How Boris Yeltsin's security service was born and what did it do
GUO - SBP - FSO: 1991-1999
After Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin came to power, dramatic changes took place in the Kremlin guard. The new government, guided by the demands of the political situation, destroyed the old Soviet special services and built its own, now Russian.
To understand how these processes took place and how the work of the Russian presidential guard was organized, two direct participants in the events agreed to help us. These are the former head of the Presidential Security Service (SBP) of the Russian Federation, Alexander Vasilyevich Korzhakov, and the former first deputy head of the Main Security Directorate, Boris Konstantinovich Ratnikov.
From private to lieutenant general
The history of Boris Yeltsin's relationship with bodyguards dates back to 1985. According to the existing order, he was given personal protection after moving from Sverdlovsk to Moscow and his election as secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. And here are a few facts that are quite remarkable from the point of view of continuity in the Soviet state protection. In 1976, as the first secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional committee of the CPSU, Yeltsin replaced his future colleague in the Politburo of the Central Committee, Yakov Petrovich Ryabov, who in April 1984 was taken under the protection of the 9th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR. Vyacheslav Georgievich Naumov became the head of Yakov Petrovich's security, before that in 1980 he took over the leadership of the 3rd operational group of the 18th department of the 1st department from the legendary Mikhail Petrovich Soldatov, who was mentioned more than once in our series of publications.
The initiative to raise Boris Yeltsin in the power hierarchy belonged to Yegor Ligachev. In December 1985, Yeltsin was recommended by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee for the post of first secretary of the Moscow City Committee (MGK) of the CPSU. On December 24, 1985, replacing 70-year-old Viktor Grishin in this position, he began active work in this post. The most significant stages of his work include significant personnel cleaning. Interestingly, it was Boris Yeltsin who came up with the idea to celebrate the city day in the capital.
The head of Yeltsin's security was the commandant of his state dacha Yuri Kozhukhov, who himself chose his deputies - attached - Viktor Suzdalev and Alexander Korzhakov. It is curious that Yuri Kozhukhov was in no hurry, as they say, to "lead his deputies to the post." That is, they worked, but were not officially included in the security group. The head of security in front of the head of the department motivated this situation by the fact that "… Boris Nikolayevich and I should take a closer look at these people …".
Alexander Korzhakov. Photo: Alexey Svertkov / "Russian Planet"
Subsequently, Alexander Vasilyevich will be called "the second man in Russia", and at that time he was a 35-year-old major. After working in the field security of Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, Alexander Korzhakov performed the functions of the senior operational duty officer of the 18th department. It must be said that Alexander Vasilyevich is the only officer in the history of the Nine who has traveled the entire professional path in 30 years - from an ordinary Kremlin regiment to a lieutenant general.
Alexander Vasilyevich Korzhakov began his service in the 9th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR on November 9, 1968 in the Kremlin regiment. Already at this time he was a member of the volleyball team. “For sport,” as they said in the “nine,” Vladimir Stepanovich Rarebeard was in charge at that time. At the end of his military service during the Brezhnev Politburo, Alexander Korzhakov was again taken into management. But now he has become an ensign in the 2nd section of the 5th department - a unit that provides covert protection of the routes of protected persons, located next to the regiment right there, in the Kremlin Arsenal.
The tasks of the officers and employees of this unit were to ensure the safe passage of protected persons in any conditions. The management of the department attracted officers and employees of the department to work in the places of stay and rest of the protected persons, during their business trips around the country and abroad. Therefore, the officers of the 2nd department of the 5th department were the first candidates for the personnel reserve of the 1st department, which directly ensures the safety of the protected persons. It is noteworthy that the head of the 5th department, in which Alexander Vasilyevich began his professional career, was the same Mikhail Nikolaevich Yagodkin, who at the Borovitsky gate of the Kremlin in January 1969 most actively participated in neutralizing the mentally ill rifleman Ilyin.
“We worked like 'stompers' under Stalin,” recalls Alexander Korzhakov. - Only they were given felt boots and warm clothes, and we had to buy everything ourselves. Difficulties arose with this, because, for example, not all trousers can be put on over the pants. I had size 48 felt boots so I could put on a few pairs of warm socks in harsh winters.”
The price of loyalty
In February 1988, Boris Yeltsin was dismissed from the post of secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, but Alexander Korzhakov did not end his relationship with the man for whose safety he was responsible. Yeltsin valued this dearly and treated Alexander Vasilyevich as a friend.
The dismissal of Yeltsin from a high position, in which he worked for exactly two years (from February 1986 to February 1988), was caused by thoughts, assessments and judgments that were literally revolutionary for that time. The famous expression "Boris, you are wrong", belonging to Yegor Ligachev and succinctly describing the situation with his own Ural protégé, sounded on October 21, 1987. Four months later, Yeltsin was employed as the first deputy chairman of the State Construction Committee - after a responsible party position, this appointment was extremely humiliating. Naturally, state protection and privileged security were instantly removed. And Yeltsin's security officers, Yuri Sergeevich Plekhanov, the head of the "nine", through the head of the 1st department, Viktor Vasilyevich Aleinikov, were "strongly recommended" to stop any contacts with the disgraced and, as it seemed, plunged into oblivion, the former guarded person. This was a very serious warning, and a verbal order in the Chekist language practically meant a categorical ban. The department colleagues also spoke to Alexander Korzhakov about the seriousness of the situation.
Meeting of voters with a candidate for the Moscow City Council in the 161st electoral district, First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin (center) 1987. Photo: Alexander Polyakov / RIA Novosti
But the KGB officers were never alien to purely human relations, and on February 1, 1989, Alexander Vasilyevich, immediately after passing the daily watch in the department, simply and without any second thoughts himself came to congratulate Boris Nikolayevich on his birthday. With the same attitude, his comrade in the disbanded security group, Viktor Suzdalev, joined Korzhakov. But the former head of Boris Yeltsin's security, Kozhukhov, did not support the initiative of his colleagues. The birthday ended at 5 o'clock in the morning …
This blatant fact of disobedience, naturally, did not escape the attention of the operatives in charge of the disgraced Yeltsin, who immediately reported the incident to the management of the department.
“The bosses especially did not like the toasts I made for Boris Nikolayevich,” Alexander Korzhakov writes in his book “Boris Yeltsin: From Dawn to Dusk”. "It turns out that the disgraced leaders of the Communist Party should have no prospects for the future."
In February 1989, Yuri Plekhanov fired an experienced and honored officer. By that time, Alexander Korzhakov had worked with guarded persons for more than 18 years at almost all posts of the department, and not only on business trips around the country and abroad, but also in Afghanistan, where, as part of a special group of the 1st department, the "nine" ensured the safety of the leader the country of Babrak Karmal. Korzhakov was dismissed on a very unusual basis. At a "carpet" conversation in the personnel department, his boss, a senior officer, a decent man, hiding his eyes, voiced the "sentence" of the leadership to Major Korzhakov: "to be fired due to too much seniority" …
By the way, in Afghanistan, the combat paths of Major Alexander Vasilyevich Korzhakov and Boris Konstantinovich Ratnikov crossed. This is a very remarkable fact in the history of the formation of the future security system for the President of Russia.
This is the professional payment for faithful service: first, the management of its order attaches the employee to the statesman, and then it blames its attached officer for his human loyalty to the protected person. This can be traced throughout the long history of state protection. Abram Belenky, Nikolai Vlasik, and others also found themselves in the same situation. This is a kind of sword of Damocles, hanging over the head of the attached. Such an image is understandable only to those who have gone through their professional path in this position or were next to those who single-handedly bore this burden of responsibility, sharing it with their leader.
Running a little ahead, it is worth noting that under the new government the price of loyalty to those who fell into disgrace will remain the same. In 1997, Yeltsin's chef Dmitry Samarin and a dozen more loyal security officers will be fired for participating in the celebration of Korzhakov's victory in the elections to the State Duma in Tula. How can you not remember the common phrase: "They are not the first and they are not the last."
The future Russian president and his most devoted bodyguard parted for a short time. In 1989, a sensational and almost forgotten mysterious story took place with the fall of Boris Yeltsin into the Moscow River near Nikolina Gora. Boris Nikolayevich himself said that unknown persons attacked him and threw him off the bridge. Korzhakov conducted a thorough investigation of this case and realized that Yeltsin's version was implausible, he was clearly hiding something. What exactly, according to Alexander Korzhakov, remained unknown. At the same time, it was he who was the first to receive a call from Yeltsin, who got into an ambiguous situation.
After that, Boris Nikolayevich invited Alexander Vasilyevich to work as his attachment again, and Korzhakov accepted this invitation. The agreement between them can be considered rather informal, because there was no personal protection in the USSR, except for the 9th Directorate of the KGB, and could not have been. And before the adoption of the Law "On Private Security Activity" there were still three whole years.
Two comrades served
June 12, 1990 The First Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR adopts a declaration on the independence of the republic … as part of the USSR. The political career of Boris Yeltsin, with whom Alexander Korzhakov was constantly and everywhere, was gaining strength. The figure of Yeltsin on the socio-political Olympus of the Soviet state sliding into the abyss became more and more significant. By the summer of 1991, it became clear that the collapse of the USSR, and therefore of its state security agencies, including those responsible for protecting the country's political leadership, was inevitable.
Time required swift and decisive action. The pressing problem, which Alexander Korzhakov had to immediately solve, was the personnel problem: who would stand behind the new leader of the country with him? And such people were found.
Together with Korzhakov, his comrade Boris Konstantinovich Ratnikov was engaged in the creation of the security service. As already mentioned, they met back in Afghanistan, where Korzhakov guarded Babrak Karmal on a six-month business trip from the nine, and Soviet KGB officer Boris Ratnikov was an “adviser” to the KHAD task force (Afghan state security service) for three years. Boris Konstantinovich combined the professional duties of a wide-profile specialist - from the commander of a combat group and an agent, to an operational worker and an analyst.
In April 1991, Colonel of the KGB for Moscow and the Moscow region, Boris Ratnikov, was invited to the security department of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, which was created to guard Boris Yeltsin. Having received the invitation, Boris Konstantinovich wrote a letter of resignation from the KGB of the USSR.
These people became the founders of a new structure that had no historical counterparts. On July 19, 1991, Alexander Vasilyevich, with knowledge of the matter and understanding of professional prospects, transformed the department into the Security Service of the President of the RSFSR (SBP RSFSR). By the decree of the President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev, this service briefly entered the Security Directorate under the Administration of the President of the USSR. There is no need to think that behind such a name a whole host of bodyguards, drivers, security guards and other specialized specialists is immediately built up - there were only 12 of them.
In August 1991, immediately after Gorbachev's return from Foros, Boris Ratnikov was invited to the Kremlin to discuss the organization of a new structure of state security instead of the 9th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR. Alexander Korzhakov himself was on vacation with Yeltsin in Jurmala, so his deputy Ratnikov went to a meeting with the President of the USSR. The essence of the conversation boiled down to the fact that it was necessary to create a new structure for the two main characters of the country.
This is how the “transitional” Security Directorate arose under the administration of the President of the USSR, which replaced the legendary “nine” on the historical stage. You need to understand what the confrontation was between two specialized, but politically competing structures: the SBP of the President of the USSR, which retained both the staff and management mechanisms of the huge "nine", and the SBP of the RSFSR, consisting of 12 people.
President of the RSFSR Boris Yeltsin (left) speaking at the building of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR. Right - Alexander Korzhakov. 1991 year. Photo: Valentina Kuzmina and Alexandra Chumicheva / TASS photo chronicle
Boris Yeltsin's office was located in the White House. It was there that Alexander Korzhakov and Boris Ratnikov, having drawn attention to Yeltsin's uncharacteristic attacks of weakness that periodically occur at the time when he was in the office, and after conducting an operational and technical inspection on their own, in a niche behind one of the cabinets they found the famous "antenna" the size of an average modern TV. It was an attacking tool - almost a psychotronic weapon. You need to understand that the protection of that very White House - the House of Soviets was carried out by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but as a particularly important object it was supervised by the KGB of the USSR. That is, it was not difficult for the (so far) KGB of the USSR to install not only operational listening equipment, but also much more serious devices.
Return of the GUO
On June 12, 1991, Boris Yeltsin was elected President of Russia by popular vote. However, this did not immediately entail the creation of a separate structure for its security. This happened later, on December 14, 1991, when the Main Directorate of Protection (GUO) of the RSFSR was created on the basis of the practically unchanged structure of the Nine. It was headed by Vladimir Stepanovich Rarebeard - an old friend of Alexander Vasilyevich both in the "nine", and, what is important, in Afghanistan, where in the conditions of war human qualities were tested not by word, but by deed. Prior to the formation of the GUO, Vladimir Redkoborody headed the Security Directorate under the Presidential Administration of the USSR - this is how the transformed "nine" was called from August 31, 1991.
Exactly one year later, on June 12, 1992, another colleague and friend of Alexander Vasilyevich, Mikhail Ivanovich Barsukov, came to replace Vladimir Stepanovich Rare-beard.
In the new state structure, Alexander Korzhakov became the first deputy head of the GUO - General Mikhail Barsukov. At the same time, Alexander Vasilyevich headed the Presidential Security Service (SBP), which he himself created, one of the most important independent units of the GUO.
In fact, the GUO was the same "nine", with the only difference that the security department of the first person of the state, in the 9th Directorate of the USSR KGB, which was part of the 1st department, here rose to the level of an independent unit. The GUO in the same way continued to ensure the safety of persons "at the direction of the country's leadership" with the help of the renamed 18th branch of the 1st department of the "nine".
It should be noted that the GUO for Alexander Vasilyevich is far from just an abbreviation: he attaches great importance to the traditions of the security business and highly values the security service of Joseph Stalin, which was called the same.
“When I came to the guard, our mentors were experienced officers who had worked in Stalin’s guard,” recalls Alexander Korzhakov. - For example, Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Grigorievich Kuznetsov. We learned from the instructions for security officers developed in the Ninth Directorate. These instructions were written after Stalin's death, based on the experience of his GUO. It was clearly stated there that the main thing for the security officer is the post. Analytics, shooting, hand-to-hand combat - that's all later. And now they show on TV: the president of a country is walking, and around him there are such strong guys in dark glasses. I always told my guys about these glasses: you don't wear them, you yourself won't see anything …
But it's not just about transferring experience. The Stalinist GUO was a special supranational structure, independent of any ministries, departments or services. There was a saying in Stalin's guard: "The Kremlin ensign is equal to the Siberian general." The status of an employee of the GDO had enormous weight, and aroused fear in many. In matters of protecting the government, the GUO was above any security officers.
After Stalin's death, by order of Khrushchev, the Security Directorate was transferred to the KGB - to the recently created Ninth Directorate. This was, in my opinion, a big mistake. The committee was headed by Vladimir Semichastny, who had nothing to do with intelligence, counterintelligence, or security: Khrushchev simply appointed a person convenient for him to this most important position.
In addition, protecting the life of the main person in the country is the highest state task. And after the transfer to the KGB, the chief of the secretary general's security had at least two dozen chiefs over him. They could give him any order - for example, to leave the guarded person in danger. This, by the way, is what happened in 1991 with Gorbachev, when he was in Foros. The head of his bodyguard, Vladimir Medvedev, was visited by the head of the Nine Yuri Plekhanov and his deputy Vyacheslav Generalov, ordered to remove the guards, and Medvedev himself was sent to Moscow. To avoid this risk, when Yeltsin came to power, we decided to return to the Stalinist scheme."
Antipode of the KGB
What was the Stalinist scheme for organizing the security service of the head of state mentioned by Korzhakov? In fact, the SBP was the president's universal operational tool. Its opposition to the KGB consisted in the direct subordination of the service to the president himself, with all the powers arising from this provision. If we draw historical parallels, then the SBP was conceived as an analogue of the same All-Russian Cheka, only subordinate to the head of state with rights similar to a ministry separate from the Council of Ministers. So, the SBP had the right to recruit personnel without the consent of anyone else. The head of the SBP could be appointed and removed only by the President of Russia. In accordance with this status, specific tasks were assigned to the UBP. And the protection of the President of Russia was only one of them. When the Statute on the UBP was presented in the presidential administration, the confusion of the person in charge of legal issues defied description.
On September 3, 1991, Alexander Korzhakov headed this new structure, created for the current, requiring an immediate solution of state tasks.
“We selected the best specialists from all over the country for the SBP,” says Alexander Vasilyevich. - The main and only selection criterion was professionalism. Super-professionals worked with me. I called this service "the Russian special services team" and am proud that I had such subordinates."
“When I was given the job with cadres, I brought about a dozen experienced" Afghans "officers to the Kremlin, adds Boris Ratnikov. - They were golden guys. Competent, with clean hands, no bribes could bribe them. They went not so much to serve Yeltsin as to work for Korzhakov, who enjoyed unconditional authority among the "Afghans". It was very important. The president at that time did not trust either the KGB (believing that the committee members continue to work for the communists) or the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Therefore, the new service was created not as an ordinary security structure, but as an antipode to the KGB. It was, in fact, a special service, which, in addition to protecting the head of state, was also responsible for resolving issues of state security. Its tasks included collecting and evaluating information about processes in politics, economics, finance, defense, industry and public life."
In the structure of the SBP, according to the tasks reflected in its fundamental position, the corresponding lettered (designated by letters) departments were also allocated. Thus, an anti-corruption department was created in the Kremlin administration and the government, respectively. One of the subdivisions of this service has received the informal name "Intellectual Support Department". In fact, it was the anti-crisis service of the UBP. Under the leadership of Boris Ratnikov, she was engaged in monitoring the situation in the country and abroad, collecting signs and detailed analysis of possible threats to the security of the state and its top officials.
A separate direction of the department's work was associated with the study and counteraction by its own forces of the so-called "psi-technologies". In this regard, the employees of the department have been sharply criticized more than once. For example, the famous scientist Eduard Kruglyakov called Boris Konstantinovich Ratnikov and his colleague Georgy Georgievich Rogozin “charlatans”. We asked Boris Konstantinovich how he could comment on this.
“Such things could have been said due to the lack of reliable information about our work,” says Boris Ratnikov. - None of us in the Kremlin did any kind of esotericism or mysticism. Yes, we used psi-technologies that were developed by the KGB as a tool for monitoring potential and real threats against Russia and high-ranking officials. All information received in this way was rechecked through intelligence and counterintelligence agencies and only after confirmation was reported to the leadership."
Alexander Korzhakov also highly appreciates the work of this department: “After they predicted the events of October 1993 on the basis of their monitoring for six months, I had not the slightest reason not to trust them. The information provided by this service has always been helpful and accurate.”
Information leak
In those turbulent times of privatization and "developing democracy" in every sense, only the blind could not see that the conflict between the president and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet had been brewing for a long time. Well, the UBP not only knew about this, but also in accordance with their "statutory tasks" tried to help the parties find a reasonable agreement in the interests of the country.
Boris Ratnikov. Photo from personal archive
“When Ruslan Khasbulatov was the chairman of the Supreme Soviet,” says Boris Konstantinovich, “I got to know him better, as on duty I was engaged in the operational development of the shadow economy. He asked me to help him understand this issue. He was a competent specialist, so it was easy for me with him, and we established a trusting relationship.
Once in the winter or spring of 1993, I asked: "Ruslan Imranovich, why do we find a common language, but you and the president cannot find it?" He replied: "You see, I can’t drink so much. I’m not used to cognac at all. I can drink a little wine, but in such doses I can’t stand it, I’ll just feel bad."
When a close circle was gathering, Boris Nikolaevich really could drink a lot of cognac and not get drunk, while others "broke", and he was at his best. Then I advised Khasbulatov: "Before the meeting, put a bottle of good wine in your briefcase. And when they get the cognac, apologize, say that you are an oriental person and drink strong alcohol is not in your tradition, offer them wine too. In general, You don’t need to tell Yeltsin. Let me arrange a meeting with him, you explain what you want, and the conflict will be resolved."
Then I talked to Alexander Korzhakov, and he came to an agreement with Boris Nikolayevich. The meeting took place, but everything went wrong. Korzhakov told me that Khasbulatov did get the wine, and Yeltsin, as usual, got brandy. Well, as I understand it, after it was already pretty drunk, Yeltsin did not like that Khasbulatov objected to him, and he either pushed him or hit him. What kind of person from the Caucasus will tolerate such a thing? Naturally, Khasbulatov then wrote me a note: they say, I believed you, and that's how it all ended. I regret that I agreed, and I don’t want to enter into any negotiations”.
Boris Ratnikov handed this note to Alexander Korzhakov. Korzhakov himself also mentioned in his book that the president's elbow "made a kind of awkward movement." However, it would be more than an exaggeration to say that this ugly episode caused the October 1993 tragedy. According to Boris Ratnikov, it has become rather a point of no return. Blood could have been avoided after that failed meeting.
“Part of Yeltsin's entourage deliberately pushed the situation to the limit in order to show everyone who is the boss in the country,” believes Boris Konstantinovich. - The rebellious deputies were launched into the White House, then surrounded, and that's how it began. And it could have been done in a clever way - change the guard at night to your own and calmly seal all the offices. The deputies would come to work, but they would simply not be allowed in, and there would be no need to shoot anyone. We offered this option. But the local democrats needed an action of intimidation and blood …”.
According to Korzhakov, the reason that the shooting could not be prevented was different: “We did not just offer this option, but twice tried to seal parliamentary offices, but both times we were prevented by unforeseen information leaks. Other methods were also used to extinguish the ardor of the "rebellious" Supreme Soviet. Yeltsin and his entourage managed to persuade the majority of the deputies not to oppose the president. By the beginning of the armed conflict, no more than 150-200 out of a thousand deputies remained in the White House. But the situation nevertheless got out of control, shooting began, rebels armed to the teeth attacked Ostankino, and bloodshed could no longer be avoided."
Security weekdays
When the first war in Chechnya began, Dudayev had a whole list of people from the Russian leadership who needed to be physically eliminated. But the combat strengthening of the security made it possible to prevent all possible attempts on the life of the first persons of Russia. When asked whether the security officers had to really save the president's life, Alexander Korzhakov replies: “Only from himself. He was driving very carelessly. Once I locked myself in the bathhouse - they barely pulled me out …”.
The most successful during his service with Yeltsin, Korzhakov considers the special operation carried out by the SBP in May 1996 during the signing of a decree to end the war in Chechnya and the withdrawal of troops from the republic.
“After negotiations, we took Yandarbiev's delegation to the state dacha for rest, and early in the morning the president flew to Chechnya,” says Alexander Vasilyevich. “They were waiting for us there: a special forces group had been ready to receive Yeltsin for three weeks.
It was an episode of a propaganda campaign when Yeltsin signed a decree on the cessation of hostilities on a tank. The Chechen delegation found itself as if "held hostage". The operation with a visit to Chechnya was a success because this time we did not allow information leaks. No one from the presidential administration knew that he was flying to Chechnya."
In his book, Alexander Korzhakov, not without pride, mentions that Yeltsin's guards did not engage in political censorship and were generally democratic. So much so that during mass events, anyone could approach the president and ask a question. We decided to talk about this in more detail.
“Anyone, but not any,” says Alexander Vasilyevich. - Before letting me near the guarded person, I will look right through this person. I stood on the "track" for eight years. And I can say that it is not difficult for an experienced bodyguard officer to identify an intruder. Something in a person's behavior will certainly give away his intentions, the main thing is to look carefully."
Since Soviet times, there has also been a practice of sophisticated security checks. The inspectors can plant a dummy bomb or some other suspicious object on the "track", and if the guards did not find it, then this was regarded as a negative result. With this kind of control, the security officers developed extraordinary powers of observation.
During the Yeltsin era, Russian officials often traveled to the United States. In this regard, the SBP employees had to closely interact with their American colleagues from the Secret Service. There were no problems in this joint work.
“We had normal, partnership relations, as our goals coincided,” says Boris Ratnikov. - As a sign of a temporary partnership, we gave them vodka, and they gave us whiskey, but most importantly, we had clear agreements on how to act during international events. Problems were not needed by anyone, and it brought us closer."
At the same time, the approach to work for our and American security services does not coincide in everything.
“Unlike us, they tried to take by numbers,” notes Alexander Korzhakov. - For example, in 1985, at a meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in Switzerland, there were 18 people, and about 300 Americans. At night we guarded our territory ourselves, and they had a whole bunch of agents, they cordoned off the whole hotel. Even now, in the United States, the protection of top officials is many times more numerous than ours.
But overall, Secret Service left a very good impression. We have been friends with them since the days of Nixon and were interested in their work. When in 1981 there was an attempt on Reagan's life, none of his bodyguards were afraid - they threw themselves under the bullets! Their motivation was reinforced financially: the American special services have a very good "social system", employees do not have to worry about their future. And here it happens that you work for 40 years and then leave without a pension …”.
Interestingly, the Secret Service was created as a division of the US Treasury Department and until 2003 was subordinate only to it. And then she was transferred to the NSA (National Security Agency), which is known for its wiretapping of foreign politicians and businessmen. And this, from the point of view of Korzhakov, could put an end to the political independence of the American security service.
After negotiations between the heads and governments of the G8, Boris Yeltsin, leaving the hotel, spent five minutes talking with the residents of Denver (pictured). Photo: Alexandra Sentsova and Alexandra Chumichev / TASS
"Family" squabbles
However, the protection of top officials of the state can hardly be outside of politics. And under Yeltsin, the SBP found itself in the very center of political contradictions. The process of plundering the country was already in full swing, and Yeltsin understood that it was necessary at least not to let everything be plundered completely.
“In this situation,” says Boris Ratnikov, “the president entrusted us with the fight against corruption. The KGB was dispersed, and no anti-corruption bodies, except our service, remained in Russia. We were instructed to take control of the sale of weapons, for this, by order of Yeltsin, department "B" was created. After the 1996 presidential elections, we had to take control of Roskomdragmet, where all kinds of violations also took place."
Thus, up to a certain point, Yeltsin planned to fight the plunder of the country and in this fight he relied on his security service.
“If Nikolai Vlasik had remained in Stalin's guard, Stalin would have been alive,” reflects Alexander Korzhakov. - But Vlasik was removed, and his security service was disbanded. Therefore, Stalin was killed. And if Korzhakov had remained under Yeltsin in 1996, there would have been no Berezovsky and Chubais. But the president changed his policy and sided with our enemies."
There is something that needs to be clarified here. Korzhakov was dismissed from the post of head of the SBP only in the summer of 1996 after a memorable scandal with a box from under the Xerox. This means that Berezovsky and other oligarchs began to appear in the Kremlin even under Korzhakov. Where did he and his subordinates look before?
“If decision-making depended only on us,” replies Boris Ratnikov, “we could prevent this. But the question of who to let into the Kremlin and who not was dealt with not by the security service, but by the presidential office. Yeltsin decided everything in his own way and did not tolerate our objections, listening to the opinions of his drinking companions. Attempts by Korzhakov to “filter out” such persons aroused a storm of indignation in the president.
We resisted as best we could - somewhere through agents, somewhere through forceful actions, for example, we put Gusinsky's guys in the snow with their faces. Korzhakov managed to remove from power many outright criminals who held the posts of governors, mayors, federal officials. But in most cases, such initiatives met with open opposition from the leadership."
In his book, Alexander Vasilyevich writes that he has repeatedly provided the president and the prime minister with lists of corrupt officials, but almost all those involved in these lists safely remained in their posts. But those who showed excessive zeal in the fight against abuses in power (like, for example, Vladimir Polevanov, who replaced Chubais as chairman of the State Property Committee), on the contrary, very quickly lost their posts.
“Yeltsin could be influenced in two ways - through alcohol and family,” says Boris Ratnikov. - It was impossible to bribe him with money: if they offered him a bribe, he would have filled his face. When Yeltsin became president, at first he and his family lived in a cramped way, and he took it calmly. But his daughter Tatiana soon felt a taste for a luxurious life. And no wonder: Abramovich was ready to pay for any of her wishes. Berezovsky at that time gave away cars to the right and left, did not regret gifts for the president's daughter. Of course, such "arguments" clearly outweighed those of the Security Service."
Do not forget that taking care of Yeltsin occupied almost all of Alexander Korzhakov's working time. He was both the head of the SBP and the president's personal bodyguard. Korzhakov spent a lot of effort to somehow protect the guarded person from alcohol abuse. For this, the special operation "Sunset" was developed: he took factory bottles of vodka, diluted them by half with water and rolled them up with the help of an apparatus donated by his comrades from Petrovka, 38.
Since the spring of 1996, Yeltsin’s campaigning for his re-election as President of the Russian Federation has been added to all other responsibilities. To understand the operational situation of that time, it is necessary to comprehend the very popular term "seven-bank", which was very popular during this period of time.
According to Boris Berezovsky, which he expressed to one of the foreign media outlets, the seven oligarchs he listed by name controlled more than 50% of the Russian economy and influenced the adoption of major political decisions. And this was a reality that could not be ignored even by the security service of the President of the country. "Semibankirshchina" practically sponsored the upcoming election campaign of Boris Yeltsin. But this alliance had nothing to do with the interests of the country. This was a temporary aspiration of wealthy entrepreneurs in order to maintain a favorable regime for themselves, contributing to their personal enrichment.
So Alexander Vasilyevich had no more than two hours left for the affairs of the service, including to get acquainted with the analytical information that was supplied by the intellectual support department headed by Boris Ratnikov.
"Keep out" or "prevent"?
On July 24, 1995, the head of the GUO, Mikhail Barsukov, became the head of the FSB of Russia. His former position was taken by Yuri Vasilievich Krapivin. In the 9th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, following the "traditional" path of a security officer, Yuri Vasilyevich headed the commandant's office of the Grand Kremlin Palace, and then was elected secretary of the party organization of the administration. It should be understood that at that time it was practically an “unofficial” deputy head of the department.
On June 19, 1996, the GDO was reorganized and renamed into the FSO (Federal Security Service) of the Russian Federation. The leading post was retained by Yuri Krapivin until May 7, 2000. Since May 18, 2000, this post has been permanently held by Evgeny Alekseevich Murov. On November 27, 2001, his position was named Director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, and this name has survived to the present.
For all Alexander Korzhakov's love for the abbreviation GUO, the idea of forming the Federal Security Service belonged to him. In fact, it's just time for systemic formalization. The meaning of the transformation was, firstly, to give the growing qualitative and quantitative protection the status of a federal special service. Secondly, the situation developed in such a way that the governors and, as Aleksandr Korzhakov aptly put it, “mini-presidents” literally “by the will of the times” formed their own guards. The FSO idea was enthusiastically accepted by the regional leadership of the country. The persons identified by the head of the region were trained and certified as officers of the FSO of Russia. The structure itself received "reference points" in all regions without exception.
Thirdly, a serious need arose to formally delineate the status and legal basis of the activities of numerous security units, in fact mobile private armies, created throughout the country by rapidly ascending oligarchs hungry for personal power.
Only a very careless businessman or politician at that time did not surround himself with bodyguards, and the most dangerous thing was that the state knew about them, but no one was going to control them. If you look closely at the history of domestic private security, you will notice that just at that time the term "bodyguard" was withdrawn from the market circulation. The GDO had to put in place the private special forces of wealthy people who imagined themselves to be the masters of the country, although this was not its direct function. As Alexander Korzhakov notes, Berezovsky's special forces, the security structure of the Most group of Gusinsky and other "heroes of that time" posed a real threat not only to competitors, but also to the SBP, and, accordingly, to the president himself, if their owners had given an order destroy the leader of the country.
According to Korzhakov, the famous demonstration action of the SBP on December 2, 1994 against the armed guards of the tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky, who opened fire on the SBP car near the walls of the Moscow mayor's office, received a powerful response in the country and served as a serious signal to the oligarchs about who is the boss in the country. And in the press this event, which is very serious from the point of view of state security, was aptly called “face in the snow”.
“I convinced Yeltsin that it was necessary to legalize the activities of all these guys with weapons,” Korzhakov recalls. - The idea was accepted "with a bang" by all the governors. They, too, did not want at all that someone's bodyguard would one day freak out and shoot someone. We registered all the bodyguards in the FSO, periodically called them to study. In addition to the fact that now all of them have begun to work legitimately, we have the opportunity to monitor what is happening in the environment of the heads of the regions."
This is how the history of the FSO began in the summer of 1996. Only its further development went on without Alexander Korzhakov. During the 1996 presidential elections, as a result of a special operation by the SBP to determine the leadership of the SBP, the "porters" Lisovsky and Evstafiev were detained while leaving the White House with half a million dollars in a copier box.
To hush up this unattractive fact, the president's oligarchic entourage started rumors that Korzhakov was aiming for Yeltsin's place and that he had a rating higher than the president's. If the detainees were not released, they threatened to reveal the truth that Yeltsin's campaign was funded by American money. Korzhakov was fired with a scandal, then his deputy Georgy Rogozin was also fired, and Boris Ratnikov left after a while to work in Belarus. After that, according to our heroes, there was no one to interfere with the unrestrained "privatization" in the Yeltsin FSO.
Photo: Vitaly Belousov / TASS
The post of Alexander Korzhakov was taken by the aide-de-camp of the President of Russia Anatoly Leonidovich Kuznetsov and held it until 2000. After the resignation of Boris Yeltsin, Anatoly Leonidovich, in accordance with the current legislation, continued to work with the family of the first president of Russia, ensuring the safety of Naina Yeltsin after the death of her husband.
In the work with the personnel of the specialized structure, according to Alexander Korzhakov, since the beginning of the 2000s, the continuity in the glorious chain of professional traditions has become implicit.
“After us, people came who had no idea about working in security,” believes Alexander Vasilyevich. - No experience, no education. It is necessary that a person first served in the army, received at least some experience there in guarding gates, warehouses, that is, received experience in sentry work, worked out the professional skills of a sentry. Those who did not serve as a private, but immediately became a general, will never understand this. He will assign tasks to his subordinates, but will not be able to check their implementation."
However, it is quite possible that here in Alexander Korzhakov there is a certain amount of resentment for the unfair dismissal. After all, there is no reason to assert that the current FSO is not doing its job.
“Yes, they provide peace of mind,” replies Korzhakov, “but they are doing it more and more on the“keep out”principle. A typical example of such work is the empty streets during Putin's inauguration in May 2012. And we must not “not let go”, but prevent”.
“I am not familiar with the current employees of the FSO and their work,” says Boris Ratnikov. "The way has been ordered for us."
Be that as it may, the main arbiter in assessing the work of any security services is, apparently, time. Whoever managed to prevent all possible threats is the winner, and the winners, as you know, are not judged.
This is how any special services are arranged - detailed information about their work can be made public only after the statute of limitations has expired, and even then not always … As they said in one popular film: "The first rule of Fight Club is not to tell anyone about Fight Club."
Indeed, under Stalin it would never have occurred to anyone to devote the general public to the details of the work of Nikolai Vlasik and his subordinates. Under Brezhnev, the activities of the service of Alexander Ryabenko were covered with the same secret, Vladimir Medvedev published his memoirs after Gorbachev left the presidency, and this chain can be continued.
Until the time has come, the public remains for the most part to speculate about the internal "kitchen" of the protection of the first persons. Moreover, as applied to security, the adage "No news is the best news" is quite true. But someday, probably, we will be able to familiarize ourselves with the memories of the current employees of the Federal Security Service. And we will learn a lot of interesting things for ourselves. In the meantime, let's hope that the FSO of the Russian Federation will continue to successfully ensure the safety of the guarded entrusted to it, and therefore of Russia as a whole.
I would also like the long-term traditions of Russian protection to continue to be preserved for centuries. And so that her history, in which there are so many examples of true courage, dedication and loyalty, would never be forgotten, and her role as a world leader in this specific area would not be lost.
