If the history of designing cruisers such as the cruiser of the Sverdlov class can surprise amateurs of naval history with something, it is its unusual brevity and lack of any intrigue. While the projects of other domestic ships constantly underwent the most bizarre metamorphoses, during which the final result sometimes fundamentally differed from the initial technical assignment, with the Sverdlov-class cruisers everything turned out to be short and clear.
As mentioned in previous articles, according to pre-war plans, the light cruisers of Project 68 were to become the main ships of this class in the USSR Navy. Unfortunately, it was not possible to put them into operation before the start of the war, and by the end of the war the project was outdated to a certain extent. After the war, it was decided to finish building these cruisers according to the modernized project 68K, which provided for the installation of powerful anti-aircraft and radar weapons. As a result, the ships became much stronger, and in terms of the aggregate combat qualities they surpassed the light cruisers of other military-built powers, but still had a number of shortcomings that could not be corrected due to the limited size of the cruisers under construction. The required nomenclature and number of weapons, as well as technical means, did not fit corny, so it was decided to complete the construction of 5 surviving ships of this type, but not to lay new 68Ks. This is where the history of Project 68-bis cruisers began.
But before we move on to considering it, let's recall what happened to the domestic military shipbuilding in the post-war years. As you know, the pre-war shipbuilding program (15 battleships of project 23, the same number of heavy cruisers of project 69, etc.) was not carried out, and its renewal, due to the changed conditions, after the war no longer made sense.
In January 1945, on behalf of the People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov, a commission was formed consisting of leading specialists of the Naval Academy. They were given the task: to generalize and analyze the experience of the war at sea, and to issue recommendations on the types and performance characteristics of promising ships for the USSR Navy. On the basis of the commission's work in the summer of 1945, the Navy's proposals for military shipbuilding for 1946-1955 were formed. According to the presented plan, in ten years it was planned to build 4 battleships, 6 large and the same number of small aircraft carriers, 10 heavy cruisers with 220-mm artillery, 30 cruisers with 180-mm artillery and 54 cruisers with 152-mm guns, as well as 358 destroyers and 495 submarines.
The construction of such a grandiose fleet was, of course, beyond the limits of both the industrial and financial capabilities of the country. On the other hand, it was also impossible to postpone the shipbuilding programs for later - from the fire of the Great Patriotic War, the fleet emerged greatly weakened. For example, at the beginning of the war, the same Baltic Fleet had 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, 19 destroyers (including 2 destroyer leaders) and 65 submarines, and a total of 88 ships of the above classes. By the end of the war, it consisted of 1 battleship, 2 cruisers, 13 leaders and destroyers, and 28 submarines, i.e. only 44 ships in total. Even before the war, the personnel problem was extremely acute, since the fleet received a large number of new ships, not having time to prepare a sufficient number of officers and warrant officers for them. During the war, things only got worse, including as a result of the departure of many sailors to the land fronts. Of course, the war "raised" a generation of military commanders, but for a number of different reasons, the actions of the most powerful fleets of the USSR Navy, Baltic and Black Sea, were not very active, and the losses of the operating forces were very high, so the personnel problem remained unresolved. Even the acceptance of captured Axis ships transferred to the USSR for reparations turned out to be a considerable challenge for the Soviet fleet - it was difficult to recruit crews to accept and transfer ships to domestic ports.
In general, the following happened: before the war, the Red Army Navy had been a coastal fleet for a long time, focused on solving defensive missions near their shores, but in the second half of the 30s an attempt was made to build an ocean-going fleet, interrupted by the war. Now the fleet, having suffered significant losses, has returned to its "coastal" status. Its backbone consisted of ships of pre-war projects, which could no longer be considered modern, and even more often than not were not in the best technical condition. And there are too few of them left.
In essence, it was required (for the umpteenth time!) To engage in the revival of the Russian military fleet. And here I. V. Stalin quite unexpectedly took the position of industry, not the fleet. As you know, the final word remained with I. V. Stalin. Many criticize him for his voluntaristic approach to building the Navy in the post-war years, but it should be admitted that his plan for building the Soviet fleet turned out to be much more reasonable and realistic than the program developed by the Navy specialists.
I. V. Stalin remained a supporter of the ocean-going fleet, which he considered necessary for the USSR, but he also understood that it was pointless to start building it in 1946. Neither the industry is ready for this, which simply will not master so many ships, nor the fleet, which will not be able to accept them, since it will not have a sufficient number of qualified crews. Therefore, he divided the construction of the fleet into 2 stages. In the period from 1946 to 1955. it was necessary to build a sufficiently powerful and numerous fleet to operate on the native shores, which, in addition to the actual defense of the Fatherland, was also entrusted with the functions of a "cadre forge" for the future oceanic Navy of the USSR. At the same time, over this decade, the shipbuilding industry would certainly have grown so strong that the construction of an ocean-going fleet turned out to be quite tough for it, and thus the country would have created all the necessary prerequisites for a dash into the ocean after 1955.
Accordingly, the shipbuilding program for 1946-55. turned out to be significantly adjusted downward: battleships and aircraft carriers disappeared from it, the number of heavy cruisers was reduced from 10 to 4, (but their main caliber was supposed to grow from 220 to 305 mm), and the number of other cruisers was to decrease from 82 to 30 units. Instead of 358 destroyers, it was decided to build 188, but in terms of submarines, the program underwent minimal changes - their number was reduced from 495 to 367 units.
So, in the next 10 years, the fleet should have transferred 30 light cruisers, of which 5 were already on the stocks and had to be completed according to the 68K project, which, despite its many advantages, still did not fully satisfy the sailors. Therefore, it was proposed to develop a completely new type of cruiser, which could incorporate all the new weapons and other equipment. This project received the number 65, but it was quite clear that the work on it would be delayed simply because of its novelty, and the ships were required yesterday. Accordingly, it was decided to build a limited number of "transitional" cruisers, or, if you like, the "second series" of Project 68 cruisers. It was supposed, without making any fundamental adjustments to the project 68, to slightly increase its displacement in order to accommodate everything that the sailors wanted to see in the light cruiser, but that did not fit into the Chapaev-class cruiser.
At the same time, to speed up the construction of new cruisers, it was supposed to make their hulls fully welded. By and large, the widespread use of welding (during the construction of the Chapaevs, it was also used, but in small volumes) was supposed to be the only large-scale innovation: for arming and equipping new cruisers, only industrial samples should be used. Of course, the refusal to install much more modern weapons, which are in various stages of development, seriously reduced the combat capabilities of cruisers, but it guaranteed the timeliness of their commissioning. The ships of the "second series" of project 68, or, as they were called later, 68-bis, were not going to be built in a large series: it was supposed to build only 7 such cruisers, in the future they were going to lay a new, "advanced", project 65.
Thus, "in the first iteration" the program for the construction of light cruisers was supposed to include 5 ships of the 68K project, 7 ships of the 68-bis project and 18 cruisers of the 65 project. the number of various options, the designers did not manage to design a ship that would have such a tangible superiority over the light cruisers of the 68-bis project that it made sense to change the project worked out by the industry. Thus, in the final version of the program in the period 1946-55. 5 cruisers of the 68K project and 25 cruisers of the 68-bis project were to be transferred to the fleet.
Interestingly, a similar approach was adopted during the construction of the post-war destroyers of Project 30-bis: old, industry-spent weapons and mechanisms with the "addition" of modern radars and control systems. In this regard, again, there is an opinion about the voluntarism of V. I. Stalin, who supported the industry and deprived the destroyers of modern weapons. Suffice it to say that the main caliber on them was two non-universal turret 130-mm B-2LM pre-war development!
Of course, it would be nice to see on domestic destroyers the main caliber, capable of effectively "working" on aircraft like the SM-2-1, and on light cruisers of the Sverdlov type - universal 152-mm mounts, which are described by A. B. Shirokorad in the monograph "Light cruisers of the Sverdlov type":
“Back in 1946, OKB-172 (the“sharashka”where the convicts worked) developed a preliminary design of 152-mm ship turret installations: a two-gun BL-115 and three-gun BL-118. Their cannons had the ballistics and ammunition of the B-38 cannon, but they could effectively fire at air targets at altitudes up to 21 km; the VN angle was + 80 °, the vertical and horizontal guidance rate was 20 deg / s, the rate of fire was 10-17 rds / min (depending on the elevation angle). At the same time, the weight and size characteristics of the BL-11 were very close to the MK-5-bis. So, the diameter of the ball strap for MK-5-bis is 5500 mm, and for BL-118 it is 5600 mm. The weight of the towers is 253 tons and 320 tons, respectively, but even here the weight of the BL-118 could easily be reduced, since it was protected by thicker armor (forehead 200 mm, side 150 mm, roof 100 mm)."
The placement of fully automatic 100-mm cannons on cruisers would also be welcome. The SM-5-1 turret installations still provided for manual operations, which is why their rate of fire (per barrel) did not exceed 15-18 rds / min, but for a fully automatic SM-52 this figure should have been 40 rds / min. And the 37-mm V-11 with their manual guidance in the 50s already looked strange, especially since it was possible to try to equip ships with more powerful and much more advanced 45-mm rapid-fire assault rifles. And cruisers of the "Sverdlov" type could also get a more modern power plant with the production of steam of increased parameters, equipment on alternating current, and so on and so forth …
Alas, they didn’t. And all because, for once, the restoration of the Russian fleet went the right way. Since the ships were needed "here and now", rather large series of cruisers and destroyers are being laid, equipped with, though not the most modern, but well-proven and reliable "stuffing" and at the same time, the "ships of the future" are being worked out in which the customers' fantasies - sailors and designers are almost unlimited. Here, for example, the destroyers of Project 41, for which the TTZ was issued by the Navy in June 1947. The ship had everything that, according to many analysts, was lacking on the destroyers of Project 30-bis: universal artillery, 45-mm machine guns, modern power plant … But here's the bad luck: according to the results of tests that began in 1952, the destroyer was declared unsuccessful and did not go into series. The question is: how many ships would the fleet have received in the first half of the 50s, if instead of the 30-bis project, we began to deal exclusively with an ultra-modern destroyer? And so in the period from 1949 to 1952. inclusively, 67 Project 30-bis destroyers of 70 ships of this series were commissioned. And the same can be said about cruisers - it was possible, of course, to try to radically upgrade the armament of cruisers of the Sverdlov type, or even abandon the construction of 68-bis ships in favor of the newest Project 65. But then, with a high probability, until 1955, the fleet I would receive only 5 cruisers of Project 68K - the newest cruisers would probably “get stuck” on the stocks due to the fact that all their “stuffing” would be new and not mastered by the industry, and it’s better not to remember the chronic delays in the development of the latest weapons. The same automatic 100 mm SM-52 only entered factory tests only in 1957, i.e. two years after the fourteenth cruiser of the 68-bis project entered service!
As a result of the rejection of projects "unparalleled in the world", the fleet in the first post-war decade received 80 destroyers of projects 30K and 30-bis (20 for each fleet) and 19 light cruisers (5 - 68K and 14 - 68-bis), and taking into account the six ships of the Kirov and Maxim Gorky types, the total number of light cruisers of domestic construction in the USSR Navy reached 25. In fact, as a result of the “voluntaristic decisions of I. V. Stalin, who did not want to listen to either the sailors or common sense, "the USSR Navy received in each theater a squadron powerful enough to operate on its shores, under the cover of land based aviation. It has become the very forge of personnel, without which the creation of a domestic ocean-going fleet in the 70s would have been simply impossible.
It is possible to draw interesting parallels with the present day, which is terrible to remember in a row, the revival of the domestic fleet. In the twentieth century, we rebuilt the fleet three times: after the Russo-Japanese War, then after the First World War and the Civil War that followed, and, of course, after the Second World War. In the second case, a stake was made on ships “unparalleled in the world”: the first-borns of shipbuilding programs were the Uragan type SKR with many technological innovations, such as new high-speed turbines that had not been used before, the leaders of Project 1 with excellent tactical and technical characteristics. … And what is the result? The head ICR "Hurricane", a ship of less than 500 tons of displacement, was built from August 1927 to August 1930, and was conditionally adopted by the fleet in December 1930 - 41 months have passed since the laying down! 15 years before the events described, the creation of the battleship "Empress Maria", a giant weighing 23,413 tons, took only 38 months from the start of construction to commissioning. The leader of the destroyers "Leningrad" was laid down on November 5, 1932, formally he joined the Red Banner Baltic Fleet on December 5, 1936 (49 months), but in fact he was being built afloat until July 1938! At this time, the first type 7 destroyers, laid down in 1935, were just starting acceptance tests …
And compare this with the post-war pace of restoration of the Navy. As we said earlier, even Project 68K cruisers turned out to be quite at the level of modern foreign ships and generally corresponded to their tasks, but the light cruisers of the Sverdlov type were better than the 68K. Of course, the Project 68-bis cruisers did not become a military-technical revolution in comparison with the Chapaevs, but the methods of their construction turned out to be the most revolutionary. We have already mentioned that their hulls were made completely welded, while low-alloy steel SKHL-4 was used, which significantly reduced the cost of construction, while the tests showed no damage to the strength of the hulls. The body was formed from planar and volumetric sections, formed taking into account the technological features of the shops and their crane facilities (this, of course, is not yet block construction, but …). During the construction, a new one was used, the so-called. pyramidal method: the entire construction process was divided into technological stages and building kits (apparently, it was a kind of analogue of network diagrams). As a result, huge ships, over 13 thousand tons of standard displacement, being built by a series unprecedented for the Russian Empire and the USSR at four shipyards of the country, were created on average in three years, and sometimes even less: for example, the Sverdlov was laid in October 1949, and entered service in August 1952 (34 months). Long-term construction was extremely rare, for example, "Mikhail Kutuzov" was under construction for almost 4 years, from February 1951 to January 1955.
Nevertheless, in the 21st century, we chose the pre-war model of fleet restoration, based on the creation of ships “unparalleled in the world”. Bottom line: the frigate "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov" laid down on February 1, 2006 in 2016 (for more than ten years!) Has not yet entered the Russian Navy. Nineteen cruisers of the Stalin era, built in the first decade after the most terrible war in the history of our people, will forever remain a silent reproach to us today … If instead of relying on the latest weapons, we would build "Gorshkov" as an experimental ship, deploying mass construction, but at least the same frigates of Project 11356, today we could have in each fleet (and not only on the Black Sea) 3, or maybe 4 completely modern and equipped with rather formidable weapons, frigates of a new construction, and all the same " Gorshkov, waiting for the Polyment-Redut complex. In this case, we would not have to send battleships of the "river-sea" class "Buyan-M" to the shores of Syria, the shipbuilding industry would receive a powerful push forward, the fleet would still have the same "forge of personnel" and adequate ships to demonstrate the flag … Alas as the sad saying goes: "The only lesson in history is that people don't remember its lessons."
But let us return to the history of the creation of the Sverdlov-class cruisers. Since the new cruiser was, in essence, an enlarged and slightly corrected version of the previous 68K, it was considered possible to omit the preliminary design stage, proceeding immediately to drawing up a technical project. The development of the latter began immediately after the issuance and on the basis of the Navy assignment submitted by the USSR Council of Ministers in September 1946. Of course, the work was carried out by TsKB-17 - the creator of the Chapaev-class cruisers. There were not too many differences in the 68-bis compared to the 68K.
But still they were. In terms of armament, the main caliber remained practically the same: 4 three-gun 152-mm turrets MK-5-bis almost in all corresponded to the MK-5, installed on ships of the "Chapaev" type. But there was one fundamental difference - MK-5-bis could be guided remotely from the central artillery post. In addition, Project 68-bis cruisers received two Zalp main-caliber fire control radars, and not one, like Project 68K ships. The Sverdlovs' anti-aircraft artillery consisted of the same twin 100-mm SM-5-1 mounts and 37-mm V-11 assault rifles as on the Chapaevs, but their number increased by two mounts of each type.
The number of stabilized guidance posts remained the same - 2 units, but the Sverdlovs received more advanced SPN-500, instead of SPN-200 project 68K. The Zenit-68-bis launcher was responsible for the anti-aircraft fire. Interestingly, during their service, the 68-bis cruiser actively practiced firing with the main caliber at air targets (using the curtain method). A very powerful 152-mm cannon B-38, capable of firing at a distance of up to 168.8 kbt, combined with the lack of collective self-defense air defense systems in the 50-60s, "pushed" to such a decision. Accordingly, the main caliber of the project 68-bis cruisers (as well as the 68K, by the way) received ZS-35 remote grenades containing 6, 2 kg of explosives. According to unconfirmed reports, there were also shells with radio fuses (inaccurate). Theoretically, the Zenit-68-bis fire control system could deal with the main caliber fire control, however, according to available data, it was practically impossible to organize firing under the control of the CBC data, so the fire was fired according to the firing tables.
Both torpedo tubes returned to the project 68-bis cruisers, and now they were not three, but five-tube. However, the Sverdlovs lost them rather quickly. The cruisers were too large to participate in torpedo attacks, and the widespread development of radar did not leave room for night torpedo battles like those for which the pre-war Japanese imperial fleet was preparing. Aircraft armament on cruisers was not initially envisaged. As for the radar weapons, they largely corresponded to the ships of the 68K project, but not because the designers did not come up with anything new, but on the contrary, as the newest radar equipment installed on the Sverdlovs appeared, they were also equipped with the cruisers of the Chapaev type. …
At the time of the commissioning of the Sverdlov cruiser, it had the Rif radar for detecting surface targets and low-flying aircraft, the Guys-2 radar for airspace control, 2 Zalp radars and 2 Shtag-B radars for fire control main caliber, 2 Yakor radars and 6 Shtag-B radars for controlling the fire of anti-aircraft guns, Zarya radar for torpedo fire control, as well as identification equipment, including 2 Fakel M3 interrogating devices and the same number of response devices "Fakel-MO". In addition, the cruiser, like the Chapaev-class ships, was equipped with the Tamir-5N GAS, capable of detecting not only submarines, but also anchor mines.
Subsequently, the range of radars and other target detection systems expanded considerably: the cruisers received more modern radars for general coverage of surface and air targets, such as P-8, P-10, P-12, Kaktus, Keel, Klever and etc. But of particular interest, perhaps, are the means of electronic warfare. The installation of these funds on the cruisers was envisaged by the initial project, but by the time they were put into operation, they could not be developed, although the space on the ships was reserved. The first copy (radar "Coral") passed state tests in 1954, then in 1956 the more "advanced" model "Crab" was tested on the "Dzerzhinsky", but it did not suit the sailors either. Only in 1961 passed state tests of the Krab-11 radar and was installed on the Dzerzhinsky cruiser, and a little later 9 more cruisers of the 68-bis project received the improved Krab-12 model. The exact performance characteristics of the Crab-12 are unknown to the author of this article, but the original model, the Crab, provided protection from the Zarya radar at a distance of 10 km, the Yakor radar - 25 km, and the Zalp radar - 25 km. Apparently, the "Crab-12" could confuse enemy artillery radars quite well at long distances, and one can only regret that such opportunities for cruisers appeared only in the 60s.
No less interesting is the heat direction finding station (TPS) "Solntse-1", which was an optoelectronic device designed for covert detection, tracking and determining the bearing of targets at night. This station detected the cruiser at a distance of 16 km, the destroyer - 10 km, the bearing accuracy was 0.2 degrees. Of course, the capabilities of the TPS "Solntse-1" were much lower than those of radar stations, but it had a great advantage - unlike a radar station, the station did not have active radiation, so it was impossible to detect it during operation.
The booking of cruisers 68-bis was almost identical to that of the cruisers of the 68K project.
The only difference from the Chapaev-class cruisers was the enhanced armoring of the tiller compartment - instead of 30 mm of armor, it received 100 mm of vertical and 50 mm of horizontal protection.
The power plant also matched the project 68-K cruisers. The Sverdlovs were heavier, so their speed was lower, but quite insignificantly - 0.17 knots at full and 0.38 knots when forcing the boilers. At the same time, the speed of the operational-economic move turned out to be even half a knot higher. (18.7 versus 18.2 knots).
One of the most important tasks in the design of Sverdlov-class cruisers was more comfortable crew accommodation than was achieved on the 68K project cruisers, which had to accommodate 1184 people instead of 742 people according to the pre-war project. But here, unfortunately, domestic designers were defeated. Initially, the project 68-bis cruisers were planned for 1270 people, but they also did not avoid an increase in the number of the crew, which eventually exceeded 1500 people. Unfortunately, the conditions of their habitation did not differ too much from the cruisers of the "Chapaev" type:
It is extremely difficult to compare the cruisers of the 68-bis project with their foreign counterparts due to the almost complete absence of analogues. But I would like to note the following: for a long time it was believed that domestic cruisers were significantly inferior not only to the Worcester, but even to the Cleveland-class light cruisers. Probably, the first such assessment was voiced by V. Kuzin and V. Nikolsky in their work "The Navy of the USSR 1945-1991":
“Thus, surpassing the Cleveland-class light cruiser of the US Navy in the maximum firing range of 152-mm guns, the 68-bis was 1.5 times worse booked, especially on the deck, which is essential for long-range combat. Our ship could not conduct effective fire from 152-mm guns at maximum distances due to the lack of the necessary control systems, and at shorter distances the Cleveland-class cruiser already had firepower (152-mm guns are faster, the number of universal 127-mm more guns - 8 on one side against our 6 100-mm guns) …"
In no case should the respected authors be accused of insufficient depth of analysis or admiration for Western technology. The only problem was that the American press grossly exaggerated the performance characteristics of their ships, including the Cleveland-class light cruisers. So, in terms of protection, they were credited with an extremely powerful 76-mm armored deck, and a 127-mm belt without indicating the length and height of the citadel. What other conclusion could V. Kuzin and V. Nikolsky draw on the basis of the data available to them, besides this: “68 bis was booked 1.5 times worse”? Of course not.
But today we know perfectly well that the thickness of the armored deck of the Cleveland-class cruisers did not exceed 51 mm, and a significant part of it was below the waterline, and the armor belt, although it reached 127 mm in thickness, was more than half as long and 1.22 times lower than that of the Sverdlov-class cruisers. In addition, it is not known whether this armor belt was uniform in thickness, or, like previous light cruisers of the Brooklyn class, it thinned towards the lower edge. In view of the above, it should be recognized that the light cruisers 68K and 68-bis were protected much better and more efficiently than the American cruisers. This, combined with the superiority of the Russian 152-mm B-38 cannon in everything except the rate of fire, over the American Mark 16, gives the Soviet cruisers of the Sverdlov project an obvious superiority in battle.
The assertions of V. Kuzin and V. Nikolsky about the absence of fire control systems capable of ensuring the destruction of targets at maximum distances are possibly correct, since we do not have examples of Soviet cruisers firing at a distance of over 30 km at a sea target. But, as we know, the ships confidently hit the target at distances of about 130 kbt. At the same time, as A. B. Shirokorad:
“The naval guns have a limiting and effective (approximately 3/4 maximum) firing range. So, if American cruisers had a maximum firing range less than 6, 3 km, then their effective firing range should be, respectively, 4, 6 km less."
The effective firing range of the domestic B-38, calculated according to the “method of AB Shirokorada "is 126 kbt. It is confirmed by the practical firing of the project 68K cruisers held on October 28, 1958: controlling the fire solely according to the radar data, at night and at a speed of over 28 knots, three hits were achieved in three minutes from a distance that changed during firing from 131 kbt to 117 kbt. Taking into account that the maximum range of Cleveland's cannons did not exceed 129 kbt, its effective firing range is about 97 kbt, but this distance still needs to be reached, and this will be difficult given that the American cruiser does not exceed the Soviet one in speed. And the same is true for the Worcester-class light cruisers. The latter is undoubtedly better booked than Cleveland, although here there are also some doubts about the reliability of its performance characteristics. Nevertheless, its guns do not exceed the Cleveland cannons in firing range, which means that for any American light cruiser there will be a distance from 100 to 130 kbt, at which Soviet cruisers of projects 68K and 68-bis can confidently hit the “American”While the latter will not have such opportunities. Moreover, for the "Worcester" the situation is even worse than for the "Cleveland", since this light cruiser did not carry specialized command and control personnel for controlling the main caliber fire in combat with surface ships. Instead of them, 4 directors were installed, similar to those who controlled 127-mm universal artillery on other US ships - this solution improved the ability to fire at air targets, but the issuance of target designations at enemy ships at long distances was difficult.
Of course, at 100-130 kbt, a 152-mm projectile is unlikely to be able to penetrate the armored deck or the citadel of "Cleveland" or "Worcester", yet the capabilities of even the best six-inch guns at such distances are small. But, as we know, already at the end of the war, fire control systems were of enormous importance for the accuracy of shooting, and the radars of American fire control directors were completely incapable of resisting the fragments of Soviet 55-kg high-explosive shells, and therefore the superiority of Soviet ships at long distances was of enormous importance.
Of course, the likelihood of a one-on-one artillery duel between the Soviet and American cruisers was relatively small. Nevertheless, the value of a particular warship is determined by its ability to solve the tasks for which it was intended. Therefore, in the next (and last) article of the cycle, we will not only compare the capabilities of Soviet ships with the "last of the Mohicans" of Western artillery cruiser construction (British "Tiger", Swedish "Tre Krunur" and Dutch "De Zeven Provinsen"), but also consider the role and the place of domestic artillery cruisers in the concepts of the USSR Navy, as well as some little-known details of the operation of their main caliber artillery.
