The counterstrike of Rotmistrov's tank army in the Prokhorovka area, despite the setbacks in the previous two days, was inflicted on the morning of 12 July. At the same time, two tank attacks were launched on the flanks: by Katukov's tank army in the direction of the Oboyansk highway and from the other flank in the bend of the Psel River. These strikes require separate consideration.
Before the counterstrike was launched, everyone from the high command to the rank and file had faith in its success. For the first time since the beginning of the war, such a powerful tank fist, almost a thousand tanks, was concentrated on a narrow sector of the front. Everyone saw this power and were eager to fight.
For many officers and men in the tank army of Rotmistrov, this was the first battle, they were ready to carry it out with dignity. In the very first hours of the counterattack, they fell into a terrible meat grinder and were shocked by what was happening, but, having recovered, they fought bravely. There were more than enough examples of personal and mass heroism.
The counterstrike of the tank corps began at 8.30 am immediately after the artillery preparation, which did not fulfill its task of disrupting control in the enemy's forward units and suppressing his anti-tank weapons for successful operations of the first echelon tanks.
Due to the fact that the front edge of the enemy's defense was formed only at night before the counterstrike, reconnaissance could not establish the presence and deployment of its fire weapons, therefore the effectiveness of the fire was low. The shooting was carried out in the areas and during the artillery preparation it was not possible to seriously disrupt the enemy's fire system and destroy his anti-tank weapons.
When planning a counterattack, the command focused on a rapid dash of tanks deep into the enemy's defenses from the first minutes of the attack. The main blow was directed at the Oktyabrsky state farm and the height of 252.2, they were to hit the “fork” between the two advancing tank corps.
One tank corps attacked in two echelons along the railway, the second along the Psel River, its battle formation was built in three echelons. Thus, in the first attacking echelon of two corps in a strip about 6 km wide, there were four brigades, one tank regiment, a total of 234 tanks and 19 self-propelled guns.
There was no continuous avalanche on the morning of July 12. If the 368 combat vehicles of the two corps really attacked at the same time in this narrow sector of the German defense, then, undoubtedly, they would have broken through it. But it was not possible to organize an "armored avalanche".
The Germans seized the bridgehead from which it was planned to launch a counterblow, and the brigades' starting positions were moved several kilometers away from the front line.
The considerable distance and the terrain cut by beams markedly increased the interval between the introduction of the first and second echelons of corps into battle.
Tank battalions from the area of concentration to the initial ones moved in several columns and then through infantry positions and narrow passages in minefields in company columns began to deploy into battle formation in front of the enemy. Thus, the enemy had the opportunity to observe the formation of a tank wedge and prepare to repel the blow.
The area in front of the state farm and the height, where tank formations were deployed under enemy fire and launched an attack, was also very narrow, only about 900 m. Even a brigade could not deploy completely in one line, only a battalion. This led to serious complications from the first minutes of the attack.
Firstly, the corps could not immediately throw a significant amount of armored vehicles into battle, but introduced them in parts, with significant intervals between them. Secondly, it was also not possible to use the speed of tanks as one of the main elements of a breakthrough. The brigades did not attack on a wide front, but in crowded, large groups, in these conditions it was difficult for their crews to maneuver.
The maximum force is always invested in the first strike, therefore it was extremely important at the beginning of the attack to observe the synchronization and continuity of entering into battle, both battalions and brigades. The interval between the entry into battle of battalions in a brigade was set at 10 minutes, and for brigades - 30 minutes. But this was impossible to accomplish.
The significant distance from the place where the brigades of the second echelon were located to the front edge and the difficult terrain on their way led to an increase in the interval between the entry into battle of brigades not only of the first and second echelon, but also inside the first echelon.
Thus, the corps formations did not go in a continuous wide stream, but in waves, brigade by brigade, and the interval between them for a dynamic tank battle was significant, from 30-40 minutes to 1-1, 2 hours. This made it possible for the enemy to destroy them in turn.
In this regard, in two directions along the railway and from the Petrovka area along the river in two groups, not connected to each other, only two tank brigades and three batteries of self-propelled guns moved in echelon to the height in a battle formation, with a total number of no more than 115 tanks and self-propelled guns. … That is, at the beginning of the counterstrike of the main forces, it was simply impossible to organize an avalanche of tanks.
In addition to the unsuccessful choice of terrain for the introduction of large tank forces, the command misjudged the power of the enemy's anti-tank defense in this sector. It did not expect that the enemy would be able to create, in a short summer night, a stable defense capable of stopping several hundred of our combat vehicles.
As soon as our tankers approached the distance of a direct shot to the enemy positions, they immediately flared up with torches and started smoking about two dozen vehicles of the first line. There was a feeling that the brigades' armored wedge came to an abrupt stop in front of a large but invisible obstacle.
The battle formation was disrupted, the crews began to maneuver on the battlefield, creep away, trying to use the folds of the terrain in order to get out of the destructive fire. Much of the first line burned down in a matter of minutes. It was immediately clear that the shock wedge of both corps had met well-organized anti-tank defenses.
Thus, the first decisive blow of the two tank corps did not work.
The enemy did not allow the first line of tanks to approach the distance from which the T-34, let alone the T-70, could conduct effective fire. The enemy simply shot the first line, and the rest of the tanks stopped and began to engage in firefight from the spot.
The command understood that the infliction of a frontal strike by two corps, no matter how cynical it sounds, initially put an end to the brigades of the first echelon. Having burned out, they had to pave the way for the further movement of tanks of the second echelon. The brigades of the second echelon were drawn into battle only when the brigades of the first echelon were stopped and half of their vehicles had already been knocked out.
The tanks could not break through between the railway and the state farm through the ridge of height 252.2, the enemy effectively used the capabilities of his anti-tank defense. As a result, the area 1 km north and northeast of the height turned out to be a real graveyard for tank battalions, here at the beginning of the attack they suffered the greatest losses.
After the entry of the second and third echelons, the number of tanks in the direction of the main attack of the two corps almost doubled, the enemy artillerymen and tankers could not stop the onslaught of our tankers. This helped a group of combat vehicles break through to the ridge and into the area of the state farm.
From the first hour the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm and the height of 252.2 resembled the surf. Four tank brigades, three self-propelled guns batteries and two rifle regiments rolled into the area in waves, but, having met fierce enemy resistance, they again retreated. This went on for almost five hours, until the tankers drove the enemy out of the area, suffering colossal losses.
It is difficult to understand the logic of the command. Why for such a long time significant forces of armored vehicles rushed to a powerful anti-tank stronghold, if after the first hour of the battle it was clear that it was necessary to change tactics?
At 10.30–11.00, the advance of four tank brigades had already been stopped, and a heavy fire battle began with a well-organized anti-tank defense. There was only a local breakthrough of our tankers to a depth of 5 km near the Komsomolets state farm, but the Germans were able to eliminate it. This was the most massive and deepest breakthrough of our tanks, but it turned out to be the last. For its development, the Soviet command no longer had any forces left.
The version about massive head-on collisions of Soviet and German tanks in this battle is not confirmed by anything. There was no need to push German tanks towards the Soviet tanks rushing at full speed. The Germans had a well-organized defense, their task was to repel all available means of the advancing Soviet tanks with fire, which they did.
There were only isolated oncoming battles of Soviet and German tanks. In the area of height 252.2 there were several such battles between groups of combat vehicles, but this took place already in the afternoon, when the Germans launched a counteroffensive. At this point, the initiative came already from their tank units. The total number of tanks on both sides participating in such battles did not exceed 50-60 units.
With the support of the counteroffensive, our aviation also acted rather unsuccessfully. She failed to fully provide cover for the counterstrike group, as well as inflict significant damage on enemy troops. Moreover, the pilots, especially the attack aircraft, systematically carried out bomb-assault strikes against the troops of almost all the armies that had gone over to the offensive.
Often, the pilots did not pay attention to the signals given by their troops. It got to the point that in some areas the rifle subunits did not specifically point out the front line with rockets and panels, for fear of falling under their own bombs. Driven to despair, some formations "drove away" their planes with small arms fire.
Thus, the strike wedge of the tank army, supported by two rifle divisions, despite all efforts, did not manage to overcome the stubborn resistance of the enemy. The main forces of our group, having taken height 252.2, were still in its vicinity to the west and south-west of it.
After continuous attacks, the forces of both tank corps were at the end by 15.00. In the brigades, 10-15 vehicles remained in the ranks, and in some even fewer - 5-7. But the counterattack continued, the command at all levels received orders not to stop in any way, but to continue pressing the enemy. But the forces were gone, the possibilities of connections were melting with every hour.
Already in the afternoon it became obvious that the general operational situation was developing far from what the command had expected. Although it has not yet lost hope of turning the tide in its favor. But the enemy offered stubborn resistance along the entire front. It became clear that the counterattack of the two Guards armies did not justify hopes, while the troops suffered heavy losses.
The first blow of the brigades of the two Soviet corps, which looked like one united attack, lasted until about 11.00 and ended with a transition to the defense after the liberation of the Oktyabrsky state farm at about 13.30-14.00. The Oktyabrsky state farm and height 252, 2 in the course of the battle changed hands several times, and only after 17.00 the enemy was for the last time knocked out from the height 252.2 and it remained behind the Soviet troops.
Between 14.00 and 14.30 the Germans almost completely halted the offensive of the tank corps and their brigades, after incurred losses, basically lost their combat effectiveness. After 15.00, the Soviet command no longer doubted that the counterstrike plan had failed. In addition, it became obvious that the enemy not only stopped the main grouping of troops, but was also trying to push it back. Combat operations to deliver the counterstrike between 20.00 and 21.00 were completely suspended, and the rifle divisions took up the defensive line.
Thus ended the Soviet tankers' counterstrike, on which so many hopes were pinned. Despite the colossal efforts of the high command, officers and ordinary soldiers, it was not possible to achieve the set goal (breaking through the enemy's defense). The advance of the German troops was only stopped. For the sake of completeness, it is probably worth explaining how the German and Soviet sides evaluated the results of this battle and what losses the sides suffered.
The end follows …
