Umbrella over Syria

Umbrella over Syria
Umbrella over Syria

Video: Umbrella over Syria

Video: Umbrella over Syria
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Anonim

Russian electronic warfare systems have confirmed their high efficiency and can be considered as an asymmetric weapon for a new generation of wars

The withdrawal of our main forces from Syria did not relieve the United States and its NATO allies of headaches. The Western community is actively discussing the work of Russian electronic warfare systems. The reason for such close attention, apparently, is that our technology is capable of closing significant areas in which modern high-tech weapons and military equipment are becoming ineffective.

This is very disliked by those who previously widely and successfully used their electronic warfare systems in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, Libya, and the Balkans. But the advantage in this area, which amused our "friends", is a thing of the past.

The Americans themselves were the first to declare this. In particular, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges (commander of US forces in Europe), Ronald Pontius (deputy chief of the cyber command), Colonel Jeffrey Church (head of the electronic warfare department of the ground forces), Philip Breedlove (at that time the commander-in-chief of the combined forces of NATO in Europe). With reference to the latter, the Daily OSNet reported that in the area of operation of the Russian military group, American troops and their NATO allies were blinded and deafened on the ground, in the air and in space - in a "bubble" with a diameter of about 600 kilometers. Earlier, according to Breedlove, Moscow “inflated” such “bubbles” over the Black and Baltic Seas. He also told about the breathtaking capabilities of Russian electronic warfare systems, which are capable of creating vast areas of A2 / AD (anti-access / area denial). They should be understood as zones of guaranteed prohibition for the enemy's access and any opposition to the use of his own weapons. Everything is like in the famous song by Edita Piekha: “I don't see anything, I don't hear anything, I don't know anything, I won't tell anyone”.

What actually happened? At one time we were not hysterical about the use of Western electronic warfare systems in Yugoslavia or Iraq. Apparently, there are good reasons for such a nervous reaction of our sworn friends. Only a real effect could cause the frustration of those who do not even think about the possible superiority of Russia in some military matters.

Situation Levers

With the escalation of the current electronic warfare, it would be foolish not to use our capabilities to protect the Russian group and cause maximum damage to terrorist groups. After the destruction of our aircraft by a Turkish fighter, Lieutenant General Evgeny Buzhinsky, Deputy Director General for Foreign Economic Affairs of OJSC Radio Engineering Concern Vega, said: "Russia will have to use means of suppression and electronic warfare."

What exactly do we have in Syria? The first, presumably, can be called the terrestrial mobile complex "Krasukha-4", which serves for setting up broadband active jamming to suppress radio-emitting reconnaissance and data transmission space, air and ground based at ranges of 150-300 kilometers. The complex is effective for countering the electronic means (RES) of reconnaissance satellites such as Lacrosse and Onyx, AWACS and Sentinel aircraft, as well as drones.

With a high degree of probability, we can talk about the use of the Khibiny multifunctional aircraft complex electronic warfare, which became widely known after it completely crushed reconnaissance and control equipment, as well as the Aegis missile defense system of the American destroyer Donald Cook in the Black Sea. "Khibiny" can be a group means of protecting aircraft from all existing anti-aircraft and aviation weapons. In this capacity, the complex proved itself to be the best in 2008 during the operation to force Georgia to peace.

In September, two Il-20 electronic reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft arrived at the Khmeimim airbase. With a complex of various sensors, antennas and other optoelectronic devices, these machines are capable of solving the assigned tasks during 12 hours of flight in any weather and climatic conditions, day and night. It was also reported about the transfer of the Borisoglebsk-2 complexes to Syria, which today are considered one of the most difficult in the world in their class.

To create an electronic umbrella on the border with Turkey, other advanced electronic warfare equipment could also be used. For the suppression of radars, disruption of guidance, control and communication systems - complexes such as "Lever", "Moscow", "Mercury", "Porubshchik". The latter is based on the Il-22, which is equipped with side antennas and a cable with a transmitter that unwinds several hundred meters in flight. Along with these electronic warfare equipment, disposable sighting jamming transmitters could also be used to protect our aircraft and helicopters.

It is impossible to exclude the use of electronic warfare systems Infauna and small-sized jammers of the Lesochek type to combat radio-controlled landmines, improvised explosive devices and high-precision weapons, as well as to disrupt cellular communications and in the VHF range. The media reported about a probable demonstration of the capabilities of the active jamming stations "Lever-AV" and "Vitebsk". The first can be installed on any military equipment and suppress control systems and air defense systems of the enemy.

According to the chief of the electronic warfare troops of the RF Armed Forces, Major-General Yuri Lastochkin, the developed means make it possible to provide the possibility of radio intelligence and radio suppression of communication systems for collective use, covert, selective blocking of subscriber terminals of enemy cellular communications. Experts believe that electronic warfare systems approximately double the capabilities of ground forces and increase the survivability of aviation by 25-30 times.

You can't drown this song …

Taking into account the potential and purpose of our electronic warfare equipment, one of the main tasks in Syria was to cover the Russian military group and the Khmeimim airbase from possible air and ground strikes, as well as to protect personnel and equipment from being hit by radio-controlled land mines and improvised explosive devices.

Umbrella over Syria
Umbrella over Syria

The effectiveness of the solution in this case is closely related to the measures to protect their RES from technical intelligence and electronic suppression. The need for this is due to the well-known facts of the transfer of intelligence information to the armed opposition and terrorist groups by the special services of Turkey, the United States, Saudi Arabia and other countries.

Other, no less important tasks of electronic warfare equipment are constant monitoring of the electronic situation in the areas where their group and the Khmeimim airbase are based and the strict observance of the rules of electromagnetic compatibility to ensure the normal functioning of their own radio electronic equipment.

To ensure high-precision fire destruction of command posts and other important objects, the task of determining their location was solved by establishing the coordinates of the radio-emitting means located on them. It is also known about the suppression of ground and space-based radio communications, drone control channels and data transmission from them.

Finally, an important condition for the reconciliation of the warring parties was the informational confrontation on the air with the use of electronic warfare means.

Thus, Syria turned out to be a testing ground where in real combat conditions, including in the confrontation with the RES of developed Western countries, important experience was gained. It allowed us to identify the strengths and weaknesses of our technology, to become the basis for further enhancing the capabilities and methods of its application. Much, for obvious reasons, remains outside the scope of publicly available information. But what is already known allows us to draw some conclusions.

The first and, probably, the main one: EW means are one of the main asymmetric means of waging war of the new generation. In the West, they are stubbornly called hybrid and are trying to shift their authorship to Russia. Today we are accused of allegedly being the first to carry out such a war, which resulted in the annexation of Crimea. But much earlier the "non-contact" aggression of the Western coalition led by the United States took place, as a result of which a unified Yugoslavia ceased to exist. And it is the hybrid wars, planned and unleashed by the same forces, that have become the cause of the current deplorable fate of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, the situation in Syria and the catastrophic situation with refugees in Europe. It is obvious.

The main capabilities of electronic warfare equipment should be hidden as much as possible from potential adversaries, and the tactics of their use should be based on surprise. This will not allow taking proactive measures, and in conjunction with the principles of massiveness, concentration on the main direction (priority objects) will ensure the achievement of the set goals.

It is also extremely important that the basis for the creation of our electronic warfare equipment should be domestic components. Otherwise, as experience shows, it can become our sore spot, which opponents will not fail to strike with sanctions. A striking example of this is the state and combat readiness of the main samples of Syrian equipment, which today is 50 percent and below.

With the further improvement of domestic electronic warfare systems, it is imperative to increase their selectivity and purposefulness of impact on the enemy's electronic warfare systems. This will minimize the negative impact on the operation of their electronic systems.

Currently, one of the main directions should be considered the active development and creation of electronic warfare equipment with millimeter and terahertz ranges of operating frequencies. Today they are being actively mastered by manufacturers of new generation RES and high-precision weapons. What will it give? So, if in the lower ranges there can be 10 working channels, then at a frequency of 40 GHz there are already hundreds of them. Consequently, their "closure" will require more sophisticated automated electronic warfare equipment.

Another important conclusion: the West is concerned about our successes in this area and has been stimulated to improve its electronic warfare systems and methods of their use. There is no doubt that our “friends” will find the finances for this, especially in the context of the incessant anti-Russian hysteria. Therefore, the gained very valuable combat experience should be maximally used by the military and manufacturers of electronic warfare equipment for its further development and maintaining its leading position.

Russia drew the right conclusions from the 2008 war with Georgia. The current successes confirm this. Today, according to Yuri Lastochkin, our electronic warfare equipment surpasses foreign counterparts in terms of range, range of targets, and other parameters. At the same time, the share of modern weapons and military equipment in the EW troops is 46 percent. Under the state defense order, about 300 basic and more than a thousand small-sized electronic warfare equipment have been delivered.

Some in the West, not without a grain of malice, relished the information about the Turkish newest electronic warfare system "Koral" (Koral), which, they say, will nullify the capabilities of our S-400 air defense system. Without a shadow of embarrassment, they took on faith the statement of the General Staff of the Turkish army that it would disable all Russian radar systems in Syria. Indeed, the "Coral" with a range of about 150 kilometers is designed to suppress modern ground, sea and air-based radars. But, firstly, those who are at least a little familiar with the specifics of our anti-aircraft missile systems can say that they are being created taking into account possible electronic countermeasures. Secondly, no confirmed evidence of the Coral's capabilities has yet emerged. Thirdly, the S-400 air defense system has already implemented highly effective anti-jamming measures that will not allow us to drown out our means.

The report of the US Army Department of Foreign Armed Forces Research noted that today Russia has a great potential for electronic warfare, and the political and military leadership understands the importance of such means of warfare. "Their growing ability to blind and disable digital communication systems can help them (Russians. - AS) equalize forces in the fight against a superior enemy," the document emphasizes.

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