Bashar al-Assad needs to work very hard to thwart the West's plans to "reformat" his country.
For more than a year, the attention of the whole world has been riveted on the Middle East region, where the fate of many peoples of Muslim countries is once again being decided. The new object of direct state interests of the United States and its NATO allies is Syria with the regime of Bashar al-Assad, which is undesirable to the West. The country is teetering on the brink of a real civil war with numerous human and material losses. The civilian population is dying, the warring parties, as usual, mutually blame each other for this. Opposition detachments, supported by the West, acquire an organized structure, a unified management, receive support with weapons, ammunition, food, etc. from the territory of Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, since the land and air borders of Syria are practically open. Government forces hold cities and large populated areas, while the opposition controls about half of the country's territory, including almost all of the countryside.
The preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria is of great geopolitical importance. The stability and power of Syria is extremely important for Russia, which is striving to maintain its influence in the Middle East region. It is quite obvious that the military intervention of the West and the overthrow of the legitimate government of Syria will open a direct path of aggression against Iran, which, in the end, will pose a certain threat to Russia itself.
Syria's geopolitical position is extremely unenviable. The country is in a hostile environment: from the south - Israel, blazing Lebanon, in the east - unstable Palestine, Iraq, from the north - hostile Turkey.
Syria's military doctrine is built on the principle of defense sufficiency, which determines the development of the armed forces. They see Israel as the main enemy in Damascus, not excluding the threat of military conflicts with Iraq and Turkey.
The Syrian Armed Forces have developed on the basis of these tasks and today are one of the strongest among the Armed Forces of the countries of the Arab world. Powerful ground forces (3 army corps, 12 divisions, 7 of them tank, 12 separate brigades, 10 special forces regiments, a separate tank regiment) are in dire need of cover from air strikes. The combat capabilities of the Israeli and Turkish aircraft exceed the capabilities of the Syrian Air Force by an order of magnitude. Undoubtedly, Syria, like any country, is incapable of resisting the actions of the united air force of the coalition of NATO states in the event of their conducting air operations. Therefore, the Syrians have long been concerned about the development of an air defense system, acquiring modern air defense systems in Russia, Belarus, and China. According to experts, the Syrian air defense system today is a rather formidable force.
The destruction of a Turkish reconnaissance aircraft by Syrian air defenses on June 22, 2012 clearly confirms this. According to many political analysts, the downed Phantom was almost a guarantee of preventing the impending NATO armed intervention hurrying to help the opposition. The effectiveness of the Syrian air defense cannot be compared with the air defense of Libya, which was unable in any way to withstand the modern NATO air force grouping.
Let's take a closer look at the state of the heroic air defense, consider some of the features of the construction of its components, and try to give an objective assessment of the combat capabilities of the guarantor of sovereignty and the preservation of Syrian statehood.
What is in the arsenal of the Syrian air defense forces?
The Syrian air defense forces are armed with anti-aircraft missile and artillery systems and complexes of both modern and outdated types that have gone through the Arab-Israeli war 40 years ago. At one time, the Soviet Union provided truly invaluable assistance ($ 13.4 billion in debt!) In the supply of weapons, training of personnel, so practically all weapons (not only anti-aircraft weapons) are of Soviet and Russian origin. Today, the Syrian air defense system includes about 900 air defense systems and more than 4000 anti-aircraft guns of various modifications. The S-200 "Angara" and S-200V "Vega" (about 50 launchers), S-75 "Dvina" air defense systems have the greatest range in terms of range; S-75M "Volga". Israel's extreme concern is caused by modern medium-range air defense systems - the S-300 of early modifications (48 air defense systems), which were allegedly supplied by Russia at the end of 2011 (according to other sources, by Belarus and China). The largest representation in the air defense system of Syria has air defense systems and medium-range air defense systems, among which there are modern complexes Buk-M1-2, Buk-M2E (36 SDU, 12 ROM), as well as obsolete air defense systems C-125 Neva, S -125M "Pechora" (140 PU), 200 SPU "Cube" ("Square"), 14 batteries of the "Osa" air defense missile system (60 BM). In addition, in 2006, a contract was signed for the supply of 50 of the most modern Pantsir-S1E air defense missile systems to Syria, some of which are already in service. As part of the ground forces there are PU SAM "Strela-1", BM "Strela-10" (35 units), about 4000 MANPADS "Strela-2 / 2M)", "Strela-3", more than 2000 anti-aircraft artillery complexes ZU-23 -2, ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" (400 units). Anti-aircraft artillery guns of 37 mm and 57 mm calibers, as well as 100 mm KS-19 cannons are in long-term storage.
As you can see, the bulk of air defense missile systems and air defense systems (about 80%) is represented by obsolete weapons and military equipment. Nevertheless, over the past years, all the complexes have undergone (or are undergoing) deep modernization and, to one degree or another, meet modern requirements.
Radar reconnaissance equipment is represented by P-12, P-14, P-15, P-30, P-35, P-80 radars, PRV-13, PRV-16 radio altimeters, the development ideology of which dates back to the second half of the last century. This technique 30-40 years ago in the Arab-Israeli wars could somehow resist the then air enemy, using the existing modes of detuning from various types of interference, changing operating frequencies, etc. Today, these samples, firstly, have developed a technical resource, in - secondly, they are hopelessly behind the potential enemy's capabilities to deliver "electronic strikes". In the best case, the air defense group can use these radars in peacetime while on alert in order to detect intruder aircraft, open the beginning of an attack by air attack weapons, air traffic control, etc.
In order for an air defense system to work effectively, it is necessary that all its components fulfill their functional purpose, contributing to the solution of air defense tasks. It is impossible to judge the power of the air defense system by the fact of the defeat of one aircraft violating the state border shot down in peacetime. The situation in the course of hostilities will be completely different. The massive use of small-sized air targets - WTO elements (such as UAVs, cruise missiles, UABs, guided missiles, etc.), the use of intense fire and electronic countermeasures against air defense weapons, the disabling of the control and reconnaissance system, the widespread use of false and distracting goals - in such incredibly difficult conditions the air defense system will function. Reflecting the strikes of modern air defense systems, united in a complex highly organized system, is possible only when opposed to it with an adequate highly effective air defense system. Here, the state and capabilities of control systems, reconnaissance of an air enemy and warning about him, a carefully organized and built system of anti-aircraft missile and artillery cover (ZRAP), as well as a fighter-air cover (IAP) acquire particular importance.
CONTROL SYSTEM
The combat control system of Syrian air defense groupings is built according to the usual classical scheme, uniting the directorates and headquarters of the air defense zones (North and South), command posts (control points) of anti-aircraft missile (artillery) formations, units and subunits, radio engineering units and subunits. The communication system is represented by traditional tropospheric, relay, short-wave radio communication channels; wire communication is also widely used.
Air defense coverage area of the main territory of Syria. The affected areas of the C-75 air defense missile systems are marked in red, the C-125 - blue, the C-200 - purple, 2K12 "Square" - green.
There are three fully computerized command posts to control the forces and means of air defense. They make it possible, before the start of an anti-aircraft battle, to ensure the work of command and control bodies in organizing air defense, planning combat operations, and to exchange operational and tactical information. The capabilities of the centralized automated control of the combat operations of the entire air defense grouping are very low due to a number of reasons.
First, the level of equipping air defense formations and units with modern automation equipment is extremely low. The anti-aircraft combat control system is represented by ACS samples from the composition of anti-aircraft missile systems and systems, moreover, from the old fleet. For example, KSAU ASURK-1M (1MA), Vector-2, Almaz, Senezh-M1E, Proton, Baikal are used to control the S-75, S-125 and S-200 air defense systems, which were put into service in the middle of the last century. The ideology of combat control of air defense systems, implemented in these systems, is completely unsuitable for modern conditions and is hopelessly outdated. The available models of ACS make it possible to solve in an automated way the tasks of collecting, processing, displaying and transmitting radar information as applied to the command post of separate homogeneous air defense formations (divisions, regiments, brigades). Centralized control of combat operations of mixed air defense groupings both in zones and in large formations has not been implemented due to the lack of automated control systems for solving these tasks.
On the one hand, it is known that the decentralization of command and control significantly reduces the overall effectiveness of the air defense system due to the lack of interaction, omission of air targets, excessive concentration of fire, etc. interference, powerful fire resistance, independent actions of anti-aircraft fire weapons can be the only effective way to solve air defense problems. The development of detailed instructions for firing and interaction with the allocation of critical space between fire units in a grouping and between groupings before the battle can significantly bring the effectiveness of an air defense system closer to the potential. In these circumstances, decentralized governance may be preferable. A striking example of the defectiveness of excessive centralization of control is the unpunished landing on Red Square of a light-engine aircraft that took place 25 years ago, which flew through a fairly strong air defense grouping in the west of the USSR, uselessly awaiting from Moscow a command to open fire and defeat an air target detected and accompanied by it.
Secondly, the situation with the state of the automated control system in combat not only at the command post (PU) of the air defense groupings, but also in the anti-aircraft weapons themselves, is far from being safe. For example, the PU-12 battery command post for the Osa air defense system automatically solves only a narrow range of tasks for setting and tracking routes according to the data of its own radar, recalculating radar data from a “digital” source. Moreover, target designation for combat vehicles has to be issued in a non-automated way, by voice with the issuance of target coordinates, which also reduces the effectiveness of control. Considering that the Osa complexes are currently covered by the S-200 brigades, which can be destroyed by cruise missiles, UABs and other small, high-speed targets, the use of PU-12 in conditions of extreme time pressure becomes practically useless.
To control the Kvadrat air defense system, the K-1 (Crab) control complex, created in 1957-1960, is used. The complex allows on the spot and in motion to visually display the air situation on the brigade commander's console according to information from the adjacent radar station of the old fleet. Operators have to manually simultaneously process up to 10 targets, issue target designations for them with forced guidance of antenna guidance stations. To detect an enemy aircraft and issue target designation to a battalion, taking into account the distribution of targets and the transfer of fire, it takes 25-30 seconds, which is unacceptable in the conditions of modern rapid air combat. The range of radio links is limited and amounts to only 15–20 km.
The automated fire control system of modern air defense missile systems and air defense systems Buk-M2E, S-300 and Pantsir-S1E (if they are supplied fully equipped with combat control points) have higher capabilities. In these ACS tools, the tasks of automated development of solutions for repelling air attack strikes (firing), setting fire missions, monitoring their implementation, regulating the consumption of missiles (ammunition), organizing interaction, documenting combat work, etc. are solved.
Nevertheless, along with a high level of automation of fire control processes among the components of the complex, the problem of interaction with external air defense means remains unresolved. With such a variety of means of a mixed air defense grouping, the problem of organizing a centralized automated control of it comes to the fore.
Thirdly, the problem is aggravated also due to the impossibility of information and technical interaction of various KSAU. The system for collecting and processing radar information with such an ACS equipment can only be non-automated using tablets. Radar information obtained using radars of the P-12, P-14, P-15, P-30, P-35, P-80, PRV-13 and PRV-16 types (possibly the radar of the new fleet) can be processed and was used with the use of automated posts for processing radar information (PORI-1, PORI-2), but Syria has no information about their presence. As a result, the air enemy reconnaissance and warning system will operate with a large delay in radar information.
Thus, in the face of intense fire and electronic countermeasures, the centralized control of air defense weapons when equipped with outdated ACS models will undoubtedly be lost, which will reduce the group's potential for destroying air targets.
RADIO ENGINEERING
The combat use of the Syrian radio-technical forces (RTV) groupings has a number of characteristic features. The increased role of radio-technical troops in the air defense system in armed conflicts of recent decades is quite obvious, on the effectiveness of which the quality of control mainly depends, and therefore the success of the fight against enemy aircraft and unmanned vehicles. Nevertheless, one of the weak points of the Syrian air defense is the radio-technical troops, equipped with outdated radar stations that have completely exhausted their service life. About 50% of the radars in service with radio engineering companies, battalions and brigades require major repairs, 20-30% are not ready. The P-12, P-14, P-15, P-30, P-35, P-80 radars are well known to American military specialists and their colleagues from NATO in Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli wars and the wars in the Persian Gulf.
One of the most modern anti-aircraft weapons in Syria is the Pantsir-S1E air defense missile system.
At the same time, a significant qualitative breakthrough has taken place in the development and combat use of Western air defense forces over the past few decades. It is quite obvious that the Syrian (read, also Soviet) RTV weapons are not able to effectively counter modern air attack weapons for a number of reasons:
1. Low noise immunity of the RTV grouping. The radar prototypes designed in the middle of the last century, as well as the RTV grouping created on their basis, were able to ensure the performance of combat missions in conditions of the use of active noise interference of low intensity (up to 5-10 W / MHz), and in certain sectors (in certain directions) - in the conditions of using active noise interference of medium intensity (30-40 W / MHz). In the 2003 operation "Shock and Awe" against Iraq, the forces and means of electronic warfare of the NATO coalition created interference densities two orders of magnitude higher - up to 2-3 kW / MHz in the barrage mode and up to 30-75 kW / MHz in the sighting mode. At the same time, the RTV RES and the S-75 and S-125 air defense systems, which are in service with the Iraqi air defense, were suppressed at 10-25 W / MHz.
2. Low level of automation of control of forces and means of radar reconnaissance. The radar reconnaissance means available in the RTV of Syria are not capable of functioning in a single information space due to the absence of a single automated center for collecting and processing information. The collection and processing of information in a non-automated way leads to large inaccuracies, delays in the transmission of data on air targets up to 4–10 minutes.
3. The impossibility of creating a radar field with the required parameters. The fragmentary radar field makes it possible to assess only a private air situation and make individual decisions on it for the conduct of hostilities. When creating an RTV grouping, it is necessary to take into account the geographic features of the area of upcoming combat operations, its limited size, the presence of large zones of airspace uncontrolled by the grouping of radio-technical forces. Mountainous areas are not very suitable for deploying RTV units, therefore the creation of a continuous radar field is extremely problematic. The maneuvering capabilities of RTV subunits and units are also extremely limited.
The features of the difficult terrain make it possible to create a three-band radar field with the following parameters:
- the height of the lower border of the continuous radar field: over the territory of Syria, in the coastal region and along the line of divorce from Israel - 500 m; along the border with Lebanon - 500m; over the territory of Lebanon - 2000 m;
- along the border with Turkey - 1000 - 3000 m; along the border with Iraq - 3000 m;
- the height of the upper boundary of the continuous radar field over the territory of Syria - 25,000 m;
- the depth of the radar field (removal of the detection lines) beyond the Syrian-Israeli border can be 50 - 150 km;
- overlap of the radar field - two to three times;
- at altitudes of 100–200 m, the radar field is only focal in nature in almost all important directions.
Of course, the ongoing modernization of the obsolete Soviet-made radars that are in service is helping to increase the effectiveness of the RTV grouping in Syria. For example, in early 2012, the Russian radar station deployed on Mount Jabal al-Harrah south of Damascus and the Syrian radar station located in Lebanon on Mount Sanin were modernized. This led to the ability to quickly receive warning information about possible air attacks from Israel. However, to solve the problem, it is necessary to radically re-equip RTVs with modern effective radars. This is partly the case with the supply of air defense systems and air defense missile systems, which include modern radars with high energy and noise immunity.
Taking into account the peculiarities of RTV equipment, the terrain, the experience of the combat use of forces and reconnaissance means of the air enemy of Syria, a number of basic organizational and tactical recommendations can be proposed.
It is advisable to introduce corner reflectors and portable radar radiation simulators (IRIS) into the radar reconnaissance subunits as standard elements of the battle order. Corner reflectors should be installed at false and combat (spare) positions in groups or singly at a distance of up to 300 m from the radar (SURN, SOTs BM). Portable IRIS should be installed at a distance of several hundred meters to several kilometers from the antenna post or SURN air defense missile system.
Use radars that are out of order, but with working transmission systems as false (distracting) ones. The deployment of such radars should be carried out at combat positions at a distance of 300–500 m from command posts (command posts), and should be switched on for radiation with the beginning of an enemy air attack.
Deploy a network of air observation posts at all command and control (PU) and in the areas of probable actions of enemy air forces, equipping them with means of observation, communication and data transmission. Organize special operational channels for the transmission of especially important information for prompt notification of overflights.
A complex of organizational measures is of great importance for enhancing the concealment of elements of the reconnaissance system of an air enemy. Careful camouflage and engineering equipment should be carried out at each radar position immediately after deployment. Trench trenches for reconnaissance stations so that the lower radiator of the antenna is at ground level. All cable facilities should be carefully covered to a depth of 30-60 cm. Near each radar station, trenches and slots should be equipped to shelter personnel. The change of positions of the radar reconnaissance units should be carried out immediately after the overflights of the reconnaissance aircraft, after working on radiation even for a short time, while being at the position for more than four hours.
To reduce the visibility of the radar in the visible and infrared ranges against the surrounding background, carry out camouflage and deforming coloring, create false thermal targets from available means (making fires, lighting torches, etc.). False thermal targets must be placed on the ground at real distances corresponding to the distances between elements of battle formations. It is advisable to use false thermal targets in combination with corner reflectors, covering them with camouflage nets.
Most of all in the air defense system of Syria is outdated medium-range air defense systems, among which, in particular, about 200 SPU "Kvadrat".
In the conditions of the use of the WTO by the enemy, create radar fields for duty and combat modes. A standby radar field should be created on the basis of a standby radar of the meter range of waves, which should be deployed at temporary positions. To create a combat mode radar field covertly on the basis of modern combat mode radars from the air defense missile systems (SAM) entering service. On missile-hazardous areas, create warning lanes based on low-altitude radars, as well as visual observation posts. When choosing positions for their deployment, ensure that the closing angles in the sectors of probable detection of cruise missiles do not exceed 4-6 minutes. The reconnaissance of the enemy air before the start of active air attack operations should be conducted with radars, mainly of the meter wave range, from temporary positions. Turn off these radars and maneuver to reserve positions immediately after turning on the combat mode radar in combat positions.
In order to organize the protection of the radar from the strikes of anti-radar missiles (PRR) in the radar reconnaissance units, it is necessary to carry out the following measures:
- purposefully carry out psychological training of personnel and training of combat crews in combat work when the enemy uses PRR;
- to carry out an early and thorough analysis of the expected directions, areas, hidden routes for the launch of missile launchers to the missile launch lines;
- to carry out timely opening of the beginning of the enemy air strike and detection of the approach of its carrier aircraft to the launch lines of the missile defense system;
- to implement strict regulation of the operation of RES for radiation (it is preferable to use radars of the meter wavelength range and PRV for detecting and tracking targets);
- at the stage of organizing hostilities, carry out the maximum frequency spacing of the same type of RES in subunits, provide for a periodic frequency maneuver;
- immediately turn off the radar of the centimeter and decimeter wavelengths after the launches of the PRR.
These and a number of other measures are undoubtedly known to the combat crews of the radar station, who have studied the experience of combat operations and are preparing for a modern war. Despite the seeming simplicity and accessibility, their implementation, as practice shows, makes it possible to significantly increase the survivability of elements of the reconnaissance system of an air enemy in conditions of strong fire and electronic countermeasures.
POTENTIAL IS THERE, BUT IT IS INSUFFICIENT
With the available number of air defense systems and air defense systems, as well as numerous anti-aircraft artillery complexes, the anti-aircraft missile and artillery cover (ZRAP) system of Syria's air defense is capable of creating sufficiently high densities of fire over the main objects of the country and military groups.
The presence in the air defense system of different types of air defense systems, air defense systems and ZAK allows you to build a multi-layer system of anti-aircraft fire with a concentration of their efforts to cover the most important objects. Thus, the S-200 system will make it possible to destroy the most important targets at ranges of 140 - 150 km from the borders of the sea coast, at ranges of up to 100 km from large industrial centers and in mountainous areas adjacent to Lebanon and Turkey. The S-75, S-300 systems have a reach of up to 50-70 km above the covered objects (taking into account the values of the closing angles and the effect of interference). The fire capabilities of the modern air defense systems and air defense systems "Buk-M1-2, 2E" and "Pantsir-S1E" will provide a high density of fire at medium altitudes and ranges up to 20-25 km. The ZRAP system at low and extremely low altitudes is supplemented by the fire of numerous ZAK such as "Shilka", S-60, KS-19.
An analysis of the fire system shows that between the Northern and Southern zones of Syrian air defense there is a gap in the integral zone of destruction, primarily at extremely low, low and medium altitudes. Although the gap in the affected area is covered by two or three S-200 air defense systems from the side of each zone, it is likely that the position of their starting positions has long been reconnoitered and known to the enemy. With the beginning of active hostilities, cruise missile strikes will first of all be carried out on these launch positions, so it is advisable to keep S-300P air defense systems and Buk-M2E air defense systems in a buried reserve in this direction in the Northern and Southern air defense groupings to restore the damaged fire system.
In addition, there is a hidden approach from the north-western direction at extremely low and low altitudes in the Northern Air Defense Zone, covered by three C-200 divisions, three C-75 divisions and two C-125 divisions, whose positions are undoubtedly also reconnoitered. With the beginning of active operations of enemy aircraft, cruise missiles will be launched against these positions, the air defense systems of the air defense missile systems will be exposed to active interference from which these types of complexes are actually not protected. In this case, in this direction, it is necessary to keep in a hidden reserve the S-300P air defense system, the Buk-M2E air defense system to strengthen the fire system and restore it.
To repel air attack strikes from Ar-Rakan (northern), Al-Khasan (northeastern), Daur-Azzavr directions, which remain undisguised in the general air defense system, it is advisable to organize several air defense groups for operations from ambushes and as nomads. Such groups should include the Buk-M2E air defense missile system, the Pantsir-S1E air defense missile system, MANPADS, 23-mm and 57-mm anti-aircraft guns.
A preliminary, superficial assessment of the fire system shows that the main efforts of the air defense forces are concentrated on covering two directions: southwestern (border with Lebanon and Israel) and northwestern (border with Turkey). The most powerful air defense "umbrella" was created over the cities of Damascus, Hama, Idlib, Aleppo (the capital, large industrial and administrative centers). In addition, in these cities are the main airfields for the basing of both civil and military aviation, as well as large groupings of government forces. It is positive that long-range air defense systems cover the main territory of the country, while ensuring the removal of the affected area far to the approaches to the main administrative and industrial centers, seaports, airfields, and groupings of troops. An exception is an open area in northeastern Syria, bordering Iraq.
Downed on March 25, 1999 MiG-29 of the Yugoslav Air Force. In the event of a NATO air operation, Syrian fighters will face the same fate.
The stationary ZRAP system is the basis for covering ground forces, which is supplemented by fire from barreled anti-aircraft mobile air defense systems. As already noted, there are up to 4000 units of these means in the regular structures of tank (mechanized) divisions and brigades (there are about 400 ZSU "Shilka" alone). These means are quite effective in the fight against low-flying aircraft and helicopters, they are mobile, mobile and represent, in combination with other means, a rather formidable force.
The air defense grouping is capable of fighting all types of air targets in the entire range of altitudes, the potential capabilities of the air defense grouping make it possible to destroy up to 800 air defense forces of a potential enemy before the ammunition load of missiles and ammunition is used up in simple, interference-free conditions. The multiplicity of overlap of the affected zones is 8 - 12 and allows: to concentrate fire of several complexes (mainly of different types) to defeat the most dangerous and important targets, to keep a sufficient number of air defense forces and means in reserve, if necessary, to carry out a maneuver to restore the broken fire system of the air defense group, to carry out maneuver with fire in the course of repelling enemy air strikes.
As you can see, the potential capabilities of the Syrian air defense system are quite high. The coastal Mediterranean zone of Syria, especially in the area of the seaports of Tartus, Baniyas, Latakia, is covered with greater reliability by air defense means. In addition to the existing stationary air defense systems, the Buk-M2E air defense systems that have recently entered service with the Syrian air defense system are presumably deployed in these areas. A Turkish reconnaissance aircraft shot down in this area flew along the coast of Syria, undoubtedly, in order to open its national air defense system, "get acquainted" with the new weapons that appeared, provoke the air defense locators to work in an active mode, identify their location, discover open areas in the air defense zones, evaluate the capabilities of the entire system. Well, to some extent the reconnaissance plane succeeded. The destruction of the Turkish intelligence officer demonstrated that Syria has an air defense system and is capable of performing combat missions.
However, it is too early to talk about its effectiveness in excellent tones. The ZRAP system, like other components of the Syrian air defense system, is far from perfect. The optimistic picture is clouded by the fact that the bulk of anti-aircraft missile weapons are outdated and do not meet today's high requirements. Armament and equipment - ideas and production of the middle of the last century - are unable to withstand a highly organized, technically equipped air enemy, which has in its arsenal the most modern systems of reconnaissance, control, fire and electronic countermeasures.
The main types of air defense systems of the old park (air defense systems S-200, S-75, S-125, "Osa", "Kvadrat") are poorly protected from passive interference, practically not protected from active interference, do not have special modes of operation in the conditions of using WTO elements (PRR, UR, UAB). The experience of local wars and conflicts shows that the enemy will make every effort to reduce the fire capabilities of the air defense grouping, counter the firing of the ZK and reduce their effectiveness to a minimum. Practice shows that the air defense system will be the primary target of destruction when powerful fire strikes of cruise missiles, "electronic strike" are suppressed and destroyed within 3-4 days of reconnaissance, command and control systems, fire weapons of the air defense system. There are plenty of examples of this. In conditions of strong fire and electronic countermeasures of the air enemy, the capabilities of the Syrian air defense group in the initial period of the war can be reduced by 85-95%.
Of course, the full realization of the potential fire capabilities of the air defense grouping is very problematic and practically impracticable. However, using a set of measures of an organizational and tactical nature, it is possible to significantly increase the survivability of the system, and with it, the effectiveness of air defense.
First of all, it is necessary to take organizational measures:
1. Particular attention should be paid to the development of advance instructions on firing and interaction, which is extremely important in the absence of centralized control of combat operations in the course of repelling air attack strikes. Distribution of critical space, determination of the order and sequence of destruction of air targets will effectively implement interaction between various independent air defense groups in the course of repelling a strike.
2. Create mixed air defense groupings with different types of air defense systems and air defense systems (brigades, regiments, divisions, air defense groups), using them to solve specific problems of covering important objects in different directions. At the same time, it is important to carefully build a fire system without failures (taking into account the mountainous terrain) in all altitude ranges, especially at low and extremely low altitudes.
3. For self-cover, use not only MANPADS, ZU-23, ZSU-23-4 "Shilka", but also SAM "Osa", "Kvadrat", "Pantsir-S1E", 37-mm AZP, 57-mm AZP, 100 -mm ZP, especially for self-cover of S-200 air defense systems, S-300P air defense systems.
4. Create an air defense on duty group, kept at temporary positions and conducting reconnaissance of the enemy air at peacetime frequencies.
5. Build a false fire system with a demonstration of its functioning by the work of mobile, mobile air defense systems.
6. Carefully equip the launch and firing positions in engineering terms, carry out their camouflage; equip false, prepare 2-3 spare positions.
7. On probable covert approaches of enemy aviation, foresee and plan the use of mobile air defense groups for operations as nomadic and from ambushes.
With the beginning of active operations by enemy aircraft, it is advisable to apply the following recommendations:
1. S-200, S-300P divisions should be involved only for the destruction of the most dangerous and most important targets, taking into account the possibility of their shelling.
2. To concentrate fire, use different types of air defense systems.
3. To restore the damaged fire system, use the Buk-M2E mobile air defense missile systems and the S-300P air defense missile systems.
4. Limit the operation of the radio electronic system of the air defense missile system for radiation, switch on the air defense system for radiation only if there is a control unit with a VKP.
5. Shoot at targets with a minimum parameter and in the depth of the affected area, limiting the broadcast time as much as possible.
Thus, the potential capabilities of the ZRAP system are quite high, but their implementation in the fight against a modern air enemy requires the application of certain efforts. The air defense system will show its strength only with the organized use of its components, one of which is the fighter air cover system (SIAP).
Syria's fighter air cover system has the same problems as all the country's Armed Forces. The Air Force fighter aircraft consists of four squadrons on the MiG-25, four on the MiG-23MLD, and four squadrons are armed with the MiG-29A.
The basis of fighter aircraft is 48 MiG-29A fighters, modernized at the turn of the century.30 interceptors MiG-25 and 80 (according to other sources 50) MiG-23MLD fighters are already outdated and have limited combat use. Even the most modern of the presented fleet, the MiG-29, needs improvements. In addition, the active composition of the Air Force includes over 150 MiG-21 fighters, but their combat value is very low.
The weak point of the SIAP is aerial reconnaissance. The Syrian aviation does not have airborne radars - AWACS aircraft, and therefore, in the event of an armed conflict, Syrian pilots will have to rely only on ground-based reconnaissance and guidance stations, also represented by an outdated fleet.
The effectiveness of fighter air cover depends on the number and combat capabilities of fighters, the availability of the number of fighters in various degrees of readiness, the capabilities of reconnaissance and control systems in terms of the detection range of air defense systems, the number of guidance, their stability in electronic warfare conditions, the nature of enemy aviation actions (altitude, speed, depth of strike, types of aircraft, etc.), the level of preparedness of the flight personnel, time of day, weather conditions and other factors.
The estimated efficiency of the fighter air cover (as the ratio of the number of aircrafts destroyed by fighter aircraft to the total number of aircrafts participating in the raid in the zone (area) of responsibility) will be about 6-8%. Of course, this is clearly not enough, especially since even this low efficiency can be achieved only with a high level of preparedness of the flight personnel.
Thus, SIAP's capabilities to disrupt the performance of a combat mission of enemy aircraft are extremely insignificant. The countries of the potential adversary (Israel, Turkey) have a general military-technical superiority over Syria and overwhelming in military aviation, command and control systems, communications, and intelligence. The air forces of these countries are more numerous, maneuverable, the fleet of military equipment is constantly replenished with modern weapons.
The Syrian air defense system, which contains more than 80% of obsolete weapons, can hardly count on success in countering NATO.
In general, the assessment of the state of the Syrian air defense is ambiguous and ambiguous.
On the one hand, air defense groups have a large number of samples of the most diverse anti-aircraft weapons and military equipment. The mixed principle of manning military formations makes it possible to create a multilayer system of fire in all ranges of altitudes, ensuring the shelling and destruction of the entire variety of modern air defense systems. The air defense zone over important objects (the capital, large industrial centers, seaports, groupings of troops, airfields) can have a 10-12-fold overlap of the affected and firing zones of different types of air defense systems, air defense systems and ZAK. The presence of long-range air defense systems in the groupings makes it possible to carry out the removal of the affected area to distant approaches to the covered objects. The fighter air cover system increases the ability of air defense to intercept the most dangerous air targets over areas that are difficult to reach for ground air defense systems, in important directions, etc.
The air defense system is strong enough and capable of performing combat missions both in peacetime and in wartime. Destroying single air targets, intruder aircraft, repelling low-density air attack strikes in medium-intensity interference are quite feasible tasks for the Syrian air defense.
On the other hand, having in its composition only 12-15% of modern weapons, it is difficult for an air defense system to count on success in countering a strong, highly organized, equipped with the most modern weapons, weapon control and guidance systems (primarily high-precision) air adversaries. Applying a complex of organizational, operational-tactical and technical measures, it is possible to achieve some success in the difficult task of fighting a modern air adversary. However, in its current state, the Syrian air defense system will not be able to withstand the combined air force of the coalition of Western states conducting air offensive operations using several thousand cruise missiles, fighters, bombers, combat helicopters with mandatory preliminary fire and electronic suppression of air defense systems.
The Syrian air defense desperately needs a radical re-equipment with modern military equipment, a deep modernization of existing weapons and military equipment. High-quality training of military personnel, their preparation for conducting anti-aircraft battles with a technically superior enemy, training in anti-aircraft firing techniques (missile launches) with all types of available anti-aircraft weapons, both modern and technology of the last century, is extremely important. Only under these conditions can one count on success in protecting the airspace.
