As it was before
Now, dear reader, we are forced to temporarily move away from the main theme of our story. We will not advance one iota in understanding rocketry until we ponder a number of questions. You can study the technical characteristics of launch vehicles for years, but still do not understand why the rocket is being removed from production, although in terms of characteristics it is perfection itself. Or vice versa: a seemingly unpretentious rocket turns into a legend.
Naturally, there are objective reasons for everything. But then why were these reasons ignored when the rocket was launched into series? The answer is obvious: they simply did not know these reasons, could not predict. The most effective way to predict direction is to know the previous history of prior events.
Why does a raven throw stones to drink from an incomplete jug? Because he, knowing the law of fluid displacement, foresees the events that will occur. Let us, following the example of a raven, studying history, try to find these laws of design.
To analyze historical events and draw correct conclusions, you need to take an object for study, where chances are minimized. Do you think that the fact that we have released the most massive tank and aircraft in the history of technology is accidental? Obviously not. The reason for this was the design and production principles of this technique. And naturally, we will try to answer the question why Western designers cannot do this.
Let's continue the topic of constructive reserve. There are many more examples, but we will focus on the most, perhaps, illustrative - on the aforementioned T-34.
As you know, German designers decided to create a tank of their own to counterbalance the thirty-four, which would not be inferior, and in some respects surpassed it. And it turned out to be nonsense: the constructive reserve began to "evaporate" at the speed of dry ice already at the design stage!
The algorithm of design "research" is approximately the following. A powerful, heavy, high-recoil cannon required an extensive armored turret. All this should stand on a massive armored hull, which, in turn, should be serviced by a heavy, with many rollers, chassis. And these rollers were spinning massive and wide tracks, otherwise it is impossible, because the tracks will get stuck in a puddle of children, or the tracks will break. Not enough engine power now? No problem. Let's put it even more powerful and massive. Have you completely forgotten where to cram the gas tank for such a "gluttonous engine"? Let's find an "ingenious" solution: increase the tank's hull and decrease the tank. It's okay that a tank with such a reserve of fuel will drive over rough terrain for only 80 km, let's start a fuel truck behind it. Well, but the fact that a gasoline tanker, being a “red rag” for Russian aviation, does not travel over rough terrain is its problem, we are “designing” a tank, not a tanker. The main thing is that in the memoirs of German tank crews everything should be fabulously written, and Russian historians, "liberals", assent to them.
As you guessed, the story is about the famous "Panther", which is sad for the Wehrmacht. Now let's take a closer look at the ugly brainchild, which nevertheless was born from the womb of the vaunted German industry.
As a result, the Germans made ends meet in their constructive "solutions". They got an "average" monster tank with a gigantic bouquet of "children's" or even completely incurable diseases, weighing 45 tons! Tanks KV-1 and IS-1, which weighed less than him, somehow became inconvenient to call "heavy".
Just think, Hitler postponed Operation Citadel several times in order to accumulate more such "masterpieces", naturally, three quarters of the "masterpieces" were left to "sunbathe" on the Kursk fields. And many of them fell apart on the way to the battlefield! And at the beginning of 1944, the chief inspector of the Wehrmacht armored forces, Heinz Guderian, reported to Hitler that most of the "childhood illnesses" of this tank had been overcome. True, after a few months, this "rosy-cheeked baby" began to develop other diseases, but this time of a "gerontological" nature.
The fact is that the factory-manufacturer of 57-mm anti-tank guns began to receive praise from the front, leading to a pleasant bewilderment of our designers. The point was that the anti-tank gun, which already worked perfectly against this tank, now began to penetrate it at unimaginable distances. The casket opened simply: the superficially hardened rolled armor of the tank was made at the technological limit, and the slightest manipulations with alloying additives made it suitable only for a medieval knight. And the question is not in the deficit of alloying additives, but in the deficiency of brain matter in German technologists.
Let us at least recall how our metallurgists "mocked" the Il-2 armored hull, especially when part of the alloying metal mines ended up in the hands of the Germans. After the forced improvements, the armor turned out not only not worse, but even better in some respects, moreover, it turned out to be cheaper.
Much more can be said about this "exclusive" of the German military industry, but if we are talking about a constructive and technological reserve, it must be said that this reserve was just not enough to equip the Panther with an 88-mm cannon, despite all the efforts of the Germans … As a result, the "Panther" with its 75-mm gun became the owner of the shameful anti-record in the "caliber / tank weight" nomination, and the IS-2 became the owner of this record with its 122-mm cannon and the same weight as its counterpart. …
True, "zombie historians" can argue that caliber is one of the indicators. But this is the most important and decisive indicator. Do not forget that the projectile must have decent high-explosive, fragmentation, concrete-piercing and many other properties. By the way, the IS-2 was designed, among other things, in order to turn almost any enemy pillbox into concrete crumbs at a safe distance (with such armor and maneuver). And what could the "Panther" cannon do? Flying at high speed "blanks" (which is no wonder for the designers: lengthen the barrel and more powder in the sleeve) made holes in the enemy's armor, but it's better not to remember about other qualities of shells.
Modern "tank experts" need to firmly learn and write on their foreheads that a real tank in the overwhelming majority of cases is a maneuverable and protected unit for fire support of mobile formations, that is, by the high-explosive fragmentation action of its shells, the tank produces devastation in manpower and equipment in the ranks of the enemy. He is especially good at suppressing firing points, and, of course, the tank unit produces the maximum effect when it goes out into the operational space, breaking the enemy's rear communications. But the overwhelming majority of "shooters" between tanks belong to the category of computer games. It is expensive, unprofitable to let a tank onto a tank, and the Prokhorov massacre is an exception. In the fight against a tank, there are such means as anti-tank artillery, minefields, and finally, aviation.
Well, now, returning to the "Panther", you need to ask yourself a question: did not the Germans have an expensive "anti-tank gun"? With reservations, it can be called self-propelled and somewhat conditionally (especially from the second half of the 44th) protected. It is generally incorrect to compare the Panther with the T-34 in terms of price. We only note that the cost of the thirty-four, despite the high-quality modifications during the serial production, has decreased 2, 5 times.
Then, perhaps, the Germans have succeeded with the number of Panthers produced? It's even worse here. Expensive "toys" cannot be produced in a large series, for each produced German "mastodon" our half-starved women and kids gave out fourteen T-34s!
"Thirty-four" has become a legend, it turned the world tank building. It became clear that there was no need to produce numerous classes of light, medium, infantry, heavy and super-heavy tanks. The T-34 tank formed the world standard, the standard of the BASIC tank. And no "panthers" can even come close to this standard! I would like all these "advanced scribblers of the new wave" who enter into religious ecstasy from the "Panther" and record it in the best tank of the Second World War, to say the following: the most effective betrayal is when the "historian", due to his chronic meager mind, is sincerely convinced that he writes the truth. However, the "fifth column" will be discussed below.
Doomsday plane
Now I want to ask a question: what would Stalin have done with such "panther" would-be developers? The answer is not original. In the best scenario for them, he would have sent these "developers" to work with picks in pits in the distant taiga. Why did Hitler not do this, although the "design thought of the Third Reich" still did not so round his finger, and he later knew about it very well? Because all these German-Anglo-Saxons cannot do otherwise because of their "deep mentality"! Maybe the designers of the West have their own design postulates? They are extremely primitive. The first postulate is the principle of a loader who is crazy from alcoholism "round - roll, square - carry", the second is the principle of a three-year-old child "bigger, faster, more powerful - always better."
How these principles work, we'll figure it out now. For examples, I will always take the cult technology of the belligerent countries - because the display of these principles is very clearly visible on it. Let's take the famous Ju-87 dive bomber "Stuka". Yes, he is perfect for diving, but in order for him to get out of the dive just as well, you need to give him a large wing area, which was done, but then the reverse side of this action opens: high aerodynamic drag, which gives a low flight speed. It turns out that at the "object" the "bastard" works great, but how to safely get to "work" and back, the designers did not "foresee". Rather, they, as always, solved the problem with one unknown. As a result, "Junkers" were in the "trend" only as long as the Luftwaffe dominated the sky. As soon as the situation changed, the "blitzkrieg symbols" were blown from the sky like a wind.
Can a constructor solve problems with two or more unknowns? The Russian designer, having a dual dialectical thinking, which he inherited from our great ancestors, makes this work easy, as if playfully. As always, I will give you an illustrative example using the legendary technique.
Since the beginning of the 30s of the last century, the world aviation thought tried to create an aircraft of the leading edge, a soldier aircraft, but here one very serious problem arose. The low-flying plane, which circled like a kite over the enemy crowd of people and equipment, was fired by everyone - from tank guns to machine guns and pistols, that is, the plane had to be armored. This is where the dialectical contradiction turns out, which is too tough for Western thinking to see through.
A heavy armored aircraft turns out to be less high-speed and maneuverable, so there are a lot of chances to get a shell in your belly. A plane without armor is more maneuverable and fast, but even one bullet at low altitudes can be fatal for it. There are two different design tasks, seemingly incompatible. Not surprisingly, this is a dead end for one-sided Western brains; moreover, in the late 1930s, the United States officially closed the research program as unpromising.
The great Russian designer Sergei Vladimirovich Ilyushin combined these diametrical opposites into a single whole, and the Wehrmacht received a Doomsday vehicle for its punishers, the "black death" - the legendary Il-2 attack aircraft. For known reasons, I will not dwell on this superplane in detail, but in order to understand the triumph of the Soyuz and the future victorious march of the Angara using this attack aircraft as an example, it will be easy for us to grasp the basic, integral principle of the Russian design idea.
This idea has four postulates. It can be formulated (with some variations) something like this. The most efficient design is an inexpensive design, and for a design to be inexpensive it must be massive. Here, on two postulates, you need to break off and say that for the "Anglo-Germans" this is again a dead end, a vicious circle. They simply cannot achieve the cheapness of a fighter if it is, say, a 5% segment of the country's air force. You can, however, try to make it better, better, as much as possible, but these will be palliative measures, from 5% the plane will move, for example, to the 7% segment. The “sales market” cannot be drastically increased - this is not a civilian sphere, where the zombified population can no longer live without certain shampoos and doormats. Moreover (using the example of Ukraine) it is impossible to get the whole market of a multimillion-dollar country, because the situation will look absurd when Hitler will sell tanks and planes to Stalin, waging a war with him.
Let's return to the postulates. Russian design thought easily breaks this "vicious circle" and gives out the third postulate - in order to increase the mass production of a design, it is necessary to increase the segment of its functionality. Using the Yak-9 as an example, I talked about how the series is increased by the formation of functional modifications, but with the Ilyushin it is a little different.
The fact is that it is impossible to functionally modify the structure, far away from the original source, from the base model. Yes, the Yak-9BB could close the gaps in the missing bombers (it was necessary to quickly launch it into production), but the Yak-9BB did not become a full-fledged "bomber", therefore it was small-scale. Sergey Vladimirovich went a little further, namely along the path of improving the basic model.
And here it is worth voicing the fourth postulate, which was most clearly expressed in his attack aircraft: in order to increase the functionality of the structure, it is necessary to increase the functionality of its constituent components and assemblies, and then they will completely or partially duplicate each other. In turn, this means that the composite units are either not installed initially, which leads to a decrease in the weight of the structure (this is very important for an aircraft) and a decrease in its cost (see the first postulate), or in case of combat damage, a composite damaged unit (unit) for a while partially or completely duplicated by another unit, which leads to an increase in the reliability of the structure. Sounds tricky, but nothing complicated. For example, armor plates are almost 100% included in the power circuit of the aircraft, and are not hung like armor, which was done earlier in the aircraft industry. This made it unnecessary to install many elements of reinforcement, spars and so on, but the most important thing is that, in addition to observing the weight culture, it saved aluminum, which was sorely lacking.
Another example. The trimmer on the "Ila" is made in such a way that in case of damage to the elevator, the pilot would land the "wounded" aircraft on the trim tabs. There are many such examples. IL-2 is truly aerobatics of design thought! Any, it seemed, his shortcoming Ilyushin turned into dignity.
Let us dwell on only one "drawback": a large wing area, which allows the heavy "Ilu", on the one hand, to increase its combat load, and on the other hand, it did not add to its speed and agility (that is, it flies like an iron). However, let the fighter compete with such an "iron" in a horizontal maneuver - on the second bend, he will get a deadly "present" from the "humpback". Moreover, the large wing made the IL phenomenally stable in flight, which in turn allowed even a poorly trained pilot to master low-level flight on it, which became the hallmark of this attack aircraft. Indeed, such "visits" to the Germans became an insoluble headache for them. It is practically impossible to detect the "shaving" IL-2 by radars, visually and even by sound, which gave the newly-minted "Stealth" the main advantage in war - surprise.
Do not forget that the "Ila" armored hull on "low level" not only protects against accidental bullets, but also allows you to make an emergency landing "on the stomach" on almost any terrain. And finally, the “IL” stable in flight “allows” to make such holes in itself, a small part of which would drive absolutely any other plane into the ground. Cases were recorded when an "IL" landed on the airfield, receiving more than 500 hits!
The combat use of the IL-2 is an endless topic, and I have to summarize.
Thanks to the ingenious design "policy", the Il-2 became the most massive aircraft in the entire history of world aviation. He unceremoniously "devoured" dozens of series of pretty good aircraft or, at best, left them on a meager industrial ration. And it is no wonder that out of more than 20 large series of aircraft fighting at the front, the number of "Ilovs" reached 1/3 of the absolute number. Functionality, mass character, simplicity and reliability - these are the four pillars on which the pedestal of our great record holder rests.
Considering what has been said in this chapter, it will be much easier for us to predict the "space" policy "of the West and to understand whether it is so terrible. Undoubtedly, it will be easier to understand the genesis of Russian space and analyze the tendencies of its development.
And we will try to answer the question about the intellectual and technological potential of the West now. Yes, out of impotence and anger, they can, on orders, turn the cemetery into a lunar crater with bombers where the father of the thirty-four Koshkin MI is buried, or kill our rocket scientists with stupid cynicism, disguising it as a terrorist attack in Volgograd. Anything smarter? Smarter they made, for example, especially durable armor for the knights, who, being beautiful, heavy sarcophagi, put these dogs to rest at the bottom of Lake Peipsi. They made the Dora cannon, for servicing only the gun crew of which "only" 5000 people were needed, and its serial production was "a whole" one copy. You can recall the supertank "Mouse", which, in principle, could not be knocked out, but in principle, he also could not fight. Or remember the super-expensive and unnecessary stealth bomber, which was invisible except for impressionable American housewives with imagination.
This list is endless, and since their one-sided brain is not able to “create” in any other way, they, believe me, will please us with their “innovations”. And some of their cosmic "know-how" with which they are trying to intimidate us, as they once intimidated Gorbachev, we will analyze in detail in the following chapters.
Concluding the section, I would like to admit that the industrial and technical potential of our overseas "friends" and their strategic puppets is enormous. How and with what to beat them, we already guess, all the more we do not need to be smart, we have a military space program bequeathed to us, like the tablets of a dying prophet, by the Soviet Union. Our task is not to let the “fifth column” trample these tablets, but let's think about how to do this in the next chapter.
