In this series of articles, we described the state of affairs in the field of submarine shipbuilding, naval aviation, Coastal Forces, and the unified state system for lighting the surface and underwater situation (EGSONPO). They touched upon mine-sweeping forces, the "mosquito" fleet and other surface ships up to and including missile cruisers. We made a big excursion into the history of design, construction and service of our only TAVKR "Kuznetsov". However, neither in the materials devoted to the TAVKR, nor in the article on domestic missile cruisers, we did not say anything about the prospects of the aircraft carrier component of our fleet. In addition, over the past time, there have been some news regarding our RRC and nuclear destroyers of the Leader project, which necessitated this article dedicated to domestic cruisers of all classes. So we will once again briefly repeat their description, adding additional data about their performance characteristics and the latest news.
Heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser (TAVKR) of project 1143.5 "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" - 1 unit
Standard displacement (data in sources differ) 45 900 - 46 540 tons, full - 58 500 - 59 100 tons, but in addition, the "largest" displacement is also mentioned - 61 390 tons. Speed (theoretically) 29 knots. with a boiler and turbine power plant capacity of 200,000 hp. The cruising range at a speed of 18 knots was supposed to be 8,000 miles. Autonomy for supplies, provisions and drinking water - 45 days. Armament - up to 50 aircraft and helicopters, 12 Granit anti-ship missiles, 192 Dagger missiles, 8 Kortik air defense missile systems and 8 30-mm AK-630M mounts, the Udav anti-torpedo missile defense system. The number of the crew is 2 600 people, including 500 people. air groups.
We considered in detail the features of this ship in three cycles devoted to the deck aviation of this ship, the history of its construction and service, as well as its comparison with NATO aircraft carriers (the last article, where there are links to all the previous ones), so we will not repeat here, but Let's go straight to the prospects of this class of ships in the Russian Navy.
Our only TAVKR was commissioned in 1991, thus, in 2018 it "turned" 27 years old. This is not too old an age for large ships intended for basing horizontal take-off and landing aircraft. For example, the US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise, being commissioned in 1961, left service only in 2012, that is, it served for 51 years. There are also long-livers among non-nuclear aircraft carriers. Take, for example, the CV-41 "Midway" - comparing its service life with the TAVKR "Kuznetsov" is all the more interesting because the ships have similar dimensions - the standard displacement of the "Midway" was 47,219 tons, total - 59,901 tons. So, "Midway" entered the US Navy in 1945 and was decommissioned only in 1992, thus its service life reached 47 years. The much smaller aircraft carrier Foch joined the French fleet in 1963, and left it only 37 years later, in 2000. But this is where its story, one might say, was just beginning, since the ship did not go to disposal at all, and, appropriately repaired, was transferred to Brazil, in whose fleet he stayed for the next 17 years.
Of course, our domestic aircraft carrier is operated in much more difficult conditions than American or French aircraft carriers. The North is no joke, and the quality of operation (especially during the 90s and early 2000s) was extremely far from American standards. But still, with appropriate repairs, the Kuznetsov TAVKR is quite capable of serving at least 45 years, that is, not less than until 2036, and maybe even more.
Nevertheless, this, of course, does not mean that we have reason to give up on the TAVKR and postpone the decision to build a new ship of this type for another 10 years. And there are at least three reasons for this.
The first of them is that the aircraft carrier today is one of the most important factors providing cover for the deployment areas of our SSBNs, the naval component of the nuclear triad. The carrier-based aircraft of the TAVKR is capable of providing the best response time to attempts by NATO patrol aircraft to approach and enter these areas. But in its current form, the TAVKR has a rather limited ability to illuminate the air and surface situation. In fact, it can only rely on reconnaissance carried out with the help of its radio-technical complex and carrier-based fighters, of which the Su-33 have a good flight range, but outdated avionics, and the MiG-29K are still limited in range. And in any case, the use of multifunctional fighters for reconnaissance not only weakens the capabilities of the TAVKR, "pulling" combat aircraft to perform tasks that are not typical for them, but also does not provide the quality of reconnaissance that can be provided by carrier-based AWACS and electronic warfare aircraft. In other words, one of the most important functions of a modern aircraft carrier is informational, but precisely in this matter, the capabilities of the TAVKR "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" are very weak. And the absence of a catapult launch, unfortunately, does not allow aircraft to be based on it, capable of effectively controlling the sea and air space.
The second reason is that, with only one aircraft carrier, it is almost impossible to systematically train deck-based aviation pilots. Yes, in the Russian Federation there is a very high-quality "air deck simulator" NITKA, but for all its advantages (and if it is repaired, of course) it cannot replace an aircraft carrier. It only provides basic training for pilots, making it easier for them to adapt to the deck and reducing their risk of accidents, but that's about it. And it turns out that any kind of long-term repair of a ship leads to the detraining of its air wing, so that after the return to service of the TAVKR, it takes many months to restore its combat effectiveness, as a result of which the periods of time in which the TAVKR is truly combat-ready are significantly reduced.
The third reason largely stems from the second. In peacetime, an aircraft carrier has a value almost greater than in war, being an excellent political argument and a means of projection of power in areas remote from our borders. You can argue with this thesis for a long time, you can ignore it, but its truth does not change at all. We can argue for a long time that one or two TAVKRs are not at all equal to a dozen American supercarriers, that our fleet is not capable of today on an equal footing with the US Navy even at our borders, not to mention remote areas. But even small forces can make a big difference when deployed in the right place at the right time. So, for example, in the early 70s, the Soviet Navy was also much inferior to the American one, not to mention the total power of the NATO fleets, and our squadron of ships in the Indian Ocean could not pose a particular threat to American forces. But, nevertheless, when the next Indo-Pakistani conflict began, the active support of the warships of the USSR brought us great political dividends. Vice Admiral (Ret.) V. S. Kruglyakov later recalled:
“Attache A. Popov that when the American formation led by the Enterprise appeared near India, the Indian Defense Minister asked him to contact the USSR Defense Minister and expressed concern about the presence of the Americans. A. A. Grechko immediately invited the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. He told about the forces and actions on the map. After that, Grechko conveyed to the Minister of Defense of India through our attaché Popov: "Enterprise" is our business, and let the Indians do their own thing. "This, of course, then was a great support for India. The consequences of such a noble step towards us were very favorable for us. Ours. authority in India has grown enormously."
Of course, someone can say that at that time, in the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Navy did well without aircraft-carrying ships, and, of course, he would be right. But it should be borne in mind that a modern aircraft-carrying ship with multifunctional fighters on board is capable of projecting force not only on the fleet of “potential friends”, but also on land, which is extremely important today. Therefore, it is highly desirable for the Russian Federation to be able at any time to form a detachment of ships (albeit a very small one), led by TAVKR, carrying, among other things, aircraft capable of working in the role of shock, and to send the resulting multi-purpose aircraft carrier group to where its presence is necessary. But today, having only one TAVKR in the fleet, we cannot count on this - the likelihood is too great that by the time such circumstances arise, either the TAVKR itself will be under repair, or its air wing will not yet be fully operational. This, in fact, happened during the last trip of "Kuznetsov" to Syria, when "out of the blue" were lost two aircraft. Not that the event is completely out of the ordinary (the same Americans had accidents and worse), but this could have been avoided if we had an air group fully prepared for flights.
In general, the construction of a second TAVKR could largely solve these problems and minimize the time when the Navy does not have a single aircraft carrier at its disposal. And ideally (hardly achievable in the current economic situation), the Russian Federation should have in its fleet 3 TAVKRs, of which one will be under repair, one will be in combat readiness, and one more - either in the process of restoring combat readiness after repair, or in combat readiness … As a matter of fact, it was these considerations that were once used to justify the need for 6 such ships in the fleet, which would guarantee the presence of at least one (and most of the time - two) fully combat-ready TAVKRs in the Pacific Fleet and the Northern Fleet, but, of course, today a fleet of this size looks like a complete fantasy.
In order to avoid talking about the extremely high cost of building an aircraft carrier: there is no reason to believe that the creation of a TAVKR is somehow overly ruinous for the domestic budget. Here are a couple of figures: in 2014, the general director of JSC Nevskoye PKB, Sergei Vlasov, estimated the cost of building an aircraft carrier (depending on the performance characteristics) at 100-250 billion rubles, and the maximum estimate of the implementation of the aircraft carrier program (namely, the entire program, was much cheaper) in open sources was estimated at 400 billion rubles. maximum. In terms of prices at the end of 2018, even 400 billion turns into 559 billion rubles. As you know, GPV 2011-2027 provides for the allocation of 19 trillion. rub. The share of the fleet, according to some sources, will amount to 3.8 trillion. rub. But these funds, of course, will not be allocated all at once in 2018, but during all 10 years of the program. If we assume that inflation in the period 2018-2027. will remain at the level of 4% per year (in 2017 it was officially 2.72%, from January to November 2018 - 2.89%) and money will be issued to the fleet evenly, then 3.8 trillion. rub. in 2018 prices will amount to approximately 3, 16 trillion. rub.and financing half of the aircraft carrier program (and no one is going to finance it entirely in GPV 2018-2027) will amount to only 8.83% of the total cost of re-equipping the fleet, including the construction of an aircraft carrier (more precisely, its half) - 5.5%. Let us pay attention once again - not the total expenses for the maintenance of the fleet, but only those allocated for the purchase of new military equipment and maintaining it in combat readiness.
Nevertheless, the prospects for the construction of an aircraft-carrying ship today are very vague, and the Ministry of Defense continues to "keep the intrigue." Back in 2014, reports began to appear about the resumption of work on an electromagnetic catapult: I must say that in the USSR this work had progressed so far that the question of replacing steam catapults at the Ulyanovsk under construction with electromagnetic ones was seriously raised. It seems that the supporters of the construction of the Russian aircraft carrier should have rejoiced, but alas - this news was not accompanied by news about the development of aircraft that could be launched from these catapults.
Our admirals no longer refer to aircraft carriers as "weapons of aggression", on the contrary, they mention their need for a balanced fleet. The construction of a ship of this class is referred to as a settled matter. For example, Viktor Buruk, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy for Armaments, said at the end of November 2017 that: "We will start creating a new generation aircraft carrier in the second program period of the state armament program." And he clarified that the second program period is from 2023 to 2028. You can also recall the words of the Deputy Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Yuri Borisov: "If we talk specifically about aircraft-carrying cruisers, then (their development and laying are scheduled for) the end of the program." Alas, such promises have been heard for more than a dozen years, and if they were all fulfilled, today Russia would have much more aircraft carriers than tanks.
In fact, there is still no clarity as to whether any work on this ship (at least preparatory) is included in the new GPV 2018-2027. True, on May 16 of this year, TASS, citing an unnamed source in the defense industry complex, reported that: “USC has been instructed to submit its revised proposals (on the aircraft carrier - TASS note) for consideration to the RF Ministry of Defense by the end of the year. involves the construction of an aircraft-carrying ship with a displacement of 75 thousand tons. " At the same time, if a positive decision is made on one of these projects, then in 2019 the technical design of the ship will begin, while the laying may take place in 2021-2022. The source also confirmed that in the GPV 2018-2027. the "initial funding" of the program for the creation of a new aircraft carrier has been laid.
The seemingly unnamed source fully confirms the words of V. Bursuk, but there is very little specifics: "if you like it … then … maybe", and the USC answered a direct question about aircraft carriers with silence, neither confirming nor refuting this information. Also, the type of the new aircraft carrier is completely unknown, and rumors are running wild - from the monstrous supercarrier "Storm" with a displacement of 90-100 thousand tons, to the carrier of vertical take-off and landing aircraft, the development of which will allegedly also be financed under the GPV 2018-2027. … There is an opinion that the ship will still be atomic, but it is based on the fact that since the preliminary design of the battleship Yamato … Sorry, the destroyer Leader was approved with a nuclear power plant, then the aircraft carrier will be built with it. But this is just a consideration based on logical analysis, not a hard fact.
Thus, it can turn out very differently. On the one hand, an aircraft carrier is a status thing, and our president loves status things, and this inspires some optimism. On the other hand, it can easily happen that in the period from 2018 to 2023. work on the aircraft carrier will not go beyond the pre-draft design, or even go out, but then either the GPV will be revised, or the president will retire (V. V. Putin may not go for the 5th term, since in 2024.he will turn 72), and even Nostradamus could not have predicted what would happen in the country after the change of power in the Kremlin.
Heavy nuclear missile cruisers (TARKR) of project 1144.2 - 3 units. (and 1 project 1144)
In the article devoted to missile cruisers, we have already presented the characteristics of ships of this type, but we will nevertheless briefly recall the performance characteristics of the most modern TARKR "Peter the Great": standard displacement 24,300 tons, total displacement - 26,190 tons (according to other sources - up to 28,000 tons), maximum speed 31 knots. with a machine power of 140,000 hp, a cruising range of 14,000 miles at 30 knots. (limited by provisions, since the cruiser is equipped with a nuclear power plant). Armament - 20 Granit anti-ship missiles, 94 heavy missiles (48 as part of the S-300F Fort and 46 as part of the S-300FM air defense system), 16 launchers of the Kinzhal air defense missile system (128 missiles), two-gun mount AK-130, 6 ZRAK "Kortik", 10 * 533-mm TA (20 torpedoes or missile-torpedoes "Waterfall"), 1 RBU-12000, 2 RBU-1000, 3 Ka-27 helicopters. The crew consists of 744 people including 18 people. as part of the air group.
The other two ships differ slightly in displacement (presumably they are less by 200-300 tons) and the composition of weapons. So, on the "Admiral Nakhimov" the number of heavy missiles was not 94, but 96 missiles, since the ship was equipped with two S-300F air defense systems, in addition, instead of 12 Kinzhalov launchers, 2 * 2 Osa-M air defense systems were installed (40 missiles). The even older "Admiral Lazarev", in addition to the above, had 8 * 30-mm rapid-fire AK-630 instead of 6 SAM "Kortik" and RBU-6000 instead of RBU-12000.
Unlike the overwhelming majority of modern warships in general, and from all rocket and artillery ships, in addition to powerful weapons, the TARKR also has constructive protection against the effects of enemy ammunition. Alas, information about her is too scarce to form an idea of what exactly and how much she protects. According to some information (possibly incomplete) armor protected:
1. Launcher anti-ship missiles "Granite" - walls 100 mm (below the waterline - 70 mm) roof - 70 mm;
2. GKP and BIP - side walls 100 mm, traverse 75 mm, roof 75 mm;
3. Helicopter hangar, fuel storage, ammunition storage - walls 70 mm, roof 50 mm.
In total, the Russian fleet included four TARKRs. At the same time, the lead "Kirov" entered service in 1980 and left it relatively young - in 2002, after which they began to prepare it for disposal. Then, however, they realized it, returned it to the fleet (the ship was in an incapable state, but still) and were going to modernize it. Alas, as often happens, good intentions alone were not enough, and in 2015 the final decision was made to dispose of the cruiser.
The second and third TARKR - "Frunze" (later - "Admiral Lazarev") and "Kalinin" ("Admiral Nakhimov") entered service, respectively, in 1984 and 1988. Alas, in the era of the "wild 90s" money for their maintenance and timely repairs were not found, and the ships froze at the berths. At the same time, closer to the 2000s, they wanted to dispose of Admiral Lazarev, and in 1999, Admiral Nakhimov was formally sent for modernization, in fact, it sucks. At about the same time (1998), it was finally possible to complete the construction of the fourth TARKR, "Peter the Great" - so he became the only representative of nuclear cruisers in the Russian Navy and the "calling card" of our Northern Fleet.
In the first decade of the 2000s, the above-described status quo persisted, but then the era of the GPV 2011-2020 began. The political need for large ships capable of displaying the flag and representing the interests of the Russian Federation in the World Ocean was well understood, but the number of cruisers, destroyers and BODs capable of going to sea was decreasing by leaps and bounds. Therefore, it is not surprising that the question of modernizing the not so old TARKRs at that time was put on the agenda. Despite the fact that the return of all four TARKRs to the operational fleet was formally considered, the decision that the third ship of the Admiral Nakhimov series will be the first to be upgraded said a lot. When reports appeared in 2013 about the conclusion of a contract for the modernization of the Admiral Nakhimov, it was also announced that the repair and modernization would take 5 years, and that the Nakhimov would return to the operational fleet in 2018. However, by this time the fourth TARKR, "Peter the Great", would have served 20 years, and, obviously, would require serious repairs, which would make sense to combine with modernization in the image and likeness of "Admiral Nakhimov".
Since it was absolutely impossible to imagine that the country would be able to simultaneously carry out a deep modernization of two TARKRs, everything turned out so that even in the case of strict observance of the five-year modernization period, work on the Admiral Lazarev could not begin until 2023. say, it could no longer make much sense.
The fact is that the weapons installed on the TARKR according to the original design are rapidly becoming obsolete, both morally and physically. The same anti-ship missiles "Granit" still remain quite a formidable weapon, but they have not been produced for a long time, and those that remained in warehouses have far from endless shelf life. The S-300F air defense system was very good in the last century and has not lost its relevance today, but nevertheless these are analogues of the land S-300PMU-1, which is significantly inferior to the new, more modern modifications of the S-300, and the S- 400 … In other words, after 2020, it makes no sense to simply restore the technical readiness of the TARKR without a cardinal renewal of the armament composition. And to modernize it like "Nakhimov" (with the installation of at least 64, and most likely - 80 launchers for missiles of the families "Onyx", "Caliber", "Zircon", modernization of the S-300F and with the replacement of "Daggers" with "Polyment Redoubt ") will be very expensive. The cost of modernizing the Nakhimov was announced in 2012 at 50 billion rubles, and this amount exceeded (not much, but nevertheless) the cost of building the newest nuclear submarine of project 885M Yasen-M.
So, if we evaluate on the scale of “cost / efficiency in a spherical vacuum”, then instead of modernizing TARKRs it would be better to build nuclear submarines - if only because both “Admiral Nakhimov” and “Peter the Great” will serve after it passing 20-25 years, hardly more, but the same "Ash-M" may well "retreat" under water for 40 years. But you need to understand that the fleet requires not only submarine, but also surface ships - carriers of long-range anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles and powerful means of electronic intelligence. Thus, within the framework of the concept of a balanced fleet and in the conditions of an extreme shortage of surface ships of the 1st rank, the modernization of two or three TARKRs still looked like a completely justified decision.
However, according to the latest data, the modernization of "Nakhimov" "left" to the right right up to 2022 - this "joyful" news was announced by the general director of the enterprise Mikhail Budnichenko at the forum "Army-2018". Thus, instead of the initial 5 years, the cruiser will be upgraded for at least 9 - from 2013 to 2022. And even if the shipbuilders, "having got their hands on" on the "Nakhimov", will be able to modernize "Peter the Great" in 6-7 years, then in this case the opportunity to start the "Lazarev" will appear no earlier than 2028-2029, but by by this time his age will have reached 44-45 years! Of course, there are pluses in that the ship was mothballed for the vast majority of this time, but even if its modernization is technically possible (the hull will not fall apart in the process of dismantling the old weapons), then it will no longer make any sense.
This means that information about the maintenance of "Admiral Lazarev" in more or less decent condition (dock repair in 2014) does not indicate that the ship will ever return to service, but only about the desire to prevent its sinking before the start of disposal (which in itself is not a simple matter, requiring a separate project and a lot of money). Today, unfortunately, there are no other options left for Lazarev.
Missile cruisers (RRC) of project 1164 - 3 units
Displacement (standard / full) 9 300/11 300 tons, speed - 32 knots, armament: 16 anti-ship missiles "Basalt", 8 * 8 SAM S-300F "Fort" (64 ZR), 2 * 2 PU SAM "Osa -MA "(48 missiles), 1 * 2 130-mm AK-130, 6 30-mm AK-630, 2 * 5 533 torpedo tubes, 2 RBU-6000, hangar for the Ka-27 helicopter.
In the previous article on missile cruisers, we expressed confidence that with proper care, all ships of this type will remain in service until their 45th anniversary. Taking into account the fact that Moscow "became part of the fleet in 1983," Marshal Ustinov "- in 1986, and" Varyag "- in 1989, we assumed that these cruisers will plow the sea until 2028, 2031 and 2034respectively. Alas, the latest news suggests that our forecasts have been overly optimistic.
The first thing that needs to be said is that it is obvious that the equipment of the ships transferred to the fleet in the 80s of the last century is largely outdated and does not meet the current requirements of naval combat. Accordingly, the project 1164 RRC needs a serious modernization to maintain its combat effectiveness - and not to change the S-300F to Redoubts, but to Vulcanoes to Calibers (they will give the Vulkan anti-ship missile system so much - it will not seem like a little), and to replace radar and radio equipment, communications, electronic warfare, etc. So, to date, only Marshal Ustinov has undergone such modernization - and it is not too surprising that it dragged on for as much as five years (2011-2016).
The oldest of the three Atlantis, as the project 1164 RRC is called, the Moskva cruiser, is now in a very poor condition, with practically no progress. In an amicable way, the ship needs modernization in the volumes that Marshal Ustinov received, but then there was a hitch.
The fact is that such a modernization can only be carried out in the north, where the "Moscow" cannot get there on its own, and no one wants to tow it there from the Black Sea halfway across the world. Of course, you can take and "patch up" the ship at the Sevastopol Shipyard, returning it to speed, which will take time from six months to a year, and a lot of money, since the 13th Shipyard is simply not ready for such large-scale repairs for it - it will have to be brought to mind the plant itself, and, of course, all this will cost more, and then go to "Zvezdochka", and … what? Even if the cruiser can arrive there in 2019 and its modernization will take, by analogy with Marshal Ustinov, 5 years, then it turns out that he will finish it in 2024, when he turns 41!
In general, the large-scale modernization of "Moscow" is a big question. And most likely things will be like this - the restoration of the technical readiness of "Moscow" at the Crimean enterprises will drag on for three years, after which it will be pointless to talk about any modernization, and the ship will be repaired averagely, that is, very soon it will again require repair. And either all this will turn into another "remont-epic", from which the ship will go to scrap, or else it will be put on pins and needles right away, without torturing it before death. Moreover, another and newer cruiser of this project, the Varyag, is in dire need of modernization according to the Marshal Ustinov scheme.
Thus, if in 2015 we had 7 missile cruisers, of which TARKR ("Kirov") had already decided to dispose of, another 1 TARKR ("Lazarev") was in a sludge, one TARKR ("Nakhimov") and one RKR ("Marshal Ustinov") were under repair, and three missile cruisers - TARKR "Peter the Great", "Varyag" and "Moskva", were in combat service, then already in 2016 the situation began to worsen - "Ustinov" came out of repair, but here "Moscow", already practically incapable of combat, did not get up for repairs. And now the fate of "Moscow" is not determined, "Varyag", in an amicable way, should be put on modernization, and it is very likely that out of 3 RRC project 1164 only one will remain in service. And the situation with the TARKR will not improve, since as the Admiral Nakhimov is put into operation, Peter the Great will immediately get up for modernization, that is, we, as before, will have only one TARKR as part of the operating fleet. That is, the situation is quite real in which, formally having 6 missile cruisers ("Kirov" is still not worth counting), instead of three, we will have only two such ships in service.
But in fact, even worse options are possible. So, for example, the news repeatedly talked about the desire of our admirals to put Peter the Great for repairs even before the Admiral Nakhimov leaves it - in 2020. This idea as a whole seemed to make sense, because, generally speaking, repairs to Peter the Great, oh, how necessary, and they were going to start it no later than 2018, when, according to initial estimates, the Nakhimov was supposed to return to the fleet. However, the timing of its transfer to the fleet left at first until 2020-2021. - even in this case, staging "Peter the Great" in 2020 would still make sense, because he could carry out a significant part of the preparatory work for repairs in parallel with the completion of "Nakhimov". But now the release of "Admiral Nakhimov" has been postponed to 2022, and maybe further … Will "Peter the Great" be able to serve until that time? Or is its technical condition such that it will be stuck in 2020, regardless of how long the modernization of Admiral Nakhimov will take? And then in the structure of our fleet for several years there will not be a single TARKR at all, and taking into account the fact that the "Moscow" will also be under repair, for 4 fleets we will have exactly 2 cruisers of Project 1164 - all the other nuclear and the only aircraft carrier will be to stand in repairs or in sludge.
It may also happen that the Moskva will go into long-term repairs, and they will not find money for a deep modernization of the Varyag (especially since in the situation described above, they will also send it for modernization, having reduced the number of cruisers in the fleet to one and only The scenario described above is good at least because with a general reduction in the number of our missile cruisers, by 2030 we will still have four deeply modernized and fully combat-ready ships - two TARKRs (Peter the Great and Admiral Nakhimov "and two RRC (" Marshal Ustinov "and" Varyag "), although the last two will already be close to the maximum service life. as part of the fleet, it will be a museum rarity with electronic systems of half a century ago.
By the way, according to the latest data, Moscow was nevertheless undertaken to be repaired in Sevastopol … As for the money, it must be understood that the death of the PD-50 floating dock made a huge hole in our military budget - this structure was extremely necessary for the repair of ships of all classes (often, several ships were "driven" there at the same time!) and now, left without this grandiose engineering structure, we will need to somehow compensate for its absence. This, of course, cannot but affect our other shipbuilding and ship repair plans.
As for the new ships of the "missile cruiser" class, today the destroyers of the "Leader" type act as such. It is assumed that ships of this type will have a displacement that is intermediate between the TARKR and Project 1164 RRC, and in terms of the composition of weapons they will only slightly yield to the modernized Nakhimov. According to recent news, the RF Ministry of Defense has finally decided on the type of power plants for these ships - they will be nuclear.
By and large, the creation of such ships for the domestic fleet looks like an extremely dubious undertaking, since the construction of a series of such "battleships" Yamato "" is quite comparable in cost to the implementation of the aircraft carrier program, while their combat effectiveness will be much lower. Therefore, information that the creation of the technical project has been postponed to 2019-2022, after which the laying of the first ship of this type is possible … Let's just say if our designers were now working in the sweat of their brows on project 22350M, which is the transformation of frigate 22350 into a full-fledged destroyer of 8,000 tons of full displacement or even more, then the news of the next shift to the right along the "Leaders" could only be good news. Building a series of ships under Project 22350M looks like a much more efficient investment, and much more useful to the fleet than a few Leaders. However, according to the latest data, all rumors about the 22350M remain rumors, no order for the development of this ship has been made, and the Leaders remain the only surface ships of the 1st rank, on which some work is definitely underway. And although we can confidently state that the Leader-class destroyer program will end in fiasco (2-3 ships will be laid down, which will turn into an epic and extremely expensive long-term construction), but … We, alas, seem to expect nothing else.
