When discussing heavy armored personnel carriers, such as the Israeli Azharit or Namer, usually the argument develops in the plane of their need. Moreover, it develops in a style that is rather aggressive towards opponents. I will go from the other side and begin to develop argumentation in the opposite direction, in the plane of their uselessness.
Israeli Namer. What an absurd machine: huge and tall, with weak weapons and poor visibility. There is a large "dead zone" around it, not visible from the instruments and not fired from weapons. The corridor for the landing in the stern asks for a cumulative grenade to be stuck in it. Please note that although the Israeli soldiers feel safe, they still put their super armored personnel carrier in a kind of trench.
So, a few points.
First. As far as I can see from publications and comments, TBTR supporters are captivated by the security of the machine, which justifies all other accessories, in particular the large weight. Like, TBTR can pass under heavy enemy fire. But here one cannot but ask a simple question: if the enemy's fire is so strong and powerful, then what is the infantry to do there?
The experience of the war, after all, clearly enough shows that for the successful actions of the infantry, it is necessary to destroy the enemy, or, at least, to suppress. If not even everyone and everyone, then at least his main firing points and his heavy weapons. Within the framework of Soviet tactics, this task was carried out by artillery barrage. When it was carried out efficiently, the infantry was left with a smaller part of the combat mission, feasible for it.
In my opinion, the popularity of the TBTR arises in the conditions of the decline of artillery, when a heavy machine is trying to replace the clearly insufficient or completely absent artillery barrage. For Israel, with its specific theater of operations, this circumstance is explained by the fact that battles are being fought in densely populated areas in which artillery cannot be used - there are non-combatants all around. Therefore, the Israelis, as a rule, conduct pinpoint operations to storm a separate house, in which the militants have settled. You need to drive up to the house under fire, including RPGs and ATGMs, close to each other in order to carry out a successful attack. These peculiar conditions create the need for TBTR, determining, in particular, their design.
Thus, if we do not fight according to the Israeli method, in the absence of cities with a very high population density and development, as well as in the absence of non-combatants in the combat area, then instead of TBTR we need good artillery, and with the direct support of the infantry in the same urban battle tanks can handle it too.
Second. Subject to enemy fire and rely on the front and sides of the TBTR to withstand it, from a tactical point of view, means giving the enemy initiative. Motorized infantry with TBTR will prefer the same style of fighting: moving forward, to the enemy's defense, firing from onboard weapons so that the infantry, upon reaching the fortifications, can go out and clear them. In this concept, the bet is implicitly placed on the fact that the enemy will be weak and have little initiative, he will be afraid of steel boxes, and when he meets them, he will prefer to move away. In case he decides to shoot, the infantry will be protected by tank armor.
This is all great, until the enemy is caught evil, decisive and inventive. Tactics against TBTR can be developed without much difficulty. For example, anti-tank crews with RPGs or ATGMs, hide in camouflaged trenches and shelters, and do not open fire until the armored vehicles are close, at 70-80 meters, preferably side or stern to them. Then they hit from close range, when a miss is unlikely and there is an opportunity to aim at vulnerable spots that any armored vehicle has. There may be an addition to this tactic - a quick rapprochement and the use of overhead charges for the final destruction of the damaged armored vehicle. Guided landmines can be used to destroy the track and immobilize the vehicle.
All kinds of radars, night vision devices, infrared cameras or thermal imagers somewhat increase the capabilities of the TBTR, but they are unlikely to help make out a person hiding in a specially opened and camouflaged trench (which may have an anti-thermal shield), a crack or even a burrow from an underground tunnel. Especially in heavy rain, fog or snow. Therefore, the enemy can wait and strike for sure.
Or the reception of a tactical drape, when the enemy, when the TBTR approaches their positions, depicts a hasty retreat, and when the motorized infantry climbed out and their boxes for trophies and prisoners, abandoned and camouflaged firing points hit them. Thick armor is not a very good helper against military cunning.
In other words, motorized infantry, planted in TBTR, turns out to be very limited in the variety of tactical techniques used, which makes their actions very predictable. An enemy without armor can diversify his tactics and catch the TBTR on an unexpected move. Giving back the initiative to the enemy, and even at the level of a tactical concept, is a very bad decision. For this reason, I am generally against any "well-protected" armored vehicles for the infantry. They teach the infantry to be passive and hope that perhaps the armor will withstand.
Third. Since the TBTR, unlike the BMP-1 and its later revisions, does not provide for the possibility of firing a landing force from under the armor, it turns out that the motorized infantry will spend a significant part of the battle passively, as passengers. When they say that TBTRs can support tanks on the battlefield, this circumstance is usually forgotten. Support can be provided by the TBTR itself, with its cannons and machine guns, but not the infantry, which is deprived of this opportunity. The role of the infantry on the battlefield is essentially reduced to a trophy team; when the enemy fled, not accepting the battle with armored vehicles, the motorized infantry will pick up what the enemy threw while fleeing. If so, if the infantry is involved only in the nodding analysis, when all the work has already been done by the tanks and crews of the TBTR itself, then why is it needed there at all? The trophy team can be sent later.
Is the battle conducted by one armored vehicle?
Theoretically, you can consider a tactical concept when one armored vehicle is engaged in a battle: tanks and armored vehicles with automatic rapid-fire cannons and machine guns. But then, of all the creativity of domestic designers, the T-15 with the Boomerang-BM or AU-220M module is best suited for this purpose. Remove the troops from this vehicle, and use the vacated space for additional ammunition.
These three circumstances: replacing the suppression of the enemy with artillery preparation protection from him with armor, giving the initiative to the enemy at the level of a tactical concept, as well as the passive nature of the actions of motorized infantry, in fact, at the level of a trophy team, are quite enough to consider the idea of TBTR extremely dubious.
And now you can debate.
