defense systems in comparison with the use of modified aviation missile systems in ground complexes. The basic military strategy of NATO countries plays an important role. The practice of military interventions by Western powers shows that they are carried out only against the obviously and many times weaker countries. Weakened by the civil war, Yugoslavia, Libya, Syria are ideal targets. Even a slightly stronger Iraq was conquered in two steps. Weak countries, naturally, do not have a sufficient number of modern air attack weapons. As a result, western air defense systems are quite sufficient to combat scattered raids of low-tech air defense systems, and the consumption of expensive missiles does not exceed the costs of developing a guidance radar and equipping the complex with it.
In contrast to analogues of the "Tor" family of air defense systems, these are air defense systems designed to counter a large-scale attack by a powerful enemy. Their advantages are most fully manifested in the fight against serious threats, as part of an echeloned air defense system. With the predictable nature of the conflict and competent application, these air defense systems have no equal in the world. This also testifies to the fact that at the moment the radio command method is the optimal way of targeting short-range air defense missile systems.
