In 1220, in the midst of the military campaign to conquer Khorezm, Genghis Khan "equipped two leaders for the campaign: Jebe Noyan and Syubete-Bahadur (Subedei), with thirty thousand (soldiers)" (An-Nasavi). They had to find and take prisoner the escaped Khorezmshah - Mukhamed II. "By the power of the Great God, until you take him in your hands, do not return," Chinggis ordered them, and "they crossed the river, heading for Khorasan, and scoured the country."
They failed to find the unlucky ruler: he died on one of the islands of the Caspian Sea at the end of 1220 (some authors claim that at the beginning of 1221). But they captured his mother, bypassing the sea from the south, defeated the Georgian army in the battle of Sagimi (in which the son of the famous Queen Tamara Georgy IV Lasha was seriously wounded) and in the Kotman valley, captured a number of cities in Iran and the Caucasus.
However, the war did not end, Jelal ad-Din became the new Khorezmshah, who fought the Mongols for another 10 years, sometimes inflicting sensitive defeats on them - this was described in the article The Empire of Genghis Khan and Khorezm. Last Hero
Subadey and Dzheba informed Genghis Khan about the death of Muhammad and the flight in an unknown direction of Jalal ad-Din, and, according to Rashid ad-Din, they received an order to move north in order to defeat the tribes related to the Kipchaks of Khorezm.
War of Subudei and Jebe with the Cumans
After capturing Shemakha and Derbent, the Mongols fought through the Lezgins and entered the possessions of the Alans, to whose aid the Kipchaks (Polovtsians) came.
As you know, the difficult battle with them, which "Yuan-shih" (the history of the Yuan dynasty, written in the XIV century under the leadership of Song Lun) calls the battle in the Yu-Yu valley, did not reveal the winners. Ibn al-Athir in the "Complete set of history" reports that the Mongols were forced to resort to cunning, and, only with the help of deception, they managed, in turn, to defeat both of them.
"Yuan Shi" calls the battle on Butsu (Don) the second battle between the Subedei and Jebe corps - here the Polovtsians who had left the Alans were defeated. Ibn al-Athir also tells about this battle, adding that the Mongols "took from the Kipchaks twice as much of what they had given before."
It seemed that now Subedei and Jebe could calmly withdraw their troops in order to report to Genghis Khan about their successes and receive well-deserved rewards. Instead, the Mongols go even further north, chasing the Kipchaks in front of them and trying to press them against some natural barrier - a large river, a seashore, mountains.
S. Pletneva believed that at that time in the Ciscaucasia, the Volga region and the Crimea there were seven tribal unions of the Polovtsians. Therefore, after the defeat, the demoralized Cumans split up. Part fled to the Crimea, the Mongols pursued them, and, crossing the Kerch Strait, captured the city of Sugdeya (Surozh, now Sudak). Others moved to the Dnieper - it was they who would then, together with the Russian squads, take part in the unfortunate battle on the Kalka River (the Alizi River in the "Yuan Shi").
A natural question arises about the true goal and objectives of this campaign. What task were Genghis Khan's commanders now performing so far from the main forces and the main theater of operations? What was it? A preemptive strike against the Kipchaks, who could become allies of the new Khorezmshah? Reconnaissance expedition? Or, something more was conceived, but not everything turned out as Genghis Khan would have liked?
Or maybe from a certain moment - this is the "improvisation" of those who have gone too far, and have lost any connection with Chinggis Subudei and Jebe?
What do we see in 1223? Subedei and Dzheba were ordered to capture the Khorezmshah, but the former is no longer alive, and the new one, Jelal ad-Din, was forced to flee to India a year and a half ago after being defeated in the Battle of the Indus. Soon he will return to Iran, Armenia, Georgia, and begin to gather a new state for himself with sword and fire. Khorezm fell, and Genghis Khan is now preparing for war with the Tangut kingdom of Xi Xia. His headquarters and the army of Subedei and Jebe are separated by many thousands of kilometers. Interestingly, in the spring of 1223, the Great Khan knew at all where he was and what the corps that had gone on a campaign three years ago was doing?
Another extremely interesting question: how real was the threat to the southern Russian principalities?
Let's try to figure it out. First of all, let us try to answer the question: why did Subedei and Dzhebe, who were sent in search of the Khorezmshah, so stubbornly persecute the Kipchaks, better known to us as the Polovtsians? They did not have an order for the final conquest of these territories (and the forces for such an ambitious task were clearly not enough). And there was no military need for this pursuit after the second battle (on the Don): the defeated Polovtsians did not pose any danger, and the Mongols could freely go to join the forces of Jochi.
Some believe the reason is the Mongols' primordial hatred of the Kipchaks, who for centuries have been their rivals and competitors.
Others point to the relationship of Khan Kutan (in Russian chronicles - Kotyan) with the mother of the Khorezmshah Muhammad II - Terken-khatyn. Still others believe that the Kipchaks accepted the enemies of Genghis Khan's clan - the Merkits.
Finally, Subedei and Dzhebe probably understood that soon the Mongols, for a long time, would come to these steppes (the Jochi ulus would often be “Bulgar and Kipchak”, or “Khorezm and Kipchak”), and therefore could seek to inflict maximum damage on their current owners, to make it easier for future conquerors.
That is, such a consistent desire of the Mongols for the complete destruction of the Polovtsian troops by rational reasons can be fully explained.
But was the clash between the Mongols and the Russians inevitable that year? Most likely no. It is impossible to find even one reason why the Mongols should have sought such a clash. In addition, Subedei and Dzhebe did not have the opportunity to make a successful invasion of Russia. There were no siege engines in their tumens, and there were no Khitan or Jurchen engineers and craftsmen capable of building such weapons, so there was no question of storming cities. And a simple raid, it seems, was not part of their plans. We remember that the famous campaign of Igor Svyatoslavich in 1185 ended with a strike by the combined forces of the Polovtsi on the Chernigov and Pereyaslavl lands. In 1223, the Mongols won a much more significant victory, but did not take advantage of its fruits.
The events preceding the Battle of Kalka are presented to many as follows: having defeated the Kipchaks on the Don, the Mongols drove them to the borders of the Russian principalities. Finding themselves on the verge of physical destruction, the Polovtsians turned to the Russian princes with the words:
“Our land has been taken away by the Tatars today, and yours will be taken tomorrow, protect us; if you don’t help us, then we will be killed today, and you - tomorrow”.
Mstislav Udatny (then Prince of Galitsky), the son-in-law of Khan Kutan (Kotyan), who had gathered for the council of the Russian princes, said:
"If we, brothers, do not help them, then they will surrender to the Tatars, and then they will have even more strength."
That is, it turns out that the Mongols did not leave anyone any choice. The Polovtsi had to either die or completely submit and become part of the Mongol army. The clash of the Russians with the aliens who found themselves at their borders was also inevitable, the only question was where it would take place. And the Russian princes decided: "it is better for us to accept them (the Mongols) on a foreign land than on our own."
Such is a simple and clear scheme, where everything is logical and there is no desire to ask additional questions - and, at the same time, it is absolutely wrong.
In fact, at the time of these negotiations, the Mongols were not even close to the Russian borders: they fought with another tribal union of the Polovtsians in the Crimea and the Black Sea steppes. Kotyan, who said the previously quoted, beautiful, full of pathos, phrase about the need to unite efforts in the fight against foreign invaders, his relatives could rightfully be accused of treason, since he took about 20 thousand soldiers with him, dooming those who remained to inevitable defeat. And Kotyan could not know for sure whether the Mongols would go even further north. But the Polovtsian Khan thirsted for revenge, and the anti-Mongol alliance, which he was now trying to organize, seemed to be not defensive, but offensive.
Fatal decision
The council of princes in Kiev was attended by Mstislav of Kiev, Mstislav of Chernigov, Volyn prince Daniil Romanovich, Smolensk prince Vladimir, Sursky prince Oleg, the son of the Kiev prince Vsevolod - the former Novgorod prince, nephew of the Chernigov prince Mikhail. They allowed the Polovtsy and Mstislav Galitsky, who supported them (he is better known under the nickname Udatny - "Lucky", not "Udatny"), to convince them that the danger is real, and agreed to go on a campaign against the Mongols.
The problem was that the main force of the Russian squads was traditionally the infantry, which was delivered to the place of general gathering on boats. And therefore, the Russians could fight the Mongols only with a very strong desire of the Mongols themselves. Subudei and Jebe could easily evade the battle, or play "cat and mouse" with the Russians, leading their squads with them, exhausting them with long marches - which actually happened. And there were no guarantees that the Mongols, who at that time were far in the south, would generally come to the borders of Russia and, moreover, would enter into a battle that was absolutely unnecessary for them. But the Polovtsians knew that the Mongols could be forced to do this. Have you already guessed what happened next?
This time the gathering place of the Russian squads was the Varyazhsky Island, which was located opposite the mouth of the Trubezh River (currently flooded by the Kanev reservoir). It was difficult to hide such a significant accumulation of troops, and the Mongols, upon learning of this, tried to enter into negotiations. And the words of their ambassadors were standard:
“We heard that you were going against us, obeying the Polovtsians, but we did not occupy your land, neither your cities, nor villages, did not come to you; We came by the permission of God against our servants and grooms, against the filthy Polovtsians, and we have no war with you; if the Polovtsians run to you, then you beat them from there and take their goods for yourself; we heard that they are doing you a lot of harm, therefore we also beat them from here."
One can argue about the sincerity of these proposals, but there was no need to kill the Mongol ambassadors, among whom there was also one of the two sons of Subedei (Chambek). But, at the insistence of the Polovtsy, they were all killed, and now the Russian princes became bloodsheds both for the Mongols in general and for Subedei.
This murder was not an act of bestial cruelty, or a manifestation of savagery and stupidity. It was an insult and a challenge: the Mongols were deliberately provoked to a battle with a rival superior in strength and in the most unfavorable (as it seemed to everyone then) conditions and circumstances. And reconciliation was almost impossible.
Nobody even touched the Mongols of the second embassy - because this was no longer necessary. But they came to Kotyan's son-in-law - Mstislav Galitsky, one of the initiators of this campaign. This meeting took place at the mouth of the Dniester, where, in a roundabout way, going to join the troops of other princes, his squad sailed on boats. And the Mongols at this time were still in the Black Sea steppes.
“You listened to the Polovtsians and killed our ambassadors; now you come at us, so go; we didn’t touch you: God is above all of us,”the ambassadors declared, and the Mongolian army began to move northward. And the squad of Mstislav on boats along the Dnieper ascended to the island of Khortitsa, where they joined other Russian troops.
So slowly and at the same time inevitably, armies of opposite sides were marching towards each other.
Forces of the parties
In a campaign against the Mongols, the squads of the following principalities: Kiev, Chernigov, Smolensk, Galicia-Volynsky, Kursk, Putivl and Trubchevsky.
The detachment of the Vladimir principality, commanded by Vasilko Rostovsky, managed to reach only Chernigov. Having received news of the defeat of the Russian troops on Kalka, he turned back.
The number of Russian troops is currently estimated at about 30 thousand people, about 20 thousand more were put up by the Polovtsians, they were led by the thousand Yarun - voivode Mstislav Udatny. Historians believe that the next time the Russians were able to collect such a large army only in 1380 - for the Battle of Kulikovo.
The army, indeed, was large, but did not have a general command. Mstislav Kievsky and Mstislav Galitsky fiercely competed with each other, as a result, at the decisive moment, on May 31, 1223, their troops were on different banks of the Kalka River.
The Mongols began their campaign with an army of 20 to 30 thousand people. By this time, they certainly suffered losses, and therefore, the number of their troops, even according to the most optimistic estimates, hardly exceeded 20 thousand people, but, probably, it was less.
Start of the hike
After waiting for the approach of all units, the Russians and the Polovtsians allied with them crossed to the left bank of the Dnieper and moved east. In the vanguard, the detachments of Mstislav Udatny moved: they were the first to meet the Mongols, whose advance units, after a short battle, retreated. The Galicians took the enemy's intentional retreat for his weakness, and Mstislav Udatny's self-confidence increased with each passing day. In the end, he apparently decided that he could cope with the Mongols without the help of other princes - with some of the Polovtsians. And it was not only the thirst for fame, but also the unwillingness to share the spoils.
Battle of Kalka
The Mongols retreated for another 12 days, the Russian-Polovtsian troops were greatly stretched out and were tired. Finally, Mstislav Udatny saw the Mongol troops ready for battle, and, without warning the other princes, with his retinue and Polovtsy attacked them. This is how the battle on Kalka began, reports of which are found in 22 Russian chronicles.
In all chronicles, the name of the river is given in the plural: on Kalki. Therefore, some researchers believe that this is not the proper name of the river, but an indication that the battle took place on several closely spaced small rivers. The exact place of this battle has not been determined; at present, the areas on the rivers Karatysh, Kalmius and Kalchik are considered as a possible place for the battle.
The Sophia Chronicle indicates that, at first, at some Kalka there was a small battle between the vanguard detachments of the Mongols and the Russians. The guards of Mstislav Galitsky captured one of the Mongol centurions, whom this prince handed over to the Polovtsy for reprisal. Having overturned the enemy here, the Russians approached another Kalka, where the main battle unfolded on May 31, 1223.
So, the troops of Mstislav Udatny, Daniil Volynsky, the Chernigov cavalry and the Polovtsy, without coordinating their actions with other participants in the campaign, crossed to the other side of the river. The Kiev prince Mstislav Stary, with whom his two sons-in-law were, remained on the opposite bank, where a fortified camp was built.
The blow of the Mongols' reserve units overturned the attacking Russian detachments, the Polovtsians fled (it was their flight that the Novgorod and Suzdal chronicles call the cause of the defeat). Mstislav Udatny, the hero of the Battle of Lipitsa, also fled, and was the first to reach the Dnieper, where the Russian boats were located. Instead of organizing a defense on the shore, he, having ferried part of his squad to the opposite shore, ordered all boats to be chopped up and burned. It was these actions of his that became one of the main reasons for the deaths of about 8 thousand Russian soldiers.
Mstislav's cowardly and unworthy behavior contrasts sharply with the behavior of the same Igor Svyatoslavich in 1185, who also had the opportunity to escape, but said:
“If we gallop, we will be saved ourselves, but we will abandon ordinary people, and this will be a sin on us before God, having betrayed them, we will leave. So either we will die, or all together we will remain alive."
This example is a vivid proof of the moral degradation of the Russian princes, which will reach its peak during the time of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, his sons and grandsons.
Meanwhile, the camp of Mstislav Kievsky held out for three days. There were two reasons. Firstly, Subadey with the main forces pursued the fleeing Russian soldiers to the Dnieper, and, only having destroyed them, returned back. Secondly, the Mongols did not have infantry capable of breaking through the fortifications of the Kievites. But hunger and thirst were their allies.
Convinced of the resilience of the Kievites and the futility of the assaults, the Mongols entered into negotiations. Russian chronicles assert that on behalf of the enemy a certain "voivode of the roamers" Ploskinya conducted negotiations, and Mstislav of Kiev believed his fellow believer, who kissed the cross, that the Mongols "would not shed your blood."
The Mongols really did not shed the blood of the Russian princes: the chronicles claim that they, having laid the bound prisoners on the ground, laid boards on top of which they had a feast in honor of the victory.
Eastern sources tell about the death of captured Russian princes a little differently.
It is alleged that Subedei sent for negotiations not Ploskinya, but the former governor (wali) of the city of Khin Ablas (in the Bulgarian sources he is called Ablas-Khin), who lured the Russian princes outside the fortifications. Subedey allegedly asked them so that the Russian soldiers outside the fence could hear: who should be executed for the death of his son - princes or their soldiers?
The princes cowardly replied that there were warriors, and Subedei turned to their warriors:
“You heard that your beks betrayed you. Leave without fear, for I will execute them themselves for treason to my soldiers, and I will let you go."
Then, when the bound princes were laid under the wooden shields of the Kiev camp, he again turned to the surrendered soldiers:
“Your beks wanted you to be the first to be in the ground. So trample them into the ground for it yourself."
And the princes were crushed with their own feet by their own warriors.
After thinking it over, Subedei said:
"The warriors who killed their beks should not live either."
And he ordered to kill all the captured soldiers.
This story is more credible, since it was clearly recorded from the words of a Mongol eyewitness. And on the part of the Russian surviving eyewitnesses, this terrible and sad incident, as you understand, most likely did not happen.
Consequences of the Battle of Kalka
In total, in this battle and after it, according to various sources, from six to nine Russian princes, many boyars and about 90% of ordinary soldiers died.
The deaths of six princes are accurately documented. This is the Kiev prince Mstislav Stary; Chernigov prince Mstislav Svyatoslavich; Alexander Glebovich from Dubrovitsa; Izyaslav Ingvarevich from Dorogobuzh; Svyatoslav Yaroslavich from Janowice; Andrey Ivanovich from Turov.
The defeat was truly terrible, and made an incredibly difficult impression in Russia. Epics were even created, which said that it was on Kalka that the last Russian heroes died.
Since the Kiev prince Mstislav Stary was a figure that suited many, his death provoked a new round of strife, and the years that passed from Kalka to the Western campaign of the Mongols in Russia were not used by the Russian princes to prepare for repelling the invasion.
The return of the army of Subudei and Jebe
Having won the battle on Kalka, the Mongols did not go to ravage the remaining defenseless Russia, but finally moved east. And therefore we can safely say that this battle was unnecessary and unnecessary for them, the Mongol invasion of Russia in 1223 could not be feared. The Russian princes, either, were misled by the Polovtsy and Mstislav Galitsky, or they decided to take from the strangers the spoils they had robbed during the campaign.
But the Mongols went not to the Caspian Sea, as one might suppose, but to the lands of the Bulgars. Why? Some suggest that the Saxin tribe, having learned about the approach of the Mongols, set fire to the grass, which forced the corps of Subedei and Jebe to turn to the north. But, firstly, this tribe roamed between the Volga and the Urals, and the Mongols simply could not find out about the fire they had set up before they came to the lower reaches of the Volga, and secondly, the time for the steppe fire was inappropriate. The steppe burns when dry grass predominates in it: in the spring, after the snow melts, last year's grass burns, in the fall - this year's grass that had time to dry. Reference books assert that "during the period of intensive vegetation, steppe fires practically do not occur." The Battle of Kalka, as we remember, took place on May 31. This is how the Khomutov steppe (Donetsk region) looks like in June: there is nothing especially to burn in it.
So, the Mongols are looking for opponents again, they stubbornly attack the Bulgars. For some reason, Subedei and Jebe do not consider their mission fully fulfilled. But they had already accomplished the almost impossible, and the English historian S. Walker would later compare their campaign along the traversed path and these battles with the campaigns of Alexander the Great and Hannibal, claiming that they surpassed both. Napoleon will write about Subedei's great contribution to the art of war. What else do they want? They decided alone, with such insignificant forces, to defeat absolutely all the states of Eastern Europe? Or is there something we don't know?
What is the result? At the end of 1223 or the beginning of 1224, the Mongol army, tired of the campaign, was ambushed and defeated. The name Jebe is no longer found in historical sources, it is believed that he died in battle. Great commander Subedei is seriously wounded, he has lost one eye and will remain lame for the rest of his life. According to some reports, there were so many captured Mongols, the victorious Bulgars exchanged them for rams at a rate of one to one. Only 4 thousand soldiers break through to Desht-i-Kypchak.
How should Genghis Khan meet the same Subbedei? Put yourself in his place: you send two generals at the head of 20 or 30 thousand selected horsemen in search of the head of a hostile state. They do not find the old Khorezmshah, they miss the new one, and they themselves disappear for three years. They find themselves where they are not needed, they fight with someone, gain unnecessary victories that lead to nothing. There are also no plans for war with the Russians, but they demonstrate to the potential enemy the capabilities of the Mongol army, forcing them to think and, possibly, induce to take measures to repel subsequent aggression. And, finally, they are destroying their army - not some steppe rabble, but invincible heroes from Onon and Kerulen, throwing them into battle in the most unfavorable conditions. If Subedei and Jebe acted arbitrarily, "at their own peril and risk," the conqueror's anger must be very great. But Subedei avoids punishment. But the relationship between Genghis Khan and his eldest son Jochi deteriorates sharply.
Jochi and Genghis Khan
Jochi is considered the eldest son of the great conqueror, but his real father was probably the unnamed Merkit, whose wife or concubine Borte became during her captivity. Chinggis, who loved Borte and understood his guilt (after all, he shamefully fled during the raid of the Merkits, leaving his wife, mother, and brothers to the mercy of fate) recognized Jochi as his son. But the illegal origin of his firstborn was no secret to anyone, and Chagatai openly reproached his brother for his Merkit origin - due to his position, he could afford it. Others were silent, but they knew everything. Genghis Khan, it seems, did not like Jochi, and therefore allocated to him the devastated Khorezm, the sparsely populated steppe on the territory of present-day Kazakhstan and the unconquered lands of the West, to which he had to go on a campaign with a detachment of 4 thousand Mongols and soldiers of the peoples of the conquered countries.
Rashid ad-Din in the "Collection of Chronicles" hints that Jochi violated the order of Chinggis, first evading aid to the corps of Subedei and Dzheba, and then, after their defeat, from a punitive expedition against the Bulgars.
“Go to the lands visited by Subudai-Bagatur and Chepe-Noyon, occupy all the winter quarters and summers. Exterminate the Bulgars and the Polovtsians,”Genghis Khan writes to him, Jochi does not even answer.
And in 1224, under the pretext of illness, Jochi refused to appear at the Kurultai - apparently, he did not expect anything good from his meeting with his father.
Many authors of those years speak about the tensions between Jochi and Genghis Khan. The 13th century Persian historian Ad-Juzjani states:
“Tushi (Jochi) said to his entourage:“Genghis Khan has gone mad that he is destroying so many people and destroying so many kingdoms. Muslims ". His brother Chagatai found out about such a plan and informed his father about this treasonous plan and his brother's intention. Upon learning, Genghis Khan sent his confidants to poison and kill Tushi."
The "Genealogy of the Turks" says that Jochi died 6 months before the death of Genghis Khan - in 1227. But Jamal al-Karshi claims that this happened before:
"Carcasses died before his father - in 622/1225."
Historians consider this date more reliable, since in 1224 or 1225, an angry Genghis Khan was going to go to war against Jochi, and, as they say, only the death of his son stopped this campaign. It is unlikely that Genghis Khan hesitated with the war against his son who showed disobedience for two years.
According to the official version, cited by Rashid ad-Din, Jochi died of illness. But even his contemporaries did not believe this, claiming that the cause of his death was poison. At the time of his death, Jochi was about 40 years old.
In 1946, Soviet archaeologists in the Karaganda region of Kazakhstan (in the Alatau mountains, about 50 km northeast of Zhezkagan) in the mausoleum, where, according to legend, Jochi was buried, a skeleton was found without a right hand with a cut skull. If this body really belongs to Jochi, we can conclude that the messengers of Genghis Khan did not really hope for poison.
Perhaps, finding themselves in the Volga steppes in June 1223, Subadey and Dzhebe established contact with the Metropolia and received instructions on further actions. That is why they so long and slowly moved to the lands of the Bulgars: they could have ended up there in the middle of summer, but came only at the end of 1223 or at the beginning of 1224. Did you expect to meet the reinforcements sent by him by Jochi, or his attack on the rear of the Bulgarians? This could be the beginning of the Western campaign of the Mongols.
But why did the firstborn of Genghis not come to the aid of his father's commanders?
According to one version, he was a “paladin of the Steppe,” and did not want to lead his troops to conquer the forest kingdoms uninteresting for him and strange alien peoples. The same Al-Juzjani wrote that when Tushi (Jochi) “saw the air and water of the Kipchak land, he found that in the whole world there can be no land more pleasant than this, the air is better than this, the water is sweeter than this, meadows and pastures are wider than these.
Perhaps, it was Desht-i-Kypchak that he wanted to become the ruler.
According to another version, Jochi did not like Subedei and Dzhebe, who were people of another generation - companions of their unloved father, commanders of the old, Chinggis "school", and did not approve of their methods of war. And therefore he deliberately did not go to meet them, sincerely wishing their death.
In this case, if Jochi had survived Genghis Khan, perhaps his campaign to the West had a different character.
In any case, this great march "to the last sea" would have taken place. But in 1223, the Mongols had no plans for a war with the Russian principalities. The battle on Kalka was for them an unnecessary, useless and even harmful battle, because in it they showed their strength, and it was not their "fault" that the Russian princes, busy with their strife, ignored such a serious and formidable warning.
The murder of the ambassadors was not forgotten either by the Mongols, or, even more so, by Subedei, who had lost his son, and this probably influenced the course of subsequent military campaigns of the Mongols on the territory of Russia.
Some of the oddities of the initial stage of the war between the Mongols and the Russian principalities will be discussed in the next article.
