The abundance of criticism of the domestic fleet, and especially of the direction in which naval development is developing, should, in all fairness, be accompanied by some kind of explanation of how everything should have been done.
The previous article on the crisis of the amphibious capabilities of the Russian Navy deserves such a continuation. Consider how you can return the Navy's ability to land amphibious assault forces without resorting to expensive solutions.
This is especially important now, when economic realities will no longer allow the Russian Navy to develop extensively. Of course, developing extensively is great. There is no way to use helicopters in the landing operation - we are building a DVKD or even a UDC. Few landing ships? We are building more …
The trouble, however, is that there will be no money for such a path in the budget for many years. This means that we have to find another way. Cheap. His own, such as no one else has used. No money, but you stick there. So it will now be, apparently.
Is it real? Yes, quite, and these opportunities need to be "launched in the information field" right now.
In order to assess the prospects for the "budgetary" modernization of the Russian Navy's amphibious forces, let us first write down the boundary conditions:
1. It is necessary that the new landing ships be able to release military equipment into the water at a great distance from the coast.
2. At the same time, it is necessary to ensure the possibility of delivering combat helicopters and helicopters with a landing force to the landing zone.
3. It is necessary to ensure the landing of heavy equipment - tanks and sapper equipment in the first wave, self-propelled artillery, more tanks and transport vehicles in the second.
4. In the event of a failure of the landing operation, the naval staff must provide the ability to evacuate most of the people from the shore, at least without equipment.
5. In this case, it is necessary to do without large specialized amphibious ships.
The conditions contradict each other somewhat, but, oddly enough, there are solutions that satisfy them.
Historically, Russia, forced to have a large land army, could not invest in the navy in the same way as the British or the Americans. And if the latter in the course of the last big war massively built landing ships, then the USSR Navy was forced to mobilize warships and transport ships for the landing. The landing of the Marine Corps from the cruisers should be left "outside the brackets", but the mobilization of transport ships tells us a relatively unexpected way out.
In 1990, an unusual ship for the Soviet Navy - the high-speed sea transport of weapons "Anadyr", entered the Pacific Fleet.
The ship was hardly intended to carry weapons from port to port.
First, its cargo hold has been optimized to accommodate lighters, while lighters are needed to transport heavy loads to unequipped shore. Secondly, and most importantly, the ship was equipped with cockpits to accommodate personnel, which in terms of numbers approximately corresponded to the reinforced battalion - according to various sources, from 650 to 750 people.
Thirdly, in the standard version "Anadyr" had a hangar for two Ka-27 helicopters. And a huge flat cargo deck. The ship, in fact, most of all corresponded to what in the West is called Landing ship dock - landing ship dock. The stern ramp quite allowed the equipment to be unloaded into the water, like a landing ship, and instead of lighters, there could well be other watercraft. By and large, there were no differences from the landing ship.
In order to use the "Anadyr" in the landing operation, he did not need any modifications - none at all. And if the Soviet marines had a seaworthy armored personnel carrier - an analogue of the American LVTP-7, then from Anadyr, using these machines, it would be quite possible to carry out the same over-the-horizon landing, the same that the Americans are preparing to carry out from their UDC. The only downside was a small hangar, but even here we have a historical precedent, though not domestic.
This is "Contender Bizant". One of the mobilized transport ships used by the British in the Falklands. The flat cargo deck was covered with flooring and turned into a flight deck, and a hangar for Chinook helicopters was assembled from containers. This ship was not used as a landing craft, but the principle is important to us. If we assume that we are using a certain analogue of "Anadyr" as a DVD, and we need to place more helicopters on it, then a light prefabricated one can be attached to the permanent hangar and two helicopters in the permanent hangar can be supplemented with six or eight in the temporary one.
If we are landing a battalion of the Marine Corps, and if the situation requires part of the forces to be landed in the form of an airborne assault, then we need to raise at least a company in helicopters. And these are eight Ka-29s or some hypothetical transport vehicles based on the Ka-32. It would also be nice to have two or four Ka-52K shock units to cover the landing. It is quite possible to place them on such a huge ship as "Anadyr".
On the other hand, if airborne assault is unnecessary or impossible, then all helicopters on board can be attacked. Or, if it is planned that there will be no resistance (well, you never know), then you can limit yourself to a couple of sanitary facilities and not build any additional hangar at all.
Moreover. If you equip the ship with a lift for heavy equipment, then you can now place helicopters inside, on the lower cargo deck, increasing their number to dozens. This will allow an airborne assault battalion to land from the air at once, and provide its actions with the support of attack helicopters.
Or, alternatively, use the upper cargo deck to accommodate ground vehicles, as well as the lower one, lowering armored vehicles and trucks down and rolling them out from there.
If necessary, such a ship becomes a very convenient and multifunctional base for special operations, it can be present anywhere in the world ocean, carry on board special forces, helicopters, boats and boats, UAVs, container weapon systems (cruise or anti-ship missiles) and a large supply of logistical funds. It can be used as a mobile base for anti-submarine aircraft somewhere in the Sea of Okhotsk, for example, and based on it anti-submarine helicopters.
But the most important thing is that outside the periods of use in combat operations, it is just transport, which is used as transport, for transportation. As you know, the Ministry of Defense has purchased a large number of vessels of various types to supply the grouping in Syria. Since the Ministry of Defense still has to buy transport ships, why not buy such a ship? Yes, it is inefficient compared to purpose-built vessels for commercial use, but in the end the military is not required to compete in efficiency with civilian carriers. And for sure, such a ship would be much more efficient as a transport in the same "Syrian Express" - in the upper cargo deck there may well be wide covers on one side (the "Anadyr" had them) to load cargo with cranes from above, on the other, openings for container locks, so that, after loading the hold, we can also put stacks with containers on top.
But we definitely need a docking camera. Indeed, without it, a large landing boat or several cannot be placed inside the ship, and without them the first wave of landing will not receive tanks and engineering equipment. And the docking camera will interfere with the work on the transportation of goods.
In this case, you can provide a removable deck or pontoon, which would level the floor of the dock chamber with the landing-cargo deck. You can also provide an onboard latchport for loading and unloading equipment when mooring with the side to the berth.
Thus, by investing in a high-speed transport of a similar design, the Navy does not lose anything - it still needs transport ships both to participate in wars like the Syrian, and to ensure daily activities. Buy them anyway. And having bought such a ship, the Navy also gets a large DKD / DVKD "in combination" and removes the need to build specialized ships of this class. On the Syrian Express, this kind of transport would be more useful than anything it currently uses. And in an amphibious operation, it is much more effective than the notorious Mistral (provided that there are appropriate command and control systems and a medical unit with personnel on board).
How many of these ships are needed? At least one for each fleet, except for the Baltic, so that at least one battalion battle group can be landed.
Preferably - at least two. Ideally, according to the number of battalions in an MP brigade subordinate to the fleet. Then the questions of the landing of troops will be completely removed, but this, most likely, will turn out to be economically unrealistic. The Baltic Fleet should be excluded due to the fact that all countries in the region are either emphatically neutral or are part of NATO and an offensive operation of this magnitude against them is still fantastic, and such a ship will not survive the first hours of a big war in Europe. But for the Black Sea Fleet, Pacific Fleet, and the Northern Fleet, the presence of such ships is mandatory.
Thus, the Navy needs "from three" universal dock transports, which must be adapted for use as amphibious assault ships.
But, as already mentioned, it will not work economically to put the entire marines on such vehicles. How to land the second echelons? What will be the "peacetime amphibious assault ship" during the exercise? How to land, if necessary, the marines in the Baltic? At first, it may well be the existing BDK. Firstly, in the presence of a seaworthy armored personnel carrier or BMMP, the BDK, which has a stern port, can land this equipment on the water anywhere. In fact, in the presence of a seaworthy armored personnel carrier or BMMP, over-the-horizon landing becomes possible even with a large landing craft - just without airborne assault and without tanks in the first wave. But for the airborne assault, we will have the amphibious transport described above, and the option with parachute landing from aircraft should not be ruled out, it will simply cease to be the only option, and will become one of the possible.
So, it turns out that in parallel with the transports it is necessary to build "classic" large landing ships? No.
BDKs should be used as long as possible, before they are decommissioned, but something else should come to replace them.
It is necessary to revive the now extinct class of Medium landing ships - KFOR. And if the landing of the forward echelon, like hypothetical expeditionary operations, falls on amphibious transports, then the reinforcement of the amphibious assault of the first echelon, the disembarkation of the second echelons and amphibious operations in conditions of weak or no resistance should be carried out by medium amphibious ships.
This decision seems paradoxical, but only at first glance. Let us first consider what the new KFOR should be and why, and only then we will figure out what advantages this class of ships conceals in itself.
SDK is a priori a small ship. This means that it is cheap compared to the BDK. Mass. It can be built on all shipyards at once. With the defeat of such a ship, the losses are much less than in the case of one and a half times larger large landing craft. Currently, JSC "Rosoboronexport" offers buyers the KFOR of project 21810. One of the features of this ship is that it can pass through inland waterways. BDK do not have this capability.
What does the possibility of transferring ships from theater to theater mean for the landing forces? The fact that they can be built in limited series, if funding is also limited. Then it is enough for the country to have the number of ships necessary for the landing of one brigade of the marine corps at once on three potential theaters of war - the North, the Baltic and the Black Sea. Hypothetically, the Caspian. That is, the small size of the KFOR makes it possible to save on the number of ships, at least for the first time. Of course, such a maneuver is not easy even in peaceful conditions. In winter, it will require icebreaker assistance and serious engineering support, if only because the ice on some rivers cannot be broken by a river icebreaker, it must first be blown up. But with relatively small ships, this at least becomes feasible in principle. It is absolutely impossible to do this with BDK.
And it is also impossible to use the large landing craft in river landing operations. And this may also be needed, at least in the last War - it was necessary, let us recall at least the Tuloksin landing operation.
How should the size of the KFOR be limited? Locks on inland waterways, the heights of the spans of bridges over them and the depths of rivers. Within these limits, the maximum possible size is required, but not exceeding these limits. Naturally, the KFOR should have a power plant based on diesel engines, apparently produced by the Kolomna plant. The weapon that the ship is equipped with should be minimized. 76-mm cannon, AK-630M, MANPADS operated by crew members, and one long-range ATGM for hitting point targets on the shore and on the water.
But, and this is important, we should not make our new KFOR look like the old ones. Our ship should be completely different.
Relatively recently, interested observers were shown a project of an amphibious assault ship, created according to the concept of a stern landing vessel, which can roughly be translated as "amphibious assault ship with stern landing."
The peculiarity of the concept is that this amphibious assault ship does not have a bow gate, and when approaching the shore, the ship has to turn around and unload equipment ashore using the stern ramp. This solution has a number of disadvantages. First, it is required to ensure the efficiency and survival of the propeller-rudder group with this type of maneuver. Secondly, a U-turn is still a dangerous maneuver in conditions when there are a lot of other ships around, which are also turning. Thirdly, the commanders of ships cannot "sleep" the moment when it is necessary to start a maneuver, otherwise it may have to be performed under fire.
But there are also pluses. They are well shown in this video.
Stern landing vessel
Let's briefly list the advantages of the scheme.
First, such a ship is more seaworthy. Secondly, it is technically simpler - there is no gate and mechanism for opening them, there is no weakened zone in the nose of the case. Thirdly, there is no risk of knocking out the gate leaves when slamming. Because of this danger, sometimes landing ships have to tack to be at an angle to the wave, there is no a priori this problem. Fourthly, if such a ship participates in the landing of the first wave of assault forces, then the release of amphibious armored vehicles is in any case carried out through the stern ramp, and the presence of a gate in the bow is simply not required. Fifth, a smaller ship is more "profitable" when landing in a port simply because of better maneuverability and less demanding on the size and location of berths. Sixth, this arrangement allows equipping a sufficiently large helipad on each KFOR, which simplifies takeoffs and landings from it.
Why do you need a helipad? Firstly, helicopters can also be launched from KFOR. They just do not have and should not have a hangar, but with tactical landings at a short distance from the front line, helicopters can just stand moored on the deck for half a day. Secondly, such KFOR can be used as "jump points" - a helicopter arriving "from its own" shore can sit on the deck of this ship, refuel, and continue the sortie. Such a scheme allows the use of coastal combat helicopters at a combat radius of many hundreds of kilometers, more than five hundred for most types of helicopters. In another situation, a modular air defense missile system or an air defense missile system in an autonomous module can be installed on a flat deck, additional cargoes are located, etc. A small amphibious assault ship of traditional architecture is almost completely devoid of all these advantages. As a last resort, there will be a helicopter platform, but extremely cramped and dangerous.
For landings in ports, the ship must be able to release foot soldiers from either side.
How many such ships are needed? If the large amphibious transport described above should land a battalion, then it is logical to assume that all the remaining MP battalions in each of the fleets should land such KFOR (we do not know what the Marine Corps staffs will be when adopting BMMPs and how the MP and the capacity of the KFOR will be adjusted, so the numbers are approximate). Then, if you have one transport, you will need about thirty more KFOR per brigade. This is a lot, but small ships give us the opportunity not to build so much for each fleet, but to have one brigade of six to eight ships on the Black Sea Fleet, Northern Fleet, BF and in the Caspian Flotilla, and concentrate them together for landing operations of each of the fleets ferrying ships along inland waterways. In a bad scenario, when the passage was disrupted by the enemy, or when there was not enough time for it, any of the fleets, with a KFOR brigade, with boats and amphibious transport, as well as military transport aircraft, will be able to land at least three battalion assault forces, which is much better than now.
It is worth noting that due to its good seaworthiness, the KFOR can be used at a great distance from its territory. The Pacific Fleet stands alone, but there you can have two transports, one battalion of the Marine Corps can be used as a parachute battalion, and then you will need to have about 20 SDKs so that you can land all the marines of the Pacific Fleet in one operation. At the same time, the simplicity and small size of the ships guarantee the possibility of building them in the required quantity, and fast, and a small crew, a diesel power plant based on proven and mastered units, and the same design simplicity guarantee low operating costs. And, of course, such ships can also be used in transport, as well as in the role of mine and network minelayers.
It remains to provide the landing party with opportunities for protection from sea mines, and for artillery support from the sea. But this should already be done by surface ships that are not part of the landing force, frigates, corvettes and minesweepers. Although it might be worthwhile to study additionally the creation of some extremely simple artillery ship armed with a pair of 130 mm cannons in two turret mounts, long-range MLRS, anti-tank systems for hitting point targets and, of course, an artillery reconnaissance radar that allows you to fight against enemy ground artillery. Such a ship should also pass through inland waterways, and be as simple as possible. In fact, we are talking about the reincarnation of a gunboat.
Naturally, there won't be many of them. It is quite possible that three or four such ships for each of the fleets will be more than enough. That is also quite within the forces of our military budget.
Thus, by showing a non-standard approach, it becomes possible to recreate amphibious forces in the Russian fleet, which any potential enemy will have to reckon with.
Of course, the marines themselves will have to transform. The states will have to adapt to the realities of the ship composition, with armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and armed MTLB marines will have to transfer to special landing vehicles capable of traveling in high waves. To save money, you can enter into a partnership with Turkey, which plans to show its version of LVTP-7 next year, 2019.
Although the Omsktransmash project mentioned in the last article looks much more preferable, the budget is not rubber.
You will need tank landing boats that could be loaded with tanks inside the amphibious transport. Moreover, the size of the boats should allow tanks to enter them with mine trawls. This is a prerequisite.
Let us briefly list what kind of groundwork Russia currently has in order to start implementing a project to restore amphibious capabilities:
- There are the necessary diesels.
- There is all the necessary radio and electronic weapons for ships, as well as weapons for them.
- There is documentation for the BMTV "Anadyr".
- There is a shipbuilding industry capable of doing just such technically not complicated things quite quickly.
- There is a wonderful sea attack helicopter - Ka-52K.
- There is a suitable base platform for the creation of a landing helicopter - the Ka-32. Several special amphibious Ka-29s are also available.
- There is a BMMP project from Omsktransmash
- There is an opportunity to cooperate with the Turks, or, in extreme cases, to buy a seaworthy BMP from the Chinese. This will save a lot of time.
- There are excellent marines.
- There are a small number of ships capable of forming the "backbone" of the second line, while everything is unfolding.
This is more than enough.
Historical experience tells us that, firstly, when repelling aggression against our country, the ability to carry out amphibious operations is critically important, and, secondly, that without landing on the enemy shore, defeat the enemy “fenced off” from us by the sea. unrealistic. In the extremely chaotic and unpredictable twenties of this century, we should be ready for both.
Moreover, it is not so expensive.
