The main component of the Far Eastern military campaign of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1945 was the Manchurian strategic operation, carried out from August 9 to September 2 by troops of three fronts: Transbaikal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern, supported by the forces of the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Flotilla. The Mongol troops also took part in it. The Trans-Baikal Front included the 12th Air Army (VA) of Air Marshal S. A. Khudyakov, in the 1st Far Eastern-9 VA of Colonel-General of Aviation I. M. Sokolov and in the 2nd Far East -10 VA of Colonel-General of Aviation P. F. Zhigareva. Planning and coordination of the actions of the aviation forces was carried out by the representative of the Headquarters for aviation, the commander of the Air Force, Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov. With him was the operational group of the Air Force headquarters.
The air armies of the Trans-Baikal and 1st Far Eastern fronts, which were assigned the main role in the operation, were reinforced by formations and units that had combat experience gained in battles with Nazi Germany. Two bomber corps (two divisions in each), fighter, guards bomber and transport aviation divisions were relocated to the Far East.
Soviet aviation had more than twofold superiority over the Japanese in the number of aircraft. The quality of domestic vehicles involved in the operation, such as Yak-3, Yak-9, Yak-7B, La-7 fighters and Pe-2, Tu-2, Il-4 bombers, was at least as good as Japanese aircraft. … It is worth noting the fact that the Japanese Air Force did not have an assault aircraft. The Soviet one had Il-2 and Il-10. Many of our pilots, regiment, division and corps commanders had extensive combat experience.
The Air Force was tasked with gaining air supremacy and providing cover for the groupings of the front forces; support of ground forces in breaking through fortified areas; delivering strikes against railway junctions, lines, echelons, disrupting the maneuver of the enemy's operational reserves during our offensive; violation of command and control; conducting aerial reconnaissance, providing intelligence to the headquarters of ground forces.
Combat operations 12 VA had formed plans for the first five days of a front-line operation, 10 VA - on the first day of the operation, and 9 VA - for 18 days (preparatory stage 5-7 days, the period of destruction of defensive structures - 1 day, the period of breaking through the enemy's defenses and development of success - 9-11 days). Detailed planning in the 9th Air Army was determined by the presence of fortified areas, which could complicate the deployment of the front's main strike forces in selected operational directions. To achieve surprise on the eve of the operation, the actions of the aviation of this army in the first two stages were canceled by the directive of the front commander. The units and formations of the VA were to take off at dawn on August 9.
The headquarters of the air and land armies jointly worked out plans for interaction, single coded maps, radio signal and negotiation tables, and mutual identification signals. The basis of the interaction of the air forces with the ground forces during the Manchurian operation was to coordinate the efforts of the air armies with the main strike groupings of the fronts in order to achieve the greatest results.
The experience of the defeat of Nazi Germany testified that the interaction of the IA with the troops of the fronts, first of all, should be organized according to the principle of support, which made it possible to carry out centralized control and the massive use of aircraft. It should be noted that the organization of interaction between aviation forces and ground forces was largely determined by the specifics of the basing and combat operation of aviation in the specific conditions of the Far Eastern theater. The increase in the composition, regrouping and concentration of the air force on the eve of the operation required the preparation and expansion of the airfield network.
The material and aerodrome-technical support of aviation operations became more complicated due to the limited means of communication, especially during the offensive. The vastness of the theater, desert-steppe and mountain-wooded terrain, the lack of settlements and sources of water supply, severe climatic conditions - all this significantly hampered the work of the aviation rear. The understaffing of personnel and the necessary equipment in the airfield-based areas also affected. That is why the headquarters of the Supreme Command, the air armies were reinforced with aviation technical units. The delivery of ammunition, food, water and fuel and lubricants was carried out centrally, at the direction of the heads of the airfield-based areas. The stocks of everything necessary were created for combat work during 12-13 days of the operation.
Heavy rains, fogs, thunderstorms, low clouds, desert and mountainous-wooded areas, a limited number of landmarks made it difficult for aviation to fly. Therefore, the study of the areas of upcoming combat operations in terms of navigation was extremely important. To ensure air navigation and interaction with the efforts of aviation and ground forces, a system of control and identification marks was created on the tops of the hills, 3-6 km from the border and 50-60 km from each other. The most important roads were marked with special signs. Before the operation, ground support for air navigation moved to forward airfields. Radio direction finders and drive radio stations were located in the areas where fighters were based, radio beacons were located in the areas where bombers were based and light beacons in the areas where IL-4 night bombers were based, on their flight routes, at base airfields, at control and identification and checkpoints. Pilots-leaders from the air regiments permanently based in the Far East were allocated to the regiments that arrived from the west. In squadrons, units and formations, the study of the areas of deployment and hostilities was organized on the basis of maps, with flying over the terrain on transport aircraft. The preparatory period for the Far Eastern air formations lasted over 3 months. For units arriving from the Western theater of operations, from 15 days to a month. These activities of the preparatory period ensured aviation success in the performance of the assigned tasks.
Air reconnaissance was carried out not only by reconnaissance air regiments and squadrons, but also up to 25-30% of all forces of bomber, assault and fighter aircraft. Attack aircraft and fighters were supposed to conduct tactical reconnaissance to a depth of 150 km and observation of the battlefield, bombers and reconnaissance units - operational up to 320-450 km, long-range strategic bombers up to 700 km.
A month before the start of the operation, the enemy's territory was photographed to a depth of 30 km. This helped to open up the enemy defense system, finally outline the areas of the breakthrough, select the places for crossing the rivers, clarify the location of defensive fortifications and structures, fire weapons and reserves. With the beginning of the operation, 12 VA aircraft carried out aerial reconnaissance, for the needs of which more than 500 sorties were carried out daily. It was conducted on a wide front, over 1500 km. Initially, reconnaissance flights were carried out at high altitudes, from 5000 to 6000 m, and later at medium altitudes, from 1000 to 1500 m. On average, all air armies spent 2-3 times more sorties for these tasks than during offensive operations., in the Western theater of operations. The reconnaissance was carried out in directions and areas (strips) by aerial photography and visually.
The transfer of aircraft to forward airfields was carried out in small groups. The flight was made at low altitudes with complete radio silence, to increase stealth. This ensured the surprise of the use of large aviation forces.
The most instructive operational interaction of the air forces with the troops was carried out in the Trans-Baikal Front. In connection with the significant separation of tank formations from the combined-arms armies leading an offensive in separated parallel operational directions, only aviation could provide continuous support for the advancing formations to the entire depth, operations. The control of the air divisions supporting the tank army was carried out by the operational group. Communication was provided by a mobile radio center. For long-range guidance of aircraft, it was attached to a radar. The fighter aviation division had radars to guide aircraft to air targets. In each regiment of fighters, to organize short-range guidance posts, aircraft controllers with radio stations were allocated.
There are also omissions in the planning of interactions. So, to support the actions of the ground forces in the auxiliary areas of the front (Hailar and Kalgan), one bomber division and a regiment of fighters were allocated. The airfields for maneuvering for air units and formations interacting with the 6th Panzer Army were not entirely successful. It was not planned to deliver counterattacks by joint actions of aviation and tanks, and it was not envisaged for the actions of bombers during the first days of the operation in the interests of the combined arms army, leading an offensive on the left flank of the tank army. All these shortcomings could lead to a decrease in the rate of advance of the front forces, therefore the plans for interaction were finalized and the indicated shortcomings were eliminated with the beginning of the operation.
Far East Air Force Commander A. A. Novikov with his field headquarters was in the zone of operations of the 12th VA, in the main direction. The leadership of the 9th and 10th VA and the Pacific Fleet Air Force was carried out through the headquarters of the Far East Air Force. With the exit of our troops to the Manchurian Plain and until the end of the military campaign, control was carried out through the Air Force field headquarters from Khabarovsk.
The forces of all three fronts launched an offensive on the night of 9 August. It was decided not to conduct artillery preparation in order to achieve surprise. The troops immediately captured a large number of enemy strongholds and fortifications.
The success of the offensive of ground forces in the main strategic directions was facilitated by the aviation of the 9th and 12th VA. 76 IL-4 bombed military installations in Harbin and Changchun. In the morning, with the aim of paralyzing the work of communications, prohibiting the maneuver of reserves, disrupting control, the bomber aviation of these air armies and the Air Force of the Pacific Fleet delivered two massive strikes. The first was attended by 347 bombers under the cover of fighters, in the second - 139 bombers.
In the afternoon of August 9, the 10 VA formations were supported by the troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front, crossing the water barriers. On the third day of the operation, the forward detachments of the Trans-Baikal Front crossed the vast desert and reached the spurs of the Big Khingan. Thanks to the active actions of the 12th VA, the Japanese command was unable to promptly pull up reserves and deploy defenses on the ridge passes. The tank army, having overcome the Big Khingan in difficult muddy conditions, due to lack of fuel, already on the 3-4th day of the operation had to stop and stay for almost two days in order to pull up the rear.
By the decision of the front commander, the supply of the tank army was carried out by transport aviation, its aircraft transferred more than 2,450 tons of fuels and lubricants and up to 172 tons of ammunition. Up to a hundred transport Li-2 and SI-47 were allocated daily, making up to 160-170 sorties per day. The length of the routes ranged from 400-500 km to 1000-1500 km, of which 200-300 km passed over the Bolshoi Khingan ridge, mostly covered by fog and low clouds. There were no airfields and convenient sites in the event of an emergency landing. The flights were made to points with which radio communication had not yet been established, and the airfields were not known to the flight personnel. In these conditions, reconnaissance groups, specially created and following with the advance units of the ground forces, successfully performed their tasks. Each group had 1-2 cars, a radio station, mine detectors and the necessary tools. The groups conducted reconnaissance of the area, searched for sites for the creation of airfields, established communications with transport aircraft and ensured their landing.
It was not necessary to conquer air supremacy: on August 9, it was established that the Japanese, having decided to retain aviation for the defense of the islands of Japan, redeployed it almost completely to the airfields of South Korea and the metropolis. Therefore, all efforts of the aviation of the air armies were thrown into support of the ground forces of the fronts, which undoubtedly contributed to the success of the operation.
Attack and fighter aircraft of the 9th VA actively supported the front troops. Its strike groups in two main directions in five days of operation advanced 40-100 km. Aviation representatives, who had powerful radio stations, often helped the commanders of ground troops, who had pulled ahead and lost contact, to establish it with the command post of their armies.
Considering the successful actions of the Trans-Baikal and 1st Far Eastern fronts, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Far East A. M. Vasilevsky gave the order to deploy the offensive of the 2nd Far Eastern Front, with active air support. Within a week, his troops defeated several enemy formations and successfully advanced deep into Manchuria. Due to the great distance from the airfields of assault aviation, as a result of a rapid offensive, the support of tank formations of the Trans-Baikal Front by decision of the Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov, assigned to bomber aviation 12 VA.
Concentrated strikes by attack aircraft and bombers proved to be effective. To destroy the resistance centers of the Duninsky fortified area blocked by the 25th Army of the 1st Far Eastern Front, twelve nines of the IL-4 19 bomber air corps delivered a concentrated blow. Bombing was carried out from an altitude of 600-1000 m serially along the lead in two passes. Using the result of the air strike, our troops took possession of the Duninsky fortified area. Centralized aviation control allowed the command of the air armies to focus on the direction where it was most important. One of the main properties of aviation, its high mobility, was competently used.
The interaction of the 9th Army and the troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front was at a high level. There have been cases where attack aircraft and bombers supporting one army were re-targeted to support another. The concentration of the efforts of the air army, according to the tasks of the offensive operation and objects, ensured the rapid pace of the offensive of the front formations. In the course of supporting the troops in the directions of the main strikes, the enemy was continuously influenced. This continuity was achieved by the fact that attack aircraft operated in echelon and made five to seven attacks with each aircraft, and bombers systematically launched strikes on communications. The aviation was forced to carry out combat work in difficult weather conditions almost throughout the entire operation. When group flights were excluded, due to bad weather conditions, fighters and attack aircraft conducted reconnaissance in pairs, simultaneously attacking the most important enemy targets.
For target designation of aviation, the ground forces skillfully used colored smoke bombs, missiles, artillery shell explosions, tracer bullets, and cloths. Aircraft 9 and 10 VA, in order to support the advancing Soviet troops and strikes against fortified areas, made respectively 76% and 72% of combat missions made by strike aviation.
The success of the operation of the Trans-Baikal Front significantly depended on whether the Japanese would have time to occupy the passes over the Great Khingan with their reserves. Therefore, for the first five days of the operation, all railway stations on the Uchagou-Taonan and Hai-lar-Chzhalantun section were subjected to Tu-2 and Pe-2 strikes, which operated in groups of 27-68 aircraft. In total, 12 VA bombers made 85% of all sorties for this purpose. Unlike the 12 VA, the air army of the 1st Far Eastern Front used mostly attack aircraft and fighters to isolate reserves from the battlefield, which did not destroy railway stations, but blocked traffic by destroying trains and steam locomotives, input and output railway switches.
A huge amount of work on the preparation of airfields, following the leading forces of the fronts, was done by the rear services of the air armies. For example, 7 air hubs were prepared in 12 VA in four days. And from August 9 to 22, 27 new airfields were built and 13 were restored, and 16 and 20 were restored in 9 and 10 VA, respectively.
With the withdrawal of the troops of the Trans-Baikal Front to the central regions of Manchuria, opportunities were created to encircle the entire Japanese grouping. Airborne assault forces, numbering from 50 to 500 fighters, were landed in the enemy rear in the areas of large cities and airfield hubs, which contributed to an increase in the pace of the offensive and played a significant role in the final encirclement and defeat of the Kwantung Army.
Together with the landing troops, as a rule, aviation representatives with radio stations landed. They constantly kept in touch with the command of the VA and with their air divisions. Provided the ability to call air units to support the landing troops. About 5400 sorties were made for landing, cover and support of the landing forces. The planes transported almost 16, 5 thousand people, 2776 tons of fuels and lubricants, 550 tons of ammunition and 1500 tons of other cargo. Transport aircraft made about 30% of combat sorties, conducting reconnaissance in the interests of airborne assault forces. During the operation, the transport aviation and communications aviation of the three VA made 7650 sorties (9th VA - 2329, 10th-1323 and 12th -3998).
It took ten days to defeat the Kwantung Army. During such a short period, the Air Force flew about 18 thousand sorties (together with the Pacific Fleet Air Force over 22 thousand). In quantitative terms, they were distributed as follows: up to 44% - to support the Soviet troops and fight against enemy reserves; up to 25% - for aerial reconnaissance; about 30% - in the interests of landings, transportation and communications and control.
For strikes on Japanese airfields, our Air Force spent only 94 sorties (about 0.9%). The reason for this was that parts of the enemy aviation were withdrawn to airfields located inaccessible to our front-line bombers. In order to cover the ground forces and escort aircraft of other types of aviation, the fighters flew more than 4,200 sorties. The allocation of such a powerful fighter force for solving the assigned tasks was clearly excessive, since the enemy aircraft almost did not operate.
During the Manchurian operation, the Air Force carried out what was not always possible to do during the battles in the western theater of operations: to disorganize rail transport and successfully destroy enemy reserves. As a result, the Japanese command could only partially use railway communications for maneuver, the battle areas were isolated from the supply of fresh forces, the Japanese were unable to export material values and withdraw their troops from the attacks of the advancing Soviet troops.
The experience of the Manchurian operation showed that during the rapid offensive of our troops, when the situation was changing especially rapidly, aerial reconnaissance became not only one of the main, but sometimes the only means of obtaining reliable information about enemy forces and their intentions in a short time. The combat actions of the Soviet aviation in the Manchurian strategic operation confirmed that the principle of support allowed the maximum use of the maneuverable qualities of aviation, made it possible to centrally control and massively use air formations in the directions of the main strikes of the fronts. The disunity of all three strategic directions of the theater of operations required the organization and implementation of the closest interaction between aviation and ground forces. Despite the enormous scale of hostilities, air force control during the preparation of the operation and, partly during its conduct, was carried out centrally. The main means of communication were radio and wire communication lines, as well as aircraft of the aviation communication units of the air armies. In conclusion, it should be noted that the combat actions of the ground forces and the air force in the Manchurian operation, in terms of their spatial scope and speed of the offensive, the achievement of the main strategic goals at the beginning of the war, are unmatched throughout the Second World War.
