In the joint project of "Tula News" and "Tula Business Journal" - "Weekly Bulletin", an article was published "Secrets and problems of existing modifications" Pantsir-S1 / 2 ". What is the media keeping silent about? " Judging by the title, one would expect a detailed analysis of the problems of the Pantsir air defense missile system from the article. Instead, the author criticizes the Izhevsk air defense missile system "Tor". Elderberry in the garden, uncle in Kiev. Pantsir has problems, but we criticize Thor. One could, of course, not pay attention, especially since the Tula bulletin is for internal, so to speak, use. But the trouble is: the article began to be intensively "copied and pasted" by various media outlets. And she went far beyond Tula. Although this is not the main thing, let them publish themselves. But the Tula article contains such an incredible amount of lies that you simply cannot pass by. Among other things, it asserts the almost helplessness of Russian equipment in front of the western means of air attack and the "standard" quality of the western air defense systems. It's not even about "Thor" and "Shell", but about Russian weapons in general. Therefore, the article requires a detailed analysis.
"Black myth" about the "dead funnel"
Referring to the Syrian experience, the Bulletin writes:
… the unique quality of Tula air defense missile systems, inaccessible, for example, to the military self-propelled air defense missile system "Tor-M1V / 2U". We are talking about the ability of "Armor" to intercept small 122-mm NURS type 9M22U "Grad" system, 227-mm URS M31A1 GMLRS systems MLRS / HIMARS, as well as operational-tactical ballistic missiles MGM-140B / M57 (ATACMS Block IA), approaching to covered objects at dive angles of the order of 80-85 degrees with speeds from 600 to 1300 m / s. The interception of the above-mentioned high-speed elements of high-precision weapons attacking directly the air defense missile systems themselves or the objects covered by them at such steep dive angles (80-82 degrees) became possible thanks to the integration into the Pantsirei-C1 weapons control systems not only of the 1RS2 dual-band centimeter-millimeter guidance radars / 1PC2-1E "Helmet", which differ in a very mediocre elevation viewing area (in the range from 0 to 45 °), but also multispectral optical-electronic sighting systems 10ES1 / 10ES1-E / … / (which) boast a huge elevation viewing area from -5 to +82 degrees. Conclusion: equipping with optical-electronic sighting devices 10ES1 / 10ES1-E not only increased the noise immunity of the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system, but also partially relieved them of the critical drawback inherent in the Tor-M2U air defense missile system - the presence of a huge "dead funnel" in the upper hemisphere above position of the complex. For "Pantsir-S1" this "funnel" has only a 16-degree opening angle, while for complexes of the "Tor-M1V / 2U" family its angular raster can reach 52 degrees!
(Spelling, punctuation and original classification of the author are hereinafter fully preserved.)
In reality, the tracking area in elevation of the radar guidance system of the Tor-M family is from -5, 5 ° to + 85 °. That is more than the Pantsir-S1 air defense system. The detection zone by the elevation angle of the SOTS SAM of the Tor-M family is 0-64 °. The tangent of the 64 ° angle is 2.05. This means that the near line of taking on the tracking of a target flying at an altitude of 12 km is 6 km. The detection range of the SOC SAM of the "Tor" family is 32 km. Even if the SVN flies at a speed of 1000 m / s, the "Thor" will have 26 seconds to capture it "in the crosshairs". Given that the reaction time of the complex is 6 seconds. Well, after the target is taken for tracking by the guidance station, even its dive at an angle of 85 ° does not pose a problem for the Tor-M2 air defense system. As for the OES ZRPK "Pantsir", this is an extremely meteorological guidance system, which is recognized by the Tula people themselves - and even in the article under consideration. While the combat work of the "Thor" family air defense system does not depend either on weather conditions or on the time of day.
In an irrepressible thirst to find (at least on paper) a "hole" in the domestic short-range air defense, the author turns to very exotic Western air attack weapons:
It is logical to assume that the Tor-M2U air defense missile systems dispersed over a vast area of the theater of operations, operating alone, without full separation from other types of friendly air defense systems, will be completely defenseless against air attack weapons attacking “to the top of the head”. Such means include not only the above-mentioned unguided and guided missiles, but also the ALARM anti-radar missiles from the British company BAe Dynamics, the terminal section of the flight path of which takes place in several stages:
- ascent to a height of 12 km / … / above the estimated location of the enemy air defense system; deployment of the parachute and slow descent with loitering and simultaneous scanning of the earth's surface for the presence of a radar; shooting a parachute, launching an accelerating solid propellant of a combat (2nd) stage, followed by a dive at the detected radiation source.
It is logical to assume that the survival rate of "Pantsirey-S1", in the event of a strike by anti-radar missiles ALARM, will be several orders of magnitude higher than the similar coefficient of the self-propelled SAM "Tor-M1 / 2V.
As it was shown above, the "Shell", if it differs from the "Thor" in terms of the presence of a "dead zone", then only for the worse. So, in reality, the "survival rate" (in Russian speaking - combat stability) of the Tor-M2 air defense system is higher than that of the Pantsir C1 air defense system. Including thanks to the lightly armored hull on a tracked chassis, which is noticeably less susceptible to small-caliber and fragmentation weapons than an unarmored hull on wheels.
As for the UR ALARM, even a descent at an angle of 90 ° does not provide it with the possibility of hitting the Thor air defense missile system, as well as the Pantsir air defense missile system.
The author does not notice a logical contradiction: if the location of the air defense missile system is known for sure, why look for it? And if the location of the air defense missile system is not known exactly, how to bring the missile launcher exactly into the “dead zone”, which at an altitude of 12 km near the “Tor-M2” air defense missile system has a radius of only 1 km? If SD decreases strictly vertically, then what kind of loitering can we talk about? And if the angle of descent is less than 90 °, then where are the guarantees that the UR will not go beyond the "dead zone" (which is constantly decreasing up to a distance of 1 km from the complex and at an altitude of 3 km has a radius of only 250 meters)? And what will happen if the air defense missile system is in motion while the UR ALARM is "loitering with a parachute" ?! I drove off a kilometer, and I shot it down (just a minute, no longer than a parachute descent from 12 km). Going in for parachuting in the area of the air defense system is a very risky event.
But the main thing is not even this, but the fact that the "sofa experts", as usual, have very strange ideas about the tactics of using air defense systems. They regularly "disperse" them in such a way that combat vehicles are all alone. Meanwhile, the MD air defense systems are intended for combat use as part of a subunit (the basic tactical unit of the Tor-M2 air defense missile system, as well as the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system is a battery) and as part of an echeloned air defense system, where complexes and systems of short, medium and long range mutually cover each other. The minimum tactical unit is a flight (2 BM). And already when working in the "link" mode, the "dead funnels" completely disappear.
You need to work together. And everyone should mind their own business. S-300 and S-400 air defense systems - to shoot down strategic aircraft and ballistic missiles (by the way: there is no data on the interception of the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system of operational-tactical ballistic missiles, this is the purest invention of the author of the bulletin). SAM "Buk" - to fight with planes and helicopters of tactical aviation outside the launch zone of air defense forces. SAM "Tor" - to intercept high-precision and small-sized air defense systems that broke through the first lines of defense. And the “couch experts” should lie on the couch. Silence is desirable.
Reality versus fantasy
Paying all his attention to the notorious "dead funnel", the author forgets about other key characteristics of the complexes he is comparing. But it is not only the elevation range that determines the air defense system's ability to intercept air targets. The effectiveness of combat work is determined by a huge number of factors. What are the final, integral indicators of the Tula and Izhevsk complexes? In 2009, demonstration (in fact and according to the initial plans - comparative) firing of the Tor-M2U air defense system and the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system were carried out. Here is what Lieutenant General A. G. Luzan reports on their results:
SAM "Tor-M2" and SAM "Pantsir-S1" fired at the target missile "Saman", created on the basis of the anti-aircraft missile SAM "Osa" and simulating a high-speed small-sized WTO in flight, and at the aerodynamic target E-95, equipped with a Luneberg lens to increase the effective scattering surface and simulate an ATGM carrier, a cruise missile or a medium-sized drone. Both Thor and Shell fired at Saman three times. "Thor" hit all three "Saman", missile consumption - 3. "Shell", firing at three "Saman", fired 8 missiles, there were no defeats. At the same time, two targets of the E-95 "Pantsirem" were hit with the consumption of one missile for each. The results of these demonstration firing once again reliably confirmed the previously mentioned advantages of the Tor-type air defense system as the main means of combating high-speed small-size WTO in flight.
That is, in the course of these firing, the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system confirmed its effectiveness only in intercepting medium-sized low-speed targets (the maximum speed of the E-95 is 80 m / s, the average speed of the Osa missile defense system, on the basis of which Saman was created, is over 500 m / s).
Such depressing results demanded a thorough analysis, the results of which were announced in 2012 at the XV scientific and technical conference "Actual problems of protection and security", held under the auspices of the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences. In the report of the candidate of military sciences V. V. Belotserkovsky and I. A. Razin (VA VPVO AF), in particular, it was noted:
low capability of the complex to fire at targets, maneuvering and flying with a heading parameter of more than 2-3 km.
Simply put, the Pantsir air defense missile system is capable of hitting targets flying directly or almost directly at it - 4-6 km along the front. The reason is also indicated:
… there are only two methods of aiming missiles (by the three-point method, by the method of half-straightening) / … / (with these guidance methods) the missile warhead warhead detonation control system is triggered only when the target moves directly to the firing combat vehicle.
(The heading parameter of the Tor-M2 air defense missile system is ± 9, 5 km, that is, it is capable of covering a front 19 km wide.)
The possibility of firing at targets flying at speeds of more than 400 m / s has not been confirmed, although in the performance characteristics of the complex, a speed of 1000 m / s is given.
(In the performance characteristics of the Tor-M2 air defense missile system, the maximum target speed is indicated at 700 m / s, but at the same time, according to one of the operators, the Belarusian Army, the Tor-M2U complex already successfully intercepted targets flying at a speed of 1000 m / s.)
The maximum firing range of 20 km is provided for air targets flying at a speed of no more than 80 m / s.
(SAM "Tor-M2" at a distance of 15 km is guaranteed to hit a target flying at a speed of 300 m / s.)
Etc. In total, the list of critical shortcomings of the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system was 15 items, including problems with targeting missiles, problems with millimeter-wave radars, problems when firing at low-flying targets. And, finally, the long time of transfer from the traveling position to the combat position (the deployment of the Tor-M2 air defense system takes 3 minutes).
I would like to believe that these shortcomings of the Pantsir air defense missile system have been eliminated. But so far there is no reliable information about this. A military expert, editor-in-chief of the magazine "Arsenal of the Fatherland" Viktor Murakhovsky, citing his sources - air defense officers, reports:
In Syria, it turned out that the "Pantsir" does not see small-sized and low-speed targets, which include military UAVs.
According to him, the effectiveness of the Tor-M2 air defense system is 80%, while that of the Pantsir does not exceed 19%. Other authors have repeatedly published similar data.
Despite this, the Tula continue to spread fake information about the superiority of the Pantsir air defense missile system over the Tor air defense missile system. Alas, no one canceled the principle of "trust but verify". But with the verification of the high performance characteristics of their complex declared by the Tula KBP, everything does not go very smoothly. So, at the beginning of 2020, the Indian media reported that "Pantsir" ZRPK did not pass competitive tests. " India has chosen the South Korean complex K-30 Biho. And this is really bad, since the "victory" over the "Pantsir" of the rather mediocre South Korean air defense missile system is reflected in the reputation of Russian weapons in general.
Cherry on a cake
The author of the "bulletin" seems to be aware of the shortcomings of the "Pantsir-S1" air defense missile system; "Abroad will help us"! The author predictably ends his opus, as they would say in the old days, with “admiration for the West”:
To date, the British Land Ceptor equipped with CAMM-ER missiles with active radar seeker, as well as the Israeli SPYDER-MR, which has an anti-aircraft modification of the Derby air combat missiles with a similar guidance principle.
On what grounds? And they have homing systems! The fact that at short range radio command guidance is superior to the GOS, that the GOS on the western complexes are not from a good life, but inherited from the aviation SDs, on the basis of which they were developed, does not bother the Tula "expert". These complexes have an ugly long deployment period - 15-20 minutes (!), Two to three times longer than that of the "Shell", and five to seven times longer than that of the "Thor". In principle, they cannot conduct combat work on the move (Russian MD complexes have such an opportunity). The "Spider" has problems in intercepting low-flying targets: the lower boundary of the affected area is 20 meters (for "Pantsir" and "Thor" - 5 meters). Land Ceptor was tested just a year ago and what it is really capable of is a big question. But all this, of course, is not important, since they are made in the West …
On this I would like to end the analysis of the absurdities that have entangled the media path of the MD SAM. But it will hardly be possible to finish. Because articles similar to the one discussed here regularly appear on the pages of domestic information resources. Who orders them and why?
