This text is a continuation of an abridged translation of the book Luftwaffe'45. Letzte Fluge und Projekte”by a colleague of NF who has translated many interesting topics related to the German Air Force. The illustrations are taken from the original book, the literary processing of the translation from German was done by the author of these lines.
It was planned to use air groups I./ZG 26 and II / ZG 76. Production of the Me-410 was planned to be discontinued, therefore, in the future, it was planned to use repaired aircraft in the units instead of new ones. But even these plans were short-term, since these aircraft were planned to be used until February 1945. Instead of the Me-410, until the end of 1945, the production of aircraft of the Do-335 type was to be organized, and if they were successfully used in opposition to the British Mosquito, it was planned to equip such aircraft of at least 8 air groups. Additionally, in the period from August to December 31, 1945, it was planned to arm 2 air groups with fighters of the Ju 388 J-l or J-3 type. In the late autumn of 1944, 21 reconnaissance squadrons armed with aircraft of the Ju-88 D or Ju-88 F type were on the Eastern Front. Three more reconnaissance squadrons were armed with Me-410 aircraft. For reconnaissance at night, there were special night reconnaissance squadrons, and for reconnaissance over the sea, the 1st and 2nd squadrons of the 5th reconnaissance air group were intended. In addition, there were two squadrons of the air reconnaissance group "123", which were armed with Me-109 aircraft. In total, it was planned to have 29 reconnaissance squadrons on the Eastern Front, intended for reconnaissance during daylight hours. These reconnaissance squadrons were to be armed with aircraft such as Ar 234 B-l, Do 336 A-4 or Ju 388 L-1. Three of these 29 squadrons were to be armed with Ar 234 aircraft, 10 squadrons with Ju 388 aircraft and 14 squadrons with Do 335. At night it was planned to use Ju 388 L-1 aircraft instead of Do 217 and Ju 188 aircraft. or L-3. Reconnaissance squadrons of the Western Front (Wekuste OK11 group) were supposed to use aircraft of the Ju 88 G-1 and G-2 type. The reconnaissance squadrons of the Weskuste OKL 2 air group were to use He 177 aircraft with a long range for weather reconnaissance. Later, for conducting meteorological reconnaissance, it was planned to use aircraft of the Ju 635 type or, possibly, of the Hü 211 type. According to other optimistic plans, in France it was supposed to use the KG 51 squadron, equipped with Me 262 A-l / A-2 aircraft.
Me 262 A-1a from KG (J) 54.
and the KG 76 squadron, armed with Ar 234 B2 aircraft. Later, it was planned to stop production of aircraft such as Ju 388, and instead to produce jet aircraft. There were plans to use aircraft of the Do 335 and Ju 287 types as fighters after it would no longer be possible to use these aircraft as bombers. To protect against enemy bombers, absolute priority was given to fighters, including jet ones. Instead of fighter squadrons armed with aircraft of the Fw 190 D-9 or Bf 109 K-4 types, more and more Me 262 fighters were to be used. There were also 4./NSGr night reconnaissance aircraft. 2. as part of NSGr groups. 4 and 5, armed with aircraft such as Fiat CR 42 and NSGr group. 7. Most of these units, performing auxiliary functions, were armed with training aircraft of the Ar 66 C and D type, Go 145, converted into combat ones, as well as aircraft of the Fw 56 and Si 204B types.
The naval aviation units, which were in little demand by that time, had flying boats of the Do 24 T-1 type, which carried out escort of ships and were engaged in search operations, as well as several aircraft of the Ju 88 C-4 and C-7 types, Fw 190 A-8 and fighters of the type Me 410. Surprisingly, Reichsminister A. Speer considered it possible to increase the production of aircraft, despite the increasingly powerful Allied air strikes and the Allied occupation of part of Western Europe in 1944. aircraft throughout the year through the production of standard aircraft variants. General management of this headquarters was carried out personally by A. Speer and Field Marshal E. Milch. Their general deputy (HDL) and at the same time the immediate head of the headquarters was appointed a graduate engineer K. Saur (Karl Otto Saur). Graduate engineer Schiempp was appointed responsible for the preparation of the necessary design documentation. Wagner, a graduate engineer, was responsible for the communications between the aircraft manufacturing enterprises at the headquarters.
Thanks to these people, the headquarters in the shortest possible time managed to achieve a noticeable increase in aircraft production. A. Hitler adhered to the same view regarding the concentration of industrial efforts. Reich Minister Speer received significant powers, and the headquarters of fighter aviation began not only to organize the mass production of aircraft, but at the same time to create conditions conducive to an increase in the serial production of aircraft, which directly influenced the decisions made in the Reich Aviation Ministry (RLM). On July 1, 1944, the headquarters of fighter aviation began to use its capabilities in full. During the meeting, the Minister of Aviation G. Goering gave an order to increase the monthly production of fighters to 3,800 units per month. Among these 3,800 fighters, 500 were supposed to be jet fighters of the Me 262 type. It was also planned to produce 400 fighters and 500 night fighters. Together with the repaired 300 fighters, the headquarters of the fighter aviation in total expected to receive up to 5,000 fighters a month. Also, special attention was paid not only to the production of aircraft engines and equipment, but also to increasing or decreasing the production of all the necessary equipment.
The freed up production capacity should immediately be used to increase the production of fighters with jet and piston engines, which, it was hoped, would allow achieving air superiority, at least over the territory of the Reich. Director Karl Frydag was appointed responsible for the increase in aircraft production, and Dr. Wałter Werner was responsible for the increase in engine production. A little later, on July 27, 1944, the General (GLZ), who was on the staff of the Reich Ministry of Aviation (RLW), received another position, becoming the head of the Technical Production (Chef TLR), which was subordinate to the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, which made it possible in a shorter time to bring aircraft with even higher performance characteristics to serial production. Until September 1, 1944, all test centers of the Air Force under the leadership of the appropriate command (KdE) came under the head of Technical Production, as well as the Technical Academy of the Luftwaffe, and the leadership responsible for research in the interests of the German Air Force.
The first result of these reorganizations was the streamlining of production, but even these measures could only partially affect the successful implementation of the plans. Although the number of aircraft in service grew to an unprecedented scale, nevertheless Speer and his deputies were by no means satisfied with this. During a meeting with Goering and HDL representative Karl-Otto Saur on December 12, 1944.the latter provided real data on the German aviation development program, which he wanted to start in the coming months. It was planned to produce 1,500 aircraft of the Me 162 and Me 262 types each month. At the same time, the production of the Bf 109 fighters of the G-10, G-14 and K-4 modifications, as well as the Fw 190 of the A-8, A-9 and D modifications. -9 was supposed to be phased out, and instead of them, 2,000 Ta 152 fighters would be produced monthly. Also, to protect the country's territory, it was planned to produce 150 Me 163 and Me 263 aircraft monthly. scouts were planned to produce 300 Do 335 and 100 Ju 388 monthly. It was planned to start production of a bomber version of the Ar 234 jet bomber. 500 aircraft of this type, located in many combat units, were to be converted into night fighters and reconnaissance aircraft.
In total, since the beginning of 1945, it was planned to produce 6,000 combat aircraft monthly - of which 4,000 single-engine fighters and 400 training aircraft. At the same time, Saur proposed to assign the highest priority to the production and dispatch of Me 262 and Me 162 fighters to combat units. Night fighters received a much lower priority. Until mid-1945, it was planned to reduce their monthly production to 200 units, and then slowly increase to 360 units. It was planned to reduce the entire production of interceptors in favor of fighters and then increase the production of 2-engine interceptors of the Do 335 type. It was also planned to first reduce the production of training aircraft, and suddenly, instead of the monthly production of 600 training aircraft of the Fw 190 type, it was planned to produce 350 training aircraft of the Ta 152 type. Since the beginning of 1945, jet aircraft of the Ar 234 or Ju 287 types have been mentioned only sporadically. Jet fighters, especially single-engine fighters of the Me 262 A-1a and He 162 A-1 / A-2 types, should have already bypassed piston-engine fighters in terms of production. Due to the difficult situation of the country, aircraft with jet and rocket engines of the No 229 or Me 263 types could no longer be produced in the required volumes, it was also not clear when these aircraft could be brought to the stage that would allow organizing their mass production.
Soon after being appointed head of the TLR and after Hitler's last mention of the need to concentrate, the Fighter Headquarters demonstrated its capabilities.
At the same time, the general position of the Reich could be characterized as very difficult, and the state of transport communications and the transportation of units and finished products between German enterprises were on the verge of collapse and disruption, respectively. In January 1945, the industry could still operate at the expense of previously accumulated reserves, but already in February many enterprises could not manufacture products due to the termination or disruption of the timing of the supply of components from allied enterprises. The Allies inflicted especially heavy blows on the railway communications of the Reich, as a result of which the state of the railway network soon became critical. To partially compensate for these problems, especially with regard to the production of various types of fighters, the head of the fighter headquarters, engineer Saur (Saur) and the headquarters of industry, tried to do everything possible to maintain the production of single-engine piston-engine fighters in southern and central Germany. In January 1945, it was planned to produce only Me-109 and FW-190 fighters in the amount of 2,441 units: of which 1,467 are Me-109 fighters. In addition to 64 new Me-109 fighters, 104 standard Me-109 G-10, 268 Me-109 G-10 / R6 and 79 Me-109 G-10 / U4 fighters were produced. Despite the difficult situation of the German industry, 79 Me-109 G-14 and 258 Me-109 G-14 AS and Me-109 G-14 AS / U4 were produced. After repairs, 277 Me-109 fighters were sent to the ranks of the air force during January 1944. In January 1944, the German Air Force had approximately 1,000 more powerful FW-190 combat-ready fighters. Most of the fighters of this type, 380 units, were the version of the FW-190 A-8, and 43 were the FW-190 A-8 / R2. Fighters of the FW-190 A-9 and FW-190 A-9 / R11 versions increasingly replaced the FW-190 A-8 fighters. The Luftwaffe received 117 FW-190 A-9 fighters. The FW-190 D-9 and FW-190 D-9 / R11 were in great demand, of which 275 units were produced. In addition to fighter air groups, 247 Me-109 fighters and 48 FW-190 fighters were sent to the training air groups of the 9th Aviation Corps.
Most of the 103 aircraft required in accordance with the plans for manning the air groups were to arrive before the end of January 1945. For use as part of the Mistel bunch, 20 FW-190 fighters received the 2 / ZG 76 air group. For the Croatian allies, ten aircraft of the Me-109 type, and for the Russian Liberation Army (ROA) - 6 Me-109. Of the 19 newly built fighters with higher performance characteristics of the Ta-152 type, 12 aircraft were first decided to be tested for tactical purposes in a new test squadron subordinate to the head of TRL. 108 Me-262 fighters were distributed among the combat units, including 15 fighters received by the 1 / JG 7 air group, 11 more aircraft were transferred to the 3 / JG 7 air group, 36 aircraft were sent to the reserve squadron, two in 1 / KG (J) 6, six in 1 / KG (J) 54, eight in the ISS division dedicated to the protection of industrial plants. Only three aircraft entered the 16th test unit for tactical tests. Serial production of the Do-335 was still behind schedule, and a single Do-335 A-1 was placed at the disposal of the TRL chief. The situation with the supply of night fighters was somewhat better.
For the squadron of night fighters, there were 48 Me-110 G-4, 38 He-219 A-0 and 222 Ju-88 fighters. 11 Ju-88 G-1 and G-6 were intended for night reconnaissance. Four prototypes were converted into combat aircraft, and four aircraft were handed over to the TRL chief for testing. FW-190 aircraft were used as attack aircraft, primarily the F-8 version. These attack aircraft were used in small numbers on the Eastern Front. In total, there were 512 attack aircraft, 477 of which were at the disposal of the SG1-SG77 air groups, 21 in the SG151. It was also expected that 10 aircraft will be delivered to the 1 / SG1 air group and four - at the disposal of the head of TRL. As for the bomber units, at this time, the transition from aircraft of the He-111 H-20, Ju-88 A-4 and Ju-188 A / E types to the jet Ar-234 B-2 was carried out. In February, 23 aircraft of the Ju-88 A-4 type and 9 of the Ju-188 type were converted from prototypes into combat formations. Several aircraft of the Ju-88 A-4 and Ju-188 types were sent to the training units. In reconnaissance units, the transition to jet aircraft of the Ar-234 and Me-262 types was also carried out. 37 Me-109 and four Ar-234 type aircraft, converted from prototypes to combat ones, were expected to be transferred to the night reconnaissance unit. Another 11 Ar-234 aircraft, converted from prototypes, were transferred to combat units from the "B" subdivision. In addition to 13 Ju-88 D and Ju-88 T aircraft, there were 15 more ready-to-fly Ju-188 aircraft and four Ju-388 aircraft. Aircraft of the Ju-88 and Ju-188 types were to be transferred to long-range reconnaissance air groups.
Ten of the 15 Ju-188 aircraft were planned to be transferred to the night reconnaissance air groups. Two aircraft of the Ju-388 L-0 and Ju-388 L-1 type each from the test air groups came to the disposal of the OKL and the head of the TRL. Also 15 aircraft of the Fi 156 type were assigned to rescue units. In addition, several Ju-52 / 3m aircraft and three Ka 430-type transport gliders were transferred there. Along with the existing production, distribution of new, repaired and training aircraft since 1944, the head of the Technical Department (TRL) took over all the research. and developments in the aviation sector, as well as the acceptance of industrial aircraft and the aviation fuel necessary for them. The processing and evaluation of materials on ongoing developments, all test management at all test centers of the Luftwaffe and the operation of aircraft were also reassigned. This concerned both the Technical Academy of the Luftwaffe and the leadership of research in the interests of the Luftwaffe. From August 1, 1944, the head of the TLR was appointed the head of the RLM planning department, Colonel W. Diesing, who remained in this position until his death in an accident on April 14, 1945. The Allied offensive made the job of the TLR leader difficult.
The advance into Germany in the northwest direction forced the production of MK 108 automatic cannons to be relocated from the Lüttich area. The vehicles necessary for this were not available, so all the equipment had to be transported on only cars. Allied air attacks made it impossible to use the railways, as the railroad tracks were in constant need of repairs, complicated by a lack of manpower. Increasingly, Allied aircraft destroyed bridges, which forced the delivery of weapons and other necessary materials, using bypass routes. As a result, in many aircraft fighter squadrons, the supply of MK 108 automatic cannons for Me 262 A-1a fighters was carried out intermittently.
3-cm automatic cannon MK 213.
Meanwhile, the allied bombing of industrial enterprises affected more and more. The aircraft manufacturer in Pölittsch was bombed, resulting in an almost complete suspension of operations. Lack of coal for power plants has led to power outages and reduced production. On January 10, 1945, engineer Saur decided to equip future fighters with high performance characteristics not only with new MG-213 revolving cannons, but also with automatic sights with gyroscopes of the EZ 42 type. In the first decade of January 1945, it was planned to produce 66 such sights. There were problems with the stability of aircraft such as He 162 A-1 / A-2. The first night auxiliary fighter of the Me 262 B-1a / U1 type should be ready by the end of the month. The readiness of the BV 155 fighter raised concerns, since it was impossible to predict in advance when its first flight might take place. By February 14, 1945, the production of Me 262 aircraft reached 50% of the planned value, the production of other aircraft also increased not as fast as expected.
During January and February 1945, only 15 aircraft of the FW-190 D-11 and FW-190 D-12 types (with a DB 603 engine) were built. In this situation, Focke-Wulf could not clarify the launch of the FW-190 D-14 fighter into series production. Another prototype on which high hopes were pinned, the Horten 9 (8-229) -type fighter was also far from mass production. Gothaer Wagonfabrik was able to assemble three prototype aircraft developed by the Horten brothers at the Friedrichroda plant. On January 15, 1945, a large Soviet offensive began, and the regions of Poznan and Silesia could be completely lost to the Germans in the near future. In addition, restrictions in the supply of electricity also affected, and by January 18, 1945, the Fighter Headquarters believed that everything related to the production and testing of aircraft could be in an even less satisfactory condition than before.
