Discussions about the security of ships give rise to a powerful brainstorming session, during which technical details and little-known facts from the history of naval battles are revealed.
At the same time, the thesis about the need to return the armor, despite the seeming paradox, is fraught with a great question: how efficient is the modern Navy?
The main reason, in my opinion, is that the ships have not really been at war in recent years … eleven (against equal / dangerous opponents). Here is the design idea and stopped. Infantry and tanks after WWII were extremely actively used, and as a result we received anti-splinter helmets / bulletproof vests / harnesses built into the equipment for the infantry, DZ and KAZ for tanks + removal of the fighting compartment in the case of "Armata". With the ships, the development stopped at the level "maybe they won't get into us" thanks to electronic warfare, ineffective and / or few anti-missiles.
Comment by severny.
On my own I would add that over half a century of bloody evolution, MBTs have turned into real armored monsters. Despite the presence of a huge arsenal of anti-tank weapons, piercing "on paper" any armor and leaving no chance for all existing models of armored vehicles.
The discussion resulted in a series of popular (judging by the readers' reviews) articles on the ship's security. In response, critical articles are born, the authors of which are desperately looking for arguments "against". They seek, but do not find.
Gentlemen, you need to look more carefully!
Here are just a few comments on the recently published "VO" article "Missing Armor".
Which ships were seriously booked during WWII? These were at least "light cruisers", but "light" only in the classification of that era. In reality, these were ships with a total displacement of more than 12,000 tons. That is, comparable in size with the modern RRC pr. 1164. Ships of smaller dimensions did not have armor, or the armor was purely symbolic: with a plate thickness of 25-50 mm
Armor protection of light cruisers of the 30s. outnumbered their weapons.
1536 tons. 25 railway wagons with metal is much more symbolic!
All this - LKR pr. 26-bis (“Maxim Gorky”), equal in displacement to the unarmored destroyer “Orly Burke”. A very surprising result: when one bow group of main battery towers weighed more than all 90 missile silos with Tomahawks. The cruiser had three times the crew. And, what is especially "delivers", its power plant surpassed by 30,000 liters. with. turbines of the ultra-modern "Burk".
If you do not like the “Maxim Gorky” with a 70-mm armor belt, the even lighter “Atlanta” will come to the rescue, where the thickness of the armor plates reached 95 mm (the standard displacement of the cruiser was 6700 tons, the total displacement was 8100).
21st century, Internet. Didn't you have enough strength, if only for the sake of decency, to familiarize yourself with the light cruisers of World War II?
The version that the weight allocated for armor on WWII cruisers could have gone to increase the height of the radar antenna posts' reinforcements does not stand up to criticism. The command and control centers of the WWII cruisers were located, as a rule, at the same altitudes, or slightly lower - by a few meters. For example, the control tower of the 68-bis cruiser was located at a height of 27 meters from the waterline, and the radar antenna post on the project 1164 cruiser is located at a height of 32 meters
The problem is not in the antenna posts of the radar and control tower. The problem is located a little lower.
Where the wind whistled at the cruisers of World War II, now you can comfortably sit in a chair and, by pressing the computer buttons, admire the ocean sunset from a height.
Simply put, there, at an unattainable height, are the usual decks. With the premises, communications and consoles of the combat information center. And the superstructure itself has acquired the appearance of a huge multi-storey "box" width from side to side.
It is large because the designers have thousands of tons of load reserve and a margin of stability after removing the armor. There is where to roam! Moreover, the "computers and electronics" themselves weigh negligible against the background of other items of the ship's load. The bulk of the weight went to the load-bearing kit, planking and deck flooring of this multi-storey "box".
Why did you use up the reserve so “ineptly”? This was discussed in detail in the previous article. Without any recommendations and restrictions, designers choose the simplest way, placing antennas on the walls of tall superstructures - to simplify their installation and maintenance. Along the way, using the resulting volumes for the placement of combat posts and gyms for fitness. Plus additional ballast to compensate for the negative windage effect from the solid superstructure.
"Specific density of the ship". To test the above arguments, you can use the simplest, even primitive, but visual way to estimate the density of the ship's layout. The underwater part of any vessel has a complex shape, and in order not to calculate the integrals, we simply take the volume limited by the length, width and draft of the hull
My opponent introduced a new parameter - “Specific Gravity of the Ship”. It is calculated as the ratio of the displacement to the volume of the underwater part of the hull (length * width * draft).
To understand the senselessness of this venture, I will give you the simplest example.
There is a ship with a displacement of X tons and a draft of H meters. During the modernization, half of the boilers and turbines weighing x tons were removed from it. How will the “density” of the cruiser change? According to everyday logic, it should decrease (the displacement is less by Y tons, the volume of the hull remained unchanged).
What does my respected opponent do? The cruiser's displacement (X - x) decreased, along with it the draft (H - h) decreased. That is, the “specific density” of the ship after the removal of the power plant mechanisms practically did not change!
Where is the mistake? There is a displacement, measured in tons. There is a volume of the underwater part of the hull - cubic meters. m m. Mixing these parameters gives absurd results.
There are also exceptions that prove the rule. There are armored ships, the relative density of which is close to that of rocket ships. True, the very booking of such ships can be considered tending to zero. These are Project 26-bis cruisers
Somewhere we have already met them … Ah, this is “Maxim Gorky”, whose armor weight exceeded the weight of the weapon.
The disappearance of 25 wagons with scrap metal is a trick that even Copperfield cannot do.
Our BOD 1134B is similar in displacement to the Japanese light cruisers Agano … The ships are the same, but the armor on the BOD 1134B is not! Where did the incompetent designers get the tons of armor free on our BOD? There is no need to rush to conclusions, first you need to enjoy the information on booking "Agano". It had a side armor thickness of as much as 50 mm, a deck of 20 mm and a turret of 25 mm. In principle, armored personnel carriers of the ground forces are armored in almost the same way today. In short, the displacement and dimensions of unarmored missile ships and their armored artillery ancestors begin to converge when the armor of the latter tends to zero
Well, if you really argue, then argue honestly.
“Agano” had an armor belt 60 mm thick (length 65 m, height 3.4 m), to which two additional 55 mm sections were attached to protect the cellars (27 m long in the bow and 6 m in the aft part). Citadel deck - splinter protection 20 mm. Ammunition elevators covered plates up to 50 mm thick.
The total weight of the “Agano” armor tended to zero and amounted to 656 tons (8% of the cruiser's standard displacement). It is this kind of load reserve that the designers would receive by building a ship similar in displacement, completely abandoning armor. It is also necessary to take into account that there is a whole technological gap between “Agano” and 1134B - 35 years. With the same power of the power plant, the 1134B designers again gain an advantage at the expense of gas turbines, gaining additional hundreds of tons.
Where did the incompetent designers get the tons of armor free on our BOD? Spent on weapons! Four air defense systems, anti-submarine missiles, light artillery, a helicopter … BOD pr. 1134B became the most armed ship in the history of the Russian Navy. In terms of the number of missiles on board, "Bukar" was twice as large as the modern Aegis destroyer! Despite the outdated technology of the 70s, bulky and ineffective beam launchers, fire control devices on the monstrous microelectronic base of that era.
How did the specialists of the Northern PKB manage to build a masterpiece?
The Bukar did not have high superstructures.
1134B, like the Japanese Agano, are not the best examples for a discussion about the “mysterious” loss of displacement.
The Japanese was a specific light cruiser, one of the worst in its class.
The Soviet BOD did not have the layout typical of ships of the 21st century. Despite the placement of weapons on the upper deck (which negatively affected stability in comparison with modern UVP), "Bukar" did not have a solid box-shaped superstructure from side to side, as high as a ten-story building. And due to this, he had a huge advantage!
In this sense, Project 1134B is an example of how many useful things can be installed on board with the correct layout of the ship.
And the answer lies in the armor penetration of modern warheads of anti-ship missiles. The presence of an armored belt with a thickness of 150-200 mm does not fundamentally solve the problem of protecting the ship. The presence of a thick, but negligible in terms of area, armor belt 200-300 mm thick does not play any role. Even if a missile hits it, it can penetrate it without much problem
No role and no major problems. The same as the disappeared 1,500 tons from the cruiser "Maxim Gorky".
150 mm of armor steel is a guaranteed protection against any anti-ship missiles encountered in practice (Harpoon, Exocet, NSM, Yingzi, X-35).
Reasons? Harpoon speed, weight and fur. the durability of the warhead (since all the rest of the rocket's "offal" will turn into dust upon impact) in comparison with the armor-piercing 203-mm projectile. Estimate the odds. filling. Do not forget to take into account the unfortunate location of the warhead in the middle of the rocket body. And draw your own conclusions!
Opponents of defended shipbuilding usually base themselves on misconceptions based on the silhouettes and layout of modern Zamwolts and Aegis destroyers. Gentlemen, the creators of these vessels did not plan to increase their security, they built them in such a way that you cannot put armor there now.
The highly protected ship of our time will not be similar to any modern ship or TKR of past eras. A shorter, more stable and roomy hull, a citadel-armored capsule with the integration of armor into the power set, rational installation angles (a strong blockage of the sides, like that of the Zamvolt, the most squat superstructure in the form of a tetrahedron), horizontal protection, not inferior in power to the vertical, additional measures to cover ammunition storage areas, a fragmentation wall along all compartments and passages - on the opposite side from the side, numerous internal bulkheads …
The mass of such armor will be in the range of 2-2, 5 thousand tons (focusing on TKR types "Baltimore" and "Des Moines"). Moreover, modern ships can afford more due to modern technology.
With a full displacement of the cruiser 15 thousand tons.
The complexity and cost of armor plates are nothing compared to the high-tech "stuffing" of modern Aegis. Otherwise, the construction of such a ship is no different from the construction of the Orly Burke.
It is known that the HEAT warhead of the Basalt anti-ship missile system, which is in service with the Project 1164 cruisers, penetrates 400 mm of armor steel
It would be interesting to get acquainted with the original source and the results of practical shooting "Basalt" at protected targets.
Supercruisers like Peter the Great may well sink not Harpoons or Kh-35, but Granite and Basalt
At arms exhibitions, they always show samples of superguns and ATGMs that can penetrate any tank. But whenever a war breaks out, tanks are greeted with land mines and rainstorms from conventional anti-tank weapons (from Pak 38 blanks to simple and massive RPGs).
I think the analogy is clear.
Even for light anti-ship missiles that do not have high kinetic energy (low flight speed and warhead mass), a compact cumulative warhead can be built that can cope with at least a 100-mm obstacle
Will pierce the board, and what next? Ahead is a system of isolated compartments and anti-fragmentation bulkheads.
Kamikaze imprint aboard the cruiser Sussex
