Very few people know that in a yellow building behind the Kremlin wall, closer to the Spasskaya Tower, the Commission of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on military-industrial issues was located, which in everyday life was called the military-industrial complex. 1967 to 1987 in the military-industrial complex, Yu. P. Kostenko, dealing with the development of domestic armored vehicles. In 1953 he graduated from the Moscow Higher Technical School and was sent to the Design Bureau of the Uralvagonzavod. From 1962 to 1967 works at the head institute of the tank industry - VNIITransmash (Leningrad). In 2000, he published a brochure [1] on the development of armored vehicles, which, due to the small circulation (500 copies), did not become the property of specialists and interested readers. Let's try to comment on the views of this highly qualified and high-ranking official on the features of the development of our infantry fighting vehicles.
Our BMP - tracked armored personnel carriers
In December 1979, Soviet motorized rifle units equipped with BMP-1 entered Afghanistan, a large number of which were disabled with the help of enemy small arms, which came as a surprise to the command of all levels. A scandalous situation arose: the BMP-1 was not provided with bulletproof protection. Armor-piercing bullets even of 7.62 mm caliber pierced the side, stern and roof of the hull, as a result of which the crew and troops died.
In order to understand what domestic BMPs are, consider the combat characteristics of the BMP-1. Vehicle weight - 13 tons. Armament: 73-mm gun "Thunder"; ATGM - "Baby"; coaxial with gun 7, 62-mm machine gun. In the sides of the hull there are seven embrasures for firing machine guns and two front ones for firing light machine guns. Reservation - bulletproof: armor thickness - from 6 to 26 mm. At the same time, the sides, stern and roof of the hull are pierced by an armor-piercing bullet of 7, 62 mm at a distance of up to 50 m. The vehicle has 11 seats: in front of the left is the driver, behind him is the commander, in the stern - 8 motorized riflemen, in the rotating turret - gunner. The vehicle has a system of anti-nuclear protection of personnel.
BMP-1
If we consider the BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle as a fighting vehicle, then the infantry should be able to fight the enemy infantry without leaving the combat vehicle. But the design of domestic infantry fighting vehicles does not provide this. First, it does not protect against the most common small arms of enemy infantry. Secondly, initially the main weapon of the BMP-1 was anti-tank, not anti-personnel, which made this vehicle defenseless when attacking a prepared enemy defensive zone. A shrapnel round was introduced into the BMP-1 ammunition only 7 years after the start of production of this vehicle, although this should have been done back in 1966 when it was put into service.
And, thirdly, the commander of the motorized rifle squad (he is also the commander of the vehicle) was "blind". Being in the hull and not having all-round vision, he saw what the driver was, and less than the gunner-operator, to whom he gave the firing commands. Note that the error with the placement of the commander in the hull was corrected 13 years later on the BMP-2, which was equipped with a two-man turret.
Thus, the BMP (1, 2, 3), in terms of their technical capabilities, do not correspond to their formidable name, but represent an example of a heavy armored personnel carrier capable of providing fire support to infantry directly during the battle. Accordingly, it was high time for the Ministry of Defense to reconsider the tactics of the combat use of infantry fighting vehicles.
This situation was a consequence of the poor study by the Ministry of Defense, together with the Ministry of Defense Industry of the TTKh on the development of BMP-1, etc. small arms of the enemy when firing "point-blank". At the same time, the question - whether such a machine can or cannot float - is of secondary importance. The main task of the armored personnel carrier is the delivery of manpower to the area of the planned combat operation in conditions of overcoming water obstacles by swimming. For this type of vehicle, the level of armor protection is of secondary importance. In this situation, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Defense Industry did not understand.
At the beginning of 1980, Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments V. M. Shabanov, reporting on the results of his trip to Afghanistan at the military-industrial complex, dropped the following words: "Who needs this" tin can "- BMP-1, which does not even protect against small arms!"
"Tin can" under fire of anti-tank weapons
The process of creating samples of weapons and military equipment from the development of tactical and technical requirements, design, testing to adoption is inherently a compromise. With regard to domestic infantry fighting vehicles, there was always a desire, in the face of a sharp limitation of the overall and mass characteristics, to create vehicles with good firepower, high driving performance, which was carried out due to the protection characteristics that unacceptably reduce the survival of the crew and the landing force. At the same time, the development of high-precision weapons, the improvement of previously known anti-tank weapons have led to a sharp decrease in the combat properties of lightly armored vehicles in the context of modern and future military conflicts.
In well-known reference publications [2] it is mentioned that domestic infantry fighting vehicles are designed to increase the mobility, armament and security of the infantry operating on the battlefield. As for security, it is somehow strange that the events of Afghanistan and Chechnya did not allow the authors of this publication to bring the parameters of protection into line with the reality. The paratroopers and the crew, being in the BMP, are practically unprotected. The state of protection against the effects of small arms can be assessed by comparing the characteristics of armor protection (armor thickness - 6-26 mm) with the armor penetration of standard ammunition [2] of small arms (see table).
Armor penetration of standard small arms ammunition
The result of comparing the parameters of the BMP-1 armored protection with the armor penetration of ammunition of standard small arms indicates that the enemy can calmly let the BMP close to his positions, and then shoot them point-blank from conventional small arms.
It is very unfortunate that military educational institutions do not disclose the actual parameters of BMP protection, and disorientation and misinformation on this issue continues in various publications.
BMP-2
But on the battlefield, not only small arms ammunition will operate on the BMP, but also other more effective anti-tank weapons: artillery shells, grenade launchers, ATGMs, unguided cumulative cluster elements, homing and self-aiming ammunition delivered by aviation, MLRS and various engineering mines. In these conditions, the fate of the BMP crew and landing force is especially aggravated during enemy attacks in a single formation with tanks. In this case, anti-tank weapons will effectively hit the crew, cause an explosion of ammunition and fuel combustion. Numerous cases of the defeat of lightly armored vehicles during hostilities cause a negative moral and psychological reaction in the military. Such a reaction has already taken place when using our infantry fighting vehicles in Afghanistan and Chechnya. The paratroopers, even on the march, try to be on top of the armored vehicle. This is primarily due to the fact that when mines are detonated, when grenade launchers are fired, the probability of death inside the BMP is much higher than when placed on the roof.
But even before approaching the combat zone, the BMP will be hit by various anti-tank ammunition delivered by various carriers. The action of these ammunition will be very effective. The most dangerous hit is the impact of a self-aiming ammunition (Skeet). The impact core (mass of the order of 0.5 kg, speed - 2 km / s, armor penetration - 120 mm), after breaking through the armor protection, forms a powerful fragmentation stream weighing several kilograms, which effectively affects the landing force, ignites the fuel tanks and powder charges of the liners. The defeat is aggravated by the ricochet of a part of the fragments, which inflict additional damage. Homing mines (Merlin, Griffin, Strix) with armor penetration of 500-700 mm will be very effective against BMPs. The cumulative jet of such ammunition has a large depth of armor action.
Unfortunately, from the above examples of the defeat of domestic infantry fighting vehicles, the conclusion follows about the weak protection of these vehicles, the creators of which paid attention primarily to driving performance and weapons.
Ways to increase the protection parameters of BMP
But is the entire arsenal of methods and materials used in the creation of BMP protection? After all, there is a fairly wide range of materials (armored steel, titanium, aluminum, ceramics, fiberglass, armored nylon and Kevlar, etc.), which is not yet fully used. Of this set, only armor steel was widely used. Aluminum "armor" is used in the design of the BMP-3, BMD-3, which made it possible to somewhat reduce the parameters of the armor-bearing fragmentation flows. The use of nylon, Kevlar and other similar materials as lining (on the inside of the hull) allows localizing the fragmentation effect of a number of ammunition.
Internal components of the vehicle (transmission, engine, etc.) can contribute to the protection of ammunition, fuel and crew. The placement of the engine compartment in the rear of the BMP-3 does not indicate attempts to improve the protection of the crew and the landing force. On the contrary, on foreign BMPs "Marder" and "Bradley" the engine and transmission are installed in the bow of the hull and, acting as a "thick" screen, protect personnel, which is very important in an offensive operation.
BMP-3
There is information about the delivery of "Kurganmashzavod" and NIIStali to the United Arab Emirates of explosive reactive armor kits for the BMP-3 in service in this country. But something like DZ is not visible on our infantry fighting vehicles, which at the same time increases the resistance of protection against small arms. The DZ installation increased the length of the BMP-3 from 6, 7 to 7, 1 m, the width across the screens - from 3, 3 to 4 m. The mass of the vehicle increased from 19, 4 to 23, 4 tons. The increase in mass by 4 tons was due to for the significant weight of non-metallic damping devices that localize the explosive effect of the remote sensing on the thin body of the BMP-3.
In connection with the development abroad of guided anti-tank weapons to destroy armored objects not only at the front line of defense, but most importantly, in the rear of our troops, it is necessary to actively develop means of countering detection and guidance systems of these ammunition.
The development of protection for lightly armored vehicles should be based on the results of in-depth studies of the processes of interaction of promising weapons with new variants of protection structures. Protection designers should take into account that impact balls are actively destroyed by steel screens (3-5 mm thick). In the role of a screen, you can use a remote sensing device, which can protect not only from a cumulative jet, but also destroy the impact core.
Since lightly armored vehicles will always be part of the Ground Forces, the air defense can significantly reduce the loss of infantry fighting vehicles by combating carriers of cluster guided weapons.
By now, the question of creating a family of machines capable of performing combat missions in modern and future military conflicts is already overripe. Justification of the composition of this family and the parameters of the samples should be the primary task of the MO. The work carried out related to the modernization of old machines only allows you to gain time, but no more. But in new vehicles, the protection of the crew and the landing should not be in the last place.
Disadvantages of the system of technical training of BMP personnel
BMP-2
The essence of these shortcomings lies in the fact that the basis of our technical training system is based on an unspoken premise - a person who knows the weaknesses and shortcomings of his weapon, in combat conditions, may become cowardly and not complete the task. At the same time, there is a provision according to which the design documentation of a new type of weapon entering service and into mass production is declassified, and the performance characteristics of the model remain secret. Therefore, the main attention in the educational process is paid to the study of the design and operating conditions of the sample, and the performance characteristics are given in a general form with an emphasis on advantages. So, for example, the personnel, when studying the material part of the BMP, learns that the booking protects well against small arms, from a shock wave, penetrating radiation and light radiation of a nuclear explosion. But a soldier, officer, general who has undergone such training, it turns out, does not know what kind of small arms ammunition and from what range the armor of our infantry fighting vehicles is affected and what should be expected from other lethal weapons.
Thus, the personnel have the false impression that conventional small arms are not dangerous for these vehicles. What this leads to is clearly seen in the examples of Afghanistan and Chechnya, where the command staff got acquainted with the real performance characteristics on the battlefield, paying for it with lives and losses of military equipment. To send a modern complex machine into battle, knowing in advance that its crew does not have the necessary knowledge and control skills, means deliberately committing a crime, dooming equipment and people to death.
Tactics lagged behind technology
In 1968, there was an opinion in the military-industrial complex that after the BMP-1 enters the troops, its shortcomings will appear, both in the command of the Ground Forces and in the General Staff will understand that it cannot be used as a combat vehicle, but should be used as an armored personnel carrier and simultaneously as an infantry fire support vehicle. The military-industrial complex was mistaken in this assumption. In the Ground Forces, no one was in a hurry to engage in the tactics of using infantry fighting vehicles and, it seems, is not doing it until now. For 10 years after the adoption of the BMP-1 into service in the training centers of the Ministry of Defense there were no corresponding training programs.
A dialogue between Yu. P. Kostenko and Deputy Head of the Academy. M. V. Frunze in science (colonel general, doctor of military sciences, professor), with the help of whom they hoped to sort out this difficult issue.
BMP-1
Colonel General (GP): - Where do we start?
Yu. P. Kostenko (UP): - Let's start with the simplest: the motorized rifle squad is on the attack. The BMP reached the initial line for the landing. In this case, does the commander go into battle with the landing party, or does he remain in command in the car?
GP: - Of course, there is a battle with a landing party.
UP: - And who in this case remains the commander of the BMP: the driver or the gunner?
GP: - It is up to the squad leader himself. Obviously, he will leave the one with the smartest in the car for the elders.
UP: - That is how ?! After all, a person must be taught in advance to drive a machine in battle.
The professor thought for a moment, but left this question unanswered.
UP: - Okay, the infantry went forward. In this case, the BMP should follow its motorized rifle?
GP: - Yes.
UP: - And what is the distance provided by the charter between the infantry and the BMP?
GP: - 100 m.
UP: - Suppose the infantry came under machine gun fire and lay down. How, in this case, will the squad leader give the command to the BMP to the gunner to suppress the enemy machine-gun point?
GP: - He will whistle and signal with his hand.
UP: - Sorry, but this is happening on the battlefield, where bullets whistle and shells explode. How in such conditions can you hear a regular whistle or see a waving hand at a distance of 100 m ?!
The general's self-confidence began to noticeably decrease.
GP: - Well … he can signal with a red flag.
Gradually, the general's face, neck, hands began to turn red.
UP: - Well, here the situation is more or less clear. But tell me, in a motorized rifle platoon the platoon commander has 5 infantry fighting vehicles at his disposal, therefore, he has 5 artillery pieces and 200 rounds for them. Do the regulations provide for the possibility for the platoon commander to centrally control the fire of all this artillery?
GP: - No, the platoon commander in battle, in the offensive does not have such an opportunity.
UP: - The battalion commander can have up to 50 BMP-1s, therefore, he has 50 "Thunder" guns and 50 ATGM launchers "Malyutka". But it is quite obvious that one person - the commander of a battalion - cannot physically control the combat actions of motorized riflemen and the fire of an infantry fighting vehicle at the same time. Does the staffing list provide for the position of deputy commander of a motorized rifle battalion for artillery?
GP: - No. There is no such position in the staffing table.
A confused person sat in front of me.
GP: - Yuri Petrovich, sign me a pass and let me go to the Academy. A commission from the General Staff is working there now, checking the educational process. If the commission has any comments, then the Academy will be in trouble, - and confidentially and sincerely added: - Nobody asks us for tactics.
This example clearly shows that such generals should not be allowed to solve the most important tactical tasks.
How the General Staff stripped the country
In 1967, the General Staff informed the Council of Ministers and the State Planning Committee that, according to its calculations, the Ministry of Defense needed 70,000 BMP-1s to equip the troops with a new type of infantry weaponry! The Council of Ministers (VPK) and the State Planning Commission accepted this for execution. In economic terms, this was a huge burden for the country. Note that in the sixth year of serial production, the BMP-1 cost 70 thousand rubles. On November 29, 1968, Marshals Grechko and Zakharov signed an application for 1971-1975, in which the Ministry of Defense's need for an BMP-1 for a five-year period was indicated in only 27,250 pieces. But the country's industry was unable to accept even such an application. Moreover, the entire industry of the Warsaw Pact countries was unable to cope with such a request. The USSR government instructed the State Planning Committee and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations to negotiate with the People's Republic of Poland and Czechoslovakia on the possibility of organizing the production of BMP-1 in these countries especially for the USSR. At the same time, it was envisaged that in 1971-1975. The USSR is ready to buy 2500 BMP-1 in Poland, and Czechoslovakia - 2250 BMP-1. The Czechs accepted the offer, the Poles refused. As a result, capacities were created in Czechoslovakia and deliveries to the USSR of 500 BMP-1 each year began.
BMP-3
A government decree of September 3, 1968 provided for the creation of production facilities for the BMP-1 at two plants of the Ministry of Defense Industry in the cities of Kurgan and Rubtsovsk. The factories were practically rebuilt. In the end, the fifth five-year plan for 1971-1975. it was planned to manufacture 12061 BMP-1, which was 44% of the declared need of the Ministry of Defense. Application for 1976-1980. provided for the manufacture of 21,500 infantry fighting vehicles. These figures indicate the following. Starting practically from scratch, the Ministry of Defense Industry supplied the army with 20 thousand infantry fighting vehicles in 10 years. The main supplier was the Kurgan Machine-Building Plant.
The previous procedure for working out high-level decisions on weapons development is very interesting. As a rule, the decision was worked out by the Ministry of Defense Industry, the Ministry of Defense, the State Planning Committee, and the military-industrial complex and the Central Committee of the CPSU gave only their "go-ahead" to them. Such a system, firstly, was cumbersome and unwieldy, and secondly, it created an atmosphere of irresponsibility when making decisions. At the same time, with such a system, defense planning was torn into two parts: military strategic plans - in the General Staff, and strategic plans for their material and technical support - in the State Planning Committee. This gap led to gross miscalculations that did not bypass the domestic lightly armored vehicles.
In general, as follows from the main provisions of Yu. P. Kostenko, the military-industrial complex really assessed the state of domestic infantry fighting vehicles, but the tune was ordered by the Ministry of Defense. In that state structure, even officials of the rank of Yu. P. It was not easy for Kostenko to fight the clumsy state machine. In the brochure, words of repentance and regret are heard between the lines for what he did not have time to do.
Literature
1. Yu. P. Kostenko, Some issues of the development of domestic armored vehicles in 1967-1987. (memories and reflections), LLC "YUNIAR-Print", Moscow, 2000
2. Arms of Russia 2000, Publishing house "Military Parade", Moscow, 2000
