The basis of the American nuclear shield is considered to be: nuclear submarines. However, in the 1980s, the American military leadership seriously considered the issue of creating a mobile ground-based missile system with a small-sized solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile "Midgetman".
In January 1983. To study the prospects for the development of the American ICBM grouping of the US Air Force SAC for the period until the end of the 20th century, President Reagan created an independent commission chaired by Lieutenant General B. Scowcroft. The commission's verdict was announced in April 1983. One of the results of the commission's work was the conclusion that in order to meet the needs of the Air Force SAC for a promising, relatively cheap ICBM with a high degree of survivability, it is necessary to develop "small, solid-fuel, monoblock and high-precision mobile ground-based ICBMs." It was proposed to study other deployment options for this ICBM. A few days after the results were released, President Reagan approved the Scowcroft Commission's findings. In May of the same year, the commission's conclusions were approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the US Congress. In August 1983. Defense Secretary Weinberger decided to immediately begin working out specific engineering requirements for the SICBM ("Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missile") - under this acronym the new project was encrypted.
Work on the formation of the appearance of the future missile began in January 1984 and was carried out under the leadership of the Headquarters of the Ballistic Missile Organization BMOH ("Ballistic Missile Organization", Headquarters of), Norton Air Base (California). In the same year, at Hill Air Force Base (Utah), at the Ogden Air Force Logistics Center, work began on the creation of specialized experimental stands for testing the SICBM missile. From the very beginning, it was decided to use only promising structural materials, high-energy types of solid fuels and the most modern electronics when creating a new rocket. It was decided to "unload" the missile as much as possible by abandoning the stage of disengagement, facilitating the KSP missile defense system. According to the calculations of specialists, the mass of the future rocket should not have exceeded 15.42 tons. The PGRK has been developed since 1983 in accordance with the Midgetman (Dwarf) development program. On the basis of unique design and technological solutions, a PGRK was created as part of one transport and launcher (TPU) with high thrust-dynamic and minimum weight and size characteristics with a new small-sized and high-precision ICBM Midgetman.
According to the tactical and technical characteristics of the PGRK, it was distinguished by its high readiness for launching a rocket from a combat launch position (BSP) and combat patrol routes, and also had the ability to quickly disperse and maneuver to change field positions (according to the law of random numbers) over a large territory. At the same time, the number of personnel was limited to the calculation of the TPU, including the commander and the driver. Control of combat patrols and missile launches on the march was envisaged (via radio and space communication channels) from a protected mobile control point (PUP). It was planned to adopt and deploy the PGRK in 1991 on the infrastructure of the Minuteman and MX missile systems. The program received the status of "highest national priority" and was under the control of the US Congress.
The Midgetman ICBM was a small-sized three-stage solid-propellant rocket with a series connection of stages, made in one caliber, which provided the most compact design. Its performance characteristics are given in the table.
Maximum firing range, km 11000
Missile length, m 13.5
Rocket diameter, m 1, 1-1, 25
Launch weight, t 16, 8
Payload mass, t 0, 5-0, 6
The number of warheads, units 1
Charge power, MT 0, 6
Shooting accuracy (KVO), m 150
As part of the sustainer stages, three solid-propellant rocket engines were used, the bodies of which were made of a composite material based on Kevlar-type organic fiber with the addition of graphite filaments. The engines had one rotary nozzle partially recessed into the chamber, which made it possible to reduce the length of the ICBM. The astro-inertial control system with the BTsVK ensured high accuracy of missile guidance at highly protected and small-sized objects of a potential enemy. The warhead was equipped with the Mk 21 warhead (from the MX missile) and an effective complex of means to overcome the missile defense system of a potential enemy. In order to protect the missile from the damaging factors of nuclear weapons, original design and functional protection measures were used. The "cold start" system provided the launch of the rocket to a height of about 30 m, followed by the launch of the first stage main engine. Flight tests of the rocket were scheduled for 1989.
The protected TPU was intended for transportation, preparation and launch of a rocket from points of permanent deployment and combat patrol routes. Demonstration samples of the wheeled (developed by the Boeing Corporation) and tracked (Martin-Marietta) TPU have passed transport tests at the Malmstrom Aviation Base and the US Automobile Range. Based on their results, an installation was selected, which was a truck tractor with a semitrailer (actually a launcher) on a multi-axle wheeled chassis with steered axles. The container with the rocket was inside the semi-trailer and was covered with metal folding doors. The tractor was equipped with a four-stroke 12-cylinder turbocharged engine with a capacity of 1,200 hp. with. The predicted characteristics of TPU are presented in the table.
Dimensions for BSP and field position, m 20, 5x3, 8x1, 8
Dimensions on the march, m 30 x 3, 8 x 2, 8
Launcher weight with a rocket, t 80-90
PU weight, t 70
Lifting capacity of PU, t 24
Average speed of movement, km / h:
- on the highway about 60
- rough terrain about 20
- on improved pound roads about 40
Cruising range, km 300
Fuel consumption per 100 km of track, l 400
Time of TPU deployment in the field position in the position of maximum security and stability, min about 2
The time for rolling up the TPU and preparing for the march when changing the field position (excluding the time of approaching the tractor), about 5 minutes
To ensure the launch of the XMGM-134A rocket, American designers used the so-called. "mortar" scheme. The launch complexes of the "Midgetman" ICBMs were supposed to be a four-axle tractor with a three-axle semi-trailer, on which, in a horizontal position, a transport and launch container made of organic fiber of a new generation was located, closed with doors made of special armored steel. During the tests, the prototype of the mobile launcher - "Phoenix" showed a speed of 48 km / h on rough terrain and up to 97 km / h on the highway. The power plant is a 1200 hp turbocharged diesel engine, the transmission is electro-hydraulic. Upon receiving the command to launch the rocket, the tractor stopped, unloaded the semi-trailer from the TPK to the ground and pulled it forward. Due to the presence of a special plow-like device, the semi-trailer was self-buried, providing additional protection against the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion (see diagram). Further, the semitrailer flaps were opened and the transport and launch container was brought to a vertical position. A solid-propellant gas generator located in the lower part of the container, when triggered, threw the rocket to a height of up to 30 m from the upper cut of the TPK, after which the main engine of the first stage was turned on. To reduce the error in determining the coordinates of the launch position, the BGRK was to be equipped with satellite navigation systems.
The rocket was fixed in a transport and launch container using eight rows of special polyurethane tiles (see photo) covered with a Teflon-like material. They performed shock-absorbing and obturating functions and were automatically removed after the missile exited the container. During test launches, the rocket was launched from a special launch container installed vertically on the Earth's surface.
However, at the beginning of 1988, opinions appeared in the US Congress that it was preferable to develop a BZHRK, since the MX rocket was considered already worked out. Many congressmen lobbying for the interests of the Navy, given the adoption of the Trident-2 SLBM, declared the dubious effectiveness of the Midgetman missile system and criticized the simultaneous deployment of two types of ground-based mobile missile systems. It was considered inexpedient to increase the range of missile systems to five or six types, since the costs of maintaining and operating weapons of the US SNS increased. In addition, as additional studies have shown, the transition to the full-scale development of PGRK will require huge financial costs per warhead, especially since the missile had limited energy capabilities for re-equipping with a multiple warhead.
As a result, in 1989, funding for the Midgetman ROC program was terminated, there was, of course, a break in the work associated with it, and part of the cooperation disintegrated. The main factor in the decision to suspend the development of the Midgetman PGRK was the military-political factor - the completion of the process of preparing the Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1 Treaty). According to foreign analysts, the likelihood of his conclusion was high and the Americans intended to “trade the idea for iron,” that is, persuade the Soviet Union to abandon its mobile missile systems as a response to the non-deployment of the Midgetman missile system in the United States.
It was also predicted that sooner or later the country's VPR, under a plausible pretext, would abandon the PGRK and BZHRK in favor of the development of SSBNs with the Trident-2 SLBM. It is quite understandable that in connection with the signing of the START-15 Treaty on July 31, 1991, the US President, in his address to the nation on September 28, 1991, announced the closure of the Midgetman ROC program.
At the same time, the American VPR announced that a significant scientific and technical reserve had been created, allowing to resume full-scale tests and start deploying the Midgetman missile system from 1994, although the actual development of the main PGRK systems was at the level of 15-20 percent. So, according to the flight design test program, it was planned to carry out 22 missile launches, including from real combat patrol routes. However, the first test launch of an experimental rocket was unsuccessful for technical reasons.
During the throw tests, only elements of the "cold" start system were tested. Due to the lack of an experienced TPU, resource and transport tests of the unit were not carried out with studies of the behavior of the rocket under shock and vibration loads. It was not possible to develop forms and methods of combat use of PGRK, a system for organizing combat duty and control of nuclear missile weapons on BSP and combat patrol routes, the procedure for dispersal and maneuvering, the basics of maintenance and operation, camouflage, engineering preparation of combat patrol routes, organization of protection and defense PGRK, as well as other types of comprehensive support. The American specialists did not even think of starting to implement plans for construction and installation work at the BSP of the ICBM airbases.
Nevertheless, the US military-industrial complex for eight years of implementation of the Midgetman ROC program, due to various military-political reasons, did not create a PGRK, which is unambiguously confirmed by the provisions of the START-1 Treaty. So, in the "Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of Initial Data in Connection with the Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms", the American side announced only a prototype and two training models of the Midgetman missile (without performance characteristics), and photographs of this ICBM and TPU (as a mutual exchange with the Soviet side) did not submit. She did not specify facilities for the production, repair, storage, loading and deployment of ICBMs6. In addition, the Americans ensured that the main restrictive and liquidation provisions and procedures regarding the USSR (RF) combat railway and mobile ground missile systems were included in the text of the Treaty and its annexes, although they did not develop their mobile group of ICBMs. At the same time, the Soviet (Russian) side, making unilateral concessions, declared in the START-1 Treaty the entire regular grouping of BZHRK and PGRK Topol and infrastructure facilities.
It must be admitted that with the political will of the American leadership and appropriate funding for the work, the creation and deployment of the Midgetman PGRK grouping would be quite real. The high level of development of rocketry and heavy automobile manufacturing in the United States is beyond doubt. A comparative analysis of mobile missile systems in service with some states shows that the Midgitman PGRK being created had decent operational and strategic characteristics for preparing and conducting missile launches with BSPs, operational dispersal and execution of combat missions from combat patrol routes, was distinguished by sufficient security, vitality, secrecy of action and the ability to participate in retaliatory actions.
In addition, it should be added that it would be correct to consider the Kurier PGRK as an analogue of "Karlik", and not systems of the "Topol", "Topol-M" or "Yars" type.
