In previous articles, we examined in detail the circumstances of the creation of the world's first battle cruisers of the Invincible class and the German "big" cruiser Blucher. All these ships, despite some positive qualities, were unsuccessful and, by and large, should be considered as mistakes of the British and Germans. Nevertheless, after them Great Britain continued, and Germany began building battle cruisers. The series of articles offered to your attention will be devoted to them.
Let's start with the German cruiser Von der Tann, especially since it was laid down just after the Invincibles and Blucher, but before the second series of British battle cruisers (of the Indefatigable type).
The history of the "Von der Tann" began on May 17, 1906, exactly two weeks before the German naval attaché in London transmitted information that the newest British cruisers of the "Invincible" class had received a 305-mm cannon. Surprisingly, the German battle cruiser was not invented by shipbuilders or admirals, but by Kaiser Wilhelm II.
The emperor suggested that shipbuilders develop a new type of warship for special combat operations, which, among other things, could perform the functions of a reconnaissance cruiser with a squadron, but at the same time could participate in a linear battle. At the same time, the new ship was supposed to:
1) carry at least four 280mm guns;
2) have a speed 3 knots higher than the fastest battleship.
If the author of this article managed to correctly translate the phrase "The new battleships of the Ersatz Bayern / Nassau class should form the basis of the new type", then the project of the newest German dreadnought of the "Nassau" type should be taken as the basis for development.
It is known that the idea of "Nassau" was born before the British "Dreadnought" became known in Germany. As we can see, the Germans also thought of the concept of a battle cruiser quite independently. However, the Kaiser's brilliant visionary gift should not be overestimated here: it is likely that such thoughts were prompted by his visit to Italy in 1905, during which he had the opportunity to get acquainted with the high-speed Italian battleships. It is quite possible that in this case it worked "I want the same, only better."
However, we see that, unlike the British, the Germans initially saw battlecruisers as fast battleships to serve with the squadron as a fast wing, and this was a fundamental difference in the views of the "big" cruisers among the Germans and the British. However, one should not assume that the Germans did not have a debate about a new class of warships. The main ideas of the German battle cruiser were expressed by the Kaiser, he was supported by the Imperial Naval Ministry. In a memorandum dated June 29/30, 1906, entitled "Large cruiser of 1907 and subsequent years" (the German "Law on the Fleet" regulated the laying down of warships by year, so that meant the cruiser laid down in 1907 and ships of the same class in the future) was given an excellent justification of the German type of battle cruiser. The main theses of the memorandum were as follows:
1) the British fleet has significant superiority in classic armored cruisers (the Germans used the term "large cruiser", but hereinafter, to avoid confusion, we will write "armored" for both German and English ships) and this superiority,due to the productivity of the British shipyards, it will be preserved in the future;
2) therefore, any independent operations of the few German armored cruisers, regardless of where they are carried out, are doomed to failure. Whether it is reconnaissance or other actions in the North Sea, or the classic struggle on ocean communications - in the end, the armored cruisers of Germany will be intercepted and destroyed;
3) in accordance with the above, Germany should completely abandon the construction of armored cruisers, and instead lay a new class of ships - high-speed battleships, whose main task will be to participate in a general battle as a high-speed wing.
Due to the fact that at the time of drawing up the memorandum it was already known that the British Invincibles were armed with eight 305-mm cannons, and taking into account the Japanese armored cruisers, the Naval Ministry considered that the new type of ships should have:
1) six or eight 280-mm guns in three or four two-gun turrets, or in two two-gun and four single-gun turrets;
2) eight 150-mm guns in casemates or towers;
3) other weapons were to include twenty 88-mm cannons, four 8-mm machine guns and four torpedo tubes;
4) the forward armored conning tower should have a thickness of 400 mm, or at least 300 mm, the aft one - 200 mm. Other reservations should be 10-20% thinner than Nassau-class battleships;
5) the stock of coal must be 6% of the displacement, the speed must be at least 23 knots.
On the other hand, there were high-ranking opponents to this point of view. For example, such an interpretation did not meet with any understanding from the Secretary of State of the Navy A. Tirpitz, who believed that a cruiser should be just a cruiser, and not something else. On the memorandum of the Imperial Naval Ministry, as they say, the ink had not yet dried, when in July 1906 the Marine-Rundschau magazine published an article by corvette captain Vollerthun, dedicated to the future of armored cruisers. In it, the corvette captain made a brief overview of the evolution of the class of armored cruisers, on the basis of which he told the reader:
"The modern British armored cruiser is a very expensive ship, but it does not have the qualities that would enable it to fight a modern battleship in a decisive battle."
This conclusion is undoubtedly indisputable, which cannot be said about the other statements of the author. According to his logic, since the British did not create a cruiser for a squadron battle, then Germany does not need to "run ahead of the locomotive" and an attempt at such a qualitative leap is premature. The corvette captain said that it was impossible to create a successful ship that would manage to combine the strength of a battleship and the speed of a cruiser, and that such hopes were deliberately illusory. Consequently, there is no need to try to cover the immense, but it is necessary to clearly distinguish between the tasks and tactical capabilities of the battleship and the armored cruiser. According to the author of the article, the armored cruiser should under no circumstances be used in a general battle as a ship of the line, including as a "high-speed wing".
I would like to draw the attention of dear readers to this moment. As we can see, in Germany there were different views on the tasks of armored cruisers, but for all their polarity, they were much more logical and reasonable than the considerations that guided the British when designing their armored and battle cruisers. British admirals wanted to use their moderately armored cruisers as a "fast wing" in the battle fleet, without thinking at all about what would happen to them if they were "paid attention" to the large-caliber guns of battleships or battleships. At the same time in Germany, the debate boiled down to the following: "either we are building high-speed battleships that can fight in line, or we are building conventional armored cruisers, which in no case will be put in line."
Nevertheless, it should be noted that, although the Germans independently came up with the idea of a battle cruiser, the Invincible had the most significant influence on its practical implementation. If A. Tirpitz was the enemy of the "fast battleship", he was not opposed to increasing the artillery on the armored cruisers. In the same July 1906, he ordered to prepare a draft of a battleship and an armored cruiser with 305-mm guns, and the battleship was supposed to carry twelve, and the battle cruiser - eight such guns. However, the 305-mm guns subsequently had to be abandoned, both because of the unavailability of the guns and turret installations for them, and because of the economy in displacement, which was given by the use of 280-mm guns.
After a series of meetings, the tactical and technical characteristics of the future ship were clarified: the main caliber was supposed to be eight 280-mm guns, the middle one - eight to ten 150-mm guns. The speed was supposed to be "as much as possible" close to the armored cruiser E (the future "Blucher"), the booking should provide protection against hits from 305 shells. Displacement restrictions were also present, but they were formulated somewhat differently than the British: it was assumed that the displacement of the new cruiser should not exceed that of the Erzats Bavaria (the future Nassau), from which it followed that the cruiser could be equal to the battleship in weight, but at the same time the cost of the cruiser should have been lower than that of the battleship. In addition, it was necessary to study the possibility of using turbines.
In September 1906, the design bureau presented technical projects under the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 4b, but all of them, except for No. 1 and 2, were rejected and only the latter were considered.
Both projects had the same armament: 8 * 280-mm, 8 * 150-mm, 20 * 88-mm and 4 torpedo tubes, but different placement of artillery. Surprisingly, but true: the Germans considered that the combination of one- and two-gun turrets was preferable, but they also took into account the fact that project No. 2 was a half-knot faster (2, 3-5-24 knots, versus 23-23, 5 knots at the project number 1). Interestingly, the designers could not meet the displacement requirements - it was higher than that of the Nassau, but at the same time project No. 1 was 150 tons heavier than project No. 2 - 19,500 tons versus 19,350 tons.
In order to reduce the displacement, it was proposed to leave only six 280-mm guns on the cruiser, placing them in the center plane, as was done on the Brandenburg-class battleships.
At the same time, an onboard salvo of six 280-mm guns remained, but in comparison with project No. 2, the displacement could be reduced by 800 tons. Nevertheless, such an innovation was rejected by A. Tirpitz, who quite logically objected that the idea itself was good, but the nation would not understand if, in response to an eight-gun cruiser, we build only a six-gun one.
Subsequently, many different proposals were made, including, for example, reducing the main caliber from 280 mm to 240 mm, but in this case the cruiser was obviously weaker than the British one, which was also unacceptable. As a result, we finally settled on eight 280-mm guns, while various schemes for its placement were proposed, including very original ones, such as this one
It soon became clear that the new cruiser of the given characteristics could not be "tamped" into a displacement of less than 19,000 tons, but even that was more than the weight of the Nassau, whose displacement in 1906 projects "grew" to 18,405 tons, and according to in fact, the battleship had a normal displacement of 18,569 tons, or (according to other sources) 18,870 tons. In any case, no one ever planned 19,000 tons for Nassau, nevertheless, when it became clear that the new cruiser would not work less than 19,000 tons, they resigned themselves to this and looked only to ensure that the cost did not surpass "Nassau".
The "correct" placement of the artillery was suggested to the Germans by the British. The fact is that there was a rumor that the Invincible could still operate with all eight main guns on board. In fact, this was not the case, because even theoretically, the tower of the opposite side could only fire in a narrow sector, 25-30 degrees, in fact, its shooting interfered so much with the second "traverse" tower that it could only be shot from if the tower closest to the enemy is disabled. But the Germans could not know this, so they placed the artillery in a rhombic pattern
I must say that this scheme did not immediately become the main one, because the Imperial Naval Ministry nevertheless preferred an extremely exotic scheme with three two-gun towers in the center plane and two single-gun towers on the sides (given above), in addition there were certain doubts that when using a rhombic scheme, it will be possible to shoot from a turret located on the opposite side without damaging the hull structures. However, in the end, it was the rhombic scheme that was used to further design the ship. Turbines were finally adopted for the power plant, while the new cruiser was supposed to become the first large German ship with four screws (before that, three screws were considered the standard). The displacement has grown again - up to 19,200 tons.
In the final version, the following tactical and technical characteristics of the future cruiser were determined:
Displacement (normal / full) - 19 370/21 300 tons.
Waterline length - 171.5 m.
Width - 26.6 m.
Draft (at normal / full displacement) - 8, 13/9, 17 m.
The rated power of the machines is 42,000 hp.
Speed at rated power - 24, 8 knots.
Fuel stock (normal / full) - 1000/2 600 tons.
The range of the course is 4 400 miles at 14 knots.
Artillery
The main caliber was represented by eight 280-mm guns (strictly speaking, 279 mm, in Germany the caliber was designated in centimeters, i.e. 28 cm, hence the generally accepted domestic 280-mm) with a barrel length of 45 calibers. The guns fired 302-kg shells with an initial speed of 850 m / s. Armor-piercing shells had 8, 95 kg of explosive (data may be unreliable). The elevation angle was originally 20 degrees, while the range reached 18,900 m, subsequently, in 1915, it was increased to 20,400 m. Ammunition for 8 guns was 660 shells (i.e., 82-83 shells per barrel) … According to German data, the armor penetration of the 280-m projectile was 280 mm of Krupp's armor at a distance of 10,000 m (54 kbt.) And 200 mm of the same armor at 12,000 m (65 kbt.).
Medium caliber - ten 150-mm guns with a barrel length of 45 calibers, the maximum elevation angle before modernization was 20 degrees, they fired with armor-piercing and high-explosive shells weighing 45, 3 kg. with an initial speed of 835 m / sec. The firing range was initially 13,500 (73 cab.), But later, with the use of new, elongated shells and, probably, an increase in the maximum elevation angle, reached 16,800 m (91 cab.). "Six-inch" were placed in the casemate, in the center of the hull, the ammunition consisted of 50 armor-piercing and 100 high-explosive shells per gun.
Anti-mine caliber - sixteen 88-mm guns with a barrel length of 45 calibers, loaded with unitary cartridges weighing 15, 5 kg. A shell weighing 10, 5 kg. flew with an initial speed of 750 m / sec. for 10 700 m. (58 cab.). The ammunition load was 200 rounds per gun.
Reservation
The booking system "Fon der Tann" turned out to be another puzzle, and I must say that the author of this article does not pretend to understand it one hundred percent. To begin with, we note that the Germans had their own system for naming body armor. They called the main (aka lower) armored belt an armored belt, the upper armored belt - a citadel, higher was the booking of casemates. Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity, we will "combine" the citadel and the armored belt into one and will call them an armored belt, and the armored belt together with the traverses closing it will be called a citadel.
To begin with, let's remember what the Nassau armored belt was. Its height reached 4.57 m, but its thickness was not constant. In the middle of the armor belt for 2 m, its thickness was 270 mm, and further, to the upper and lower edges, the armor was thinned to 170 mm. In this case, the belt was 1, 6 m under water, respectively, 270 mm. the section of armor went under the waterline by about 32 cm (then, over 128 cm, its thickness decreased to 170 mm), and rose by 168 cm above the water surface. Then, along the same 128 cm up, the belt also thinned from 270 to 170 mm.
Armored belt "Von der Tann" was similar to "Nassau", but had certain differences. Unfortunately, in the sources available to the author, the height of the armor belt is not given (even G. Staff, alas, does not write about this), but it can be assumed that it approximately corresponded to that of the Nassau, i.e. was 4.57 m or so. The "thickest" part of the Von der Tann armor belt was inferior to the Nassau both in thickness and height, but if everything is clear with the thicknesses (Von der Tann had 250 mm versus 270 mm for Nassau), then the height of the 250 mm plot is unclear. V. B. Hubby points out:
"Along the main waterline, the thickness of the main armor belt was 250 mm against 180 mm for the Blucher and a height of 1.22 m, of which 0.35 m went below the main waterline."
Thus, according to V. B. To Muzhenikov it turns out that Von der Tann was protected by a narrow, only 1, 22 m strip of 250 mm armor, but here we can assume a mistake. It is possible that the 250 mm section of the Von der Tann armored belt had a height of 1.57 m, of which 35 cm were under the waterline, and 1.22 m above it.
Judging by the figures given, the Von der Tann armored belt went under water for the same 1.6 m as the Nassau armored belt, and also gradually thinned, as on the first German dreadnought. At the same time, it is reliably known that the belt of the battle cruiser had 150 mm on the lower edge. But above 250 mm. section of the armored belt "Von der Tann" received more powerful protection than the "Nassau". Where the "Nassau" thickness decreased from 270 mm to 170 mm, "Von der Tann" was protected by 200 mm armor. Some publications erroneously indicate the thickness of 225 mm, but this is incorrect - the armor belt had such a thickness only opposite the barbet of the side tower of the main caliber.
The 250 mm armor belt was quite long, covering 62.5% of the waterline length. Of course, he covered not only the boiler and engine rooms, but also the feed pipes of the bow and stern towers of the main caliber. In the bow the armor belt was "closed" by a traverse 170-200 mm thick, in the stern - 170 mm, and not 180 mm, as is often indicated in the sources.
The ends of the battle cruiser were also armored. The bow of the ship outside the citadel was armored with 120 mm armor plates, which thinned to 100 mm closer to the stem, while both 120 mm and 100 mm armor plates thinned to 80 mm to their upper edge. In the stern of the citadel there was a 100 mm armor belt, and its armor plates also had only 80 mm thickness at the upper edge. But if in the bow the armor belt reached the stem, then in the stern several meters of the waterline remained unbooked. Here the armor belt ended with a traverse 100 mm thick.
Above the armor belt was a casemate of 150 mm guns, the thickness of its armor plates was also 150 mm. In length, it was significantly shorter than the armor belt, the hull was not armored in the bow and stern of it. Inside the casemate, the guns were separated by 20 mm thick armored bulkheads.
As for the horizontal armor, within the citadel it was represented by an armored deck 25 mm thick, with 50 mm bevels to the lower edge of the armor belt. At the same time, the armored deck was slightly above the waterline. Outside the citadel, the armored deck was located below the waterline, apparently along the lower edge of the armored belt, while its thickness was 50 mm in the bow, 50 mm in the stern, and the area where the board was not armored and 80 mm in the area of 100 mm plates. In addition, the casemate had a roof and floor armor 25 mm thick.
The forward conning tower of the battle cruiser was protected by 300 mm of armor, the roof - 80 mm, aft - 200 mm and 50 mm, respectively. In addition, chimneys, ventilation and lighting shafts were booked. The Von der Tann had a 25 mm thick anti-torpedo bulkhead that protected the ship along the entire length of the citadel.
Overall, and despite some weakening relative to Nassau, the Von der Tann's booking looked extremely solid. Nevertheless, he also had his vulnerabilities.
The main caliber turrets were armored quite well - frontal plates and rear wall 230 mm, side walls 180 mm, inclined sheet in front of the roof 90 mm, the rest of the roof 60 mm, flooring in the rear of the tower 50 mm. The barbets had 200 mm of armor, while at the bow and stern turret, at the part of the barbette that was facing the bow (and, accordingly, the stern), the thickness of the armor increased to 230 mm, and only 170 mm on the opposite side. But the problem was that a barbet of this thickness only reached the nearest armored deck, and below it had only a symbolic thickness of 30 mm (or even 25 mm). The height of the barbet, at which it was 170-230 mm thick, is marked in blue on the diagram.
The problem was that the projectile hitting the deck of the "Von der Tann" something like this
He easily punched a 25-mm deck, after which it was separated from the feed pipe by only a 25-30 mm barbet. Of course, not only the tower of the side opposite to the one in which the battle was being fought, but all the towers of the Von der Tann, especially during longitudinal fire on it, were in danger. But in fairness, it should be noted that such a weakness in booking barbets was inherent in all dreadnoughts and battle cruisers of the first series - a similar vulnerability (albeit to a somewhat lesser extent, but a 305-mm projectile, in general, does not matter whether to pierce a 30 mm wall, 50 mm or 76 mm) had both "Nassau" and "Dreadnought" and "Invincible", etc. To some extent, this justified the German designers, but of course, it did not create additional protection for the Von der Tann sailors.
Power plant
The Von der Tann was the first German large warship to use turbines, and this is probably why the manufacturers miscalculated. It was assumed that the rated power of the ship's turbines would be 42,000 hp, at which the ship would develop 24.8 knots, however, during the forcing tests, a power of 79,007 hp was achieved, while the maximum speed was 27.398 knots. On a six-hour run, the cruiser showed 26.8 knots. average speed. At the same time, in everyday operation, "Von der Tann" showed similar results - according to some data (Koop) in 1910, the cruiser developed 79 802 hp, reaching 27, 74 knots at 339 rpm!
I must say that V. B. Muzhenikov points out that there were some problems with the Von der Tann turbines that caused the ship to have problems maintaining speed during the war, and even points out the cause of such problems:
"In 1911, after a campaign in South America, he traveled 1913 miles between Tenerife and Heligoland at an average speed of 24 knots, which later in the war led to turbine malfunctions."
Nevertheless, in the Jutland battle, the Von der Tann increased its speed to 26 knots and it can be assumed that problems with the turbines arose irregularly, which, however, is also not too bad for a warship. In any case, we can only say that Von der Tann did not have a constant "drawdown" in speed.
This concludes the description of the first real German battle cruiser. In the next article of the series, we will consider the history of the creation and performance characteristics of the opponents of the "Von der Tann" - the battlecruisers of the "Indefatigable" project. In it, we will compare the data of the English and German ships and give an assessment of their projects.
