In the previous article, we looked at the linear cruising creativity of Germany, the USA and Japan. And what about England?
I must say that the British sailors after the First World War found themselves in a very difficult situation. On the one hand, England, as of 1918-1919, had the most powerful linear fleet, which, in general, approached the multipower standard. As of November 1918, the KVMF included 33 battleships, including Canada, which was later transferred to Chile, and 9 battle cruisers, if not counting the "large light cruisers" of the Koreyges class. Total - 42 ships (or 41 without "Canada"), and the rest of the world had 48 battleships and one battle cruiser (15 - USA, 9 - Japan, 7 - France, Italy and Russia - 5 each, counting for the latter also "Emperor Alexander III ", later taken to Bizerte, Spain - 3, Brazil and Argentina - 2 and Turkey - 1 battle cruiser). But on the other hand, the basis of the British battleship fleet was still pre-war construction and was quickly becoming obsolete, while the fleets of the United States and Japan were replenished with the latest battleships and both of these countries began to implement large shipbuilding programs. In the United States, back in 1916, a very ambitious program for the creation of 10 battleships and 6 battle cruisers was adopted, the war delayed these plans, but in 1918 Congress confirmed its renewal, and starting from the next, 1919, its funding was carried out in full. The Japanese (albeit not immediately) adopted their famous "8 + 8" program. Both of these powers immediately set about laying down the latest battleships armed with 406-410mm guns.
As a result, by 1919 the British were faced with the fact that their powerful fleet was rapidly becoming obsolete. Of the 9 battle cruisers, 4 were ships of the Invincible and Indefatigable types, which, in fact, were outdated even before the outbreak of the First World War, and the other five (two types of Lion, Tiger, Ripals and Rhynown ") Had extremely limited combat usefulness due to extremely weak protection. Of the 32 British battleships (they nevertheless honestly transferred "Canada" to Chile), 10 were outdated ships, which had practically lost their combat value, armed with 12-inch cannons, 11, although they had impressive 343-mm guns, were designed even before the First World War. and only the last ten "381-mm" battleships (5 of the Queen Elizabeth type and the same number of the Royal Soverin type) could be considered quite modern. At the same time, the same USA in 1919 had 9 battleships with 356-mm cannons (although the two earliest ships of the "Texas" type had steam engines as a power plant) and built 3 battleships with 406-mm guns according to the new program. preparing to lay 7 more battleships and 6 battle cruisers. The British, in response to these super-efforts, had only the battle cruiser Hood in completion and not a single capital ship in the construction plans.
In general, the British gradually came to understand that if something was not done, and urgently, then as the United States carried out its last shipbuilding program, the Royal Navy could find itself in the shadow of the American one. But here, to the "external enemy" was added an "internal enemy" - the country, exhausted by the nightmares of the First World War, was not at all eager to enter another, extremely expensive arms race. Moreover, confusion and hesitation began in the Admiralty itself, because a number of sailors hastened to declare the line forces obsolete and dying, while the future belongs to submarines and aviation.
In total, the supporters of the resumption of the construction of battleships had to endure two desperate battles, and they won the first - according to the results of a comprehensive study of a specially created Commission for Post-War Development, it was concluded that the battleships "have not yet lost their former importance." However, the battle for the budget was lost - according to the "10-year rule" in August 1919, the budgets of the British armed forces were to be determined not on the basis of their declared need, but on the basis of the amounts that the Treasury could find for them. Of course, the Treasury immediately washed its hands … It was possible to reverse this trend later, when in the 1921-1922 budget year the Admiralty managed to “knock out” funds from the financiers to resume the construction of linear forces - the laying of four newest battle cruisers.
I must say that the British took the projects of post-war ships designed to replenish the linear forces of the KVMF as seriously as possible. Of course, after the final design of the Hood was approved, the designers and admirals continued to amuse themselves with various versions of the battle cruiser, made, in fact, in the same corps. But it was clear to everyone that even the final scheme of the Hood's defense was by and large already outdated and not suitable for the newest ships. And therefore, when the time came to really determine the performance characteristics of future battleships and battle cruisers, the British acted in the best traditions of naval science and tried to determine … no, not the tactical and technical characteristics of the ships of Japan and the United States, which were built or designed at that time time. The British did not strive to create ships that could withstand the battleships or battle cruisers that they were building now, they wanted to create ships that could fight both modern and promising ships of this class.
Having carried out various calculations with the "participation" of the most powerful British cannons (381-mm and 457-mm caliber), the British came to the conclusion that promising battleships of foreign powers for more or less acceptable protection against such powerful shells will eventually be forced to increase the thickness an armored belt up to 380 mm, and an armored deck - up to 178 mm. As we can see by looking at the relevant reference books, neither the Americans nor the Japanese at that time had any such plans. Battleships of the "Kaga" type had a 305 mm side and an aggregate thickness of decks (and not an armored deck) up to 160 mm in the thickest places. The battleships "South Dakota" had 343 mm sides and an armored deck up to 89 mm thick, not counting the decks made of structural steel. Nevertheless, the British believed that the logic of the development of battleships would sooner or later lead the thickness of the deck and side armor to the thicknesses indicated above.
In order to be able to overcome such a serious defense, the British needed a super-powerful weapon, and the bets were placed on the 457-mm cannon. At the same time, the British preferred the usual placement of such guns in four two-gun turrets for them, but at the same time they understood that the three-gun turret mounts they did not like could give great weight and size advantages, and therefore, probably for the first time in the history of the KVMF, they began to design three-gun mounts simultaneously with two-gun ones. However, the British were ready to consider both the 420-mm cannon and the new 381-mm long-barreled (fifty-caliber) artillery systems: however, such weapons did not exist in nature, and the 457-mm still remained the favorites. In terms of the anti-mine caliber, it was decided to return to the use of 152-mm artillery - from now on it was supposed to be placed in towers with a high level of mechanization of loading operations, and this neutralized the main advantage of the lighter 120-140-mm artillery systems - the ability to maintain a high rate of fire for a long time. The displacement of future battleships and battle cruisers was limited only by the dimensions of the existing docks, as well as the Suez and Panama Canals, but there were options too. The underwater protection had to withstand a torpedo hit with an explosive content of 340 kg. The speed of battleships was first called 25 knots, but then reduced to 23 knots, but the Americans still had their "pernicious" influence on the TZ for battle cruisers - under the impression of the 33.5-knot speed of the Lexington, the British wanted to set the bar first by 33.5 knots, but then they changed their anger to mercy, allowing them to reduce the speed to 30 knots. The cruising range was to be 7,000 miles at 16 knots.
The first projects of a new type of battleship (L. II and L. III, the figure indicated the presence of four two-gun or three three-gun turrets), presented in June 1920, amazed the imagination.
The normal displacement of L. II was 50,750 tons, the main caliber was 8 * 457-mm guns, while the towers were located linearly (and not linearly elevated!), Mine countermeasures - 16 * 152-mm guns in two-gun turrets. On the one hand, the linear arrangement of the artillery looked completely archaic, not allowing to fire at the bow and stern with the guns of the two towers, but the British calculated that already at an elevation angle of 12 degrees, the second and third towers could fire over the first and fourth without risk of damage the last.
However, the real highlight of the project was its booking scheme.
In this project, the British applied the principle of "all or nothing" previously used by the Americans. An armored belt of more than 150 m in length and an unusually powerful thickness of eighteen inches (457 mm) had a low height, only 2.4 m, while it was at a large angle to the sea surface (25 degrees). The horizontal part of the armored deck was also unprecedentedly powerful - 222 mm. But this section of the armored deck was located much higher than the upper edge of the 457 mm armored belt, which was completely unusual: 330 mm bevels connected the armored deck not to the lower, but to the upper edge of the armored belt!
There was some logic in this (at first glance - completely insane) layout. Without a doubt, the 457 mm vertical section, and even at an angle of 25 degrees, was able to withstand the impacts of 457 mm shells, presumably that 222 mm armor (at least at medium combat distances) could also reflect it. As for the 330 mm bevels, here, probably, the angle of their inclination was chosen very carefully, so that at small and medium distances, the shells, having a flat trajectory, would simply ricochet away from them. At long ranges, when the trajectory became more hinged, the bevel seemed to be "substituted" for the projectile, but due to its great thickness, it was probably still quite equivalent to 222 mm of horizontal protection. At the same time, such a "tortoiseshell" in cross-sectional protection provided a much larger volume of protected space, in comparison with the classical scheme of an armored deck with bevels.
Why did we pay so much attention to the battleship project in the article on the last British battle cruisers? For one reason only: to illustrate how in the post-war projects of "capital" ships the British were ready to neglect all and all traditions, prevailing views on many things, for the sake of the combat effectiveness of future battleships and battle cruisers. And that's what they did in the end.
Displacement
Alas, the size of the Suez Canal, coupled with the docks available in England, still seriously limited the size of future warships - their normal displacement should not have exceeded 48,500 tons, and all the wishes of the admirals could not enter into these dimensions. As a result, sailors and designers had to balance the composition of weapons, armor thickness, power plant power in order to create balanced battleships and battle cruisers in the specified dimensions. In the project of the battle cruiser "G-3", the normal displacement was 48,400 tons (with a normal fuel supply of 1,200 tons).
Artillery
As the various options for the battle cruiser were worked out, the shipbuilders came to the sad conclusion that even the three-gun artillery mounts are still too heavy and it is impossible to place 9 * 457-mm guns on the ship, unless you sacrifice other parameters too much. As a result, it was decided at first to limit itself to six 457-mm cannons in two towers, but the sailors looked askance at such an innovation - six barrels made it very difficult to zero in, and as a result, it was decided to lower the caliber, first to 420-mm, and then to 406 -mm. Interestingly, "just in case" it was stated that the three-gun 406-mm turrets are close in weight to the 457-mm two-gun turrets, so if the opposite decision is made, the placement of 6 * 457-mm guns in three two-gun turrets will not require much then a major redesign of the ship.
In general, the return to 406-mm guns looked quite justified and a reasonable step, but nevertheless one should not forget that if it were not for the Washington Naval Conference, then Japan would have started (after two Kaga-class battleships) to build battleships (and, probably, battle cruisers) with 457-mm cannons. Thus, the fleet of His Majesty in the part of battle cruisers ceased to "travel first class". But the British were hardly worth grieving about this, in fact, there would have been some kind of "change in composition" - while during WWI England neglected the protection of its battle cruisers in favor of large guns and speed, Germany limited itself to a smaller caliber with better protection, and such the approach fully justified itself. Now, with the construction of the G-3, England would have found itself in the position of Germany, and Japan - in England.
However, the situation was seriously complicated by the fact that once the world's best engineers in Great Britain, alas, did not cope with the creation of an effective 406-mm artillery system and a three-gun mount for it. The fact is that, although the battlecruisers of the "G-3" project were never embodied in metal, the 406-mm / 45 guns developed for them took their place in the towers of the battleships "Nelson" and "Rodney", which is why we are quite good imagine what the last British battle cruisers were supposed to be armed with.
So, in the years preceding the First World War, the British adhered to the concept of "heavy projectile - low muzzle velocity" and created a very impressive 343-381-mm guns. But when creating them, the British continued to use a rapidly aging concept: a wire barrel design, which had a sufficient number of shortcomings, such as, for example, a lot of weight, but one of them was critical - long-barreled guns with such a design were not good. That is why the British did not get the 305-mm / 50 gun, which, although it was put into service, still did not suit the British in terms of firing accuracy and a number of other parameters. As a result, the British were forced to return to guns with a barrel length of no more than 45 calibers, and in order to increase the power of such guns so that they were competitive with the newest German 305-mm / 50 guns, they increased the caliber to 343-mm … this is how they appeared superdreadnoughts.
At the same time, the concept of "low muzzle velocity - heavy projectile" perfectly matched the "wire" design of the barrels, because for such an artillery system, a long barrel is not that unnecessary, but it is quite possible to do without it. However, according to the results of the First World War, the British came to the conclusion that they were wrong, and that the concept of "light projectile - high muzzle velocity" is more promising.
In support of this thesis, the "British scientists" cited seemingly reasonable theses that in certain circumstances (for example, when hitting the armored decks of ships at long distances), shorter "light" shells have an advantage in armor penetration over heavy (and, accordingly, long). All this was true in theory, but alas, in practice, these advantages turned out to be insignificant. Nevertheless, the adoption of such a concept in itself was not some kind of evil - the same Germans created a very formidable 380-mm gun for their Bismarck-class battleships. But this, again, happened to a certain extent because the German artillery system had a long barrel (the longer it is, the longer the exposure time to the projectile of expanding powder gases, and this contributes to an increase in the initial velocity of the projectile - up to certain limits, of course. a kilometer long, the projectile will simply get stuck).
So, the mistake of the British was that, having adopted the concept of "light projectile - high muzzle velocity", they retained the archaic wire structure of the barrel, limiting its length to 45 calibers. As a result, the resulting artillery system had a very low survivability. To somehow solve this issue, the British had to go for a significant reduction in the mass of powder charges, which, of course, greatly reduced the initial velocity. The result was disappointing - instead of firing a 929 kg projectile with an initial speed of 828 m / s, the British 406 mm / 50 provided only 785 m / s for such a projectile. As a result, instead of the all-crushing "hand of the gods", the British sailors received a very ordinary and, perhaps, the worst artillery system in its class - as we said earlier, the American 406-mm cannon, installed on battleships of the "Maryland" type, fired 1,016 kg with a projectile an initial speed of 768 m / s, and a Japanese 410-mm gun fired a projectile weighing exactly one ton with an initial speed of 790 m / s. At the same time, the American gun had a barrel survivability of 320 shots, and the British one - only 200.
The disadvantages of the artillery system were supplemented from the hands of an archaic and imperfect tower design. The British did not dare to switch to electrical control, retaining the hydraulics, however, at least they used oil instead of water as a working fluid, which made it possible to switch to thin-walled steel pipes instead of copper ones. But the rejection of the loading mechanism at different angles (the guns were charged at a fixed elevation angle), design errors, due to which there was a shift in the axes of the towers during turns, from which its epaulette was destroyed and so on, and so on led to the fact that the crews of "Nelson" and the Rodney, their main caliber was perhaps more troublesome than all the Axis fleets put together.
However, all of the above cannot be attributed to the shortcomings of the project of the battle cruiser "G-3". We can only repeat that the 9 * 406-mm armament for this ship looked reasonable and sufficient.
The anti-mine caliber was represented by eight two-gun 152-mm turrets, the anti-aircraft armament was very developed - six 120-mm guns and four ten-barreled 40-mm "pom-poms". "G-3" was supposed to be equipped with two underwater 622-mm torpedo tubes.
The torpedoes weighed 2,850 kg, they carried 337 kg of explosives at a range of 13,700 m (that is, almost 75 kbt) at a speed of 35 knots, or 18,300 m (almost 99 kbt) at a speed of 30 knots.
Reservation
It is a pleasure to describe the armor protection system of post-war British battleships and battle cruisers, since it was very simple and straightforward. The rather complex and multi-level armoring of WWII ships was replaced by the American “all or nothing”. The basis of protection was a vertical armor belt 159.1 m long (with a total ship length of 259.25 mm at the waterline) and 4.34 m high - in normal displacement it dropped 1.37 m lower and rose 2.97 m above the waterline … At the same time, the armor belt had an inclination of 18 degrees, and also - it was internal, that is, it did not protect the board in contact with the sea, but was deepened into the hull so that its upper edge was 1.2 m from the board. In the areas of the cellars of the main caliber towers (over 78, 9 m), the thickness of the armor belt was maximum and amounted to 356 mm, for the rest - 305 mm. In general, the belt completely defended the areas of the towers of the main and anti-mine calibers, the engine and boiler rooms of the ship. The only armored deck rested on its upper edge with bevels: however, the angle of these bevels was so insignificant (only 2.5 degrees!) That it was right to speak of a single horizontal deck, but formally they were all the same. The thickness of the deck, as well as the armor belt, was differentiated: above the cellars of the main battery guns (that is, apparently, over the 78, 9 meter section of 356 mm of side armor), it had 203 mm, thinning in the stern sequentially to 172, 152, 141 and 102 mm (the last, four-inch thickness, the deck had above the aft boiler room and engine rooms), while the areas of the anti-mine caliber towers were covered by a 178 mm armored deck. The citadel was closed by traverses 305 mm thick in front and 254 m in the stern, but there were two additional 127 mm bulkheads, so the overall protection was not so bad.
However, something was also protected outside the citadel - for example, the underwater torpedo tubes (and where without them), located in front of the citadel, had protection from 152-mm armor belt, traverse and armored deck of the same thickness. The steering gear was protected by 127 mm deck and 114 mm traverse. Most likely, this was all, although some sources still indicate that in addition to the above, outside the citadel there were also lower decks (probably passing below the waterline) in the bow and stern, their thickness was 152 mm and 127 mm, respectively.
The artillery had a very strong defense. The forehead, side plates and the roof of the towers were protected by 432 mm, 330 mm and 203 mm armor, respectively. The barbets had a thickness of 356 mm, however, closer to the diametrical plane, where the barbet was overlapped by the adjacent one, or the superstructure, its thickness decreased to 280-305 mm. But on the conning tower, one might say, they saved - 356 mm armor plates protected it only in the frontal projection, on the sides and rear it had only 254 and 102 mm of armor, respectively.
The anti-torpedo protection (which included a 44 mm thick armor bulkhead) was designed to counteract charges equivalent to 340 kg of TNT. Its depth reached 4, 26 m, not metal pipes (like in the "Hood"), but water (total - 2 630 tons!) Were used as a "working fluid", while in peacetime it was supposed to keep the PTZ compartments drained. Interestingly, for the rapid straightening of the roll, a system was provided for purging individual PTZ chambers with compressed air.
Power plant
It was assumed that the ship's machines will develop 160,000 hp, while its speed will be … alas, it is not entirely clear how much, because sources usually indicate a spread of 31-32 knots. However, even the lower limit is very good, and, of course, gave the British battle cruiser many tactical capabilities of a fast ship. However, the admirals, remembering Lexington, were not happy with such speed and wanted more: however, reluctantly, they agreed, because a further increase in speed required a significant reduction in other fighting qualities, which no one wanted to do. It is not entirely clear what range the G-3 would have had it been built, but given the rather impressive maximum fuel capacity of 5,000 tons, it would hardly have been small, and could well have been the initially desired 7,000 miles by 16 nodes or so. "Hood" with a maximum fuel capacity of about 4,000 tons was able to overcome 7,500 miles at 14 knots.
Layout
I must say that the first glance at the layout of the battle cruisers "G-3" immediately brings to mind the already rather old saying: "A camel is a horse made in England." Why, well, why did the British have to abandon the normal and absolutely sensible placement of the towers "two in the bow, one in the stern" in favor of … this ?! However, oddly enough, the British had very serious reasons to "shove" the third turret in the middle of the hull.
I must say that the first design iterations of the battleships and battle cruisers of the British were carried out in a completely traditional manner.
But … the fact is that at that time in all British "capital" ships, up to and including "Hood", the charging compartments of the main caliber were located above the shell ones. This was due to the fact that the hold of the ship is relatively compact, and the shells occupy a much smaller volume than the gunpowder, which should eject them from the barrels of the guns. Therefore, charge storage has always been located above the projectile compartments.
But now the British saw a drawback in this, because it was the powder "depots" that posed the greatest danger to ships - fires followed by detonation in the Battle of Jutland, according to authoritative commissions, caused the penetration of fire into the powder magazines, and not into the shell magazines. In general, in tests, the shells showed themselves to be somewhat more resistant to shock waves and flames. Therefore, the British came to the conclusion that the location of the charging compartments at the very bottom, under the projectile storage, would provide the newest battleships and cruisers with much better survivability than was possible before. But alas, it was not possible to swap the storage of projectiles and charges with the traditional layout. That is, of course, it would have been possible to do this, but at the same time the layout ceased to be rational, it was required to lengthen the citadel, which led to an increase in displacement, etc., and so it was until someone proposed exactly the scheme that we see in the final draft "G-3". The location of three 406-mm turrets in close proximity to each other helped to place powder magazines under the shell, without sacrificing other characteristics of the ship. This is precisely the reason why the British adopted for their newest battleships and battle cruisers such, at first glance, a strange arrangement of main battery artillery.
However, it should be noted that the most extravagant layout was still not the G-3 battlecruisers, but the N-3 battleships, which the Admiralty was going to lay a year after the battlecruisers
As you know, on warships, it was considered traditional to place boiler rooms closer to the stem, and engine rooms to the stern, that is, steam engines (or turbines) were located behind the boilers, closer to the stern. The same was the case with the battle cruisers "G-3". However, on the battleships "N-3" the British managed to swap them - that is, after the third tower, the engine rooms went first, and only then - the boiler rooms!
Comparison with "classmates"
Having studied the projects of post-war battle cruisers (the last military ones - for Germany), we come to the conclusion about the unequivocal superiority of the British "G-3" over German, American and Japanese ships of the same class. Its nine 406-mm guns, at least on paper, were almost as good as the most heavily armed Amagi, while the G-3 outnumbered the Japanese by one knot and simply had incomparably more powerful armor. The American Lexington, when meeting the G-3, could only count on "retreating to prearranged positions," or rather, on flight, because speed was the only parameter by which this battle cruiser had superiority over the "G- 3 "(33, 5 knots against 31-32). But in practice, he most likely would not have succeeded, and in battle the "American" simply did not have a chance, one could only hope for a miracle.
The most distinct chances of success against the "G-3" would be possessed only by a German battle cruiser, but nine 406-mm British ships still look preferable to 6 * 420-mm German ships, and the 350-mm belt of the latter, although it exceeded 356 mm in length section "G-3", but was significantly lower, and the second armor belt was only 250 mm. At the same time, we must not forget that the Germans used vertically arranged plates, while the British planned to put them at an angle, and the given thickness of the British protection was 374 and 320 mm for 356 mm and 305 mm sections, respectively. But most importantly, the G-3 had an incomparably more powerful horizontal defense. In the previous article, we indicated that the thickness of the main armored deck of the German ship was 30-60 mm, but this issue requires additional clarification, and perhaps it still had 50-60 mm throughout. But, for obvious reasons, even if this is so, then such a thickness cannot be compared with the 102-203 mm armored deck "G-3". Of course, the German cruiser still had an armored (or just thick structural steel) deck of 20 mm, but such spaced armor has less durability than a single armor plate of the same thickness, and the advantage of the "G-3" still remains overwhelming. In general, in general, it is the armor protection "G-3" that is the real "highlight" of the project, thanks to which it significantly surpassed similar projects in other countries.
However, we can see that the design of the last British battle cruiser also had significant drawbacks. And first of all it concerned, oddly enough … the booking system, which we just called the most impressive. But in fairness, it should be pointed out that only the citadel section, which had 356 mm (374 mm of reduced) vertical armor and 203 mm armored deck, looked more or less acceptable protection against 406-mm shells. That would have been enough, but the length of this section of the citadel is completely small - only 78.9 m or 30.4% of the total length of the waterline. The rest of the citadel, which had 320 mm of reduced vertical armor, and 102-152 mm of horizontal, was no longer sufficient protection against shells of this caliber. Also, the barbets of the turrets of the main caliber, even in their 356 mm parts, were quite vulnerable, although it would not be so easy to pierce them: they had a circular cross-section, so it was very difficult to hit the barbet at an angle close to 90 degrees.
The vertical armor belt "G-3" was "sunk" into the side, which made it possible to save on the weight of the armored deck, as it did it already, but at the same time reduced the volume of the reserved space: at the same time, enemy shells could inflict serious (although not threatening the ship's death) damage without even breaking through the armor belt. The ends of the ship were completely unprotected, which was more or less acceptable in the battle of battleships, but was a big drawback in most other combat situations - even relatively small damage from high-explosive bombs and shells could cause extensive flooding, a strong trim on the bow or stern, and as a result, a significant drop in the combat capability of the battle cruiser.
But still, in general, it should be stated that in the "G-3" project, the British came as close as possible, much closer than other countries to the concept of a fast battleship during the Second World War. And if something did not work out for them, it was not because the British admirals and designers did not understand something, or did not take into account, but only because in a given normal displacement (48,500 tons) on technologies of the beginning of 20 -s, it would have been completely impossible to design and build a 30-node battleship carrying 406-mm cannons and well protected from shells of the same caliber. The British knew exactly what they wanted, understood the unattainability of their desires and were forced to make deliberate compromises. And we can say with good reason that as a result of these compromises, albeit not ideal, but extremely successful and well-balanced project of the battle cruiser "G-3" was obtained.
