In real time, the problem of the so-called non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons is once again in demand for military-political analysis. On the one hand, there is a growing understanding among many that Russia needs to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). On the other hand, there is still a strong opinion that Russia needs to preserve the regime of this treaty.
The INF Treaty is a long-standing pain in our defense policy. Moreover, it is a defense one, since I would like to look at someone who dares to assert that Russia's military-political views have an aggressive connotation at least in some way. At the same time, hardly anyone would dare today to deny that the military-political actions of the United States are acquiring an increasingly aggressive character. And already taking into account this collision, the problem of the INF Treaty, or rather the RSM, is actually not a problem for Russia. We need efficient continental-range radar missiles, period.
Alas, this obvious truth is still not obvious to everyone, so we have to prove it again and again. Any idea and initiative in the military sphere and, as a consequence, any type and branch of the Armed Forces (and at a lower level - any system of weapons) should be assessed in Russia primarily from the standpoint of their ability to exclude the possibility of external aggression, that is, to strengthen the military regime. political stability.
If a weapon system effectively reduces the likelihood of aggression and enhances stability (or provides a quick restoration of stability if it is broken), such a system is needed. Otherwise, you can do without it.
HISTORY IN SUBJECTIVE INCLUSION
What in this respect can and should be said about those weapons systems that were eliminated by the Soviet Union under the INF Treaty? I am brackeing the issue of shorter-range missiles as secondary and will only talk about the Pioneer medium-range complex, which, in fact, is one and can be the subject of correct consideration.
The Pioneer medium-range missile, when it was created, was rather redundant under the conditions of the Soviet Union, and the pretext for its development - the US medium-range missile deployment in Europe - was unconvincing. Regardless of the specific flight time of the Pershing-2 RSD, they, like American cruise missiles of any base, did not significantly affect the nuclear stability regime. The presence in the USSR of many hundreds of ICBMs with MIRVs and dozens of RPK SNs with hundreds of SLBMs guaranteed to exclude the threat of a first US strike and, in general, a serious threat of a real exacerbation of the situation. In other words, the development and deployment of the Pioneer RSD, with the powerful strategic nuclear forces and conventional Armed Forces of the USSR, was not a very intelligible measure, redundant, rather undermining the security of the USSR than strengthening it.
Everything has changed in the world since more than 500 Pioneer RSDs were put on alert in the USSR. Then they rather hindered us, but how useful they would be now!
I invite those who wish to imagine what NATO's policy would have been in the 90s in terms of moving to the east, admitting former members of the Internal Affairs Directorate and former Soviet republics to NATO, if several hundred IRBMs were still deployed on the territory of the Russian Federation in the 90s "Pioneer". I do not exclude that a single warning from the population of the capitals of potential NATO neophytes that from the moment of joining NATO, a couple of Pioneers will be targeted at each capital and its environs, would be enough for this very population to think about whether join NATO?
Having at its disposal today several hundred Pioneer-class IRBMs, Russia would be able to exchange for real restraint of NATO countries not even the elimination of the Pioneers, but only an agreement to reduce their number and relocate to Asia. In our system of regional containment, even 200-300 RSD "Pioneer" would turn out to be an unkillable trump card with which we could respond to the potential adventurism of our regional neighbors.
Russia now has no real "Pioneers", and even withdrawal from the INF Treaty will not automatically give them to us - large-scale (quite, however, feasible for the Russian Federation) efforts are needed to recreate an IRBM with a range of up to 5,000 km.
Nevertheless, the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the treaty would automatically improve the European and world situation. When I say “healed”, I mean that sometimes the relaxation of tension is achieved not by softness, not by concessions, but by a good slap in the face - it is only important to give it decisively.
WHO SHOOTS WHOM
We have to hear assertions that denunciation of treaties does not strengthen, they say, but weakens the security of states. This thesis is dubious in itself. The simplest example of the opposite: the denunciation of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty by Russia in the fall of 1918 strengthened our security. With reference to America's abandonment of the 1972 ABM Treaty, this thesis is generally incorrect. The fact that the United States miscalculated in abandoning the ABM-72, since, they say, instead of 100 allowed for ABM-72 anti-missiles, they plan to deploy only 44 missiles by 2020, we can only say, forgetting that 100 missiles is the upper contractual ceiling, that ABM-72 limited the ABM infrastructure and did not allow the deployment of NMD, and after withdrawing from ABM-72 America can deploy any and all missile defense systems in any ABM architecture, and America will do this at the right time for it. At the same time, all assurances that it is possible to distinguish between strategic and non-strategic US missile defense should be attributed to the dangerous era of illusions and euphoria of the 90s. The same "Standards-3M" - a strategic tool in the future!
The attempts to oppose each other for the withdrawal from the RIAC of Alexander Shirokorad ("NVO" No. 24, 07/12/13), Yuri Baluevsky, Midyhat Vildanov ("NVO" No. 25, 07/19/13) also look strange. Their reasons are not only not on different planes, but are closely related, since they complement each other. Moreover, the arguments against the INF Treaty are far from being exhausted by them.
There is no logic in the fears that if under Soviet conditions the Pershing-2 reached the Moscow region, then with the hypothetical deployment of the US RSD on the territory of the NATO “neophytes” Russia will “shoot through” to the Urals and beyond.
Firstly, it is important for us that in the presence of continental Pioneer-class RSDs, we will shoot all of Europe from the Urals. And not only Europe.
Secondly, if Russia, instead of thoughtless reductions in strategic nuclear forces, will reasonably mass them and provide them with active defense complexes, then the hypothetical US RSD will shoot through our territory, as before, only on headquarters maps during exercises.
Thirdly, officials in Warsaw, Vilnius, Riga, Tallinn, Bucharest and Sofia are not so confident about making their countries hostages of US nuclear policy for handouts from the United States. Moreover, the old European members of NATO will have something to think about. Now Russia does not have effective regional nuclear weapons systems capable of guaranteed hitting targets from its territory at a distance of up to 5000 km with a strike time of tens of minutes. This can only be done by RSD. And NATO countries find themselves in sufficient security. The restoration of our IRBMs will not deprive them of such security - if: a) NATO countries do not support the aggressive tendencies of the United States; b) force the United States to remove from Europe their nuclear weapons, which provoke Russia; c) refuse to place new US RSDs in Europe.
If Europe does not directly or indirectly (through US nuclear missile launchers) threaten Russia, then why, one wonders, will Russia threaten Europe?
One may ask: why do we need to restore the RSD then? Then, our RSD in the Urals region will be an insurance continental guarantee of Russia's regional security, and nothing more.
AMERICA, THIRD COUNTRIES AND TALEIRAN
In the same way, the fears are far-fetched that the appearance of the RSD in our country will allegedly provoke China. Everything is just the opposite - if we had 300 (better than 700) RSDs in the Urals and Baikal regions, which I would conventionally call "Poplar", then the respect of China, Japan and others for Russia would only increase. Already somewhere, but in the East filled with behavioral politeness, only strength is really appreciated.
What can we say about the validity of worries about possible threats to Russia from IRMs of third countries. There is nothing to worry about at all. Firstly, whether Russia will keep the INF Treaty regime or not, those countries that consider it necessary for themselves will develop their own IRBMs. Secondly, it is incorrect to lump together RSDs with a range of about 1000 km - they are within the power of many countries, and RSDs with a range of about 5000 km - are fundamentally more difficult to create than RSDs with a range of 1000 km. And, thirdly, all third countries are creating RSM, absolutely not having in mind the factor of threats to the Russian Federation as significant.
It is hardly possible to agree with such a grandmaster's strategic analysis, when referring to the possible US policy towards the nuclear DPRK or subnuclear Iran justifies the forecast of the US policy towards nuclear Russia. These are very different matters. A truly qualified analysis unambiguously shows that the strategic goal of the United States is to ensure such a new systemic nuclear monopoly, when it becomes possible for an unpunished first disarming US strike against the means of a retaliatory strike by the Russian Federation while neutralizing an extremely weakened retaliatory strike by the Russian Federation at the expense of a multi-level massive US NMD. In the light of this unchanging paradigm of US policy towards Russia, it is necessary to consider all US military activities, including innovations in the field of strategic non-nuclear weapons, plans for a rapid global strike (BSU).
I will refer to the public statement made at the Cathedral hearings in the Holy Danilov Monastery on November 12, 1996, by Lieutenant General Nikolai Leonov, professor of MGIMO, until 1991 - the head of the analytical department of the KGB of the USSR: to my own experience, to say unequivocally that in the ruling circles of the United States, the primary goal has always been the destruction of Russia, regardless of its system, whether it is monarchical, democratic or socialist. They do not need any great power in this geopolitical space. And this is hammered into the public and political consciousness of the entire state."
And not only in relation to Russia, America is pursuing a policy of provocation. Such an intelligent and subtle analyst like Talleyrand, a diplomat demanded by the Directory, Napoleon and Louis XVIII, wrote: “Europe should look at America with open eyes and not give any pretext for repression. America will become a tremendous force, and the moment will come when it will want to have its say on our deeds and lay hands on them. The day America comes to Europe, peace and security will be expelled from it for a long time."
So, it is not Russia that sees America as an enemy, but America in Russia. It is not Russia that destabilizes Europe and the world, but America - for more than one century. And until America really changes its foreign and military policy, only extremely irresponsible people can regard Russia's nuclear containment of America's aggressiveness as senseless.
As for the essence of NATO's policy, including in the light of the INF Treaty, everything has been clear here for a long time. Now, when assessing NATO's policy, it is sometimes said that the masks have been dropped. It is true, however, let me say that the North Atlantic bloc has never seriously put on a mask of peacefulness - so, hastily thrown a scanty sheep's skin over the wolf's policy, nothing more. Already in 1994, Richard Haass, a former employee of the US National Security Council, wrote in Foreign Policy magazine: "If problems with Russia arise again, it is better that they appear on the borders of Russia than on the borders of Western Europe."
Frankly and to the point, without any masks. And after all, the possible "problems with Russia" meant one thing - Russia's refusal from the policy of surrendering its national interests.
The question of Russia's soonest withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the re-establishment of the Pioneer-type IRBM is not a question of "self-affirmation", everything is much more serious. If at the intercontinental level we have, at the very least, military-technical means of ensuring military-political stability, then at the continental level we do not have them now. But they can be. The Pioneers can and should be replaced by Topolki. Projects regarding the development of a certain high-precision warhead for equipping ICBMs or CDs are not even worth objection. Even for the United States, such ideas are nothing more than a cunning cheating move, and for Russia, with its limited number of ICBMs, it is just a stupid chimera.
NEW - WELL FORGOTTEN OLD
Not for the sake of self-promotion, but to illustrate that clarity did not arise yesterday, let me remind you that 14 years ago, NVO published my article with the title “Pioneers” must be revived”(No. 31, 1999, p. 4), which said: “The Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Elimination … The INF Treaty eliminated a whole class of our missile systems with ranges of up to 5000 km. Europe was also freed from the Pershing. The question seemed to be closed forever. However, the oblivion of the 1975 Helsinki agreements, NATO policy and the "Yugoslav syndrome" put on the agenda the idea of returning to our defense arsenal of continental medium-range nuclear missiles. After all, the logic of NATO's actions leads in the long term to the fact that Western nuclear warheads may end up in the same place where Soviet military contingents were once stationed. Who, if not Russia, will these charges be aimed at?"
At the same time, the following was said: “The growing regional instability, the uncertainty of the prospects here, as well as the US and NATO policy towards Russia create objective prerequisites for analyzing the promising role and significance of our continental nuclear forces in the 21st century. TNW is not a "battlefield weapon". Like strategic nuclear weapons, it cannot be considered a means of conducting real combat operations. A promising TNW should become a systemic analogue of strategic nuclear weapons with the only difference that if strategic nuclear weapons are designed to ensure military-political stability at the intercontinental level, then TNW should have the same functional significance at a lower continental level. If earlier TNW was often considered as a possible "weapon of the battlefield", then nuclear weapons of the continental class should have the functions of exclusively regional deterrence of hypothetical force pressure and encroachments on our national interests. It is this approach to TNW that is justified for Russia. Moreover, the military-political functions of such tactical nuclear weapons are best embodied in medium-range (from 1000 to 5000 km) missile systems."
From what was said already in 1999, a logical conclusion was drawn: “It is obvious that the formulated requirements are best met by missile systems with a firing range of up to 5000 km, that is, medium-range ballistic missiles of the Pioneer type. The “Pioneer” type formula is used here only for brevity. In fact, we can talk about other options for launch vehicles. It is important to restore in the structure of Russian nuclear weapons not so much specific complexes as a specific firing range."
Even earlier, retired Major General Vladimir Belous in the article "Tactical nuclear weapons in new geopolitical conditions" published in the journal "Nuclear Control" (No. 14, 1996), expressed the correct idea: much more military and political significance than for the United States. " He also owns a good formulation: "American TNW is a war for export."
In a systemic respect, everything is correct here: for the United States, TNW is a type of nuclear weapons, from the point of view of their legitimate interests, redundant. That is, an aggressive, pushing America to export a war waged - which is traditional for the United States - far from their national territory.
But if this is so, then why is the problem of the INF Treaty in the focus of bilateral relations between the United States and the Russian Federation? For the United States, their "non-strategic" nuclear weapons are a war for export, but where are they going to export? Presumably, first of all to Europe.
And if so, then the problem of the INF should be primarily concerned with Europe, or rather, the NATO countries (although today NATO is almost all of Europe). In fact, the United States does not even have an advisory, let alone a decisive, vote in the INF problem. For the United States, any system of continental and subcontinental range is a war for export, it is an instrument of provoking some countries against other countries. Is it really unclear to someone even today?
ABOUT THE COMPARISON OF ARSHINS AND PUDS
Most experts rightly believe that the presence of effective IRBMs in the Russian defense arsenal would neutralize the superiority of certain countries in conventional weapons, in the number of troops, etc. But the problem is objectively broader! Only new massed IRBMs with a range of ~ 5,000 … 6,000 km and with a variant nuclear combat equipment, which allows us to deliver first a warning demonstration strike, and then strike the aggressor, will provide us with regional stability across the entire spectrum of possible threats. And not a possible war, but the containment of aggression or its almost instantaneous "curtailment" - this is a truly worthy task for the "Topolkov" necessary for Russia.
Sometimes they write that tactical (although it is not “tactical” for Russia, but strategic, but at the regional level) nuclear weapons turn out to be a system-forming factor in geopolitical confrontation. However, this is not entirely true. Unlike the United States and a number of other powers, Russia is involved in this confrontation, while the United States and a number of other powers are producing it, which is far from the same …
As for the expediency of negotiations on "non-strategic" nuclear weapons, they do not make much sense already because the same Russia and the United States will lead them - if you look objectively - to talk about fundamentally different concepts for them.
For the United States, everything is determined by the formula "war for export". For the Russian Federation - the fundamental tasks of ensuring the security of the national territory. You can't, excuse me, compare arshins with poods, meters with kilograms!
Therefore, frankly speaking, it is advisable for Russia to negotiate in the only format acceptable to us - with the aim of recognizing by the United States of America and the NATO bloc the special significance for the Russian Federation of regional systems and Russia's special rights to the presence of massive effective IRBM in its arsenal. At the same time, such negotiations can be conducted with our great eastern neighbor, China, but in any case, the presence of hundreds of new Topolek RSDs in the Russian Federation will not complicate our mutual relations, but will certainly improve them.
How many pink tears of affection were shed more than two decades ago - and not by the USSR and not by smart people in Russia - over the coming of the era of "cooperation for peace" instead of the era of confrontation! In fact, the tears turned out to be crocodile. And isn't it time to face this truth - both at the global and regional levels of ensuring Russia's security?
