The Boxer tank was distinguished by another unusual element - a fundamentally new approach to creating a tank control complex not as a separate unit, but as part of combat assets on the battlefield, interconnected into a single whole. In this tank, ideas were first laid to implement what is now called a network-centric tank.
Instead of creating separate systems and devices at the stage of developing the concept of the tank, the creation of a single control complex was laid down, dividing it into systems that ensure the solution of the tasks facing the tank's crew. After the analysis, four tasks were identified - fire control, movement, protection and interaction of tanks with other tanks attached to units and means.
Under these tasks, four tank information and control systems (TIUS) were laid, operating autonomously and via digital communication channels exchanging the necessary information with each other. All the instruments and systems of the tank were combined into a single integrated system, and at the development stage, a standard digital information exchange channel was put into each device, allowing it to be integrated into the overall control system at any stage.
This approach made it possible to build up systems by changing only the software of the computing facilities. The main elements of TIUS were on-board computers, which did not exist at that time and had to be developed.
The most revolutionary was the interaction management system, which is now called the tactical echelon management system. The military did not ask it, we ourselves offered to implement it in the tank. To do this, it was necessary to create a tank navigation system based on GLONASS signals, special protected radio communication channels, classified equipment, reconnaissance equipment based on the then-non-existent UAVs, means of interaction with fire support and reconnaissance helicopters, equip tanks with a state recognition system by analogy with aviation.
This system made it possible to create a single covert information network of the unit, determine and display the location of its own and subordinate tanks, automatically exchange information about the state of tanks, carry out target designation and target distribution, receive intelligence from the outside, including using UAVs, control the fire and maneuver of the unit in real time.
The system included all the elements for remote control and firing from a tank using a television system and creating a robotic tank on its basis.
At the beginning of my work, I had to prove for a long time the necessity of creating such a system, introduce the concept of TIUS, theoretically substantiate the structure of the system in my dissertation and create the most complex cooperation of organizations that ensures the implementation of this task. After the support of the military, the complex began to be developed practically from scratch, while a lot of technical and organizational problems arose, some of which could not be solved.
When the first prototypes of individual subsystems began to appear, the military at all levels were amazed that such tasks could be implemented in a tank. Naturally, not everything worked out, since no one had previously developed such complexes and there was no basis for their creation.
During the development of the complex, many problems arose, for example, the developers of the signal receiver from the GLONASS satellite system could not make it in any way with a volume of less than 5 liters, and now it is a microchip in a mobile phone. To display the map of the location of the tank, light panels were needed, the development of which had not yet been completed. At the first stage, it was necessary to use panels, which were then installed only on the space station.
The development of this complex was many years ahead of its time, there were no technical means, technologies and specialized organizations for on-board computing systems, in this regard, the work progressed with difficulty and it was not possible to fully implement it on this tank.
Problematic issues when creating a tank
The adopted layout of the tank and the technical characteristics laid down made it possible to create a new generation tank. In the process of carrying out the work, despite the constant failure to meet the deadlines, neither the leadership of the military-industrial complex, nor the military had any doubts about the possibility of implementing this project.
It should be noted that the technical decisions made were not always justified. In an attempt to provide high performance, they often followed the requirements of the military, which led to an unreasonable complication of the tank's design. At the same time, an increase in some characteristics led to a decrease in others. So, the use of a 152 mm cannon led to an increase in the mass of the tank and, as a consequence, to a decrease in its mobility and maneuverability.
Placing a large amount of ammunition of this caliber in an automated ammunition stowage led to the complication of the automatic loader and a decrease in its reliability. In this regard, the use of a 152 mm cannon on a mass tank requires serious analysis, it may be advisable to modify the tank with different gun calibers.
The adopted configuration with a semi-extended gun at the first stage without an armored casing was a beautiful technical solution, but not fully completed. Instead of looking for a structure that would ensure reliable operation outside the reserved space, they made a simple decision and booked a cannon, which led to an increase in the height and weight of the tank.
The development of a power plant based on only one type of two-stroke engine was not entirely justified, it was advisable to lay a reserve power plant as well. A fundamentally new four-stroke engine was being developed, but work on it was curtailed.
During the development process, complex technical problems arose in individual units of the tank and they were gradually solved. Most of the problems were with the automatic loader due to the limited volume allocated for it in the tank and the large amount of ammunition. The first two designs were unsuccessful, the drum-type design then adopted was worked out at the stand and did not cause any questions.
The gun created for the tank was too large in mass and there were problems with its automation. At the first shots, even the balls in pursuit were deformed from the heavy load on the turret shoulder strap. After a series of measures to reduce the mass and design improvements, everything was eliminated and there were no special complaints on subsequent firing from the tank.
Serious attention has been paid to reducing bore wear. in Volgograd, they worked out the chrome plating technology, which makes it possible to significantly increase the wear resistance of the barrel. The development of high-power ammunition did not cause any particular problems, especially when they switched to unitary ammunition.
The engine on the first sample periodically overheated, attempts to solve this problem by modifying the ejection cooling system did not lead to success, as a result of the ball, a fan engine cooling system was introduced and tests confirmed its effectiveness.
The sighting system for the tank was multifunctional and complex. Its design was based on technical solutions worked out or used earlier in other complexes. Therefore, there could be no problems with technical implementation, except for the development of a CO2 laser, which required additional serious research. The principles of creating guided weapons were also worked out and tested when creating other complexes. The sighting complex was not manufactured within the specified time due to the complete disorganization of the work of the complex developer.
There were serious technical and organizational problems in the management complex and TIUS. The industry did not have the technology and technical means to carry out such work, and there were no organizations with experience in creating systems of this level. Attempts to entrust this work to non-specialized organizations of the Ministry of Defense Industry and Miradioprom did not lead to success.
Only the organizations of the rocket and space complex had such technologies and technical means. After several setbacks, which took years, it was finally decided to involve the organizations of this department in this work.
In 1990, the work on the creation of a control complex and TIUS was entrusted to the leading organization for rocket and space systems - NIIAP (Moscow). After getting acquainted with the complex, they confirmed the correctness of the chosen direction and expressed their readiness to implement it, but too much time was lost. They started developing the complex too late, the Union collapsed and that was the end of it.
Thus, there were no fundamental problems that could lead to the impossibility of creating a tank. I had to take part in the consideration of issues on the tank at the Councils of Chief Designers, meetings and collegia in the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Radio Industry, and repeatedly visited the Kremlin offices of the military-industrial complex with Kuzmin and Kostenko.
There was always one question, when will you make a tank and why the terms of its development are missed. Questions about the failed concept of the tank or the termination of work were never raised. All only demanded the fulfillment of the specified deadlines, while doing nothing to organize the work.
It would seem that with such interest and the absence of technical problems, the tank should have been developed. A natural question arises - why did this not happen? My constant opponent Murakhovsky answered it most accurately and colorfully. About ten years ago, when discussing the fate of this tank on the Internet, he wrote that "the times of Stalin's commissars are over." You cannot say more precisely, in essence it is so, it was a time of complete degradation and collapse in the country, and this also affected the military-industrial complex. Complete irresponsibility and impunity, for years you could do nothing and get away with it.
Leaders at all levels, from ministers to directors of organizations and chief designers, did not take any measures to organize the work, they missed deadlines, they were assigned new ones, they also thwarted these deadlines until the Union collapsed. The last time the terms of the state tests of the tank were postponed to 1992, but that was already a different historical era.
No one stopped work on the tank, she herself died already in Ukraine. In this wretched state, it was ridiculous to talk about carrying out such a scale of work. I had to report to the first Ukrainian Minister of Industry, Lobov, and he asked me a question, why did I not agree on the development of the complex with Yeltsin ?! It was difficult to imagine a more stupid question. The wretched and pathetic ukroruleviteli also finish off the KMDB, where the remnants of the Soviet school of tank building are still preserved.
The ideas put into the Boxer tank were partially embodied in subsequent tank developments. The cannon, removed and half-removed from the turret, makes it possible to implement the concepts of tanks of a non-traditional layout and to look for options for a significant increase in their firepower.
The concept of creating a network-centric tank is only now beginning to be implemented; finally, this time has come and tanks are acquiring a fundamentally new quality that allows them to effectively manage a unit on the battlefield. Separate elements of this complex are also introduced into the Armata tank. Only the same performers who did not work very successfully on the Boxer tank are alarming, but more than thirty years have passed, perhaps they have already mastered something.
The history of the creation of the Boxer tank is very instructive in its finale, when inactivity and impunity of leaders and officials of different levels can bury breakthrough technical solutions in the creation of military equipment.
