Having decided on the principles that should underlie the sane shipbuilding policy of Russia, you need to subject them to at least a theoretical test. In a sense, this was done using the example of corvettes in the last article, which clearly showed what kind of ships the Navy would receive if it followed these simple rules.
But it is necessary to put the question more broadly, and in principle to show what kind of surface fleet of the Russian Federation can afford, if not chasing chimeras.
This, on the one hand, will relieve someone of illusions, and on the other hand, it will become a worthy response to the supporters of the thesis that the Russian Federation cannot afford a fleet due to the collapse of the industry. Maybe our problems are purely organizational.
The surface fleet will be considered. And, of course, there are some comparisons of what is being done and what could have been done instead.
Let's start with the Main Power Plants - GEM.
Main power plants as a boundary condition
One of the limiting factors limiting the type of ships under construction is the ability to produce the main power plant necessary for the ship, its (roughly speaking) engines and transmission, if we appeal to things that are understandable from an everyday point of view. At the moment, a number of power plants are mass-produced in Russia.
The suppliers of diesel engines that are used to equip surface ships are PJSC "Zvezda" (with its radial multi-cylinder diesel engines of various models) and JSC "K plant", which produces medium-speed diesel engines of the D49 family with different power. The advantages and disadvantages of both are widely known. So Zvezd has problems with reliability and the possibility of long-term operation at maximum power. The Kolomn's reliability was brought to an acceptable level, but insufficient power remained (foreign classmates in the same dimensions are much more powerful). However, these engines have proven to be suitable for warships despite their diesel roots.
Due to the specificity of Zvezda's products, it is worth putting it in a separate section, but for now, about Kolomny.
On domestic warships, 10D49 engines with a capacity of up to 5200 hp are used. with. (BDK project 11711, frigates pr. 22350) and 16D49 with a capacity of up to 6000 liters. with. (corvettes of projects 20380 and 20385, patrol ships of project 22160).
These diesels need gear drives to convert the rpm and provide the ability to reverse the direction of rotation of the propeller. The reducer is produced by JSC "Zvezda-reduktor", this enterprise is a monopolist, it is irreplaceable. So, on patrol ships, a gearbox RRP-6000 (5RP) is used, one gearbox per engine and one shaft line. A similar gearbox is used on the BDK.
On corvettes, RRP-12000 is used, which summarizes the work of two 16D49 diesel engines for a common shaft line, and in total forms a diesel reverse gear unit DDA-12000, where 12000 is the total maximum power of the unit in horsepower. Each corvette of projects 20380 and 20385 has two such units with a total capacity of 24,000 liters. with.
An important point is that gear drives for patrol ships and corvettes are unified and made on the same equipment. Because of this, the RRP-6000 has too much mass, inappropriate for a single diesel engine.
A separate story is the power plant of frigates, where the diesel engine is used for the economy drive, and for the afterburner - the M-90FR gas turbine manufactured by UEC-Saturn. Such an installation - the M-55R diesel-gas turbine unit as part of the Kolomna 10D49 diesel engine, the M-90FR GTU and the PO55 reducer - is installed on a frigate in the amount of 2 units, on two shaft lines. For frigates of project 22350, this is the minimum possible power plant.
How many such installations can the domestic industry produce?
As for the frigates and their M-55, the question is open, while the domestic industry has produced only one complete set, and what pace it can show in the future is unknown. We can assume that for now it makes sense to count on one ship kit every two years.
An important point - this is not due to the real capacities of the "Star-Reducer"! This is predetermined by the organizational mess around this organization, artificially induced by some structures
In reality, if you bring the organization of labor at the enterprise back to normal, throw out different gaskets from the production process and debug the tests, then you can walk. What does the possibility of supplying a power plant for or other ships requiring a power plant of a similar power.
But, since this organizational issue has not yet been resolved (and there is no reason to believe that it will be solved in the near future), we will restrict ourselves to empirical one set (ship) in two years.
Unfortunately, due to the need to provide an experimental non-serial 6RP gearbox for the project 20386 undership, work on the continuation of the production of gearboxes for frigates has been postponed for this year - 6RP is manufactured on the same equipment as the P055, which is part of the M-55R. Let's hope that 20386 will remain an isolated excess, a monument to the madness that swept the naval issues in the 2010s. To do this, however, you need to end this madness.
Thus, the possibilities for the construction of diesel-gas turbine units should be assessed so far as one set in two years or one frigate of 22350 level in two years. This is how the GEM limits the ability to produce such ships.
As for fully diesel installations, the picture is as follows.
"Star Reducer" can assemble up to four RRP-12000 per year. That is, ships of the corvette 20380 level can be laid in an amount of two units per year annually. An alternative is the production of RRP-6000, which, although unified with the RRP-12000, are structurally simpler and can be produced, if you strain, in an amount of up to 5-6 units per year, which in theory makes it possible to lay up to 3 ships with a pair diesel engines and such gearboxes per year, an example of a ship with such a power plant is Project 22160.
Thus it is necessary to choose - or two "conventional corvettes", or three "conventional patrolmen or some small corvettes with two diesel engines", at the same time will not work.
Let's summarize.
The GEM limits the capabilities of the Russian Federation for the laying and construction of warships as follows:
- 1 frigate of type 22350 or an analogue in the same hull every two years with the prospect of acceleration up to 2 units per year, but it is not known when;
- simultaneously 2 corvettes, similar to 20380 in basic dimensions, or slightly less (for example, on the case 11661) per year;
- or instead of them 3 smaller ships with two diesels each, also a year.
Theoretically, one can hope that it will be possible to receive 1-2 transmissions of RRP-6000 per year, plus to the four RRP-12000. If so, it means laying down another ship within a year or two. But this is "questionable."
K Zavod will supply the required number of diesel engines without any problems, if it is possible to plan their production in advance.
This is how our capabilities look real today.
Someone will say that this is not much. Maybe so, but this is more than we are building now, and much more. In terms of the construction of corvettes, this is almost a Chinese pace - they mortgage and hand over three of their 056s a year (on average). We, it turns out, can two corvettes a year, if we start only from the power plant, without taking into account other factors. So much for the collapsed industry.
On an 8-year period of time, these are 4 frigates and 16 corvettes with at least four more small ships (small corvettes, large landing craft, SDK or something else of the same kind) in the form of a "bonus". On a ten-year-old, respectively, there are 5 frigates, 20 corvettes, and 4–5 smaller ships. It is clear that these are not the numbers of ships that can be built during this time, but for how many ships a power plant can be made.
Roughly speaking, with such approaches, technically, from the beginning of 2011 to the end of 2020, it would be possible to lay - 20 corvettes, 4-5 landing ships, or the same number of something similar to the Chinese project 056. import substitution, but it will come out now, if different 20386 and similar "projects" do not cross the road. The number of frigates would have been built as many as were built, except that it would have been possible until 2014 to try to “pull out” a few more sets of power plants for 11356 from Ukraine, time allowed, but now this is a completely passed stage.
Only an insufficient number of test stands for the assembly of diesel units can serve as a brake with all-diesel ships. But this problem could be solved, you just need and that's it
What the Defense Ministry did instead of all this is well known today, and we will not return to this sad topic for now.
What projects today "claim" for the existing serial production of power plants?
On the RRP-6000 and, accordingly, the power plant with one Kolomna diesel engine per valolinium, there are patrol ships of Project 22160, their "continuation" being discussed now, another, in fact, a "sawmill".
On DDA-12000 - corvettes 20380, 20385, BDK, built according to the modified project 11711 ("Vladimir Andreev", "Vitaly Trushin", perhaps the series will continue).
At the same time, we repeat - you can do or the maximum number of RRP-12000 for corvettes and RRP-6000 "as much as possible." Or do as much as necessary for all types of ships, but then the time factor arises. That is, there is competition for industrial capacities between the ships with the "power plant of the corvette" and the "power plant of the patrol ship".
In the case of the M-55R, which is used on frigates of project 22350, in addition to frigates, it will most likely be required for universal amphibious assault ships of project 23900 (sort of like being built now in Kerch), and besides, for the same industrial resources required for these units, project 20386 competes (for it, the same M-90FR afterburner turbines are needed).
Thus, there will be competition for the power plant between the frigates of the project 22350, the underfrigates of the project 20386 and the UDC of the project 23900.
Now it is worth looking at how you can use the available opportunities rationally.
Available enclosures and their capabilities
We abstract partly from the available types of ships and think about what “maximum fleet for the same money” can be obtained with such resources and guided by the approaches voiced earlier?
We look - one "frigate" power plant every two years means the laying of a ship with a total displacement of 4800-5400 tons every two years.
And this means that in five to six years (it is quite realistic to reach such a timeframe) you can start receiving a ship in two years.
In principle, with project 22350, it is quite realistic to reach these dates and then support them, provided that, firstly, Severnaya Verf is forced to move faster, and secondly, if they do not wedge into this rhythm from 20386 and its hypothetical mutations and UDC (for which this GEM is very suboptimal, but there is no other suitable power).
But what if we do not need a universal frigate that can more or less perform any tasks, but for example, an air defense ship?
Everything is simple - on the same hull with the same power plant, a ship is made with more developed electronic weapons, with a reduced composition of offensive missile weapons (for example, instead of 3 vertical launch units, there will be 1 for eight missiles, and behind the mast there will be Uranium missile launchers …Same as 20380 corvettes), but with an increased number of Redut air defense missile launchers. In the proposed case, it is quite realistic - 6 launchers "Reduta", which gives 48 missiles 9M96. Instead of a 130-mm cannon, such a ship can have a 100-mm A-190, which was shot on the last corvettes so that it is expensive to watch, and it works well for air targets.
And what if a specialized anti-submarine vessel of the far sea zone?
Again the same thing - the same power plant, the same hull, a double hangar for two helicopters, re-arranged (taking into account the fact that the volumes are finite - simplified) anti-aircraft artillery weapons, if necessary, then a reduced number of missile launchers.
And the same "class below" approach. We have 12,000 liters. with. on one pair of diesel engines and 24,000 hp. with. on two, the dimensions of the hull are approximately clear for the example of a corvette, and in principle you can "fit" a lot into them: for example, this hull is wide enough to accommodate two helicopters.
The maximum number of vertical launch units on it is 3 units (provided that there is still only one helicopter), which can be seen in the example of 20385, if we simplify the radar system and free up the same missile deck as on 20380, then it is possible to put a KRO on such a ship "Uranus", and from UKSK, for example, to abandon, in favor of three launchers "Reduta" and 28 missiles.
If we abandon the hangar for the helicopter and confine ourselves to the take-off and landing site, then it is possible to increase the number of missile weapons on board up to 30 missiles in the Reduta air defense unit of 16 different types of missile launchers in the air defense unit and even keep the Uranus. Or to reduce the number of launchers, but to mount the "Pantsir" on the ZRAK ship, radically strengthening its air defense of the near zone (in comparison with what is).
That is, we again get a lot of options. At the same time, unlike a frigate, this is really a mass - twenty ships in a ten-year period and five BDK / SDK as a bonus - this is a lot by any standards, especially taking into account the possibility of forming battle groups from ships that, on the one hand, are unified, and on the other - complement each other in their capabilities (one has two helicopters, the second has one, but has a PLUR, the third does not have helicopters, but an "adult" radar, even the same "Polyment" and 30 anti-aircraft missiles, etc.) …
And what about the landing ships with this approach?
Yes, everything is fine with them, for ten years 10-20 gearboxes working with one diesel engine can be made without problems, and these are 5-10 scows of the "Ivan Gren" type, only simpler, for example, the same project 21810 SDK.
On the other hand, in order not to be left without such an option as "vertical coverage" at a great distance from the native shores, it would be quite possible to build this:
This is the DVD, which was calculated under the code "Surf", the real "Surf", and not what journalists who are far from the topic are now talking about. Russian "Rotterdam". Before the epic with the Mistrals, the fleet wanted exactly these ships. And the "Korvetovskaya" GEM (2 DDA-12000) could well move them at the required speed. By sacrificing four hypothetical corvettes out of twenty hypothetical ones, it would be possible to create a reserve for the power plant, sufficient for the construction of such ships, and this would be a much wiser decision than the epic with the UDC, which promises to be incredibly expensive and really long, and it can still end in failure.
Thus, even the existing GEM do not really limit us.
This becomes even more obvious if you turn your attention to the "star motors".
Multi-cylinder power plants from Zvezda - М507, 504 and others
Multi-cylinder engines, types M503, 504, 520, twin (two-compartment) 507 have long been widely used in the Navy and border units. Currently, 128-cylinder М507Д are installed on the 22800 Karakurt MRK, and a special low-magnetic modification of the 42-cylinder М503 is installed on the Project 12700 minesweepers. The Navy needs such engines for the existing MRKs, IPCs, and Soviet-built missile boats.
How many such power plants does the Navy have per year?
There is an answer - PJSC "Zvezda" is capable of producing six M507 engines or (since M504 is a "half" of M507) twelve M504s. Special M503 is a separate complex story, we will not touch on it, for the rest the statistics are clear.
In addition, there is a theoretical possibility of expanding production at the Kingisepp Machine-Building Plant, and such attempts are being made. So, it was possible to assemble and transfer to the border service for testing the M520 engine produced at KMZ. That is, there is a certain growth potential. Alas, the state is not particularly trying to develop this potential, rather the opposite, but everything can change, just note for now that it exists. But we will start from reality.
What are six M507s per year?
These are two RTOs "Karakurt" per year. Today they are being built more slowly, but in any case, this series will be built relatively soon. The fact that the construction of a series of such highly specialized ships is a mistake has already been said, but in the dimensions of the "Karakurt" hull and with its power plant (3xM507, three valolines) it is quite possible to make a multipurpose ship, just a small one, without a helicopter and without a landing pad …
Such a ship may well replace both MRK and IPC, fight submarines, strike against the coast with cruise missiles and surface ships. The possibility of creating such a ship has been discussed more than once. Moreover, according to some reports, the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau even has a project of such a ship, where, as in the Karakurt, everything is serial and can be immediately produced and put into operation without modifications.
And where and how to use these engines after the construction of a series of such ships for the revival of the OVR? For example, a series of anti-submarine "Karakurt-2 PLO" in the minimum number to cover naval bases?
First, we need a new missile boat for a long time, created according to modern concepts - high-speed, at least 45 knots, inconspicuous, cheap. It can be assumed that a pair of M507 and two valolines could well disperse a small boat armed with the Uran anti-ship missile system or another missile of the same dimensions to the required speed. This means that these power plants limit the laying of boats at the rate of three boats per year.
You can, however, approach the issue from a different angle. In the author's article, dedicated to shipboard power plants in the newspaper VPK-Courier, the following example was given:
At present, Zvezda is able to produce three M507D engines per year with a guarantee, which, for example, makes it possible to build one ship in the dimensions of the Karakurt. Perhaps in the foreseeable future it will be possible to produce four engines per year. But three M507Ds are essentially six M504s, and four are already eight. M507 is, simply put, a pair of two M504s. Is it possible to obtain acceptable tactical and technical characteristics on the "halves" of the M507? It turns out you can.
Currently, multi-shaft water jet installations are becoming more widespread in Western countries. This is essentially a "battery" of water cannons, occupying the entire width of the vessel from side to side.
So far, such propellers are used mainly on high-speed ferries. For example, the Silvia Ana, with a length of 125 meters, a width of 18, a total displacement of 7895 tons and six engines with a capacity of 5650 kilowatts, develops a speed of up to 42 knots. Such a move is given to him by a multi-shaft water jet installation.
It is easy to calculate that for a ship the size of the Karakurt and the same displacement (less than 1000 tons), a similar multi-shaft water jet installation will provide comparable speed data at a lower power. Thus, instead of three M507D, four M504 can be used, each of which will work on its own water cannon.
That is, six М507Д are three water-jet ships in the "Karakurt" class, or, if we are talking about missile boats (three water cannons with М504), then four boats a year.
But you can also approach the question from the other side.
What if each M507D turns the water cannon on its own? And if six M507Ds go to some kind of high-speed hunting ships? With three or four cannons each?
It will be a very fast ship.
Yes, water cannons have problems. In our conditions, this is, first of all, ice on the surface of the water, for example, slush. There are other formations that are dangerous for a water cannon.
In addition, at a high-speed ship, the nozzles of water cannons at high speed are not under water, the mass of water simply does not have time to close behind the ship. And this in our climate means freezing of the nozzle. However, both problems cannot be considered unsolvable, and water cannons cannot be regarded as a difficult-to-manage deficit position.
All of the above does not need to be understood as a call to build just such ships, it is not. This is just an indication that we have a choice. Serial gearboxes, "Kolomna" and turbines M-90FR make it possible to "close" the niche of ships with a total displacement of 1500 to 5400 tons. And without the engineering madness of a four-shaft power plant on a ship the size of a frigate, and similar tricks. And they make it possible to build a rather large number of warships - much more than we actually build. Without any import.
"Stars" even in their current quantity, without modernization and expansion of production, without deploying such at KMZ (which is quite possible in five years, if you try), make it possible to quickly cover the need for ships with a total displacement of 400-1000 tons.
The number of ships that could be laid down and built without delays in the supply of power plants is much larger than we are building, and we are talking about ships of all classes - from a missile boat and an OVR corvette to a powerful missile strike frigate and not the largest, but quite suitable Navy landing ship dock.
GEM and corps do not limit the development of our Navy
It is worth paying attention to the fact that above we are not talking about any promising product or a product that does not have the completeness required for immediate production as part of the ship's power plant. Only serial and ship-tested systems are mentioned. This is done on purpose. And below the question of "perspective" will be raised.
Also, products such as the M70 and M75 gas turbine engines remained "overboard". The reason: there are no gearboxes for these turbines, there are no serial power plants in which they could work, although there are projects for such power plants, but using serial filling on serial ships is one of the basic principles, right?
For the same reason, the options with full electric motion were not considered - the operation of travel electric motors directly on the shaft, without gearboxes. By and large, the example of the construction of the Arctic icebreakers says that the domestic industry would cope with such a task, but again - there is no serial military power plant, and there is no money either, this option is deliberately left out of brackets.
But even without any new R&D, improvements and the like, we can safely say that we have no restrictions on ship power. The one that is, allows us to build a series of surface ships, covering the bulk of the issues that may arise in the near future for our Navy. And these series will be much larger than what we have now, and incomparably higher in combat effectiveness, much more rational and with a higher level of inter-ship unification than what we are doing today.
Of course, this approach sets the bar - no ships larger in size and displacement than Project 22350 frigates. But ships larger than 22350 should be built under their own naval doctrine, under the strategic concept of what our country is for in principle. There is none today, and it is not expected. Instead, we have mantras about land and continentality, skillfully fueled. If suddenly the need for large ships arises right tomorrow, then we always have the opportunity to resort to atomic power plant and assemble it from serial ready-made components.
Does the approach described above comply with the main principles of shipbuilding policy, described in the previous article?
Yes, it is quite. This approach ensures the construction of a large number of fully-fledged and combat-ready ships, the tactical and technical characteristics of which are quite sufficient for solving those combat missions that the Navy may face in the near future.
And what about the rest of the content?
Ship systems and weapons
Having hulls and power plants, you can select the appropriate weapons, ship systems, electronics, and so on.
The issue with missile launchers was disclosed above - in fact, how quickly the series of MRKs of project 21631 and 22800 received their vertical missile launch systems says everything - they can be delivered quickly.
There are not so many problems with KRO "Uran" - this complex is also supplied to the project 20380 corvettes and modernized Soviet-built MRKs, even with some delays during the creation of the ship, the necessary weapons can be obtained.
Likewise with artillery.
Today, the series includes artillery mounts with caliber 76, 100 and 130 mm. Presumably, on surface ships "from 2000 tons and heavier" it is logical to have 100 or 130 mm. On smaller ships - 76. An exception here is permissible only when the ships are not constructively using the strongest air defense. Then it becomes critical to look at the gun, first of all, as an anti-aircraft gun, and there is reason to believe that the 76-mm gun may be the best choice here. But this requires an accurate assessment.
Of the serial air defense systems for today, there is no alternative to "Redut". Firstly, its integration into the new BIUS ships ("Sigma") has already been worked out. It functions well with the Poliment radar installed on the Project 22350 frigates. Its compatibility with the Positiv radar of various modifications has been worked out.
Another powerful argument in favor of the "Redoubt" is the 9M96 missile - the same missile is needed not only by the fleet, but also by the air defense missile system of the Aerospace Forces, and the only way to reduce its price is to increase the mass production of it.
In addition, it is theoretically possible to equip the complex with other missiles that have not yet been created and expand its capabilities without making changes to the design of the ship.
Another air defense system that is still used on post-Soviet ships of the Navy - "Calm" can not be considered as any kind of alternative. The complex requires a radar target illumination MR-90 "Nut", and, as they say, "in quantity" - there are four of them on the frigates of Project 11356. In addition, "Shtil" works with the BIUS "Requirement", which is not installed on modern warships, cannot shoot 9M96 missiles and fires "its own" missiles. Thus, even outside the connection with the effectiveness of this complex, no stake can be placed on it. And in terms of efficiency, it will lose even to the combination "Positive-M + ZUR + Redut radio correction", not to mention the "Polyment-Redut" complex.
Of the near-zone air defense systems, only the Pantsir-M ZRAK and the Broadsword ZAK are serial and full-fledged. Everything else (both AK-630M, and "Duet", and 57-mm artillery mounts) either does not satisfy in terms of performance characteristics (for example, sighting systems are not mounted on the same gun carriage with the barrel block), or is not a serial and proven product (57 mm).
The possibility of installing 57-mm artillery mounts should be provided, if in the future it is required, the ships under construction should have the necessary groundwork for modernization, but it is too early to rely on these systems as basic ones. As for the 30-mm six-barreled guns based on the AO-18 assault rifle, today they have the right to life either with sighting systems on a common gun carriage, or on some auxiliary ships on which the use of simplified weapon systems is permissible.
Similarly, among anti-submarine weapons systems, there is no alternative to the "Package" complex, although it needs to be seriously improved, and not only in terms of replacing the monstrous SM-588 launcher on a normal torpedo tube.
Only the Poliment radar is suitable as a base radar station to ensure the use of air defense systems for ships of the 1st rank (frigates of different variants).
To detect surface targets - radars "Monolith", "Mineral" and "Monument".
There is a Fourke radar for detecting air targets, but it should never be used for pointing weapons, its use is possible only with other radars, as it is implemented on frigates of Project 22350. However, it can be abandoned in the future.
For smaller ships, it is rational to use the "Positive" radar, both for detecting air targets and for controlling the fire of the Redut air defense system. Pantsir-M has its own radar station.
The Puma radar does an excellent job of controlling artillery fire.
In hydroacoustics, on the one hand, everything is imperfect - the GAS "Zarya" used on corvettes and frigates is not optimal in terms of range and is filled with imported components, with the supply of which there were already problems. But at the same time, it cannot be considered bad either. Used in conjunction with a towed GAS, a low-frequency "illumination" for it, a normal (and not a Ka-27M) helicopter, it turns out to be quite good. In addition, in most cases it is still enough.
The small GAS "Platina" used on frigates of project 11356, on the basis of which the GAS is to be created for the corvette 20386 and anti-submarine versions of the RK project 11661, is outdated and cannot be considered a full-fledged model of sonar weapons. But its specificity is that in the presence of an external low-frequency "illumination", it can work in the low-frequency range, which is not available for "Zarya". This is a huge plus. The downside is complete inadequacy without illumination.
Nevertheless, the performance characteristics of these two stations make it possible to form such types of ships that would complement each other in their capabilities. And the general level of domestic hydroacoustics tells us that it is quite possible to create a more efficient GAS in a short time.
Among the towed GAS there is no alternative to the "Minotaur", and this GAS completely covers all the urgent needs of the Navy.
Thus, there is a certain basic set of serial systems, using which it is quite possible to complete ships for various purposes - and this will be good ones ships with high combat capability, and most importantly - without surprises in terms of the operation of weapons and other systems, without additional R&D, costing a lot of money, without imposed unnecessary developments. The potential of the domestic industry makes it possible to build them simply as a designer - for the tasks that are at this stage of historical development.
What kind of ship do you need? A missile strike with good speed? Optimized "for speed" hull with a power plant similar to 22350, simplified in comparison with the real 22350 sonar complex to give "high-speed" contours to the hull, "Polyment-Redut", 100-mm gun to reduce the volumes required for artillery, one hangar for an AWACS helicopter, a reduced number of PU SAM "Redut", an offensive weapon in the UKSK.
"Universal" frigate? There are 22350. "Clean" anti-submarine for BMZ? Take a corvette with a couple of helicopters. Etc. And all this will be from standard components, with purely quantitative differences (more missiles - fewer missiles), unified with each other (sometimes on the same hulls) and capable of fighting together.
The main thing in all this is seriality. If the serial production is ensured, the industry will be able to slap these ships "like cakes", continuously reducing the construction time, and the fleet will be updated in a timely manner and without failures in numbers. There will be stable intra-industry cooperation without loss of competencies and money from paid orders, which the industry will receive the faster, the faster the ships are delivered. Of course, the Ministry of Defense will be required to pay for them, and not as it is now.
This will be the fleet that the domestic industry in its current state, without significant modernization and additional investments, will master right now. And this fleet will not be weak in any way.
A little about the future
All of the above does not at all negate the work for the future, but it should be built on a reasonable basis - the presence of a scientific and technical groundwork, a conscious tactical and technical task based on the requirements for combat effectiveness, tests on ground stands, on floating stands, then, if possible, on an experimental ship or a ship, then on the lead ship with a new system and only after successful state tests - into a series, for production ships.
This cycle should never be broken - what its violation leads to, we have seen very well in the story with corvettes, alas, continuing and unknown in the end fraught with what.
Moreover, it is important to understand that the topic of promising OCD cannot come out of nowhere. It should be based on something, at least - a full-fledged research work, with experiments and experimental work, with some working models confirming that R&D for a new product is possible (Zaslon radar complex, for example, undertook exactly "from nowhere").
What areas are promising right now? The first is the MA7 gas-tube unit, which includes the M-70 main turbine, the M-90 afterburner and the gearbox. Such an installation will technically be much simpler than the M-55, which are used for frigates (it is much easier to synchronize two high-speed turbines than a turbine and a slow-speed diesel engine compared to it), and it can be used on ships up to 8,000 tons of displacement.
The promising project 22350M should be driven by this particular power plant of two units.
Naturally, first it must be built and tested at stands, and only then ships must be ordered for it. As a backlog, there are already ready-made turbines and a pre-engineered gearbox.
An important point - the Ministry of Defense and industry can turn even this into a "sawmill". The multi-way can be simple - we lay the "big" 22350M, without the tested power plant in the metal, without the spent radar, but with the promises of the "Barrier" to create it sometime, on the basis that "now" we supposedly have (in fact no) a big, real rocket ship, we cut the 22350 series, instead we launch from its own power plant "20386-overgrown", which can be read about in the article "Is the rework of the project 20386 contemplated?", and voila - a bunch of long-term construction, budget development, a lot of development projects, financial flows to the "right" people, no new ships in service for at least ten years with huge expenses for them, long-term refinements of what will still be built, and all questions in society will drown out our powerful propaganda, which has already eliminated the ability to distinguish the present from the future in people with undeveloped intelligence. Those 22350s were already outdated, but now … This option is directly opposite to the correct one, but, alas, it is more likely in our specific conditions. But let's not talk about sad things.
The second most important direction in the part of the power plant is the creation of a line of ship diesel engines of the Kolomna plant D500. These engines have also been partially developed and with sufficient funding will be quickly brought to series. But the deployment of their production in Kolomna will be much easier if there is a large and timely paid order for the D49 diesel engine for surface ships of the current generation. Which should remain the base diesel engines of the Navy until the launch of the D500 family in the series. The creation of this family of engines will seriously untie the hands of domestic shipbuilders, because in the 20-cylinder version, it has a maximum power of 10,000 hp. with., which makes it possible to build significantly larger purely diesel ships than today.
Similarly promising is the development of full electric propulsion for warships using the "icebreaker" technological reserve.
In the case of motors for small ships, we should talk about the implementation of all available developments to improve the reliability of "stars" and reduce the cost of their life cycle. The Ministry of Industry and Trade and Zvezda instead, as you know, invested in the project of the M150 Pulsar engine, which was never completed, largely due to the impossibility of cooperation with foreign partners after 2014. That is, there was a "jump for the crane in the sky", which so strongly goes against the correct principles of shipbuilding.
It is theoretically possible to consider the applicability of a power plant based on turbines M70 and M75, for example, for missile boats.
That is, work for the future can and should also be based on a real “foundation”.
And what about the creation of more advanced turbines of the next generation, more efficient than the M-70 and M-90? They should be created separately from naval affairs, with money from the Ministry of Industry and Trade. And only after their creation does it make sense to engage in their implementation in the Navy, before that the fleet should not rely on these turbines at all, although questions can and should be raised before the MPT.
Which way is still worth looking at?
Towards the adjustable pitch screws (CPP). Work on them in the Russian Federation is underway, there are functioning samples, they promise to test one on the same 20386, and this is a strategic direction. The emergence of a line of CPPs capable of transmitting high power opens the door to abandoning complex reverse gear transmissions, simplifying and reducing the cost of gearboxes and the possibility of much more massive ship construction. CPP is a possibility of an "American" scheme with two echelons of four turbines, a pair of combiner reducers and two shaft lines. This is a significant decrease in the volumes required for the power plant inside the ship's hull.
And, for example, a heat recovery circuit from turbine exhaust gases, with a steam turbine operating on the same reducer-combiner, albeit of a complicated design, is already a direct road to an aircraft carrier, moreover, to a high-speed one, with a displacement of 40–45 thousand tons. And there is also where to build it - more about this in the articles “Aircraft carrier for Russia. Faster than you expect " on Military Review and “Our aircraft carrier is real. The Russians are quite capable of what the Indians are doing. " in the military-industrial complex-Courier. We are four steps away from these possibilities (the marching modification of the M-90FR, a relatively simple gearbox, CPP and afterburner in comparison with the P055). And again, we don't even need a serious reconstruction of production.
In terms of weapons, everything is even simpler - for the next years twenty different versions of "Uranus", "Caliber", "Onyx" and "Zircon" will be enough with a margin. And UKSK allows you to create other missiles for a standard launcher. With the future missiles "Reduta" the same thing - there is a complex, missiles for it can be created and adapted to almost any.
There are questions about the future radar systems of the RLK.
Today the lobbyists of Zaslon are shouting out loud that the future belongs to such as those of Zaslon, integrated tower systems with AFAR. In general, they are right - except for the fact that these systems should not be made by the “Crazy Hands” circle, but by an organization that has at least some experience in such things. "Crazy hands" can then also be admitted to the subject - but strictly after the radar stations on the ships they have already captured confirm the initially required tactical and technical characteristics, and their price will be reduced to realistic 2, 5-3, 5 billion for the "tower" … Not earlier. These guys have a huge field for experiments - all the corvettes after "Aldar Tsydenzhapov" will go with their handicrafts, it will be possible to train for a long time. This is, of course, ideally, in reality, they will simply immediately destroy the surface forces of the Russian Navy somewhere by 2030, and disperse, some to their homes, and who to Oklahoma, if everything goes like it is now, but hope for something on no one will forbid us the best, right?
Among the real players in this market, developments on integrated radar systems with AFAR were at the JSC NPP Salyut, NII Fazotron and Almaz-Anteya. The intellectual potential of these organizations allows them to create such systems. Here are some examples.
The photo shows an experimental "turret" with AFAR from "Fazotron", mounted on a missile boat of the Pacific Fleet. As it should be under normal conditions, first there was research work, then an experimental product was obtained, the correctness of the ideas of which was tested on an experimental ship. The "pinnacle" then started working, after all, it was made by specialists in radars, and not just anyone. The problem was in goal-setting - "Phazotron" made it in order to control artillery according to its data, because there is no air defense system on the boat. And for a cannon that shoots in one direction, so many canvases are simply not needed. Nevertheless, tests have shown that it is possible to create a normal "tower" on the "Faztotron", if necessary.
A normal system, already capable of solving all problems without restrictions, was also developed by Phazotron, but it was no longer made in metal.
Another example is the project NIIP them. Tikhomirov, the oldest and most authoritative organization in the field of radar technology, which proposed a system based on the Irbis aircraft radar used on the Su-35 fighter. True, this is PFAR, not AFAR, but, on the other hand, do we need good performance characteristics or something else? As an intermediate stage, this option was completely "working".
Almaz-Antey would also cope with the task of creating such a complex.
Alas, "respected people" came to the radar clearing, and against the background of their greed, such a question as "defense capability" simply does not exist, especially since some of the "respected people" had good connections in the United States, so good that some in the FSB could not sleep at night because of this, but, alas, as in Soviet times, the Office cannot work against "truly respected people" … Therefore, we will now have a series of mass-dimensional models of radars on non-combatant ships for big money instead of working systems, combined with complete transparency of this process for American "partners".
Nevertheless, we note that in order to work for the future and create a real radar system with AFAR, capable of doing everything that Zaslon promised, but “adjusted for reality,” Russia has everything, there are organizations, personnel, they have there is groundwork, developments and prototypes, and in general, in six to seven years you can get a modern radar, if you start, relatively speaking, "today or tomorrow."
That is, even here it is possible to work according to the correct scheme - an experimental product, its testing on stands and experimental vessels - the lead ship with it - debugging - a series.
All these opportunities are already available in Russia.
Conclusion
With the elimination of organizational chaos in the domestic shipbuilding, we can suddenly discover one pleasant, but so far inaccessible to us opportunity - the ability to very quickly and inexpensively restore fully the combat effectiveness and power of the naval surface forces. This is really so now. And it is only the evil will of some finite, but very large number of people that prevents this from happening. Most of them are interested in filling their pockets with methods that are dishonest and harmful to society. The smaller one is in the same, but also in the satisfaction of its foreign curators.
If suddenly someday our fleet has to get involved in a big war, even with some weak, but competent adversary, then to justify the losses that it will incur, a lot of information will be thrown into society with great force that the industry could not this or another thing, we didn't have time, the consequences of the 90s, and that's why …
But even before all this happened, at the beginning of 2021, when there is still no war with anyone, we can safely say that this is not true, as earlier we could call the statements that
"We build 22160 because we can't do anything else"
or
“We are building only RTOs, because we can’t do anything else”
and similar dregs that huge armies of mercenary bots have been throwing on forums and military websites all the past years.
Russia has everything to build a strong fleet right now, and it will not require phenomenal money. There is industry, technology and personnel.
There is a reserve for the future and the ability to turn it into reality in a matter of years. There is even money, because with the elimination of organizational chaos and "sawing" topics, it will suddenly become clear that there is enough money too.
All that is needed is to follow very simple and understandable principles even for a person without special education. And they, these principles, many people understand, but for their implementation as guiding principles, in fact, one thing is needed.
Give the Office the go-ahead to clean up "respected people" and nothing more
All other factors limiting the development of the fleet as an instrument of military power (and they are) have nothing to do with industry and its capabilities.
Now you know that too.
