Having compared the project 68K and 68-bis cruisers with pre-war foreign light cruisers and post-war American Worchesters, we have so far ignored such interesting post-war foreign ships as the Swedish light cruiser Tre Krunur, the Dutch De Zeven Provinsen, and, of course, the last British Tiger-class artillery cruisers. Today we will correct this misunderstanding by starting at the end of our list - British Tiger-class cruisers.
I must say that the British dragged out the procedure for creating their last artillery cruisers. In total, during the war, eight ships of the "Minotaur" type were ordered, representing a slightly improved version of the light cruisers "Fiji". The first three "Minotaur" were completed according to the original project, and the head of them was transferred to the Canadian fleet under the name "Ontario" in 1944, two more were added to the lists of the Royal Navy. The construction of the remaining cruisers was frozen shortly after the war, and two ships that were in the early stages of construction were dismantled, so that by the end of the 40s the British had three unfinished light cruisers of this type afloat: Tiger, Defense and Blake. ".
The British, who fully felt the weakness of the anti-aircraft weapons of their own cruisers during World War II, nevertheless did not want to limit themselves to the creation of air defense cruisers with 127-133-mm caliber. Such ships, in their opinion, were too weak both for sea combat and for shelling the coast, and therefore it was decided to return to the development of a universal heavy artillery system. The first such attempt was made even before the war, when creating light cruisers of the "Linder" class, but was unsuccessful. It turned out that tower installations that retain manual operations when loading would not be able to provide an acceptable rate of fire, and the creation of fully automatic artillery systems capable of charging at any elevation angle was beyond the then available technical capabilities. During the war, the British made a second attempt.
In 1947, the British were going to finish building a cruiser with 9 * 152-mm universal guns and 40-mm "Bofors" in new installations, then the project was repeatedly changed and as a result, at the time of commissioning the light cruiser "Tiger", had two 152- mm with Mark XXVI installations, the picture of which is shown below:
Each of them had two fully automatic 152 mm / 50 QF Mark N5 cannons, capable of developing a rate of fire (per barrel) of 15-20 rounds / min and a very high speed of vertical and horizontal guidance, reaching up to 40 deg / s. In order to force the six-inch cannon to work at such speeds, it was necessary to significantly increase the mass of the tower installation - if the two-gun 152-mm Linder towers weighed 92 tons (rotating part), then the two-gun universal Mark XXVI - 158.5 tons, while turret protection was provided with only 25-55 mm of armor. Since at a rate of fire of 15-20 rds / min, the barrels of the guns warmed up extremely quickly, the British had to provide for water cooling of the barrels.
Apparently, it was the British who managed to create the world's first completely successful shipboard universal 152-mm installation, although there are mentions of some problems in its operation. However, versatility is generally known to be a trade-off, and the 152mm Mark N5 cannon was no exception. In fact, the British were forced to reduce its ballistics to the American 152-mm Mark 16: with a projectile weight of 58, 9-59, 9 kg, it provided an initial velocity of only 768 m / s (Mark 16-59 kg and 762 m / s, respectively). In fact, the British succeeded in what the Americans could not do on their Worchesters, but we must not forget that the British completed their development 11 years later.
The second anti-aircraft caliber of the British "Tigers" was represented by three two-gun 76-mm Mark 6 installations of very outstanding characteristics - its rate of fire was 90 shells weighing 6, 8 kg with an initial speed of 1,036 m / s per barrel, while the barrels also required water cooling. The firing range reached a record 17 830 m for 76-mm guns. The author of this article has no information about any problems with the operation of this artillery system, but it is somewhat surprising that it was not used on any other ships of the Royal Navy. Fire control was carried out by five directors with radar type 903 each, and any of them could provide guidance to both surface and air targets. Moreover, each 152-mm or 76-mm installation had its own director.
As for protection, here the light cruisers of the Tiger type corresponded to the same Fiji - 83-89 mm armor belt from the bow to the stern 152-mm turret, in the area of engine rooms on top of the main one - another 51 mm armor belt, the thickness of the traverses, deck, barbets - 51 mm, towers, as mentioned above - 25-51 mm. The cruiser had a standard displacement of 9,550 tons, a power plant with a capacity of 80,000 hp. and developed 31.5 knots.
Comparing the project 68-bis cruiser "Sverdlov" and the English "Tiger", we are forced to state that the armament of the British ship is much more modern than the Soviet one and belongs to the next generation of naval artillery and fire control systems. The combat rate of fire of the Soviet 152-mm cannon B-38 was 5 rds / min (on practice firing, volleys were supposed to follow at twelve-second intervals), respectively, a Sverdlov-class cruiser could fire 60 shells from its 12 guns per minute. The British cruiser had only 4 barrels, but with a rate of fire of 15 rds / min, it could fire the same 60 shells in a minute. Here it is necessary to give a little explanation - the maximum rate of fire of the British cannon was 20 rds / min, but the fact is that the actual rate of fire is still below the limit values. So, for example, for the MK-5-bis turret mounts of Soviet cruisers, the maximum rate of fire is indicated at 7.5 rds / min. 5 rounds / min. Therefore, we can assume that the real rate of fire of British six-inch guns is nevertheless closer to 15, but not to the maximum 20 rounds per minute.
Domestic radar "Zalp" (two for a cruiser of the project 68-bis) and the main caliber fire control system "Molniya-ATs-68" provided fire only on surface targets. True, it was assumed that the anti-aircraft fire of 152-mm artillery could be controlled using the Zenit-68-bis launcher designed to control the 100-mm SM-5-1 installations, but this could not be achieved, which is why the anti-aircraft fire was fired at tables. At the same time, British directors with a type 903 radar issued target designation both for surface and air targets, which, of course, made it possible to control the anti-aircraft fire of British six-inch guns many times more effectively. This is not to mention the fact that the angles of vertical guidance and the targeting speed of the British installation dramatically exceeded those of the MK-5-bis: the Soviet tower installation had a maximum elevation angle of 45 degrees, and the British - 80 degrees, the speed of vertical and horizontal guidance was at MK-5-bis only 13 degrees, for the English - up to 40 degrees.
And, nevertheless, in a duel situation "Sverdlov" against "Tiger" "the chances of victory for the Soviet cruiser are much higher than that of the" Englishman ".
Undoubtedly, the great impression is made by the fact that the light cruiser "Tiger", with only four barrels of the main caliber, is capable of providing the same fire performance as the "Sverdlov" with its 12 guns. But this fact should in no way hide from us that in all other respects the British six-inch gun corresponds to the American 152-mm "old woman" Mark 16. This means that the capabilities of the Tiger are absolutely in no way superior to the 12 six-inch guns of the American Cleveland and are even inferior him in fire performance, because the American guns were faster than the Soviet B-38. But, as we have already analyzed in previous articles, a dozen Soviet 152-mm B-38s gave Soviet cruisers significant advantages in range and armor penetration over both American and more powerful British 152-mm artillery systems. Neither the American cruisers nor the Tiger could conduct effective firefight at a distance of 100-130 kbt, because the maximum firing range of their guns was 123-126 kbt, and the effective firing range was 25 percent lower (less than 100 kbt). since at close to the limiting distances, the dispersion of projectiles is excessively large. At the same time, the Soviet B-38 with its record performance characteristics ensured reliable target destruction at distances of 117-130 kbt, which was confirmed by practical shooting. Accordingly, a Sverdlov-class cruiser can open fire much earlier than a British cruiser, and it is not a fact that it will generally allow that to approach itself, since it surpasses the Tiger in speed, albeit slightly. If "Tiger" is lucky and he can get close to the Soviet cruiser at a distance of effective fire of its guns, then the advantage will still remain with the "Sverdlov", since with equal firing performance of ships, Soviet shells have a high muzzle velocity (950 m / s versus 768 m / s), and, accordingly, armor penetration. At the same time, the protection of the Soviet cruiser is much better: having an armored deck of the same thickness and an armor belt of 12-20% thicker, the Sverdlov has many times better protected artillery (175-mm forehead, 130 mm barbet versus 51 mm for the Tiger), armored wheelhouse, etc. More powerful guns with better protection and equal fire performance provide the Project 68 bis cruiser with an obvious advantage at medium ranges. And, of course, not quite an "honest" argument - the standard displacement of the Sverdlov (13,230 tons) is 38.5% more than that of the Tiger (9,550 tons), which is why the project 68-bis cruiser has greater combat stability just in because it is larger.
Thus, the Soviet cruiser surpasses the British in an artillery duel, despite the fact that the latter's artillery weapons are much more modern. As for the air defense capabilities, it would seem that the obvious and multiple superiority of the British cruiser should be attested here, but … Not everything is so simple.
It is very interesting to compare the Soviet 100-mm SM-5-1 mount and the English 76-mm Mark 6. With the simplest arithmetic calculation, the picture is completely bleak for domestic cruisers. The British 76-mm "spark" is capable of sending 180 shells weighing 6, 8 kg each (90 per barrel) to the target per minute. 1224 kg / min. Soviet SM-5-1, during the same time making 30-36 rounds / min 15.6 kg shells (15-18 per barrel) - only 468-561 kg. It turns out a uniform apocalypse, one single 76-mm gun mount of a British cruiser shoots almost as much metal per minute as three onboard SM-5-1 Soviet cruisers …
But that's bad luck, in the description of the 76-mm creation of the "gloomy British genius" absolutely strange numbers are indicated - the ammunition load directly in the tower installation is only 68 shots, and the feed mechanisms with which each gun is equipped are capable of providing only 25 (twenty five) shells per minute. Thus, in the first minute of firing, the 76-mm "spark" will be able to fire not 180, but only 118 shells (68 shots from the ammunition rack + 50 more raised by reloading mechanisms). In the second and subsequent minutes of the battle, its rate of fire will not exceed 50 rds / min (25 rds per barrel). How so? What is this terrible design miscalculation?
But can we blame the British developers for not being able to add "2 + 2"? It is unlikely - of course, in the 50s of the last century, British science and industry were no longer the first in the world, but nevertheless, the pejorative "A camel is a horse made in England" is still very far away. The rate of fire of the English 76-mm Mark 6 is indeed 90 rds / min per barrel. But this does not mean at all that it is capable of firing 90 shots from each barrel every minute - from this it will simply overheat and become unusable. In the first minute, it will be able to fire 59 rounds per barrel - in short bursts, with interruptions. Each subsequent minute it will be able to fire short bursts with a total "capacity" of no more than 25 rounds per barrel - obviously, to avoid overheating. This, of course, is nothing more than an assumption by the author, and the dear reader will decide for himself how true it can be. However, one more thing should be noted: the enchanting ballistics of the British gun was achieved, among other things, by a very high pressure in the barrel bore - 3,547 kg per cm2. This is higher than that of the domestic 180 mm B-1-P gun - it had only 3,200 kg / cm2. Does anyone seriously expect that in the 50s it was possible to create an artillery system with such ballistics and the ability to conduct a long fire battle in long bursts with a rate of fire of 1.5 rounds / sec?
However, regardless of the reasons (the danger of overheating or the impassable alternative talent of the installation designers), we can only state that the actual rate of fire of the British Mark 6 is significantly lower than the arithmetic calculation based on the passport value of the rate of fire. And this means that in 5 minutes of fire combat, the Soviet SM-5-1, making 15 rounds / min per barrel (nothing prevents it from firing for a long time with such an intensity), is capable of firing 150 shells weighing 15, 6 kg or 2340 kg. Three-inch "Englishwoman" for the same 5 minutes will release 318 shells weighing 6, 8 kg or 2162, 4 kg. In other words, the fire performance of the Soviet and British installations is quite comparable, with a slight advantage of the Soviet SM-5-1. But the Soviet "weaving" hits much farther - its projectile flies at 24,200 m, the English one - 17,830 m. The Soviet installation is stabilized, but how the British twin was doing with this issue is unknown. The Englishwoman had shells with radio fuses, but by the time the Tiger entered service, the SM-5-1 had them too. And in the end we come to the conclusion that, despite all its advancement and automaticity, the British 76-mm Mark 6 was still inferior in combat capabilities to the single Soviet SM-5-1. It remains only to remember that the Sverdlov-class cruisers had six SM-5-1s, and the British Tigers had only three … It is possible, of course, that the individual directors of the LMS for each British installation provided better guidance than two SPN- 500, who controlled the shooting of Soviet "hundredths", alas, the author of this article does not have information to compare the domestic and British MSA. Nevertheless, I would like to remind respected lovers of Western technology that the artillery armament of British surface ships turned out to be almost useless against the attacks of Argentine aircraft (even primitive light attack aircraft) - and after all, during the Falklands conflict, much more advanced radars and control systems were used to control the British "guns". than what was on the Tiger.
It is interesting, by the way, that the masses of Mark 6 and CM-5-1 differ slightly - 37.7 tons of Mark 6 versus 45.8 tons of CM-5-1, i.e. in terms of weights and occupied space, they are comparable, although it can be assumed that the "Englishwoman" requires less calculation.
So, we came to the conclusion that the air defense capabilities of the 152-mm artillery of the light cruiser "Tiger" are many times higher than those of the main caliber of the ships of the 68-bis project, but at the same time the 76-mm British "second caliber" is very inferior to the Soviet "weave" " Sverdlov "both in quality and in quantity. How can we compare the general air defense capabilities of these ships?
A rather primitive method can be proposed - in terms of fire performance. We have already calculated this for a five-minute battle for the British 76mm and Soviet 100mm mounts. The English 152-mm two-gun turret is capable of firing 30 anti-aircraft shells weighing 59.9 kg each in a minute, i.e. 1,797 kg per minute or 8,985 kg in 5 minutes, respectively, two such towers in the same time will release 17,970 kg. Add to this the mass of shells of three 76-mm "Sparoks" - 6,487.2 kg and we get that during 5 minutes of intense combat the light cruiser Tiger is capable of firing 24,457.2 kg of anti-aircraft shells. Six SM-5-1 Soviet "Sverdlov" have a lower firing capacity - together they will release 14,040 kg of metal. You can, of course, argue that the author compares the capabilities of ships when firing on both sides, but in the case of repelling an attack from one side, the British cruiser will have an overwhelming advantage, and this is true: two 76-mm installations and 2 152-mm towers for 5 minutes will release 22, 3 tons of metal, and three Soviet SM-5-1 - just a little more than 7 tons. However, it should be remembered that the same Americans, both then and much later, sought to organize air attacks from different directions, like the famous Japanese "star" raids in World War II, and it would be more logical to consider just this (and not a "single-breasted") form of air attack …
And we must not forget this: in terms of range, the Soviet "weaving" SM-5-1 is ahead of not only the 76-mm, but also the 152-mm British gun mounts. The flight time at medium distances of 100-mm projectiles is lower (since the initial speed is higher), respectively, it is possible to adjust the fire faster. But even before enemy planes enter the SM-5-1 kill zone, they will be fired at with the Sverdlov's main caliber - the practice of the exercises shows that Soviet 152-mm cannons managed to fire 2-3 volleys at targets of the LA-17R type. having a speed of 750 to 900 km / h. And besides, the Soviet cruiser also has 32 barrels of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, which, although old, are still quite lethal for an enemy aircraft approaching at a distance of fire - the English Tiger has nothing like it.
All of the above, of course, does not provide the Soviet cruiser with superiority or even equality in air defense capabilities, but you need to understand - although the British Tiger has an advantage in this parameter, it is not absolute. In terms of air defense, the British light cruiser outperforms the ships of the 68-bis project - perhaps by tens of percent, but by no means orders of magnitude.
In general, we can say that the light cruisers Sverdlov and Tiger are comparable in their capabilities, with the slight advantage of the Soviet ship. "Sverdlov" is larger and has greater combat stability, it is better armored, slightly faster and has an advantage in cruising range (up to 9 thousand nautical miles against 6, 7 thousand). Its capabilities in an artillery battle against a surface enemy are higher, but against an air one - lower than that of a British cruiser. Accordingly, it can be stated that due to the use of more modern (in fact, we can talk about the next generation) artillery and FCS, the British were able to make a cruiser comparable to the Sverdlov in a significantly smaller displacement - nevertheless, the Tiger is almost 40% less.
But was it worth it? In retrospect, one can say - no, it shouldn't. After all, what actually happened? After the war, both the USSR and Great Britain felt the need for modern artillery cruisers. But the USSR, having taken proven equipment, by 1955 completed 5 ships of the 68K project, laid down and handed over to the fleet 14 68-bis cruisers, thereby creating the basis of the surface fleet and the "forge of personnel" of the oceanic Navy of the future. At the same time, the USSR did not try to introduce universal six-inch "superguns", but developed a fundamentally new naval weapon.
And what did the British do? Having spent time and money on the development of universal large-caliber artillery systems, they finally put into operation three Tiger-class cruisers - in 1959, 1960 and 1961, respectively. They really became the pinnacle of artillery, but at the same time did not have a tangible superiority over the previously built Sverdlovs. And most importantly, they were not his counterparts. The lead cruiser of Project 68-bis entered service in 1952, 7 years before the lead Tiger. And some 3 years after the Tiger entered service, the US and USSR fleets replenished the missile cruisers Albany and Grozny - and now they have much more reason to be considered the same age as the British cruiser than the Sverdlov.
Perhaps, if the British had devoted less time and money to their purely artillery "Tigers", then their URO-class cruisers of the "County" type (later reclassified as destroyers) would not have looked so defective against the background of the first Soviet and American missile cruisers. However, this is a completely different story …
Unfortunately, there is almost no information about Swedish and Dutch cruisers either in domestic sources or on the Russian-language Internet, and the available data are very contradictory. For example, the Swedish "Tre Krunur" - with a standard displacement of 7,400 tons, it is credited with a booking weighing 2,100 tons, i.e. 28% of the standard displacement! No foreign light cruiser had such a ratio - the weight of the armor of the Italian "Giuseppe Garibaldi" was 2131 tons, the Soviet "Chapaevs" - 2339 tons, but they were much larger than the Swedish ship. At the same time, information about the booking scheme is very sketchy: it is argued that the ship had an internal armor belt 70-80 mm thick, and at the same time two flat armor decks of 30 mm each, adjacent to the lower and upper edges of the armor belt. But how can this be? After all, the engine and boiler rooms are not rubber - light cruisers, and indeed any other ships, have never had a flat armor deck along the lower edge of the armor belt. The armored deck either lay on the upper edge, or had bevels in order to provide sufficient space between the armored deck and the bottom in the area of boiler rooms and engine rooms. Russian-speaking sources claim that in addition to the indicated 30 mm armored decks:
"There was additional armor 20-50 mm thick over vital areas."
Usually, this means boiler rooms and engine rooms, as well as areas of artillery cellars, but the fact is that speculating on the technical characteristics of warships is a very dangerous business. We have already examined the case when, on the basis of incorrect and incomplete information, an assertion was made that the American Cleveland was 1.5 times more armored than the Soviet cruiser 68 bis, while in fact its protection was weaker than that of the Sverdlov. Let us assume that we are talking about the protection of boiler rooms, engine rooms and areas of the main caliber turrets, but then one would expect an indication of the total thickness of armored decks at the level of 80 - 110 mm, while sources report only 30 + 30 mm!
Even more confusing is the statement about the similarity of the booking schemes of the Tre Krunur and the Italian light cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi. The latter had two spaced armor belts - the side was protected by 30 mm armor, followed by a second armor belt 100 mm thick. Interestingly, the armor belt was curved, i.e. its upper and lower edges were connected to the upper and lower edges of the 30 mm outer armor belt, forming a kind of semicircle. At the level of the upper edge of the armored belts, a 40 mm armored deck was superimposed, and above the armored belt, the side was protected by 20 mm armored plates. Thus, contrary to the claims of similarity, according to the descriptions of Russian-language sources, the booking scheme of "Garibaldi" has nothing in common with "Tre Krunur". The situation is even more confused by the drawings of the Swedish cruiser - almost all of them clearly show the outer armor belt, while the description suggests that the Tre Krunur's belt is internal, which means it should not be visible in the drawing.
Here we can assume banal translation errors: if we assume that the "two 30-mm armored decks" of the Swedish cruiser are in fact an external 30 mm armor belt (which we see in the figures), to which the main, internal, 70-80 mm thick adjoins and lower and upper edges (similar to "Garibaldi"), then the armor protection scheme "Tre Krunur" really becomes similar to the Italian cruiser. In this case, the "additional armor" with a thickness of 20-50 mm is also understandable - this is an armored deck, differentiated by the importance of the protection areas. The Tre Krunur towers had mediocre protection - a 127-mm frontal plate, 50 mm roof and 30 mm walls (175, 65 and 75 mm, respectively, for Soviet cruisers), but the sources say nothing about barbets, although it is doubtful that the Swedes about they were forgotten. If we assume that the barbets had a thickness comparable to the frontal plate, then their mass turned out to be rather large, in addition, sources note the presence of a thick (20 mm) upper deck, which, strictly speaking, was not armor, since it was made of shipbuilding steel, but still could provide some additional protection. And if we assume that "Tre Krunur" had barbets at the level of "Garibaldi", i.e. about 100 mm, vertical armor 100-110 mm (30 + 70 or 30 + 80 mm, but in fact even more, since the second armor belt was made curved and its reduced thickness turned out to be greater) and 40-70 mm armored deck (where, in addition to the actual armor was counted and 20 mm of shipbuilding steel, which is incorrect, but some countries did so) - then the total mass of armor, perhaps, will reach the required 2100 tons.
But how, then, in the 7,400 tons of the standard displacement of the Swedish cruiser, could everything else fit? Indeed, in addition to the large mass of armor, the ship had a very strong power plant, which had a nominal power of 90,000 hp, when forcing - up to 100,000 hp. Probably, boilers with increased steam parameters were used, but all the same, the mass of the installation should have been very significant. And seven six-inch guns in three towers …
It turns out a paradox - not a single country in the world has been able to create a light cruiser, in terms of its capabilities and dimensions, not exactly equal, but even at least somewhat close to the Tre Krunur! British "Fiji" and "Minotaurs", French "La Galissoniers", Italian "Raimondo Montecuccoli" had significantly weaker booking, power plants comparable in capacity, but were significantly larger than "Tre Krunur". Saving on armament by abandoning an intermediate anti-aircraft caliber? This does not explain anything: the three Tre Krunur towers weighed at least 370 tons, and the three La Galissoniera towers - 516 tons. The four 90-mm French twin towers had a much smaller mass than the ten twin and seven single-barreled 40-mm Bofors ". Thus, there is a difference in the weight of the artillery weapons of the "Frenchman" and the "Swede", but it is relatively small - no more than 150, well, maybe 200 tons. The power plant of the French is even weaker than that of the Swedish ship - 84 thousand hp. instead of 90 thousand hp But the French were able to allocate only 1,460 tons for booking, i.e. 640 tons less than the Swedes! And this despite the fact that the standard displacement of "La Galissoniera" is 200 tons more!
But "Tre Krunur" is a cruiser that was being completed after the war. At this time, in connection with the changed requirements of naval combat, ships had to install much more of any equipment (first of all, radar, but not only) than according to pre-war projects. More equipment, more space for its placement, more crew for its maintenance and, accordingly, with an equal number of artillery barrels, the post-war ships turned out to be heavier than the pre-war ones. But, for some reason, not in the case of the Swedish cruiser.
It is interesting to compare Tre Krunur and the Dutch cruiser De Zeven Provinsen.
In terms of armament, the ships are almost identical: as the main caliber, the De Zeven Provinsen has eight 152-mm / 53 guns of the 1942 model produced by the Bofors company, against seven absolutely identical guns on the Tre Krunur. The De Zeven Provinsen guns were housed in four twin-gun turrets - exact copies of those that adorned the stern of the Swedish cruiser. The only difference is that "De Zeven Provinsen" and in the nose had a pair of two-gun turrets, and "Tre Krunur" - one three-gun. The number of anti-aircraft guns is also comparable: - 4 * 2- 57-mm and 8 * 1- 40-mm Bofors at De Zeven Provinsen versus 10 * 2-40-mm and 7 * 1-40-mm Bofors at Tre Krunur.
But the booking of "De Zeven Provinsen" is noticeably weaker than that of the Swedish ship - the outer armor belt is 100 mm thick, decreasing to the extremities to 75 mm, the deck is only 20-25 mm. Power plant of the Dutch cruiser for 5000 hp weaker than Swedish. But at the same time "De Zeven Provinsen" is much larger than "Tre Krunur" - it has 9,529 tons of standard displacement against 7,400 tons of "Swede"!
It is possible that "Tre Krunur" became a victim of the admirals' overestimated ambitions - shipbuilders somehow managed to shove sailors "Wishlist" into a very small displacement, but this probably affected the efficiency of the ship. Attempts of this kind have existed at all times of military shipbuilding, but they almost never became successful. It is also possible that the Swedish cruiser had more modest performance characteristics, distorted in the Western press, as happened with the American light cruiser Cleveland. In any case, the comparison of "Tre Krunur" with "Sverdlov" on the basis of tabular performance characteristics will not be correct.
As for the "De Zeven Provinsen", here the comparison is extremely difficult due to the almost complete lack of information on its main caliber: 152-mm / 53 guns of the "Bofors" company. Various sources indicate the rate of fire of either 10-15 or 15 rds / min, but the latter figure is in great doubt. If the British, creating a 152-mm gun with a similar rate of fire for the Tiger, were forced to use water-cooled barrels, then on the cruisers of Sweden and the Netherlands, we do not see anything like this
English-language sources are also not encouraging - for example, the famous electronic encyclopedia NavWeaps claims that the rate of fire of this gun depended on the type of projectile - 10 rds / min for armor-piercing (AP) and 15 for anti-aircraft (AA). Everything would be fine, but in the ammunition section, the encyclopedia indicates the presence of only high-explosive (NOT) shells!
Nothing is clear about the speeds of horizontal and vertical aiming of 152-mm turrets, without which it is impossible to assess the ability of the guns to fire at air targets. It is argued that the guns had a fully mechanized loading at any elevation angle, but at the same time the mass of the De Zeven Provinsen turret is much lighter than that of the light cruiser Tiger - 115 tons versus 158.5 tons, while the British created their turret at 12 years later. Universal two-gun 152-mm turrets for Worcester-class cruisers, which entered service a year later, Tre Krunur, weighed over 200 tons, were supposed to provide 12 rounds per minute, but were technically unreliable.
152-mm guns "De Zeven Provinsen" fired 45, 8 kg projectile, accelerating it to an initial speed of 900 m / s. In terms of its ballistic qualities, the brainchild of the Bofors company was inferior to the Soviet B-38, which reported a 55 kg projectile speed of 950 m / s, but still exceeded the British six-inch Tiger in range and was capable of throwing a projectile by 140 kbt. Accordingly, the effective fire range of the Dutch cruiser was approximately 107 kbt, which is closer to the capabilities of the Sverdlov's main caliber. If the "De Zeven Provinsen" was indeed capable of developing a rate of fire of 10 rounds per minute per barrel in combat conditions, then it had a higher firing capacity compared to the Soviet cruiser - 80 rounds per minute versus 60 for the Sverdlov. Still, the project 68-bis cruiser had an advantage in the range and power of the projectile: the 25 mm De Zeven Provinsen armored deck could not resist the 55 kg Soviet projectile at distances of 100-130 kbt, but the 50 mm Sverdlov deck armor hit a light Dutch projectile would most likely be repelled. In addition, we know that the Soviet ship's control system provided effective firing of the main caliber at long distances, but we do not know anything about the De Zeven Provinsen fire control devices and radar, which could have turned out to be far from so perfect.
With regard to anti-aircraft fire, with a maximum rated rate of fire of 15 rds / min, eight De Zeven Provinsen main-caliber guns threw out almost 5.5 tons of shells per minute. Six SM-5-1 Soviet cruisers (the maximum is also taken - 18 rds / min per barrel) - only 3.37 tons. This is a significant advantage, and it became overwhelming in the event of shelling a single air target ("Sverdlov" could not, in contrast from "De Zeven Provinsen", fire all installations on one side). But it should be borne in mind that, unlike the guns of the Dutch ship, the domestic SM-5-1 were stabilized, and this provided them with better accuracy. In addition, shells with radio fuses entered service with Soviet installations (although, most likely, this happened in the mid or late 50s), but the author of this article does not have information that such shells were possessed by Swedish or Dutch cruisers. … If we assume that the "De Zeven Provinsen" did not have shells with radio fuses, then the advantage in air defense goes to the Soviet cruiser. In addition, the above figures do not in any way take into account even the modest, but still existing, possibilities of firing the Sverdlov's main caliber at an air target. And most importantly, as in the case of the main caliber, we do not have information about the quality of the anti-aircraft fire control devices of the Dutch and Swedish cruisers.
As for the effectiveness of anti-aircraft guns, the Soviet cruiser is undoubtedly leading in terms of the number of barrels, but the efficiency of the 57-mm Bofors installations should be significantly higher than the domestic 37-mm V-11 assault rifle. However, in order to equalize the possibilities with the Soviet ship, one 57-mm "spark" must be equivalent to three V-11 installations, which is somewhat doubtful.
In general, it can be stated that "De Zeven Provinsen" is inferior to the Soviet cruiser of Project 68-bis in artillery combat, but significantly surpasses (in the presence of shells with radio fuses) in the air defense unit. However, this conclusion is correct only if the main caliber of the Dutch cruiser fully corresponds to the characteristics that Russian-language sources give it, if the cruiser's PUS and radar are not inferior to the Soviet ones, if the main caliber was provided with projectiles with a radio fuse … Given that the above assumptions are very doubtful … But even in the variant most favorable for the "De Zeven Provinsen", in terms of the aggregate fighting qualities, it does not have superiority over the Soviet cruiser of the 68-bis project.
This article was supposed to complete the cycle about the artillery cruisers of the Soviet fleet, but the comparison of Sverdlov-class ships with foreign cruisers unexpectedly dragged on, and there was no room left for describing the tasks of artillery cruisers in the post-war USSR Navy.
