The Russian army is preparing for a massive rearmament. It will not bypass motorized rifle formations, units, subunits either, which is especially important against the background of large-scale organizational staff transformations being carried out in the troops and the "procurement holidays" of the 90s. But do we well understand what, for example, armored combat vehicles (AFVs) should our infantry receive in the near future?
It is no secret that the Russian Ground Forces are still equipped with mostly outdated and worn out armored vehicles. You will inevitably have to gradually get rid of it, but what AFVs will come to replace the decommissioned ones? The process of reforming the army in order to give it a new look must necessarily be accompanied by the formation of the concept of "armor" for the next generation. At the same time, it should be noted that before assembling, as if from a children's designer, new samples, it is necessary to answer questions about the role and place, say, of an infantry fighting vehicle in various modern wars and military operations.
Problem one: doctrine and geography
Having analyzed the doctrinal views of NATO member states, one cannot fail to note the adaptive approach adopted in the North Atlantic Alliance to the formation of task forces, the composition of which is of a combined nature. They themselves are seen as a sufficient deterrent in the event of a threat of a conflict in any strategic direction. If this has not been done and the conflict has passed into a "hot" phase, they are called upon to localize it in the embryo.
Elements of such an approach to the formation of operational groupings are clearly visible in the current Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, which takes into account the geophysical, natural and transport conditions that characterize the entire spectrum of potential theater of operations.
From this point of view, Russia is a very heterogeneous conglomerate. The country is forced to build and equip its Armed Forces with a single AFV staff, starting from an extremely wide and often contradictory set of requirements. The nature of hypothetical military operations in the Kola Arctic is strikingly different from the conditions of the North Caucasus and they have little in common with operations in the East European or Transbaikal theater of operations. This imposes a number of specific requirements on the characteristics of infantry fighting vehicles.
On the other hand, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation directly and unequivocally defines a very broad framework for the use of nuclear weapons, including, calling things by their proper names, puts them at the forefront as a deterrent, which can be used preventively. In combination with a mobile-adaptive (and not territorial) approach to the formation of new formations, this factor must also be taken into account when determining the requirements for combat vehicles of motorized rifle units, which must act confidently in the conditions of using nuclear weapons.
The task of forming adaptive operational groupings, first of all, requires unification (or universalization) of platform solutions for armored vehicles entering service with the Russian army. Units of constant readiness were conceived as highly mobile (the time of transition to the fulfillment of the assigned combat mission, ideally, about an hour) and capable of operating in any zone of interests of the Russian Federation. The rejection of the prevailing orientation of permanent readiness units for operations within the framework of a specific theater of operations requires an extremely careful approach to equipping brigades with a new look with combat and auxiliary equipment.
Thus, from all of the above, the following conclusions can be drawn: new armored vehicles should be ready for action in the entire spectrum of the described conditions, without losing their combat and technical properties; when recruiting operational groupings, the composition of armored combat vehicles of motorized rifle units should be balanced in terms of basic functions (mobility, security, firepower) and logistics.
Within the framework of the adopted State Armament Program for the period up to 2020, the design and deployment of three types of universal platforms for military equipment of the Ground Forces are envisaged. Motorized riflemen of "heavy" brigades of constant readiness will receive tracked armored vehicles (BMP), "medium" - wheeled (armored personnel carriers), and "light" - armored vehicles. In accordance with this line, it is also necessary to unify the basic platforms for special and auxiliary equipment of the ground forces, related to parts of the logistics, engineering and sapper units, chemical protection troops, electronic warfare, etc.
Problem two: shine and poverty of buttons
In this regard, of course, a rather lively discussion could not fail in the specialized military-technical press about how specialists see the new look of armored vehicles. And it really took place. However, the form and content of this controversy raise a number of puzzling questions.
It is possible to analyze the promising appearance and its organic relationship with the existing fleet of armored vehicles from different angles, but one should not forget that in the hierarchy of requirements, the issues of tactics and the tasks of the combat use of armored combat vehicles occupy a priority place. It is the forms and methods of their use on the battlefield that form the complex of tactical and technical characteristics.
At the same time, it should be noted that practically the entire background of the modern discussion of armored vehicles of motorized riflemen is formed by experts speaking from the position of "zampotekhs", shifting the main focus of the discussion to secondary engineering and technical issues. Should the Bakhchu armored vehicle be installed on it or any other universal weapon module? What kind of optical-electronic countermeasures complex does the machine need and is it needed? Should we increase the engine power and the thickness of the armor protection?
Behind this kaleidoscope of small shiny "buttons", behind the games of reason in technical parameters, the most important question is buried tightly: and for what, in fact, is the machine being created? What tasks should it solve in modern combat, how will it integrate into the combat system? What is the most effective tactics for using an AFV? And only after receiving clear and intelligible answers, the next question should be asked - how this set of combat functions should be reflected in the technical elements of the machine and what technological and production solutions will be required for this.
Instead, “piecewise”, purely reflexive logic often dominates. Need more security? We thicken the armor, use new metal-ceramic composites, and attach dynamic protection. Insufficient weaponry, are there problems with its use in adverse weather conditions? We put more powerful and heavier weapons, we load the car with thermal imagers and other modern equipment. As a result, the weight has increased? We are increasing the engine power - and by no means to drastically increase the maneuverability, but only to regain the lost mobility.
Running in this vicious circle can continue indefinitely, while few ask the question: how does each of these disparate single actions work to achieve a common goal, and what, in fact, is this goal? Yes, these steps are not taken from scratch, under each lies a specific special case from practice and the solution, as a rule, is quite adequate - if we consider it in isolation from the general problematic. But the system cannot be based on particular cases; on the contrary, a well-designed and controlled system should prevent the occurrence of such cases.
How to answer these questions without first determining the place of armored vehicles in the combat formations of motorized riflemen? Not having received after that a built-up set of tactical tasks solved by "armor" in battle? Indeed, only after a thorough study and analysis of these problems can one begin to form the appearance of a combat vehicle as a closed organism and determine its tactical and technical characteristics.
The lack of a combined approach, the lack of a competent systemic view of the place of armored vehicles in the Ground Forces is aggravated by the fact that discussions are practically not aimed at formulating new tactical tasks that have arisen for armored vehicles on the battlefield. Perhaps it is already necessary to change the ideology and architecture of the weapons complex? Moving from mechanical armor build-up to other methods of protection? To radically revise views on the marching capabilities of motorized riflemen? Finding answers to these questions is not easy.
Problem three: horizons of combat use
Assessing the potential appearance of an armored vehicle, one should study the main functional characteristics of the "armor". These include mobility, security and firepower. What is the problematic of these aspects of the design of modern armored vehicles?
The greatest questions are raised by the improvement of maneuverability. As a rule, this problem is solved by increasing the engine power and, as noted earlier, is most often a consequence of the weighting of the "improved" vehicle, and not a way to achieve a qualitative increase in the mobility of military equipment.
A special problem is posed by the task of multiplying the marching maneuverability of armored vehicles. In the context of a shift in emphasis on increasing the mobility of motorized rifle subunits, significant attention should be paid to the issues of a radical reduction in the time for the transfer of armored vehicles and personnel to concentration areas with the maximum possible preservation of the resource of the material part. Possible schemes, methods and technologies for such an increase in maneuverability are a good topic for large-scale discussion.
The problem of a dramatic increase in the protection of armored vehicles also deserves close consideration. Obviously, it is wrong to solve it only by methods of further enhancing passive armor protection, even if based on serious progress in structural materials. We emphasize that this remark does not mean that the task of improving the constructive protection of the AFV should be ignored. The point is that it is necessary to correctly prioritize when designing a set of protective measures and means.
It is possible that a little more attention should be paid not so much to the task of reducing the effectiveness of contact damage, as to the problem of preventing successful detection and target designation, but more broadly - preventing the use of weapons on armored vehicles. In particular, a systematic approach to the design of a complex of circular distance protection for the main physical fields (along the electromagnetic and optical channels) is required, the main task of which will be to disrupt the cyclograms of illumination and guidance of enemy guided weapons.
The following requirements can be imposed on such a system. It must be able to fix a potential threat, analyze and recognize its nature, and then automatically build a countermeasure scheme - optical, optoelectronic or electromagnetic. Given the complexity and size of such a complex, it is possible that it can be integrated, but physically distributed in nature and be based on several carriers, united within the general combat information network of the unit. This additionally brings us back to the repeatedly voiced problems of improving the procedures for controlling and illuminating the situation at the tactical level through the introduction of appropriate automated systems into the practice of troops.
The most important issue is the improvement of the firepower of motorized rifle armored personnel carriers. Any proposal for the development and deployment of production of new armored vehicles must be assessed only through the prism of new tactical tasks, which are proposed to be solved using the designed product. What, in fact, should the armament complex of the same BMP "be able to" in modern conditions?
Firstly, the task of hitting the observed targets from the depths of the battle formation is extremely acute for our armored combat vehicles - in other words, over the head of the infantry located in front. There is nothing new in this task - during the Great Patriotic War, the SU-76 self-propelled artillery unit for direct support of infantry was used for the same purposes. The Wehrmacht also had similar means - assault guns (for example, the massive self-propelled guns of support Stug. III), widely using them in defense and in breaking through enemy lines. After almost seventy years have passed, we have sufficient technology and accumulated experience to integrate the means of performing this task into the armament complex of a conventional infantry fighting vehicle of a motorized rifle squad, significantly expanding the range of possibilities for direct support of the infantry.
Secondly, the armament complex must steadily ensure the defeat of unobserved targets with the transmission of coordinates from external sources - for example, from reconnaissance groups or from the observation post of the unit commander, as well as target designation of army drones. Here we are again faced with the task of forming a single information space for a combat subunit, within which the situation can be automatically transferred to fire weapons in real time, and the commanders of the corresponding echelon can flexibly and in a timely manner form a squad of forces and means for destruction.
Thirdly, a new approach is needed to improve the effectiveness of the fight against air targets. This task, in particular, is connected with the already described problem of building a complex of distance all-round protection, being, among other things, one of the instruments of counteraction.
Problem four: place in battle
And again returning to the main factor that must first of all be taken into account when determining the requirements for an infantry fighting vehicle: its place on the battlefield. The standard BMP of domestic motorized riflemen, as you know, is designed for (we quote sequentially) transporting infantry to the battlefield, increasing its mobility, armament and security on the battlefield and joint actions with tanks.
Here we see the prevailing focus on the transfer and cover of the infantry. However, the combat experience gained by the Russian military in Afghanistan and Chechnya (as well as the combat experience of the NATO military accumulated in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example) shows us that BMPs on the battlefield often become a source of problems. The infantry spends energy, time and attention to protect their vehicles - otherwise the BMP is doomed. But even absorbing the efforts of personnel, modern technology is far from always capable of providing adequate support to the infantry in response in response. Apparently, in the current phase of the development of combined arms combat, this concept has exhausted itself and it is necessary to look for a new ideology for using the main combat vehicle of motorized rifle units.
Here it would be appropriate to formulate the following question. Further weighting of weapons and improvement of weapons control and target designation systems (both on the vehicle itself and within the unit as a whole) gives the old idea of a tracked vehicle of the battlefield a new dimension. Let us venture to suggest: is it not high time in this connection to move on to the perception of the BMP as a system-forming complex of weapons in the system of fire destruction of the squad-platoon-company link?
The peculiarity of this approach is that the role of the BMP in combat changes from auxiliary to main. The main part of the firing tasks of the lower tactical units is assigned to the vehicle, and now the infantry continues to work for the vehicle, protecting and supplying it with target designation, but in return receives full-fledged cover (including from air threats) and accurate work on targets revealed by motorized rifles (including number outside the visibility of the "armor" crew). Thus, the BMP ceases to be a "suitcase without a handle" and becomes a leading element in the system of fire destruction of the squad-platoon-company link. By the way, at the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries, a similar transformation, however, in the operational echelon, was experienced by the infantry divisions, having entered the world war with the attached artillery as a system-forming strike force.
By giving the BMP a new character of security and mobility, as well as establishing it as a system-forming complex of weapons for the lower tactical echelon of motorized rifle subunits, we will be able to form a new picture of the use of the usual "armor". A vehicle with heavy weapons will become not only the main combat means of a squad, platoon, company, but also an impromptu "long arm" of commanders in cases where the artillerymen assigned to the unit are not ready to open fire or are already performing a combat mission, and the BMPs of the forward formations are in an advantageous position to defeat uncovered targets.
This formulation of the question is debatable, however, it is precisely the clarification of the framework of the polemic that this article is devoted to. Let us emphasize again: the discussion of the promising appearance of the armored vehicles of the Russian infantry should begin with a clear and thoughtful formulation of the place of "armor" in the general combat system of troops. Without a thorough analysis and design "from top to bottom", any breakthroughs to "modernize" the AFV fleet of the Russian army will only lead to unnecessary spending of state funds and the receipt of equipment by motorized riflemen that does not meet their needs on the modern battlefield.
