Soviet military pilots, who entered into an air battle with Israeli fighters, lost 5 aircraft without shooting down a single enemy aircraft
For forty years this fight has been legendary. 100 Soviet aces. 50 deadly MiG-21 interceptors, the best modification of the MF for that period. The Russian "legion of death", urgently deployed to the Middle East, was supposed to radically change the balance of power in the air.
Youth and anger. The desire to fight to the last drop of blood - as bequeathed by the fathers who took Berlin. Homeland will provide you with the best technology and will teach you all the necessary skills of a fighter pilot. A squad of winners. Thunderstorm of the air ocean.
We were preparing for this battle. For the decisive battle, the best of the best were selected - the 135th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the USSR Air Force, which underwent special training at training grounds in the southern regions of the USSR. While the Soviet "falcons" cut bends over the Crimea and the Caspian Sea, trying to go behind each other, the Israelis swallowed the blood of the "war of attrition" and studied, studied, studied, practicing their own techniques of air combat.
Only old men go into battle - the best Soviet pilots against Amos Amir, Asher Snir, Abraham Shalmon and Avi Gilad. Only these four aces had more than 20 aerial victories on their account. The Israeli Air Force command rightly believed that there was no second such link in the world, equal in quality of training and abilities to the detachment of "air killers" under the command of Amos Amir.
Two teams of professionals. Two scorpions locked in one vessel. Only one should remain alive. Bolivar can't stand two.
Ahead is a painful unknown. With a shield or on a shield. Soldiers-internationalists, our country has given you a great honor - the right to represent the interests of the Soviet Union in the region of the Middle East conflict. I have no right to order. Volunteers have gathered here. Please do everything right there and come back alive.
Leaving the room, he added in a stern voice: "Keep in mind, comrades: if you get hit behind the Suez Canal line, we don't know you, get out yourself …"
A secret mission in one of the most dangerous hotspots on the planet. On the wings and keel - the identification marks of the Egyptian Air Force. In the forward part of the fuselage there is a tactical number, displayed in a fancy Arabic script. The personnel of the unit, all pilots and technicians - "Ana Habir Rusi" (translated by "I am a Russian specialist"). The MiGs were based at the Kom-Aushim, Beni-Suef, Janaklis airbases, and the forward airfield in Katamia was periodically used.
The all-seeing Mossad intelligence has already announced the arrival of the Russians. These are not simple instructors, these people came here to fight. On the other side of the Suez Canal, there was a short confusion: A direct threat to the existence of the State of Israel? But what about the observance of neutrality? How justified is shooting at planes with Russian crews? Will this not be the spark of the Great War?
“No, we have to fight,” Prime Minister Golda Meir took the initiative, “if necessary, join the fight immediately.”
They carefully prepared for the general fight - from the first half of April 1970, weekly meetings between Russians and Israelis began. Alas, every time, the opponents dispersed in different directions, never daring to engage in battle. Israeli pilots closely watched the behavior of their potential adversaries, tracked all their maneuvers and formation patterns during sorties, studied the manner of control of Soviet fighters.
I saw "Mirage" - do not take a turn
Our pilots are looking at the enemy with equal interest. Here it is! Literally in a couple of tens of meters, to the side, the fat-bellied carcass of "Phantom" slides. The American-made two-seater fighter is just a giant - 20 tons of continuous speed and fire - versus 8 tons of the MiG's maximum take-off weight! The McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom suspensions are littered with many air-to-air cruise missiles, two engines, and a sophisticated avionics suite. An extremely dangerous enemy.
F-4E Phantom II Israeli Air Force
And here - the arrow-shaped silhouette of the Mirage flashed. The graceful French fighter is almost more dangerous than the American "monster" - the load on the wing of the Mirage is less than that of the MiG - it is risky for our fighters to engage in close combat with such a nimble enemy. The finishing touch to the portrait of the Dassault Mirage III is the two built-in DEFA 30mm aircraft cannons.
Instead of a deadly and senseless "carousel" with French cars, Soviet pilots were advised to "keep their distance" using their trump card - the large thrust-to-weight ratio of the MiG-21. The main thing here is the position at the beginning of the battle and a portion of sharp, energetic maneuvers that allow you to conserve energy, constantly remaining in a more advantageous position.
Dassault Mirage IIIC by Giora Epstein - one of the most prolific aces in the history of jet aviation
What did the legendary MiG-21 look like against the backdrop of an armada of modern foreign technology? A small, lightweight, fast-paced interceptor - the MiG did not have super-powerful radars, long-range AIM-7 Spurrow missiles and impressive systems of sighting and navigation equipment - the combat capabilities of the aircraft were determined solely by the talent of the pilot. In general, the fighter was easy to fly, fast and reliable, and its excellent flight data allowed an experienced pilot to sweep any air enemy from the skies.
… By June 1970, Soviet pilots made about 100 sorties to intercept intruders in the skies of Egypt, alas, every time Israeli aviation refused to engage - at the slightest danger of a combat clash, the enemy immediately went deep into their territory. The game of hide-and-seek continued until June 25, 1970 - on that day, a pair of Soviet MiGs (pilots Krapivin and Salnik) stealthily went out across the Skyhawk attack plane - one of the R-3 homing missiles released by MiGs hit the aircraft engine with the Star of David on the fuselage … However, the tenacious Skyhawk managed to stabilize the flight and, smoking with a torn nozzle, disappeared into the sky beyond the Suez Canal.
The heady taste of victory demanded immediate continuation - an ambush on Israeli Mirages was planned for June 27: Egyptian MiG-17s struck a provocative strike on Israeli positions on the eastern side of the canal - then, according to the plan, a link of Mirages was to rise to intercept the insolent MiGs … Egyptian planes, used as bait, will lure them into their territory, where three groups of MiGs with Soviet crews will join the battle. Further, the enemy will simply be smeared in the air.
The plan didn't work. Apparently sensing something was wrong, the Israelis refused to rise to intercept. Having “ironed out” the Israeli stronghold, the Egyptian planes calmly returned to their airfields. The trouble happened in the evening of the same day. The Egyptians repeated the blow - this time the four "Mirages" fell out of the red-hot haze of the Sinai air. They managed to lure them into Egyptian territory, however … Russian fighters are nowhere to be found! The disgusting interaction between the Russian and Egyptian command did not allow the interceptors to be raised in time. The Israelis shot, as in an exercise, two MiG-17s and with impunity withdrew beyond the canal line. The beating of the Egyptian MiGs was watched by four "Russian" MiG-21s, but the ground command post forbade engaging in combat until the arrival of the other two units.
The battle
On July 30, a general battle was fought. The battle that we have been waiting for so long and for which we have been preparing so hard. In a number of Russian sources, this event is held under the designation "Battle over El Sokhna". Official Israeli name: Operation Rimon-20.
For 40 years, this story has been overgrown with such an unthinkable number of myths and legends that it is almost impossible to establish the exact details, nature and chronicle of the brutal air battle between the USSR Air Force and Hal Haavir (Israel Defense Forces Air Force) that took place on July 30, 1970. The only thing that can be said with some degree of certainty is: the approximate composition of the forces, the names of some of the participants and, most importantly, its tragic results - that day, several MiGs with Soviet crews were really shot down. As a result of the air battle, the following were killed:
Zhuravlev Vladimir Alexandrovich - captain, senior pilot. He was awarded (posthumously) the Order of the Red Banner and the Egyptian Order of the Star of Military Valor.
Yurchenko Nikolai Petrovich - captain, flight commander. Awarded (posthumously) the Order of the Red Banner and the Egyptian Order of the Star of Military Valor.
Yakovlev Evgeny Gerasimovich - captain, flight commander. Awarded (posthumously) the Order of the Red Banner and the Egyptian Order of the Star of Military Valor.
One thing is absolutely clear - it was an organized ambush of the Israeli Air Force (it is called that - Operation Rimon-20). But how did it happen that the Soviet pilots were trapped? And why couldn't they get out of it?
There are many answers. According to Israel's jingoistic version, twenty Soviet MiG-21s pounced on a "defenseless" pair of reconnaissance Mirages (bait). Alas, to their surprise, the Russians found four closely flying fighters in front of them, so that only 2 marks were displayed on the screens of the Egyptian ground radars. Realizing that this was some kind of setup, the Russians twitched and SUDDENLY were surrounded by 12 more Israeli Air Force planes.
20 MiGs against 16 Phantoms and Mirages. As a result, experienced Israeli fighters shot five Soviet aces like partridges, and without losing a single plane, returned to their airfields. That night a feast was buzzing at the Hel Haavir airbases - the happy pilots drank their bonuses for the Russians they had killed … Happy ending!
The version is vulgar and, naturally, very far from the truth. For example, one of the noteworthy versions from the Ukrainian researcher V. Babich is as follows:
No battle 20 vs 16 was in sight. On that day, there were several fights, spaced apart in time and space - and each time the MiGs fought with many times superior enemy forces - when one Soviet four entered the battle, the other four MiGs already left the battle with a critical remaining fuel. The Israelis calculated everything and were able to achieve the concentration of forces in the right place and the right moment.
Captain Yurchenko was shot down first - his MiG exploded in the air from being hit by a Sidewinder missile. A few minutes later, captains Yakovlev and Syrkin had to eject - alas, when landing, Captain Yakovlev fell into a crevice and crashed to death (there is a version that the canopy of his parachute was burned by the jet stream of a fighter flying nearby).
It is still not known exactly how Captain Zhuravlev died - according to eyewitnesses, he fought alone against four enemy aircraft until he was shot down by a stray Mirage cannon burst. It is believed that two Israeli pilots, Ifta Spektor and Abraham Salmon, who barely made it to the territory of Israel in damaged vehicles, almost became its victims.
Mirage explosion
The Mirage of the Israeli ace Asher Snir also received heavy damage - a point-blank R-13 missile damaged the plane, but the warhead of the small R-13 was too small to stop the Mirage's flight - Asher Snir pulled out of the battle and urgently sat down at the airbase Refadim (his combat colleague Amos Amir writes about this in his book "Fire in the Heavens").
Yurchenko - shot down, killed; Yakovlev - shot down, killed; Syrkin - shot down, survived; Zhuravlev - shot down, killed.
But what about the fifth downed Russian plane? And he was gone! Nothing is known about the downed plane and its pilot.
According to rumors, the Israelis managed to shoot down Captain Kamenev's plane, but there is no confirmation of this. In addition, Captain Kamenev himself subsequently continued to serve in the ranks of the USSR Air Force. Rumors, rumors … sometimes it is said that one of the MiGs made an emergency landing at one of the Egyptian airfields. Nobody knows what really happened.
At the same time, there is testimony of witnesses, according to which, after the battle, Israeli search and rescue helicopters were circling over the site of the battle - did the "indestructible" Hal Haavir really suffer any losses? It is not excluded. The operation was attended by many Mirages from 101, 117 and 119 squadrons, as well as multirole Phantom fighters from 69 Squadron of the Israeli Air Force. There is a high probability that the fact of the loss of one (or several) vehicles was carefully hidden, and the results of the battle were falsified.
Without resorting to dubious conspiracy, the following reliable facts can be established:
As a result of the battle on 1970-30-07, 4 MiG-21s were shot down, while three Soviet pilots were killed.
Reliable losses of the Israeli Air Force - the destroyed Mirage of Asher Snir that landed at the Refadim airbase.
After battle
A sad and instructive story. Not in the least wanting to “falsify the facts” (we didn’t shoot them down, but we!) Or “find the guilty ones” (there were more of them! It’s not fair), I will note that the Israeli pilots really had a number of serious advantages.
1. The Israeli Air Force had the opportunity to DEFINITELY study the MiG-21 fighter.
On August 15, 1966, the Iraqi pilot Munir Redfa hijacked a MiG-21 to Israel (Operation Penicillin). The plane was carefully studied, disassembled and even flown - the Israelis got a complete picture of the design, combat capabilities and secrets of the Soviet fighter. The Soviet pilots, alas, did not have such an opportunity - the acquaintance with the enemy "Mirages" and "Phantoms" took place directly in the air battle.
2. The Israelis used the latest tactical techniques - excellent organization of the battle, the use of electronic warfare means - squalls of electronic jamming "clogged" all Soviet communication lines, completely upsetting the control of the battle.
3. Combat experience. The Israeli Air Force did have an impressive practice of air combat - every day, for many years, Hel Haavir fighters flew to intercept air targets - regular air battles throughout the entire range of altitudes, dashing pursuits and missile exchanges, sorties to escort strike groups … leave their mark on the organization of aviation combat work.
One of the striking examples is the scrupulous lighting of the situation in the air: not only the current courses of the aircraft, but also their radio communications were plotted on the combat tablet - this made it possible to understand the situation in a matter of seconds and redirect the aircraft to where they were especially needed.
4. Most important. Pilot training and control system in battle.
In an interview, the commander of the Israeli Air Force, Lieutenant General Mordechai Hot said: "we tell the squadron commander what needs to be done, and he decides how to do it." Analyzing the results of combat missions, the Israeli Air Force shifted the center of gravity of preparation for battle to the link level. The squadron commander independently planned the scenario of the upcoming operation, using "homework" and the accumulated data on the behavior of enemy aircraft in the air.
Unlike Israeli pilots, Soviet fighters were bound by a monstrous chain of prohibitions, recommendations, and prescriptions. It is no coincidence, immediately after the tragic events of 1970-30-07, all the participants in the battle were gathered by the commander of the Soviet aviation group in Egypt, General Grigory Ustinovich Dolnikov:
The meaning of what was said was that all prohibitions and restrictions on aerobatics and combat maneuvering were lifted. We had to start air training from scratch and be guided in it by our common sense, and not someone else's conscience. The general urged us to believe our own instincts and intuition, and he himself pledged to believe in our common luck.
"Egyptian fighters in the" war of attrition ", Aviation History, no. 2/2001
"Fire in the Sky" by Amos Amir (brigadier-general). UK: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2005
