Long before the recognition of Polish independence, Russia abandoned all attempts to return these imperial territories at least to its zone of influence. However, the Bolsheviks, completely forgetting that every Pole is a master at heart, for some reason seriously decided that it was possible to make the Polish proletariat and the downtrodden peasantry happy with the prospect of a world revolution.
Pilsudski's Poland, this "last dog of the Entente", responded with black ingratitude and the defeat of Tukhachevsky near Warsaw, and Budyonny not far from Lvov.
I had to put up, and with the mediation of the West. But even then, in the historical memory of Russians with regard to Poland, not even a stereotype began to take shape, but an immutable formula: "forgiven - released, and … forgotten." And this is after all the troubles and strife, after the "brotherly friendship", in something sincere, in something, we must admit, imposed. Finally, after the experience of "almost joint" survival in the conditions of "shock therapy" of the 90s, which strengthened the real friendship of many Russians and Poles much better than any propaganda.
Polish stereotypes and ready-made formulas in relation to Russia and Russians are much more varied and richer. But the main thing is that they are just as forgivable as the persistent, characteristic Great Russian self-awareness of “seniority” in relation to our western neighbors is forgivable for us. As, however, in relation to all other Slavic peoples. And any attempts to correct, and even more so to eradicate this sense of self will certainly run into misunderstanding and harsh rejection.
The historical memory of a nation is not something immutable, but it is transformed only together with the mentality and does not depend too much on the current political situation. For example, the ability to forgive has been characteristic of Russians at all times - this was the case after 1812, and in 1945, and in August 2008, and even after the Maidan and everything that it backfired on the Slavic world. This could not and did not become the cause of not only long-term persecutions, even everyday hostility towards Georgians or Ukrainians.
We can resist for a long time, and then easily admit our guilt where it is not too necessary. No, concluding our protracted conversation about Russian-Polish relations, we will be talking not only and not so much about Katyn, although it would not hurt even there to sort out something before making parliamentary confessions. And not only with the circumstances and real time of the death of Polish officers, although it is simply unacceptable to keep silent about such facts as the German bullets that killed the Polish officers, and the German twine that tied their hands.
It is no less important to understand the origin of the documents that served as the basis for the verdict, not judicial, mind you, the leader of the peoples and his entourage, and also - to find out the source of the bravado with which some of the Nazi veterans today "confess" to the Katyn crime. And at the same time to investigate why this bravado is so carefully hushed up in Russia. Perhaps someone really needs it?
But by no means historians, but many of the already modern Polish politicians are pretty adept at writing the country's anti-Russian history. In addition, especially advanced Russian liberals manage to add to the discussions on the Polish question in its various aspects of the "negative," although they are not very much asked to do so. Anyone who in our days allows himself some kind of phrase like "brothers-Poles" or decides to remember the Slavic idea, or worse, say something about the considerable contribution of Russians to the political and economic revival of Poland, immediately begs for accusations in the manifestation of Great Russian chauvinism.
And in today's Poland, meanwhile, few people are "allowed" to at least occasionally recall the special positive role of Russia in gaining independence after the world wars - both the First and the Second. I do not at all call to try to represent black as white - the tsarist and Soviet propaganda succeeded in this, on which they burned themselves, but why hide the objective circumstances of how all this happened?
The aspiration attributed to the Russians to “keep Poland in their pocket” somehow does not fit well not only with the joint revolutionary struggle “for our freedom and yours,” but also with the common victories in World War II.
A fighting brotherhood, no matter how they try to present it as "artificial" or "unnatural," did take place, and even today it does not need proof. At least the Soviet Marshal Rokossovsky as Polish Minister of War is a much more appropriate figure than Grand Duke Romanov on the Polish throne. And no less bright.
The Bolshevik revolutionaries, even taking into account where the leader of the peoples ultimately took them, from the current official Polish point of view, absolutely do not deserve any loyal assessments. This is especially true of their foreign policy activities. And above all on the Polish question. Stalin's "gifts", most of Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia and the eastern coast of the Oder, do not count, since, they say, it is nothing more than a "fair price" for the heroic efforts and terrible losses of the Poles in the period from 1939 to 1945 …
Well, the last Russian autocrat and his dignitaries are all "oppressors and colonialists" by definition, or, if you like, by birth. They have distrust, or rather, "pathological hatred" for the Poles - all in the same genetic memory. Nicholas II, Polish historians categorically deny the right to even think about the secession of Poland - contrary to all historical logic, numerous documentary evidence and memoirs of contemporaries.
In each era, historians and politicians have ample opportunities for their own interpretation of certain events and facts. It is bad when these interpretations directly contradict the facts or replace them. The creation of some historical legends and myths must simply be recognized as a given, and sometimes as a political necessity. Indeed, sometimes the easiest way to strengthen one's own unstable positions is at the expense of predecessors, especially if they no longer have the opportunity to object.
But legends and myths are precisely capable of substituting for facts, and worst of all, if at the same time even the appearance of a balance of objectivity is not observed. Nevertheless, the author initially defends his right to subjective assessments of the events that marked the beginning of the resolution of the "Polish question" - only the sum of subjective assessments can become a support for a truly objective view.
After all, the purpose of this study, the publication of which ends on the web pages of "Military Review", was to understand the events of a century ago from the Russian side. And not least because the Poles said and wrote much more "about it" than the Russians. As a result, at times one may get the impression that Russia simply did not take any part in resolving the Polish issue, and if it did, then only in an unequivocally negative role.
Yes, the famous Pushkin's "this is their Slavic dispute" over and over again finds historical confirmation, but the Poles stubbornly disown such a "narrow" view. For them, perhaps the main political achievement in the role of a new EU member is the "eastern breakthrough" (here the first "orange revolution" followed by the Maidan and Saakashvili's aggressive adventures are recorded in whists), thanks to which Russia, they say, is forced to consider Poland alongside and even on a par with Eurogrands, as an important player in the EU, which cannot be ignored.
Long-standing diplomatic practice, which has already become traditional, according to which Russia does not divide partners into grandees and small countries, is not taken into account at all. The desire to bring the Russian-Polish dispute to the European level can actually be considered flattering for Russia, if not for one "but" … In this scenario, Russia is a priori assigned the role of an aggressor, albeit potential rather than real.
By and large, Russia does not need Poland. And it was not needed even when it was divided into three - together with the Austrian emperors and the Prussian kings. Indeed, in addition to the fact that it was necessary to prevent the excessive strengthening of dangerous neighbors, Catherine actually had to leave behind her lands with a real Slavic population. Otherwise, all these territories could turn into a European semi-desert with rare inclusions of castles and churches, surrounded by beggarly huts.
Where everyone is at enmity with everyone, where there is no power or any acceptable order. After all, the Russian empress also sought to provide her subjects with the opportunity to “travel to Europe” on a regular basis and without unnecessary problems. So that they do not rob anywhere, do not beg, so that it is not necessary to equip a whole regiment to guard each embassy. Pan Tadeusz Kosciuszko and his comrades kicked up at once, and when Catherine's grandson singled out Poland into an almost independent kingdom, this resulted in a whole series of uprisings and even wars, which the Poles themselves proudly called “revolutions”.
We must not forget that in the Russian Empire there was a very clear understanding of the difference between the Russian lands, obtained as a result of the partition of Poland, and the lands originally Polish. The reunification of the former was considered as the restoration of the power - the successor of Kievan Rus, the annexation of the latter was considered a political necessity. For the empire, Poland was more of a burden than an acquisition, which had to be dragged out of the interests of state security. After all, independent from Russia, Poland in the 19th century was simply doomed to become the prey of Prussia, or, with a slightly less likelihood, again go under the division between Prussia and Austria.
Despite the fact that Poland was a part of Russia for a little more than 100 years, the Russian factor is forever fixed in the Polish consciousness. In Polish politics and economy, he is almost the most important today, no matter how puffed up the Warsaw politicians-Russophobes. And this is even taking into account the new era of the country's frank flirting with the West, where Poland, even with the Polish President of the European Council, is still not in the forefront. For Russia, the "Polish question" only in critical years (1830, 1863 or 1920) acquired paramount importance, and it will probably be better for both our country and Poland, so that it never becomes one again. …
