In previous articles, we examined the reasons why we need naval strategic nuclear forces, and some aspects of the secrecy of SSBNs created during the Soviet era.
How are things today?
In the 2000s, the basis of the nuclear power of the Russian Navy was made up of 7 "Dolphins" of the 667BDRM project. Quite good ships in the opinion of sailors, they even at the time of their birth, that is, in the 80s of the last century, were no longer at the forefront of military-technical progress. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the first large-scale state armaments program (GPV-2011-2020), a complete renovation of the naval strategic nuclear forces was planned: the construction of 8, and then, in the version adjusted in 2012, even 10 SSBNs of the latest project.
Although … in fact, things were a little different. As mentioned earlier, in the 70s of the last century, the USSR simultaneously created 2 types of SSBNs: the grandiose "Sharks" of project 941, which were supposed to become a full-fledged 3rd generation of nuclear submarines of this class, and "moderate" "Dolphins" 667BDRM of generation "2 + ", As a development of the previous type" Squid ". It can be assumed that the Dolphins were created in case something goes wrong with the Sharks, so as not to be left with nothing. But in the end, both projects went into mass production.
However, the practice of parallel construction of two types of ships of the same purpose was vicious, and the USSR understood this. Therefore, back in the 80s, the Rubin TsKBMT began designing a new strategic submarine cruiser, which in the future was supposed to replace both the Akuly and Dolphins. The lead SSBN, the project of which received the number 955, even managed to lay in 1996, but then the ups and downs began.
Main armament
The most important problem arose with the new SSBN weaponry - the R-39UTTH "Bark". This ballistic missile was supposed to become our analogue of the American "Trident II" and, I must say, the performance characteristics of the product made a considerable impression. The missile was designed as a solid propellant, and its maximum throw weight reached 3.05 tons. A massive MIRVE IN with 10 warheads up to 200 Kt of power could be delivered to a distance of at least 9,000, and possibly 10,000 km. A special "highlight" was the ability of the "Bark" to launch under the ice - in some way unknown to the author, the rocket managed to overcome the layer of ice. Thus, the task of SSBNs was greatly simplified: there was no need to look for openings, or to push the ice masses with a hull in places where the ice was thinner. Probably, the "Bark" had some restrictions on the thickness of the ice to be overcome, but nevertheless, the capabilities of submarine missile carriers with such a missile increased sharply.
The power of American anti-submarine aircraft literally drove our SSBNs under the ice. The latter represented good protection against both dropped sonar buoys (RSB) and a number of unconventional submarine detection methods. But it was impossible to launch a conventional ballistic missile through the ice cover. Accordingly, the SSBN commanders had to look for places where the thickness of the ice allowed it to be pushed through by the hull of the ship, and then a very dangerous ascent procedure began, which required virtuoso skill from the crew, and still often led to damage to the submarine. This operation usually took hours. But even after surfacing, SSBNs still had problems, since it was necessary to remove chunks of ice (sometimes the height of a person, or even more) from the covers of ballistic missile silos. Obviously, the Bark greatly simplified the task of the submariners and, which is extremely important, reduced the time required to prepare for a strike.
In addition, the Bark could be launched not according to the optimal ballistic, but along a more flat trajectory - in this case, obviously, the missile's flight range was reduced, but the flight time was also reduced, which was important for the destruction of missile strike detection / warning systems and other important US targets.
Perhaps the only drawback of the Bark was its mass, reaching 81 tons. No matter how formidable the Bark was, the Trident II still remained the leader, having 2.8 tons of throw weight with a mass of 59 tons, and the maximum firing range of the American missiles reached 11 thousand km. Alas, for a number of objective reasons, the USSR, which created a number of remarkable liquid-propellant ballistic missiles, lagged behind the United States in the field of solid-propellant missiles. The problem was not only, and perhaps not so much in the mass of the rocket, but in its dimensions: the length of the Trident II was 13.42 m, while the analogous indicator of the Bark was 16.1 m, which obviously required an increase dimensions of the media.
Alas, work on the "Bark" was curtailed in 1998, and work on a promising SLBM was transferred from the SRC im. Academician Makeev at the Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering (MIT), the developer of the newest at that time "Topol" and "Topol-M". Officially, it sounded that "Bark" was created using a number of outdated technical solutions and that the Makeyevites could not cope with the solid-fuel rocket, since all three first launches ended in failure. It was also noted that further work on the "Bark" will be greatly delayed, since production facilities are capable of producing only one such missile in 2-3 years. In addition, the advantages of the adoption of the MIT-ovsky "product" by the fleet were cited: maximum unification of land and sea versions of ballistic missiles, cost savings. And also such a strange argument as the time spacing of the peaks of rearmament of the sea and land components of the strategic nuclear forces.
But "highley like"
All the data known to the author indicate that the only reason for the transfer of the design of the new SLBM to the MIT was the resourcefulness of the leadership of the Moscow institute in an effort to “pull the blanket over themselves,” expanding the cash flow to create a new missile.
To begin with, let's remember what exactly in the SRC them. Academician Makeev (SKB-385 in the USSR), our SLBMs were created for many decades. It was this design bureau that specialized in the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces, while the MIT worked exclusively in the interests of the Strategic Missile Forces. One of the arguments of the supporters of the MIT Bulava was a huge sum for those times to fine-tune the Bark - up to 5 billion rubles. in 1998 prices. But how could one expect that MIT specialists, who saw the sea only during their vacation from the beach, would be able to create an SLBM cheaper?
I must say that preliminary design work on the "Bark" was started in the middle of 1980, but the work really started only in November 1985, after the Council of Ministers decree on the beginning of the development work on the "Bark". By the fall of 1998, when work on the "Bark" was discontinued, the SRC im. Academician Makeev studied it for about 13 years, of which 7 fell on the timelessness of the "wild 90s" with the collapse of cooperation between the CIS countries, funding interruptions, etc. etc. The rocket had to be redone, due to the impossibility of obtaining the necessary fuel - the plant for its production remained in Ukraine and was redesigned for household chemicals. Nevertheless, the readiness of the complex at the time of closure was estimated at 73%. It was assumed that to complete work on the "Bark" will take another 3-4 years and 9 test missile launches. It is possible, and even likely, that more such launches would be needed, but it was quite possible to keep within 12-15 launches. Talk that the production of these missiles dragged on for decades does not stand up to criticism - the production capacity allowed producing up to 4-5 "Barks" per year, the question was only in financing. Perhaps 2002 was indeed too optimistic for the completion of the R-39UTTH project, but in 2004-2005, the Bark could well “pass the exams” and enter service.
The author has no information about the costs of the program for creating the "Bulava". But it is known that MIT spent almost 20 years on this - from the fall of 1998 to the summer of 2018, and during this time 32 launches were made. However, strictly speaking, it is wrong to say: “MIT did it”, because in the end the Makeyevites had to join the process of finishing the Bulava.
Thus, in all likelihood, the creation of the Bulava ultimately cost the country much more than it would have cost to fine-tune the Bark. But the problem is that the difference in the cost of creating missiles is only part of the total damage to the country's defense capability from the transfer of the design of SLBMs from the Makeyev SRC to the MIT.
As you know, the financial position of the Russian Federation did not in any way allow the USSR fleet to remain in its previous composition. In such a case, of course, it would be wise to keep the most powerful and modern ships in the Navy. Among the SSBNs, those were the six "Sharks" of Project 941 - according to the logic of things, it was them that should have been left in the operational fleet.
Not that the Shark was the perfect ship. No wonder it was said about the victory of technology over common sense. Nevertheless, since these "monsters of the Cold War" were built and commissioned, then, of course, they should have been used to ensure the country's security, and not be sawed off.
But alas, this turned out to be completely impossible, because the guaranteed storage periods for their main armament, the R-39 SLBM, expired in 2003, and no new missiles of this type were produced. It is well known that the "Barks" were originally created not only for a new type of SSBNs, but also for the rearmament of ships of Project 941. In other words, the cost of transferring "Sharks" from R-39 to R-39UTTH was relatively small. But when designing the Bulava, no one thought about the gigantic TRPKSNs, and therefore the costs of re-equipping the Sharks under the Bulava would have been colossal. That is, theoretically it was possible, but practically - comparable in terms of the cost of building a new ship.
As a result, at the beginning of the 21st century, the significantly less advanced Dolphins of Project 667BDRM became the basis of the NSNF of the Russian Federation. But their missiles also required replacement … That is, all the beautiful words about the unification of ballistic missiles of the Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy remained beautiful words: the fleet was forced to create a line of liquid-propellant SLBMs: first "Sineva", and then "Liner", which were put into service in 2007 and 2014 respectively. In other words, if we began to improve the Bark, then it would be quite possible to refuse from the creation of one or even both of these missiles - and, of course, save on this.
In addition, it should not be forgotten that the Bark had much greater capabilities than the Bulava. The maximum throw weight of the Bark is 2.65 times more, the flight range is at least 1,000 km higher. Bark adapted to the ice start, but Bulava did not. The advantage of the Bark was also the possibility of launching it along a "flat" trajectory in which, for example, the flight from the Barents Sea to Kamchatka was reduced from 30 to 17 minutes. Finally, the capabilities of the Bark allowed it to carry a maneuvering warhead that was practically invulnerable to missile defense, which we know as the Avangard. But for Bulava, such a load is too heavy.
If in 1998 it was possible to defend "Bark", the Russian Navy received a much more advanced missile already in the early 2000s, spending much less money on its development, and also saved on the further development of liquid-propellant SLBMs. At the same time, the basis of the country's NSNF in the late 90s and up to this time could have been 6 "Akula" missile submarines with the support of several "Dolphins", and not "Dolphins" with the support of "Kalmar", as it happened in reality. There is no doubt that with the "Sharks" the combat potential of our NSNF would have been significantly higher. No wonder, oh, no wonder the Americans gave us money to dispose of these whoppers … Completion of work on the Bark would have led to our peaceful sleep being guarded by SSBNs of generation 3 and 2+, and not 2+ and 2”, as it happened and is happening now in reality.
In fact, the "Bulava" had only one (albeit very significant) advantage - a lower weight, amounting to 36, 8 tons and a corresponding decrease in geometric dimensions. But no one interfered, upon completion of work on the "Barkom", to instruct the SRC them. Academician Makeev a new SLBM of more modest dimensions - for the newest next generation SSBNs. And there was no need to "cram non-stuffable" into a weight of less than 40 tons. Obviously, the smaller the rocket, the more modest its combat capabilities. Of course, the submarine carrier has its limitations, but the United States and other countries have achieved excellent results in the creation of atomic carriers "Trident IID5" - SLBMs weighing under 60 tons. Nobody prevented us from doing the same.
In fact, the only reason for the low weight of the Bulava was its unification with ground complexes. Of course, what is critical for mobile launchers is not just every ton, but every kilogram of the weight of the rocket installed on them. But at sea, such strict restrictions are not needed, so we can say that unification has become rather a disadvantage than an advantage of the Bulava.
Of course, the question raised by the author is actually more complicated and deeper: after all, the cost of creating a rocket of 81 tons weighing significantly more than 36.8 tons, and the cost of operating the "Sharks" was probably higher than that of the "Dolphins" … Surely there were also a lot of other nuances. But still, on the basis of a combination of factors, the abandonment of the Bark in favor of the Bulava should be regarded as a great mistake of our government.
It was in this environment that Project 955 was created.
But back to "Boreas"
So, in 1996, under the serial number 201, the first SSBN of the new project 955 was laid. And, I must say that with the Yuri Dolgoruky delivered to the fleet in 2013, this SSBN had only some visual similarity, and even then - if you look from a distance …
In architecture, the brainchild of TsKBMT "Rubin" most of all resembled the project 667BDRM - there was an impressive "hump" in order to hide in it the large R-39UTTH "Bark", and a two-shaft propulsion system. But in general, there is very little information in the open press about this stage in the life of the first Russian SSBN, and almost all of it has already been given above. It only remains to add that according to the initial project, Borey was supposed to carry only 12 P-39UTTH Bark.
However, the word "everything" is unlikely to be appropriate here. The fact is that a dozen "Barks" would have a maximum throw weight of 36.6 tons, but the sixteen Bulava SLBMs, which eventually received our newest SSBNs - only 18.4 tons. There is almost a two-fold advantage of the original project, and if we also recall all the capabilities that the Bark should have had, but which the Bulava does not have, then, probably, we should talk about the drop in combat potential no longer by two, but, probably, several times. According to the author, the absence of an ice launch of an SLBM is especially sad.
But what has been done is done, and when in 1988 it was decided to close the Bark development in favor of Bulava, Project 955 underwent the most significant changes. Alas, it is rather difficult for a layperson to assess the overall quality of these changes.
On the one hand, SSBNs were redesigned almost completely. New and shorter missiles made it possible to reduce the height of the "hump" of the submarine cruiser, and it is believed that this had a beneficial effect on its low noise. The author finds it difficult to determine how significant this factor is: usually professionals indicate the propeller as the main source of noise, followed by various SSBN units that emit noise during their operation. But still, apparently, the geometry and the total area of the case also have some significance.
It can be assumed that the replacement of a two-shaft propulsion system (DU) with a single-shaft water jet was an undoubted blessing. We see that the American nuclear submarines of the 4th generation use the "single-shaft water cannon" everywhere. So, if our developers did not screw up the implementation, we can assume that the new remote control has significantly reduced the noise level of the Borey. In addition, it should be understood that work on increasing the stealth of submarines is ongoing (noise is only one of the parameters, there are others), and over the years of delay on the slipway, some of the latest developments could well have ended up on the head SSBN.
As mentioned earlier, the stealth of a submarine is provided not only by a decrease in the distance of its detection, but also by an increase in the distance to detect the enemy. "Borei" received the latest hydroacoustic complex (GAK) "Irtysh-Amphora", which, at least theoretically, was the best that was previously installed on Soviet submarines. And even had to surpass the latest American complexes of a similar purpose.
Everything seems to be fine, but on the other hand, it should be understood that until about 2010, the armed forces of our country were in the position of a “poor relative,” to whom money was allocated only for the purpose of not stretching out his legs. Accordingly, the designers and builders of the Boreyev had to economize on literally everything, including the use of the backlog of the 3rd generation Shchuka-B submarines. For the head Yuri Dolgoruky, the hull structures K-133 "Lynx" were used, for the "Alexander Nevsky" - the K-137 "Cougar", and for the "Vladimir Monomakh" - the K-480 "Ak Bars".
Of course, such "innovations" could not but lead to a decrease in the combat potential of the Boreyevs. So, for example, the use of the bow structures of MAPLs of project 971, in which the torpedo tubes were located exactly there, led to the fact that it became impossible to install the antenna of the Irtysh-Amphora SJSC on the SSBN of project 955. The latter, according to the project, was supposed to occupy the entire nose part entirely, and the torpedo tubes should be located in the center of the hull. And so - we had to get out: the hardware part of the state-of-the-art SSBNs really belongs to Irtysh-Amphora, but the antenna is much more modest, from the SJC "Skat-3M", that is, the modernized sonar complex of the 3rd generation nuclear submarine. And the same can be said about the power plant of ships of this type: on the one hand, a revolutionary water jet propulsion device for domestic nuclear submarines has been implemented, and on the other hand, instead of the newest KTP-6 reactor with a capacity of 200 MW and the newest steam turbine unit, OK-650V with a capacity of 190 MW were used. and a steam turbine unit "Azurit-90". This is a reliable power plant, but it is just an improved version of the power plant of the same "Shchuka-B". That is, in the best case, such a technical solution places the Borea power plant somewhere between the 3rd and 4th generations of nuclear submarines.
In other words, in the first series of Boreyevs, in some ways the newest and most effective solutions were embodied, and in the other, what was at hand was utilized and not what was needed was put in place, but what we could produce. It could be said that there was no talk of a systematic renewal of the fleet before the start of the 2011-2020 GPV, but we had to think about saving all the time. That is why a number of systems and units of these three Boreyevs in 1996, 2004 and 2006. the tabs were taken either from boats of the 3rd generation in a clean or modernized form, or they were produced using accessories for these boats. There are also questions about the culture of production - the enterprises of the military-industrial complex were going through far from the best times, and in the period 1990-2010. in fact, they were forced to switch from serial to piece production. This could affect the quality and / or resource of various SSBN units of Project 955, and it should be borne in mind that the Ministry of Defense had to acquire some of these mechanisms abroad: the production of the latest SSBNs was not localized in the Russian Federation.
“Well, again, the author has gone into conjectures,” another reader will say, and, of course, he will be right. But you need to understand that the same noise level depends not only on the design of the ship, or even on its individual units and components. The projects can be the most wonderful, but if the technical implementation has disappointed, if, for example, "obsolete" components with a reduced resource were used in the manufacture, then after a short time it will start to rattle here, knock there, and as a result, the secrecy of SSBNs will be much lower put. Despite the fact that the timely passage of scheduled repairs since the times of the USSR has been a weak point of the domestic Navy.
And so it turns out that, on the one hand, according to the general director of the Rubin Central Design Bureau A. A. Dyachkov, Project 955 Borei have 5 times less noise than Shchuk-B, and besides (not from his words) they are equipped with the state-of-the-art Irtysh-Amphora SJSC Virginia. And on the other - taking into account all of the above, apparently in the person of "Yuri Dolgoruky", "Alexander Nevsky" and "Vladimir Monomakh", the fleet received three strategic nuclear-powered ships, according to their technical level and capabilities "stuck" between the 3rd and 4th th generations of nuclear submarines.
So what's next?
Everything seems to be fine. As you know, on November 9, 2011, a contract was signed for the design of the improved SSBN Borei-A type, and R&D costs were announced at 39 billion rubles. If this figure is correct, then such costs should be considered colossal for our country, because at that time the cost of building one "Borey" was about 23 billion rubles.
Why so much? It has already been said above that the Borei of Project 955 were "half", "patchwork" ships, the design of which was constantly changed due to long-term construction, and even with an amendment to the old backlog. Obviously, at some point it was necessary to stop and design a modification of the "Borey", in which all the innovations would be arranged in the most rational way. And at the same time - add the latest achievements of the science of submarine shipbuilding to the project.
And so, within the framework of the GPV 2011-2020, they began to create project 955A - a much more advanced SSBN, in which stealth was significantly increased, due to a decrease in the level of physical fields and noise, the latest, improved modifications of controls, communications, hydroacoustics, etc..d. etc. The visual differences between Borey A and Borey are interesting - the newest SSBN will not have a “hump” that can hold missiles: SLBMs will have enough space inside the durable and lightweight hulls. In addition, the Borea's wheelhouse from the bow was sloped to the deck.
But in "Boreyev-A" it has more familiar forms.
I would also like to note that Borey-A has new side search antennas.
"Borey" had standard rudders with a swivel block
But "Borey-A" has all-turning rudders
It has been repeatedly said that the 955A will become the ship that will fully realize the potential of the 4th generation of nuclear submarines. Well, perhaps it will be so. I would very much like to believe that our fleet will finally receive a full-fledged 4th generation SSBN.
That's just …
The first thing I would like to recall is the grandiose battle that took place over the cost of our nuclear submarines between the Ministry of Defense and the enterprises of the military-industrial complex, which took place at the beginning of the 2011-2020 GPV. Then our President had to intervene in pricing issues. There is very little information about this battle of the titans, and, it seems, the parties managed to reach an acceptable compromise.
The second is the extremely short design time for Borey-A. The development contract was signed on November 1, 2011, but preparations began for laying back in 2009, and the official laying of the first ship of this project "Prince Vladimir" took place on July 30, 2012. And that is to say - it is very similar to in great haste, since the official laying ceremony was postponed four times. Initially, the "Prince Vladimir" was going to be laid as early as December 2009 (obviously, then they planned to build according to the original project "Borey"). But in February 2012a deadline was set for March 18 of the same year, then postponed to May, and finally to July, when, in fact, the official laying ceremony took place.
And, finally, the third - without having time to build a single "Borey-A", the Ministry of Defense gathered, starting in 2018, to finance development work on the "Borey-B", which, in comparison with its predecessor, should have received improved equipment, including new jet propulsion unit. At the same time, the construction of Boreev-B was supposed to begin in 2018, and the lead ship was planned to be handed over to the fleet in 2026, and to start building serial SSBNs of this modification after 2023. However, already in 2018, these plans went to waste: the project was closed because it did not meet the cost-effectiveness criterion. In other words, it was considered that the increase in performance characteristics of "Borey-B" does not justify the costs of its creation, so it was decided to continue the construction of "Boreyev-A".
How can all this be interpreted?
Option number 1. "Optimistic"
In this case, "Borey-A" is a full-fledged ship of the 4th generation, which really absorbed all the best that domestic science and industry could give it.
The debate between the Ministry of Defense and manufacturers should be viewed as a usual, in general, bargaining that always takes place between the seller and the buyer, especially when concluding contracts of this level.
Nevertheless, the Ministry of Defense decided not to stop there, and after about 7 years it felt that it was possible to get an improved modification of the ship. This is absolutely normal practice. For example, the American lead nuclear submarine of the Virginia class was laid down in 1999, and its fourth modification in 2014, that is, the period between new modifications did not exceed 4 years. But nevertheless, preliminary studies on the Borey-B showed a relatively low increase in performance characteristics, so it was decided to limit itself to the gradual improvement of the Borey-A without separating the newly laid ships into a separate modification.
Does this mean that we are again lagging behind the United States, which is planning to lay a series of "underwater killers" of Block 5 modifications, while we continue the serial construction of SSBNs according to a 10-year-old project? Maybe yes, maybe not. The fact is that our military-industrial complex does not tend to bother with all sorts of "blocs". So, for example, the domestic multipurpose nuclear submarines of project 971 were constantly improved during the construction of the series, so the same Americans single out as many as 4 modifications of these ships. But we even have the last ship, "Cheetah", which in its capabilities significantly surpasses the lead "Pike-B" and, apparently, in terms of combat potential is somewhere between the 3rd and 4th generations, is still listed as 971.
Option number 2. "Normally"
In this case, the reduction in the price of the Borey-A led to the fact that it also became, to a certain extent, a compromise ship, although, of course, it was more perfect than the Borey. Then, not Borei-A, but Borei-B should be regarded as an attempt to realize the project's potential by 100%. Alas, the attempt was unsuccessful, since due to a general reduction in funding relative to the original plans, the creation of an SSBN of this modification had to be abandoned. And in this case, the fleet will receive a huge series of SSBNs (and the total number of Boreyev-A can be increased to 11 units), in which our scientific and technical potential will not be fully realized. But even straining all forces, we are still in the field of submarine shipbuilding are the catching-up party ….
Only those in charge know what is really going on, we can only guess. The author is inclined towards the 2nd option. And not at all because of an innate tendency to pessimism, but only because the time spent on the development of "Borey-A" is too small for solving such a large-scale task.
