Russian submarine fleet: prospects and expectations

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Russian submarine fleet: prospects and expectations
Russian submarine fleet: prospects and expectations

Video: Russian submarine fleet: prospects and expectations

Video: Russian submarine fleet: prospects and expectations
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Russian submarine fleet: prospects and expectations
Russian submarine fleet: prospects and expectations

On June 15, 2010, in Severodvinsk, the newest submarine of project 885 was taken out of the dock of the Northern Machine-Building Enterprise. Thus, today Russia has built the lead submarines of new series of three main classes: SSBN project 955 ("Yuri Dolgoruky"), diesel-electric submarines of project 677 (" St. Petersburg ") and finally Project 885 SSGN (" Severodvinsk ").

It is worth paying attention to this intermediate milestone in order to understand what prospects await the domestic submarine fleet and on which submarines those future officers and sailors who today are only finishing 9-11 grades of secondary schools will serve.

FOURTH GENERATION

The history of the new, fourth generation of domestic submarines began at the turn of the 70s-80s of the last century, immediately after the requirements were formed and preparations began for the construction of third-generation submarines - projects 941, 945, 949, 971 and others. The new generation of boats was supposed to build on the success that was achieved with the creation of third-generation submarines, capable, despite some shortcomings, of competing with American and British counterparts of the same age in terms of equipment capabilities and level of stealth.

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According to the tradition of the Soviet Navy, it was envisaged to simultaneously build several projects of submarines to perform various tasks - strategic, anti-aircraft, multipurpose, anti-submarine and special purpose. However, at the end of the 80s it became clear that such a practice leads to an unjustified increase in the costs of the Navy, and following the example of a potential enemy, it was decided to reduce this diversity to three main classes: two classes of nuclear submarines - strategic and multipurpose and one class of multipurpose diesel -electric submarines.

As a result, work on new boats led to the creation of three projects, which were approved as the main ones. The role of the new "strategist" was intended for Project 955 "Borey", a new multipurpose submarine cruiser - Project 885 "Ash". Promising diesel submarines were planned to be built according to Project 677 "Lada".

Unfortunately, the implementation of these plans fell on an extremely difficult time for our country. The collapse of the USSR and the destruction of industry, primarily the defense industry, led to the fact that in the 90s and most of the 2000s, the fleet received submarines of the "Soviet reserve", not dreaming of new submarines. The construction of the latter proceeded with enormous difficulties. Meanwhile, the size of the submarine of the Russian Navy was sharply reduced due to the withdrawal from its composition of a large number of boats of early projects, and many combat units, nominally remaining in service, could not go to sea for years.

As a result, by now the following situation has developed in the Russian submarine fleet.

MARINE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

Currently, the Russian NSNF includes six RPK SN project 667BDRM (built in the 80s - early 90s), five RPK SN project 667 BDR (built in 70-80s), one RPK SN project 955 (launched in 2007, it has not yet been commissioned). In addition, three Project 941 SNRs remain in the ranks of the Russian Navy, one of which (Dmitry Donskoy), after re-equipment, is used to test the D-30 missile system with Bulava ICBMs, and two more are awaiting their fate.

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Currently, three more Project 955 submarine missile carriers are under construction. Two of them must be handed over to the Russian Navy during 2011, and the third - in 2014 or 2015. The history of this project is quite dramatic: the construction of the lead ship officially began in 1995, but almost did not progress due to underfunding. In the future, the project had to go through a major overhaul, when, after several unsuccessful launches, they abandoned the promising Bark missile system in favor of the Bulava, the development of which turned into a real drama. As a result, the renewal of Russia's naval strategic nuclear forces is being delayed. Today, significant intellectual, financial and industrial resources have been allocated for solving the Bulava's problems, and this gives rise to hope: in the near future, the missile will be put into service.

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On the whole, despite the existing difficulties, the state of Russia's naval strategic nuclear forces against the background of the rest of the Russian submarine fleet can be considered the most prosperous. Their basis - six RPK SN project 667BDRM is currently undergoing repairs with rearmament on the Sineva ICBMs, and it is expected that they will remain in the Navy until the 2020s, and subject to further modernization - even longer.

Taking into account the construction of a series of ships of Project 955 (assuming that all the problems of the Bulava will be eliminated within the next year) and taking into account the limitations of the START-3 Treaty, signed this spring, we can say that the presence in the ranks of six RPK SN of Project 667BDRM and the construction of the same number of Boreyevs will remove from the agenda the issue of updating the Russian NSNF for the next 20 years.

KILLERS OF AIR CARRIERS

As of today, the Russian Navy retains eight Project 949A Antey nuclear-powered submarine cruisers. These boats, the construction of which began in the 80s, are among the most modern in the Russian Navy, but the state of this submarine component can be called a crisis. First of all, due to the failure of the Legend ICRC and the decommissioning of most of the Tu-95RTs reconnaissance aircraft, as well as difficulties with the commissioning of the new Liana ICRC. As a result, boats of this type can only use their own detection equipment to guide their P-700 missiles, which excludes the use of this missile weapon at full range and requires rapprochement with the target.

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The second and more serious problem is the narrow specialization of these submarine cruisers. "Sharpened" to fight the aircraft carrier formations of the US Navy, Project 949A submarines turned out to be very large, complex and expensive to build and operate ships, the purpose of which is unclear in modern conditions. In addition, the large size makes these boats very visible, and they are also quite noisy.

It is possible to extend the service life of the Anteyevs and expand their capabilities through overhaul and modernization with the replacement of the Granit missile system on boats with a new RC with universal launchers. This rearmament will allow Antey to use a wide range of modern cruise missiles and make them multipurpose ships. However, such modernization will not eliminate all the shortcomings of the project, and in addition, it will turn out to be extremely time-consuming and expensive.

SUBMARINE HUNTERS

In December 2009, the nuclear submarine K-152 "Nerpa" was introduced to the Russian Navy. The new Project 971I nuclear submarine is intended to be leased to the Indian Navy. Prior to that, the already formed Indian crew will be trained on the submarine.

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This fact is especially interesting given the state of the grouping of domestic multipurpose nuclear submarines. The last multipurpose nuclear submarine entered the Russian Navy in 2001. It was the Gepard submarine of the same type as the Nerpa. Today in the ranks of the Russian Navy is, not counting the "Nerpa", 12 submarines of project 971, the average age of which is more than 15 years. In addition to these nuclear submarines, the fleet also has multipurpose nuclear submarines of other projects - 671RTMK (four units) and 945 (three units). In the next decade and a half, at least half of the boats of this class will fail, in particular, all the submarines of Project 671RTMK and Project 945, as well as those built by the first nuclear submarines of Project 971. Such a reduction, if not compensated for by the introduction of new submarines into the fleet, will lead to the fact that by the mid - end of the 2020s, the grouping of multipurpose nuclear submarines of the Russian Navy will not be able to perform combat missions - even as important as covering Russian strategic submarine cruisers in combat service, and on the allocation of any significant number of nuclear submarines to perform tasks in remote areas of the oceans will be out of the question.

How can this situation be avoided?

Currently under construction for the Navy are two multipurpose nuclear submarines of project 885. As you know, the lead ship of the project - K-329 "Severodvinsk" was recently withdrawn from the construction shop. The existing plans provide for the commissioning of a fleet of six nuclear submarines of this type within the next ten years, and they, obviously, will not be able to replace all 27 multipurpose submarines (including the anti-aircraft 949A) that are currently part of the Navy.

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They intended to lay the lead boat of Project 885 at the turn of the 80s and 90s, but financial constraints and the collapse of the USSR postponed the start of work until 1993. Then the lengthy epic of its construction stretched. Initially, it was assumed that this ship would be handed over to the sailors in 1998, and there were rumors about the laying of two or three more hulls of Project 885. But in 1996, due to lack of funding, the construction was practically frozen.

In 1998, the commissioning dates were shifted to the beginning of the 2000s, then to 2005, to 2007 … The work on the boat was started again only in 2004. After the resumption of funding, the project had to be modernized - the equipment laid by the creators of the submarine in the late 80s was outdated and it was pointless to complete the cruiser with it. In addition, according to some information, difficulties arose with the main power plant of the new generation, which had to be refined.

In fact, rumors about the construction of the next buildings of Project 885, allegedly laid back in the 90s, turned out to be untrue. In reality, work on the second ship of the improved project 885M, named "Kazan", began only in 2009.

It should be noted that the need to build a series of six Project 885 cruisers raises questions. In order to deal with this topic, it is necessary to understand the origin and evaluate the characteristics of Severodvinsk. This is a large submarine ship with a standard displacement of 9700 and a total displacement of more than 13,500 tons, about 120 meters long and 13 meters wide. It has a high travel speed (according to some sources, up to 33 knots) and has powerful armament: 8 torpedo tubes of 533 and 650 mm caliber, as well as 8 silo-type launchers, each of which can carry up to three cruise missiles of various types.

The boat is equipped with powerful electronic equipment and hydroacoustics, and the cost of its construction, according to some sources, is approaching two billion dollars. The closest analogue of the domestic project in terms of functionality and characteristics is the American project SSN-21 Sea Wolf. Sea Wolves are also large, fast, heavily armed and expensive units. In the late 1980s, they were intended as a response to the introduction of Project 971 submarines into the USSR Navy. Then the United States wanted to build 30 submarines of this type. However, due to the end of the Cold War, the need for such a series has disappeared and in 1989-2005, the US Navy received only three boats, while the price of each submarine reached four billion dollars. As the main nuclear submarine of the new generation, the smaller and not so outstanding in terms of performance characteristics "Virginia" was chosen. Submarines of this type are planned to be built in the amount of 30 units to replace the aging Los Angeles-class submarines.

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In this regard, the question arises: does Russia today need to build a series of ships like Sea Wolfe, the characteristics of which at one time were calculated on the basis of the anticipated big war with the most powerful enemy on earth? Or, taking into account the current international situation, you can limit yourself to the commissioning of two or three submarines of the project 885 (885M), and choose a cheaper option as the main nuclear submarine for the future, which retains the necessary capabilities due to modern equipment and weapons.

The above considerations about the upcoming significant reduction in the grouping of multipurpose nuclear submarines allow us to conclude that the construction of a cheaper "mass" nuclear submarine in the amount of at least 12-15 units in the next decade and a half is vital. In terms of its main characteristics, such a submarine should correspond to the nuclear submarine of Project 971 or even 671RTM, surpassing these submarines in terms of stealth and, of course, the capabilities of equipment and weapons. Judging by some information, the development of such a project is being carried out by a number of design bureaus.

DIESEL BOATS

Back in the late 90s of the last century, the question was raised about the need to replace the boats of Project 877, which today form the basis of the domestic diesel submarine. The deliveries of submarines of this project for the Russian Navy were completed in 1994. Currently, according to various sources, our fleet includes from 12 to 15 diesel-electric submarines of this type, the oldest of which were built in the early 80s.

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The construction of either improved boats of Project 636 / 636M or the newest submarines of Project 677 was considered as replacement options. The first option promised the possibility of a relatively cheap and quick upgrade of the submarine due to the structural proximity of the submarines of projects 636 and 877, at the same time the capabilities of the latter should have increased significantly due to new equipment. The second one was more risky - the boat of Project 677 was a completely new product, the development of which in the conditions of the post-Soviet collapse of the industry promised great difficulties.

Nevertheless, in 1997, the lead submarine of Project 677 was laid, but it was launched only eight years later, and the submarine was commissioned only in May 2010. At the same time, the boat was accepted for "limited operation" - according to the available information, there is no standard hydroacoustic complex installed on it, with the development of which there were problems, there are difficulties with the main power plant.

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The delay in the commissioning of the lead boat "suspended" the fate of the next submarines of the project - B-586 "Kronstadt" and B-587 "Sevastopol", laid down in 2005 and 2006. As a result, they have not even been launched yet. Whether it will be possible to fix the problems that have arisen without deteriorating the performance characteristics of the boat and in what time frame this can be done is still unknown.

As a result, today there is a paradoxical situation: for almost 15 years now, having in its hands a successful, modern, competitive project 636, which is in demand on the world market and through constant improvement, maintains its competitiveness, Russia does not build these boats for itself. Having tried to place a bet on the latest project 677, our country faced a number of organizational and technical problems, as a result of which the renewal of the diesel submarine was delayed for ten years. With a different development of events, the fleet over the past ten years could have received six, and perhaps eight submarines of the 636th project. It is possible that he will eventually receive them - but a decade and a half later than he should have.

FUTURE OPTIONS

The renewal of the Russian Navy, including the submarine, directly depends on what funds the country can allocate for solving this problem and how carefully it will control their spending. According to the representatives of the RF Ministry of Defense, in order to fully finance the needs of the Armed Forces, it is necessary to spend 28-36 trillion rubles in the next 10 years. If the least costly, 13-trillion-dollar version of the State Arms Program for 2010-2020 is adopted, the financing of the Navy will go according to the leftover principle - the priority will be given to the strategic nuclear forces, the Air Force and Air Defense. According to information from a number of sources, in this case, the replenishment of the fleet with new ships will be carried out through the implementation of a joint program of military and civil shipbuilding, which is not part of the GPV. At the same time, in addition to the actual financing issues, it is necessary to solve a lot of problems with the reorganization and modernization of the shipbuilding industry.

What will the Russian submarine look like in the event of one or another scenario 15 years later? The following main scenarios can be distinguished:

1. Minimum. In the absence of the necessary funding, only "protected" items will be developed, in the case of the submarine fleet, these are naval strategic nuclear forces. The grouping of multipurpose nuclear submarines will retain 2-3 Project 949A submarines and 6-7 Project 971 boats, and will also receive 4-6 Project 885 ships. In total, it will include 10-16 nuclear submarines. The grouping of diesel boats will include 5-6 last Project 877 submarines and a similar number of Project 677 and / or 636M boats. Given the remoteness of the main maritime theaters from each other, Russia will not get the opportunity to create a more or less strong submarine group on any of them, preventing the critical weakening of the others. The ability of the submarine to carry out combat missions will be sharply reduced.

2. Permissible. With more significant amounts of funding, it is possible to take the necessary measures to keep a larger number of boats of "Soviet projects" in service. The modernization of all 12 existing "Bars" and, for example, four boats of Project 949A in combination with the commissioning of six nuclear submarines of Project 885 and, possibly, the first 2-3 boats of the new project will keep the number of multipurpose boats at the level of 22-25 units, which will somewhat facilitate position. The grouping of diesel submarines, having completely got rid of obsolete Project 877 submarines, will have 12-15 new submarines.

3. Optimal. Regular financing in combination with the modernization of shipbuilding will allow, in particular, to completely renew the composition of the NSNF, without bothering to modernize the PKK SN of old projects. The grouping of multipurpose boats will retain the old combat units: 4-6 Project 949A submarines, which have undergone deep modernization, and 8-10 Project 871 submarines, also improved. The order for the construction of Project 885 boats will be reduced to two or three units, but at the same time the fleet will receive 12-15 more compact and cheaper submarines. In this case, the size of the grouping of multipurpose nuclear submarines will at least remain at the current level, and possibly will slightly increase with a simultaneous improvement in quality. The grouping of diesel boats in this case will number up to 20 units of the 677 and / or 636M project, and probably some other.

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